HILL v. RICKARD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ERIC RODNEY HILL, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
) 	Civil Action No. 	25-02736 (UNA)
v. 	)
)
E. RICKARD, 	)
)
Respondent. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner is a District of Columbia prisoner designated to the Federal Correctional
Institution in Otisville, New York. He filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That court
transferred the case here because the petition challenges a D.C. conviction. See Order, ECF No. 3.
For the following reasons, this case will be dismissed.
Petitioner challenges as “illegal and unconstitutional” his jury conviction entered in D.C.
Superior Court on September 13, 2022. Pet. at 4; see United States v. Hill, 2019 CF3 015559 (D.C.
Super. Ct.) (Docket). He alleges, among other things, that the presiding judge, the prosecuting
attorney, and his public defender denied him “every legal right” to which he was entitled,
“including the right to procedural due process.” Id. at 4, 5, 6.
Unlike prisoners challenging State or federal court convictions, “District of Columbia
prisoner[s] ha[ve] no recourse to a federal judicial forum unless [it is shown that] the local remedy
is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722,
726 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (cleaned up). The local remedy, D.C. Code § 23-110, “establishe[s] a remedy
analogous to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for prisoners sentenced in D.C. Superior Court who wish[ ] to
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challenge their conviction or sentence.” Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
As relevant here,
[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not
be entertained by . . . any Federal . . . 	court if it appears that the applicant
has failed to make a motion for relief under this section or that the Superior
Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by
motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
D.C. Code § 23-110(g). The remedy is “not a procedural bar to otherwise available federal habeas
claims; it is Congress’s deliberate channeling of constitutional collateral attacks on Superior Court
sentences to courts within the District’s judicial system (subject to Supreme Court review), with
federal habeas available only as a safety valve.” Ibrahim v. United States, 661 F.3d 1141, 1146
(D.C. Cir. 2011).
Put simply, D.C. Code § 23-110(g) “divests federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas
petitions by prisoners who could have raised viable claims pursuant to § 23-110(a).” 	Williams v.
Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Such claims include “the right to be released upon
the ground that (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the [U.S.] Constitution or the laws of
the District of Columbia” or “(4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack,” and a
motion “may be made at any time.” D.C. Code § 23-110(a), (b)(1). Because Petitioner’s claim is
available locally by motion under § 23-110(a), this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain his habeas
petition. Consequently, this case will be dismissed by separate order.
_________/s/______________
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
Date: March 4, 2026 	United States District Judge
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