COLON v. TRUMP et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOSE M. COLON, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
v. 	) 	Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01863 (UNA)
)
)
DONALD TRUMP, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, who is currently designated to San Quentin State Prison, initiated this matter on
May 19, 2025, by filing a pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and Application for Leave to
Proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. He failed, however, to file a copy of his six-month trust
fund prisoner account statement as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). The Court therefore
granted Plaintiff a 30-day extension to submit the missing required financial information. 	See
Order, ECF No. 4. 	Plaintiff has since responded to that Order, by filing a largely compliant
prisoner account statement, ECF No. 5. 	Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s in forma
pauperis Application. However, upon review of the Complaint, and as explained in more detail
below, it dismisses this case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring the court to dismiss an action “at any time” if it determines that the
subject matter jurisdiction is wanting).
Plaintiff sues President Trump, Elon Musk, the Governor of Florida, the Attorney General
of Texas, and a U.S. Representative from Ohio. 	See Compl. at 1–3. 	The 71-page Complaint
chronicles a litany of alleged wrongful acts committed by Defendants that have violated the civil
and constitutional rights of “every American,” and have exceeded Defendants’ given authority.
See generally id. Plaintiff demands assorted equitable relief “restoring the federal government to
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the condition it was in before Trump became President,” including restoration of funding to federal
agencies and programs, and the return of former federal employees to their previous positions,
including backpay. See id. at 61. He also asks that the Court enjoin the Defendants from allegedly
assisting Defendant Musk in breaking SEC rules and harassing SEC employees. See id.
Accepting all the allegations as true at this stage as obligated, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 669 (2009), Plaintiff has nonetheless failed to establish standing in this matter. Article
III of the Constitution, federal courts “may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies,” Honig
v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988), of which “the core component of standing is an essential and
unchanging part[.]” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To satisfy the standing
requirement, a plaintiff must establish at a minimum (1) that he has “suffered an injury in fact—
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical[;]” (2) that “a causal connection” exists “between the
injury and the conduct complained of . . . and [is] not the result of the independent action of some
third party not before the court[;]” and (3) that the injury will “likely” be redressed by a favorable
decision. Id. at 560–61 (cleaned up). As here, “a defect of standing is a defect in subject matter
jurisdiction.” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Plaintiff does not allege a redressable injury that is particularized to himself. 	The
Complaint lacks any factual allegations showing that he sustained, or is likely to sustain, any direct
injury because of these events, which as pleaded, did not involve him personally, beyond his role
as an American citizen. 	But “a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about” the
government or its officials, “claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly
benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.”
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Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (finding that where
“the asserted harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by . . . a large
class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.”). Where, as
here, a “plaintiff’s stake is no greater” that millions of other Americans, the harm is simply “too
vague and its effects too attenuated.” See Berg v. Obama, 574 F. Supp. 2d 509, 519 (E.D. Pa.
2008), aff'd, 586 F.3d 234 (3rd Cir. 2009).
Consequently, this case is dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel, ECF No. 3, is denied as moot. 	A
separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
TREVOR N. McFADDEN
Date: November 24, 2025 	United States District Judge
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