AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff,
v.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 25-01888 (AHA)
Memorandum Opinion and Order
The American Bar Association (“ABA”) sues federal agencies and officials, alleging they
adopted an unlawful, coordinated policy of sanctioning law firms and their lawyers for engaging
in speech the government does not like. The government does not dispute that the ABA states valid
claims of unlawful retaliation for protected speech and association, discrimination based on
viewpoint, and interference with the right to petition the government, in violation of the First
Amendment. The government instead argues that even if it was repeatedly violating the
Constitution in these ways in the lead up to the complaint, the ABA has not plausibly alleged a
policy that posed a realistic threat to the ABA or its members, and therefore the ABA has no injury
and no ripe controversy under Article III of the Constitution. The court disagrees, concluding that
the ABA’s complaint—which alleges the coordinated and repeat imposition of specific sanctions
against lawyers and law firms around the country through the issuance and implementation of a
series of executive orders, several specific settlements with law firms under threat of such
sanctions, and numerous statements by senior government officials describing the coordinated
strategy—easily surpasses what Article III requires at this stage.
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I. 	Background1
The ABA’s 85-page complaint details a 14-week period leading up to this suit in which the
government launched and executed a coordinated campaign to intimidate and punish law firms
and their lawyers based on speech the administration disapproved of. Officials targeted firms and
their lawyers based on their advocacy on particular issues like diversity in the workplace; political
and social affiliations, including donations to causes the administration disfavors; representation
of certain clients, like immigrants, in matters adverse to the government; work on cases involving
certain issues, like election integrity and women’s and LGBTQ+ individuals’ rights; and work on
matters challenging the administration’s policies. ECF No. 1 ¶ 66.
The complaint alleges the administration carried out this effort by developing a specific
array of sanctions “designed to cripple targeted firms’ businesses.” Id. ¶ 65. It supports that
allegation by pointing to a series of executive orders issued in quick succession imposing virtually
identical sanctions on law firms and their lawyers, numerous instances in which law firms made
concessions to the administration to avoid such sanctions, and explicit statements from government
officials recognizing the administration’s commitment to pursuing the sanctions.
The complaint describes five executive orders issued against law firms and their attorneys
with virtually identical sanctions:
1. 	On March 6, 2025, the President issued Executive Order 14230, targeting the law firm
Perkins Coie. Id. ¶ 69. The order imposed four sanctions on Perkins Coie, directing
government officials to: (1) “suspend any active security clearances held by individuals
at Perkins Coie, pending a review of whether such clearances are consistent with the
1 	As required when considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the
court accepts the complaint’s well-pled allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in
the ABA’s favor. Tanner-Brown v. Haaland, 105 F.4th 437, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
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national interest,” and “cease providing ‘Government goods, property, material, and
services’ to Perkins Coie”; (2) require “Government contractors to disclose any
business they do with Perkins Coie and whether that business is related to the subject
of the Government contract,” review “all contracts with Perkins Coie or with entities
that disclose doing business with Perkins Coie,” and “take appropriate steps to
terminate any contract” with Perkins Coie; (3) ‘“provide guidance limiting official
access from Federal Government buildings to employees of Perkins Coie’ when such
access would ‘be inconsistent with the interests of the United States,”’ and “provide
guidance limiting Government employees acting in their official capacity from
engaging with Perkins Coie employees to ensure consistency with the national security
and other interests of the United States”; and (4) not hire Perkins Coie employees
absent a waiver. Id. ¶¶ 70–73 (quoting Exec. Order No. 14230, 90 Fed. Reg. 11781
(Mar. 11, 2025)).
2. 	On March 14, 2025, the President issued Executive Order 14237, targeting the law firm
Paul Weiss. Id. ¶ 85. The Paul Weiss executive order imposed the same four sanctions
as the order before it, directing government officials to: (1) suspend security clearances
for Paul Weiss employees; (2) terminate government contracts with Paul Weiss and
review all contracts with entities that do business with Paul Weiss; (3) limit Paul Weiss
employees’ access to federal government buildings, and restrict government employees
from engaging with Paul Weiss employees; and (4) refrain from hiring Paul Weiss
employees for jobs in the federal government. See id.; Exec. Order No. 14237, 90 Fed.
Reg. 13039 (Mar. 20, 2025).
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3. 	On March 25, 2025, the President issued Executive Order 14246, targeting the law firm
Jenner & Block. ECF No. 1 ¶ 107. This order imposed the same four sanctions as the
two orders before it, directing government officials to: (1) suspend security clearances
for Jenner & Block employees; (2) terminate government contracts with Jenner &
Block and review all contracts with entities that do business with Jenner & Block; (3)
limit Jenner & Block employees’ access to federal government buildings, and restrict
government employees from engaging with Jenner & Block employees; and (4) refrain
from hiring Jenner & Block employees for jobs in the federal government. See id.
¶ 109; Exec. Order No. 14246, 90 Fed. Reg. 13997 (Mar. 28, 2025).
4. 	On March 27, 2025, the President issued Executive Order 14250, targeting law firm
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr (“WilmerHale”). ECF No. 1 ¶ 115. This order
imposed the same four sanctions as the three orders before it, directing government
officials to: (1) suspend security clearances for WilmerHale employees; (2) terminate
government contracts with WilmerHale and review all contracts with entities that do
business with WilmerHale; (3) limit WilmerHale employees’ access to federal
government 	buildings, and 	restrict 	government 	employees 	from 	engaging 	with
WilmerHale employees; and (4) refrain from hiring WilmerHale employees for jobs in
the federal government. See id. ¶ 117; Exec. Order No. 14250, 90 Fed. Reg. 14549
(Apr. 3, 2025).
5. 	On April 9, 2025, the President issued Executive Order 14263, targeting law firm
Susman Godfrey. ECF No. 1 ¶ 120. This order imposed the same four sanctions as the
four orders before it, directing government officials to: (1) suspend security clearances
for Susman Godfrey employees; (2) terminate government contracts with Susman
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Godfrey and review all contracts with entities that do business with Susman Godfrey;
(3) limit Susman Godfrey employees’ access to federal government buildings, and
restrict government employees from engaging with Susman Godfrey employees; and
(4) refrain from hiring Susman Godfrey employees for jobs in the federal government.
See id. ¶ 124; Exec. Order No. 14263, 90 Fed. Reg. 15615 (Apr. 15, 2025).
The complaint also describes language in these executive orders tying them to a broader
effort to target law firms. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 164. It alleges two orders “open with a commitment by
the Administration ‘to addressing the significant risks associated with law firms, particularly so-
called “Big Law” firms, that engage in conduct detrimental to critical American interests.’” Id.
(quoting Jenner & Block and WilmerHale executive orders). Another opens by referring to
“‘[l]awyers and law firms that engage in activities’ deemed by the Administration to be detrimental
to American interests.” Id. (quoting Susman Godfrey executive order).
The complaint also alleges the executive orders were rolled out alongside White House
fact sheets, which tied the accompanying executive orders to those being issued against other
firms. See id. ¶¶ 74, 110, 118, 125. The fact sheet issued in coordination with one executive order
emphasized the administration “has also taken action to hold other major law firms accountable.”
Id. ¶ 110 (quoting Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses Risks from Jenner & Block
(Mar. 25, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/03/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-
trump-addresses-risks-from-jenner-block). Another fact sheet emphasized the accompanying
executive order is part of a broader strategy of “addressing rogue law firms.” Id. ¶ 118 (quoting
Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses Risks from WilmerHale (Mar. 27, 2025),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/03/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-addresses-
risks-from-wilmerhale/).
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In addition to the executive orders, the complaint alleges that the administration’s
coordinated effort to intimidate and punish law firms and their attorneys included threatening the
sanctions against several firms that yielded to the administration. These firms made changes to
how they select clients and hire attorneys, ended their commitments to diversity and inclusion, and
donated millions of dollars in free representation to causes that the administration prefers. See id.
¶¶ 88–95, 129–144. The complaint describes nine firms that yielded to the government in this way:
1. 	Paul Weiss
2. 	Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
3. 	Willkie Farr & Gallagher
4. 	Milbank
5. 	Kirkland & Ellis
6. 	Allen Overy Shearman Sterling US
7. 	Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
8. 	Latham & Watkins
9. 	Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft
See id.
In addition to alleging that these firms made concessions in the wake of and, in some
instances, simultaneous to the imposition of sanctions against other firms, the complaint alleges
facts directly tying the settlements to the sanctions. The first law firm to yield to the government
in this way, Paul Weiss, was initially subject to the sanctions, as described above. As to the others,
the complaint alleges they yielded out of fear because the administration threatened sanctions. For
example, Skadden’s executive partner explained the firm yielded because he “believed it would
be the target of a forthcoming executive order,” and the President described the Skadden agreement
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as “essentially a settlement.” Id. ¶¶ 130–31. Willkie Farr’s executive committee explained that the
firm yielded after it “learned that the President intended to issue an Executive Order targeting
Willkie similar to the orders issued against multiple firms in the past weeks.” Id. ¶ 134. Milbank’s
chair stated that the firm yielded—after the firm was contacted by the Administration about cutting
a deal—because of the “Administration’s expressed concerns about big law firms” and “entry of
Executive Orders against particular firms.” Id. ¶ 136.
The complaint also details statements from senior executive officials in the period leading
up to the complaint that tie the orders and settlements to a broader commitment to sanctioning
firms. When announcing the first executive order, the President turned to the White House staff
secretary and said: “And you’re looking at about 15 different firms.” Id. ¶¶ 76, 161. The staff
secretary responded: “That or more, sir, yes.” Id. The day he issued the second executive order,
the President gave a speech “denouncing ‘crooked law firms that aided’” in certain cases he viewed
as “partisan.” Id. ¶ 86. In late March, the President referred to “the law firms that we’re going
after” and stated that “the law firms all want to make deals.” Id. ¶ 148. A few days later at a press
conference, the President stated: “I just think that the law firms have to behave themselves.” Id.
¶ 149. In April, amid the executive orders and law firm settlements, the White House press
secretary stated that “President Trump’s policy team is executing on his directive to hold Big Law
accountable for their weaponization of justice and their lies, and the strategy has proven
tremendously successful.” Id. ¶ 146. The President spoke at a White House press event on April 8
about how “lots of law firms have been signing up with Trump” and giving him “a lot of money.”
Id. ¶ 138. The day after, while the President was signing the fifth executive order, the staff
secretary referred to it as part of the administration’s “action against a number of law firms that
have in one way or another been involved in the weaponization of government or lawfare,” id.
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¶ 121, and White House deputy chief of staff Stephen Miller “commented that the deals entered
by the President were getting close to ‘six or seven hundred million now’” and would be “close to
a billion, soon,” id. ¶ 139. That same day, the White House press secretary stated that “Big Law
continues to bend the knee to President Trump because they know they were wrong.” Id. ¶ 140. In
an interview in late April, in response to a question about using “threats and lawsuits” and “other
forms of coercion,” the President stated: “[w]ell, I’ve gotta be doing something right, because I’ve
had a lot of law firms give me a lot of money.” Id. ¶ 152.2
In June, the Wall Street Journal reported that the administration “remains interested in the
orders, and deputy White House chief of staff Stephen Miller and his allies want to keep the threats
of more executive orders on the table because they think it dissuades the best lawyers from
representing critics of the administration.” Id. ¶ 167.
The ABA filed this suit two weeks later. The ABA is the largest volunteer association of
attorneys and other legal professionals, with hundreds of thousands of members employed by law
firms of all sizes, including all the largest law firms in the country. Id. ¶ 61. According to the
complaint, 	the ABA 	“has 	numerous 	members” who 	“are no 	longer 	willing 	to 	take on
representations that would require suing the federal government” out of an “[u]nderstanding that
certain kinds of expressions and representations pose a serious risk of making a firm the next
2 	The complaint also alleges the administration’s commitment to its coordinated effort against
lawyers and law firms by pointing to letters the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sent
to twenty law firms “requesting information about their employment practices related to diversity,
equity and inclusion” and “assert[ing] concerns that some firms’ employment practices, including
those that are part of firms’ DEI efforts, may violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id.
¶ 96. The administration also issued a memorandum directed to the Attorney General and Secretary
of Homeland Security about “unscrupulous behavior by attorneys and law firms” in immigration
cases and when “litigating against the Federal Government” or “pursuing baseless partisan
attacks”; this memorandum “direct[s] the Attorney General to seek sanctions against attorneys and
law firms who engage in frivolous, unreasonable, and vexatious litigation against the United States
or in matters before executive departments and agencies of the United States.” Id. ¶¶ 101–03.
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target.” Id. ¶¶ 182–83. The complaint also describes specific, anonymous members who have
engaged and plan to engage again in the types of representations disfavored by the administration
that have resulted in sanctions, id. ¶¶ 185–200, and members who informed the ABA that they
“were too fearful of retaliation even to have their experiences described anonymously,” id. ¶ 183.
The complaint asserts the government’s coordinated effort against lawyers and law firms
violates the First Amendment in various ways, including by retaliating for protected speech and
association, discriminating based on viewpoint, and infringing the right to petition the government.
Id. ¶¶ 206–43. It seeks declaratory and injunctive relief that forbids the government from
continuing its alleged policy of imposing these sanctions. Id. ¶¶ 269–76.
The government moves to dismiss the complaint. ECF No. 22. The government does not
dispute that the complaint states valid claims; it argues the court lacks jurisdiction because the
complaint does not plausibly allege an adequate injury and ripe dispute. See ECF No. 22-1.
II. 	Discussion
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” and
“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. This limitation is “fundamental to the judiciary’s proper
role in our system of government.” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 56 (2024). Relevant here, the
Constitution’s case-or-controversy limitation means that a plaintiff must satisfy the “two related
doctrines” of (1) standing, including “an injury that is concrete, particularized, and imminent rather
than conjectural or hypothetical,” and (2) ripeness, requiring a case that is “not dependent on
contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Trump
v. New York, 592 U.S. 125, 131 (2020) (cleaned up). These doctrines help ensure federal courts
review executive actions only “when necessary ‘to redress or prevent actual or imminently
threatened injury to persons caused by . . . official violation of law.”’ Murthy, 603 U.S. at 56
(quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009)).
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Both standing and ripeness focus “on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the
requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S.
724, 734 (2008); see also Ctr. for Sci. in Pub. Int. v. Food & Drug Admin., No. 03-cv-1962, 2004
WL 2218658, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2004) (“When a court reviews claims for ripeness or standing
to pursue a claim, such review is conducted based on the facts that existed at the time the complaint
was filed.”). While the plaintiffs’ burden of proof increases as a case progresses, at the pleading
stage the court is required to “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint
and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be
derived from the facts alleged.’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)); see Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (stating that each element of standing “must be supported in the same
way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and
degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation”). Accordingly, at the motion
to dismiss stage the critical question is whether the plaintiff has plausibly alleged standing and
ripeness. See Jeffries v. Volume Servs. Am., Inc., 928 F.3d 1059, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(recognizing that at the pleading stage, “a plaintiff is required only to state plausibly that each
standing element exists”); Giron v. Zeytuna, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 3d 29, 55 n.15 (D.D.C. 2022).
Here, the government argues the ABA has not pled the requisite injury or threat of injury
to seek prospective relief against the government’s alleged policy of sanctioning and threatening
to sanction law firms and lawyers for their speech, viewpoints, and government petitioning. ECF
No. 22-1 at 11–20. In light of that argument, as well as the court’s independent obligation to ensure
it has jurisdiction, the court considers that question.
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As the government correctly points out, in cases like this where a party is seeking
prospective relief against government sanction, “standing and ripeness boil down to the same
question.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007); see ECF No. 22-1
at 30. To plead an Article III case or controversy, the ABA must plausibly allege that injury is
“certainly impending” or that there is a ‘“substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.” Susan B.
Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013)); see Chlorine Inst., Inc. v. Fed. R.R. Admin., 718 F.3d 922, 927 (D.C.
Cir. 2013).
As the parties agree, here, this inquiry boils down to whether the ABA has plausibly alleged
a government policy of sanctioning and threatening to sanction law firms based on protected
activity, by which the ABA or its members are “realistically threatened.” Haase v. Sessions, 835
F.2d 902, 910–11 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983));
see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184, 190 (2000)
(recognizing the critical inquiry as whether the plaintiff can “credibly allege that he faced a realistic
threat arising from” a policy); see also ECF No. 42 at 29 (plaintiff stating the key question is
“whether we have plausibly pled a policy”); ECF No. 42 at 6 (government agreeing that the
question before the court boils down to whether the plaintiffs “plausibly alleged a policy”). The
ABA cannot merely make “a nebulous assertion of the existence of a ‘policy,’” but rather must
allege a policy posing a “real and immediate” threat that its members are “likely to be subjected
to.” Haase, 835 F.2d at 911.
Here, the complaint goes far beyond making a nebulous assertion of a policy; it sets forth
thorough and specific allegations of a real and immediate threat of sanctions on ABA members for
engaging in First Amendment activity disfavored by the administration. The complaint details a
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14-week period in which the government issued five executive orders imposing the same four
sanctions against five law firms, along with sections that described disfavored expression by
lawyers at the firms, and induced settlements with at least nine major law firms, under threat of
having sanctions levied against them. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 68–144.
The complaint alleges the executive orders were drafted and carried out in a way that
reasonably implies a broader policy. As the government acknowledges, the orders each contained
four “operative sections” imposing the relevant sanctions that were “materially identical across the
EOs.” ECF No. 22-1 at 5–6. And several of the orders directly tied the sanctions to a broader
coordinated effort, including a commitment “to addressing the significant risks associated with
law firms, particularly so-called ‘Big Law’ firms, that engage in conduct” deemed “detrimental to
critical American interests” and a focus on “‘[l]awyers and law firms that engage in activities’
deemed by the Administration to be detrimental to American interests.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 164 (quoting
Jenner & Block, WilmerHale, and Susman Godfrey executive orders). The complaint also alleges
a consistent implementation across the orders, with each of the orders being rolled out alongside a
“fact sheet” that again tied each order to a broader plan. See id. ¶¶ 74–75, 110, 118, 125.
In addition to the coordination and consistency across the executive orders, the complaint
describes coordinated, behind-the-scenes outreach by the administration to numerous law firms,
at least sometimes with the explicit threat of sanctions unless the firms offered certain concessions
to the government. According to the complaint, at least nine firms capitulated: Paul Weiss,
Skadden, Willkie Farr, Milbank, Kirkland & Ellis, Allen Overy Shearman Sterling, Simpson
Thacher, Latham & Watkins, and Cadwalader. See id. ¶¶ 88–95, 129–44. The complaint alleges a
direct tie between these settlements and the array of sanctions imposed through executive orders.
In addition to alleging that these firms settled in the immediate wake of the executive orders, the
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complaint details how the first firm to settle—Paul Weiss—was initially the subject of one of the
executive orders. See id. ¶¶ 88–95. According to the complaint, only after Paul Weiss adopted
“client selection and attorney hiring” policies to the administration’s satisfaction; agreed to end
“diversity, equity, and inclusion” practices; and committed millions of dollars in pro bono services
to “causes favored by the President” did it reach a settlement to “relieve the sanctions against the
firm.” Id. ¶ 91. The complaint also alleges that the firms that settled did so under threat by the
administration to issue orders imposing the same sanctions against them. See, e.g., id. ¶ 134
(alleging Willkie “learned that the President intended to issue an Executive Order targeting Willkie
similar to the orders issued against multiple firms” over the preceding weeks and that Willkie cut
a deal to “avoid[] potentially grave consequences”); id. ¶ 131 (alleging Skadden believed it “would
be the target of a forthcoming executive order”); id. ¶ 136 (alleging Milbank “was contacted by
the Administration about a potential ‘Skadden-type’ agreement,” which Milbank agreed to because
of “[t]he Administration’s expressed concerns about big law firms, and in some cases its entry of
Executive Orders against particular firms”).
The complaint also details numerous statements by senior White House officials during the
14-week period leading up to the suit, in which they characterized the executive orders and
pressured settlements as part of a broader policy to sanction law firms who said things or worked
on matters the administration does not like. When the President was announcing the first executive
order, the White House staff secretary confirmed the administration was looking to sanction fifteen
“or more” additional firms. Id. ¶¶ 76, 161. The President described another executive order as part
of an approach toward “crooked law firms that aided” in certain cases he viewed as “partisan,” id.
¶ 86, and the staff secretary described yet another executive order as part of the administration’s
“action against a number of law firms that have in one way or another been involved in the
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weaponization of government or lawfare,” id. ¶ 121; see also id. ¶ 122 (alleging the President
described the executive orders as sanctioning “the ones we thought were inappropriate”). And the
complaint alleges many similar statements tying the alleged settlements to the broader effort to
intimidate and punish lawyers, including the President citing the law firms that have been “signing
up with Trump” even though “they’ve done nothing wrong.” Id. ¶ 138. The White House’s deputy
chief of staff tallied the total concessions from firms at “six or seven hundred million” and
promised “we’re going to be close to a billion, soon.” Id. ¶ 139. The White House press secretary
described the settlements as showing that “Big Law continues to bend the knee to President
Trump.” Id. ¶ 140. Speaking about the orders and settlements, the press secretary also stated:
“President Trump’s policy team is executing on his directive to hold Big Law accountable for their
weaponization of justice and their lies, and the strategy has proven tremendously successful.” Id.
¶ 146.
The complaint alleges the administration’s commitment to the policy of sanctioning firms
persisted even after several courts found the sanctions unlawful, including issuing four of the
executive orders and pursuing all the reported settlements after a court had already enjoined the
first executive order. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 79; Perkins Coie LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 770 F. Supp.
3d 190, 191 (D.D.C. 2025). The complaint also alleges that just two weeks before the complaint
was filed in this case, the Wall Street Journal reported that the administration “remains interested
in the orders, and deputy White House chief of staff Stephen Miller and his allies want to keep the
threats of more executive orders on the table because they think it dissuades the best lawyers from
representing critics of the administration.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 167.
Given these thorough and specific allegations, the complaint plausibly alleges a policy that
poses a “real and immediate” threat that ABA members are “likely to be subjected to.” Haase, 835
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F.2d at 911. The ABA’s allegations show a “pattern of conduct” that supports “a strong inference
that defendants would not hesitate to move against [the ABA and its members] should [they]
violate defendants’ restrictions on First Amendment expression.” Turner v. U.S. Agency for Glob.
Media, 502 F. Supp. 3d 333, 360–61 (D.D.C. 2020) (finding a threat of enforcement against the
plaintiff credible when there was an “extensive pattern of penalizing” others for similar conduct);
see Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 164 (finding threat credible because “there is a history of past
enforcement here”); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (finding threat of prosecution
for handbilling was not “chimerical” in part because the petitioner’s “handbilling companion” had
in fact been prosecuted).
The ABA alleges its membership includes attorneys at firms of all sizes, including at each
of the hundred largest firms in the country. ECF No. 1 ¶ 61. According to the ABA’s allegations,
its membership thus spans not only the firms that already were targeted by executive orders and
settled with the administration, but also firms under direct threat of the administration’s affirmance
that it “remains interested in the orders” and would “keep the threats of more executive orders on
the table” to “dissuade[] the best lawyers from representing critics of the administration.” Id. ¶ 167;
see also id. ¶ 96 n.26 (listing firms, several of which had not yet been targeted by an executive
order but had received outreach from the administration). The complaint also describes specific
members who have engaged and plan to continue to engage in the type of expression or
representation that has caused firms to be targeted. See id. ¶¶ 189–91 (describing a member who
is a partner at a firm with individuals holding security clearances and that represents clients who
have contracts with the federal government, who has “[r]epresented clients in litigation against the
federal government” and “in litigation related to issues disfavored by the current Administration”
and will “continue such expressive conduct”); id. ¶¶ 192–94 (describing another member who is a
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partner at a firm that represents clients who have contracts with the federal government, who, in
addition to representing disfavored clients and taking on cases “related to social and political issues
disfavored by the current Administration,” has filed “briefs taking positions adverse to high-profile
Trump Administration policies” and will “continue to engage in such expressive conduct
notwithstanding the possibility of being targeted with a retaliatory executive order”).
In addition to plausibly alleging a realistic threat of sanctions to establish its standing, the
ABA plausibly alleges ongoing First Amendment harm from chill caused by the policy. As the
D.C. Circuit has recognized, “[f]ederal courts most frequently find preenforcement challenges
justiciable 	when 	the 	challenged 	statutes 	allegedly 	‘chill’ 	conduct 	protected 	by 	the 	First
Amendment.” Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see Chamber of
Com. of U.S. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 69 F.3d 600, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“A party has standing
to challenge, pre-enforcement, even the constitutionality of a statute if First Amendment rights are
arguably chilled, so long as there is a credible threat of prosecution.”). And it is well established
that plaintiffs need not act in the face of a legitimate threat from the government to have a concrete
injury. See MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 128–29 (recognizing that a plaintiff’s “own action (or
inaction) in failing to violate the law eliminates the imminent threat of prosecution, but nonetheless
does not eliminate Article III jurisdiction”).
The complaint details at length the chilling effect the alleged policy has had on firms and
lawyers, with specific allegations that firms have declined to take on matters, including those that
challenge administration policies and that involve representation of the ABA itself. ECF No. 1
¶¶ 14–15; see also id. ¶¶ 169–81 (detailing specific instances in which firms have declined
representations or changed language on their websites to avoid punishment); Jenner & Block LLP
v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 784 F. Supp. 3d 76, 115 (D.D.C. 2025) (recognizing that the executive orders
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sanctioning law firms “cast[] a chill over the whole of the legal profession, leaving lawyers around
the country weighing the necessity of vigorous representation against the peril of crossing the
federal government”). The complaint also describes an ABA member who is an equity partner at
a large law firm that has “established a committee to address the potential impact of an executive
order should the Firm be targeted,” and “has made changes to its case acceptance procedures”
because of “the credible possibility of being targeted with a retaliatory executive order.” ECF No.
1 ¶ 187. The complaint describes how the committee (of which the ABA member is a part) has
rejected matters that are “adverse to the federal government” or “present issues that are considered
potentially disfavored by the Administration.” Id. at 187–88. The complaint specifically describes
a particular matter the member intended to work on but could not because it was rejected for being
“adverse to the Administration’s immigration-related policies.” Id. ¶ 188.
The government’s various responses are not persuasive. First, it casts the ABA’s
allegations of a policy as “mere ‘labels and conclusions,’ which are insufficient to survive a motion
to dismiss.” ECF No. 22-1 at 16 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). But that is
not a serious account of the complaint, which alleges with specificity a consistent and highly
coordinated series of executive actions along with copious statements that support the existence of
a specific policy and commitment to carrying it out at the time the complaint was filed.
Second, in its briefing the government acknowledges the complaint alleges a coordinated
series of “materially identical” sanctions across executive orders, as well as nine settlements, but
repeatedly asserts that the administration has not issued any further executive orders since the
complaint was filed. See ECF No. 22-1 at 1, 3, 9, 13; ECF No. 39 at 5, 16. In doing so, the
government does not advance any authority that would allow the court to go beyond the complaint
and accept its unsupported assertion. See Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 642 F.3d at 1139 (noting that, at the
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pleading stage, the court is required to “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the
complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that
can be derived from the facts alleged’” (quoting Thomas, 394 F.3d at 972)). But even if the court
could rely on the government’s assertion about events outside of and after the filing of the
complaint, it would not bear on the standing or ripeness inquiries, which are focused “on whether
the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.”
Davis, 554 U.S. at 734. The critical question is thus whether the coordinated actions and statements
alleged in the weeks immediately leading up to the complaint gave rise to a realistic threat to ABA
members at that time—not whether actions have in fact been taken since the case was filed.
Third, upon acknowledging the relevant timing for the court’s inquiry at oral argument, the
government argued that the court can infer that any alleged policy of sanctions had been abandoned
by the time of the complaint. ECF No. 42 at 9. The government argued that even if the series of
executive orders, settlements, and official statements plausibly allege a policy, the last executive
order and settlement described in the complaint occurred in April 2025, and any immediate threat
that existed would have been gone “a couple months after” when the ABA filed its complaint in
June 2025. Id. at 12, 50–51. This is especially so, the government argued, because by then courts
had enjoined the executive orders. Id. at 55. But this argument too conflicts with the court’s
obligation to credit the complaint’s well-pled allegations. The complaint specifically alleges the
government continued to issue executive orders and threaten sanctions despite court orders—
indeed, as noted above, four of the executive orders and all nine settlements occurred after a court
had already enjoined one of the executive orders as unlawful. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 79; Perkins Coie
LLP, 770 F. Supp. 3d at 191. The complaint alleges the administration continued to pursue its
policy into June 2025, pointing to reporting just two weeks before the complaint was filed that the
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administration “remains interested in the orders” and that senior White House officials “want to
keep the threats of more executive orders on the table because they think it dissuades the best
lawyers from representing critics of the administration.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 167; see Driehaus, 573 U.S.
at 165 (noting that “respondents have not disavowed enforcement if petitioners make similar
statements in the future” as supporting credibility of threat); Green v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 392 F.
Supp. 3d 68, 84 (D.D.C. 2019) (same).3
Fourth, the government argues that the ABA cannot sue on behalf of its members because
it cannot show that its members “would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right.” Hunt
v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); see ECF No. 22-1 at 22–24.
Here, the government largely reiterates its argument that the ABA has not plausibly alleged a
policy that would create a realistic threat to its members, see ECF No. 22-1 at 23, which is
unpersuasive for the reasons already stated. The government also asserts that, even accepting that
the ABA plausibly alleged such a policy, the ABA does not have standing because its members
“are lawyers, not law firms,” and the executive orders “primarily target law firms.” Id. That
argument is unsound. As an initial matter, it is not clear why an injury to a lawyer through their
partnership in a law firm would not count as a constitutional injury, and the government cites no
3 	To the extent the government disavowed the practice of sanctioning firms by the time this case
was filed, it will have the opportunity to develop those facts and argue the ABA lacked standing
to sue. And to the extent the government disavowed the practice after the ABA filed suit, it will
have the opportunity to develop those facts and argue the absence of a case or controversy under
the doctrine of mootness based on its voluntary cessation. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189 (“[T]he
standard . . . for determining whether a case has been mooted by the defendant’s voluntary conduct
is stringent: ‘A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” (quoting United States
v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968))).
At oral argument, given the government’s resort to facts outside the complaint suggesting
cessation of the policy, the court raised the possibility of engaging in limited jurisdictional
discovery. However, the government disclaimed any interest in jurisdictional discovery. See ECF
No. 42 at 24–25.
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authority for that proposition. And in any event, the executive orders do, by their terms, directly
target lawyers. The executive orders suspend “security clearances held by individuals” at the target
firms. ECF No. 1 ¶ 67. They “limit law firm employees’ access to federal government buildings,
and restrict government employees acting in their official capacity from engaging with law firm
employees.” Id. And they direct agencies to “refrain from hiring employees of the [targeted] law
firm to jobs in the federal government.” Id. Though it is true that each executive order detailed in
the complaint has targeted law firms, it has done so by leveling at least some sanctions against
those firms’ lawyers rather than the firm itself.4
The government’s final argument is that the ABA does not adequately identify members
“who will suffer the ‘requisite harm.’” ECF No. 22-1 at 24 (quoting Summers, 555 U.S. at 499).
But, as described, the complaint details specific members who have engaged in the very type of
expression and representations that have been targeted by the orders and who plan to continue to
do so. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 189–94; see Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 159 (“[W]e have held that a plaintiff
satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement where he alleges an intention to engage in a course of
conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists
a credible threat of prosecution thereunder” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
4 	It is undisputed that “the interests [the ABA] seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s
purpose.” Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. And, at least at this stage, “neither the claim asserted nor the
relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Id. As articulated
in the complaint, the ABA seeks declaratory and injunctive relief that does not require
“individualized proof” and its case is “properly resolved in a group context.” Id. at 344; see also,
e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Whipple, 636 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009) (“NTEU seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief, which does not require individual participation.” (collecting
cases)).
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The court accordingly concludes the ABA has plausibly alleged a substantial risk of injury
to its members at the time of the complaint sufficient to establish standing and ripeness.5
III. 	Conclusion
For these reasons, the court denies the defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 22.
AMIR H. ALI
United States District Judge
Date: 	March 31, 2026
5 	To be sure, although the ABA has plausibly alleged standing at this stage, its burden to show
standing will continue as the litigation proceeds, and the government will have the opportunity to
show the ABA does not meet the burden applicable at future stages. While the ABA’s complaint
alleges a coordinated and consistent policy of imposing or threatening a set of sanctions against
firms, the government observes that, even on the ABA’s own terms, some things mentioned in the
complaint’s prayer for relief may be outside the scope of any policy that is plausibly alleged. See,
e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶ 277 (asking the court to “[e]njoin Defendants from initiating attorney conduct
and disciplinary proceedings, or making a referral for disciplinary action, of any ABA member or
ABA member’s law firm”). The government does not cite authority requiring the court to parse
through each item in a complaint’s prayer for relief, but its point is well taken; the court’s
conclusion that the ABA has plausibly alleged standing to seek prospective relief by no means
guarantees the ABA will ultimately satisfy its burden for all or part of the relief sought in the
complaint.
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