J.D. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
J.D.,
Plaintiff,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 25 - 1349 (LLA)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
J.D. brings this action against the District of Columbia and two former employees of the
D.C. Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (“DYRS”), Anthony Lloyd and Bernell Davis,
alleging that Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Davis violently assaulted him while he was a minor in DYRS’s
custody in violation of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and District of
Columbia common law. ECF No. 1. He seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, compensatory
and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. Id. ¶¶ 111-196. The District has moved to
dismiss J.D.’s requests for injunctive and prospective declaratory relief and his Fifth Amendment
claim against the District. ECF No. 21. For the reasons discussed below, the court grants the
District’s partial motion to dismiss as it concerns J.D.’s claims for injunctive and prospective
declaratory relief but denies the motion as it concerns J.D.’s Fifth Amendment claim against the
District.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The court accepts the following factual allegations from J.D.’s complaint as true for
purposes of deciding the motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In
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May 2022, J.D. was fourteen years old, committed to DYRS custody, and living at DYRS’s Youth
Services Center (“YSC”). ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 12, 16-17. At the time, Mr. Lloyd was a DYRS Youth
Treatment Manager, and Mr. Davis was a Supervisory Youth Development Representative. Id.
¶¶ 14-15.1 Both were responsible for overseeing children committed to DYRS custody. Id.
On the evening of May 5, J.D. was spending recreational time in a communal area. Id.
¶ 20. He felt “down” and called his mother, Jane Doe; when he heard her voice, he began to cry.
Id. ¶¶ 12, 22. J.D. told his mother that he wanted to talk to a mental health professional. Id. ¶ 22.
While J.D. was on the phone, another resident “yelled profanities at J.D. and told him to hang up.”
Id. ¶ 23. Byron Mason, a Youth Development Representative supervising a different resident who
was on suicide prevention watch that evening, “took the phone from J.D. and ended the call.” Id.
J.D. continued crying and, “[f]rustrated that the other young person had interrupted his phone call,
J.D. stood up, walked over to [that person’s] door . . . , spat on the floor, and started walking
toward[] his own room.” Id. ¶ 24.
Mr. Mason instructed J.D. to return to his room and pushed him in that direction. Id. ¶ 25.
J.D. responded by telling Mr. Mason that he did not want to be touched or pushed. Id. Mr. Mason
then “reached out and wrapped both of his arms around J.D.’s chest to physically restrain him”
and “moved J.D. into his room.” Id. The other Youth Development Representative on J.D.’s unit
that night, Jelessa Hawthorne, positioned herself in front of J.D.’s door as Mr. Mason continued
restraining J.D. and called for assistance. Id.
1 Youth Treatment Managers “are responsible for overseeing the progress of young people
committed to DYRS,” ECF No. 1 ¶ 14, and Supervisory Youth Development Representatives
oversee Youth Development Representatives, who “provid[e] direct supervision of young people
committed to DYRS,” id. ¶ 15.
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Mr. Davis and Mr. Lloyd arrived and entered J.D.’s room. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28. Mr. Davis, who
supervises Mr. Mason, ordered Mr. Mason to let go of J.D. Id. ¶ 28.2 Mr. Davis then told J.D. to
sit on his bed and calm down. Id. After sitting down, J.D. removed the face mask he had been
wearing due to the COVID-19 pandemic and told Mr. Davis and Mr. Lloyd that he needed to speak
with staff from the mental health unit. Id. ¶¶ 20, 29-30. Neither called the mental health unit;
instead, they “kept telling J.D. that he needed to ‘chill out.’” Id. ¶ 32. J.D. asked several more
times to speak with someone in the mental health unit, but Mr. Davis and Mr. Lloyd did not
respond. Id. ¶¶ 33, 35.
As they were speaking, J.D. began ripping his face mask. Id. ¶ 38. Mr. Lloyd told J.D. to
give him the mask. Id. ¶ 39. When J.D. did not comply, Mr. Davis put his hand on J.D.’s shoulder
and Mr. Lloyd grabbed the mask out of J.D.’s hand. Id. J.D. “instinctively stood up,” id. ¶ 40, but
he did not try to grab the mask back, id. ¶ 41. In response, Mr. Lloyd “reached back and punched
J.D. in the face with a closed fist,” which broke J.D.’s jaw. Id. ¶¶ 41-42. J.D. fell backward, hit
his head against the wall, and landed on his bed. Id. ¶ 42.
Mr. Lloyd then climbed on top of J.D. and began strangling him, leaving J.D. unable to
breathe as blood flowed from his mouth. Id. ¶¶ 43-44. J.D. tried tapping Mr. Lloyd to get him to
stop, but Mr. Lloyd refused to let go. Id. ¶ 44. Mr. Davis initially did not intervene, but after
several seconds, he told Mr. Lloyd, “chill, chill, there’s blood.” Id. ¶ 46. Mr. Lloyd stopped
strangling J.D. Id.
J.D. felt “searing pain” in his jaw, neck, and head. Id. ¶ 47. He believed that his jaw was
broken and tried to tell Mr. Davis and Mr. Lloyd. Id. Mr. Davis told J.D. that he was wrong, his
2 Although the complaint is unclear, it appears that once Mr. Davis and Mr. Lloyd arrived,
Ms. Hawthorne and Mr. Mason left J.D.’s room. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 27.
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jaw was not broken, and he was fine. Id. ¶ 48. Neither Mr. Davis nor Mr. Lloyd sought medical
attention for J.D. as “endless blood” streamed from his mouth and pooled on the floor. Id.
¶¶ 49, 51. Instead, Mr. Davis “tried to bribe J.D. to be silent”—instructing J.D. that he should “tell
the people that [he] hit [his] mouth on the wall,” and saying that, if J.D. did so, Mr. Davis and
Mr. Lloyd would “take care of [him] for the rest of [his] stay” at the YSC. Id. ¶ 52 (fourth
alteration in original).
J.D. reiterated that his jaw was broken, which prompted Mr. Lloyd to tell him to be quiet
and ask him how old he was. Id. ¶ 53. After J.D. responded that he was fourteen years old,
Mr. Lloyd stated “you a youngin, I’m sorry.” Id. Mr. Lloyd then promised to give J.D. “snacks”
and “phone calls” in exchange for telling medical staff that he had hit his mouth on the wall. Id.
J.D. again asked to be taken to the medical unit, and Mr. Davis responded that he would call
medical staff to come to J.D.’s room because another resident was in the medical unit. Id. ¶ 54.
During the ten-minute wait for medical staff, Mr. Davis and Mr. Lloyd did not offer aid to
J.D. and instead continued to “emphasize[] that J.D. should lie about the incident and how it
happened.” Id. ¶ 55. Medical staff arrived to find J.D. covered in blood and bleeding profusely
from his mouth. Id. ¶ 56.
J.D. was taken to the emergency room at Children’s National Hospital, where scans showed
that his jaw was broken in two places. Id. ¶¶ 58-59. Doctors determined that he needed surgery,
admitted him to the hospital, and wired his jaw shut until he could have surgery two days later. Id.
¶¶ 60-61. While waiting for surgery, J.D. experienced bleeding and headaches. Id. ¶ 62. J.D. told
his mother about the assault, and she alerted the hospital’s social services team. Id. ¶ 63. J.D. then
told a hospital psychiatrist that he was “worried” about returning to the YSC and seeing Mr. Lloyd,
and the psychiatrist recommended therapy. Id. On May 9, 2022—four days after the incident and
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two days after surgery—the hospital discharged J.D. Id. ¶ 64. He returned to the YSC and
encountered Mr. Davis in the intake unit, “triggering memories of the ordeal and making him
fearful.” Id. ¶ 65.
Upon returning to the YSC, J.D. spent over two weeks in the medical unit and could not
attend school or receive specialized instruction in accordance with his Individualized Education
Plan. Id. ¶ 69. He was on a liquid-only diet and restricted from physical activity for six weeks.
Id. ¶ 66. At a follow-up appointment at Children’s National Hospital, a dental surgeon advised
J.D. to exercise his jaw, but DYRS staff did not supervise his exercises or otherwise support his
recovery. Id. ¶¶ 70-71.
J.D. continues to experience pain stemming from the incident. Id. ¶ 74. In April 2025,
nearly three years after the incident, a dentist at Washington Hospital Center informed J.D. that
his jaw is permanently misaligned and he will feel pain and discomfort for the rest of his life. Id.
¶¶ 75-76. Aside from his physical symptoms, J.D. continues to struggle mentally and emotionally:
he feels the need to constantly be alert, feels uncomfortable when people are near him, and suffers
from nightmares and insomnia. Id. ¶ 77.
J.D.’s hospitalization triggered an investigation by DYRS’s Office of Internal Integrity.
Id. ¶¶ 78-79. According to J.D., the resulting internal report substantiated his account of the
incident and revealed efforts by Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Davis to cover up the assault. Id. ¶ 82. DYRS
terminated Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Davis, but it did not report the incident to the District’s Office of
Independent Juvenile Justice Facilities Oversight, which J.D. believes it was required to do. Id.
¶¶ 83-84. J.D. was released from DYRS custody on his eighteenth birthday in June 2025. See
ECF No. 19, at 1; ECF No. 21-1 ¶ 3.
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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
With the court’s permission to proceed using pseudonyms, ECF No. 5, J.D.’s mother, Jane
Doe, filed this action on behalf of herself and J.D. in May 2025, ECF No. 1 ¶ 12. Once J.D. turned
eighteen, the court granted Ms. Doe’s motion to substitute him as the party in interest. ECF No. 19;
Aug. 6, 2025 Minute Order. In his ten-count complaint, J.D. advances claims against the District
for violations of the Fifth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 151-162
(Count IV); battery, id. ¶¶ 163-167 (Count VI); negligence, id. ¶¶ 172-177 (Count VIII); and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, id. ¶¶ 191-196 (Count IX). He brings claims against
Mr. Lloyd for violations of the Fifth Amendment, id. ¶¶ 111-125 (Count I); the Eighth
Amendment, id. ¶¶ 126-139 (Count II); battery, id. ¶¶ 163-167 (Count V); and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, id. ¶¶ 185-190 (Count X).3 And he raises claims against Mr. Davis
for violations of the Fifth Amendment, id. ¶¶ 111-125 (Count I); the Eighth Amendment, id.
¶¶ 140-150 (Count III); and negligence, id. ¶¶ 172-177 (Count VII).
After service was effected on each Defendant, the District appeared in the case and filed a
partial motion to dismiss. ECF No. 21. That motion is fully briefed. ECF Nos. 21, 33, 35.
Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Davis have failed to appear in the case.4 In December 2025, the Clerk of Court
entered defaults against them, ECF Nos. 38, 39, and in February 2026, J.D. filed a motion for
default judgment, ECF No. 43.
3 The complaint labels the count alleging intentional infliction of emotion distress against
Mr. Lloyd as a second Count VIII, so the court has renumbered it as Count X. See ECF No. 1
¶¶ 178-190.
4 In June 2025, Mr. Davis sought an extension of time to respond to the complaint because he was
seeking to retain counsel, ECF No. 18, but he subsequently failed to appear in the case either
through counsel or pro se.
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III. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court will dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In evaluating a motion under
Rule 12(b)(6), a court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also Atherton v. D.C. Off. of Mayor,
567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Although the plausibility standard does not require “detailed
factual allegations,” it “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor will “‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration
in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
IV. DISCUSSION
When the District filed its partial motion to dismiss, it disputed J.D.’s claims for injunctive
and declaratory relief and his attempt to proceed under both the Fifth and Eighth Amendments in
Count IV, in which J.D. alleges that the District has a policy or custom of allowing DYRS to use
excessive force against those in its custody. ECF No. 21, at 5-9; see ECF No. 1 ¶ 154. On the
issue of remedies, the District argued that J.D. lacked standing to seek injunctive and declaratory
relief (or, alternatively, that his claims were moot) because he had been released from DYRS
custody on his eighteenth birthday and, as an adult, he can never again be committed to DYRS.
ECF No. 21, at 5-7. In response, J.D. conceded that his claims for injunctive and prospective
declaratory relief are moot, but he argued that he had standing to seek a retrospective declaration
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that the District had violated his rights. ECF No. 33, at 1-3 & n.3. In its reply, the District clarified
that it does not challenge J.D.’s request for retrospective declaratory relief. ECF No. 35, at 1 n.1.
Accordingly, and with the parties’ agreement, the court dismisses J.D.’s claims for injunctive and
prospective declaratory relief and allows his claim for retrospective declaratory relief to proceed.
The District and J.D. continue to disagree over two related issues: first, whether Count IV
is properly brought under the Fifth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment; and second, whether
J.D. may—at this early stage in the litigation—proceed to discovery on both theories.5 In the
District’s view, the Eighth Amendment squarely governs Count IV, and J.D.’s Fifth Amendment
claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 21, at 7-9; ECF No. 35, at 2-5. While
J.D. concedes that he may eventually prevail on Count IV under only one constitutional theory,
ECF No. 33, at 2, he maintains that at this juncture he may plead the Fifth and Eighth Amendments
in the alternative and proceed to discovery on both, id. at 9-11.6 The court agrees with J.D.;
5 The applicable amendment affects the standard for reviewing the substance of J.D.’s claim that
the District has a policy or custom of allowing DYRS staff to use excessive force. “[T]o state a
claim of excessive use of force” under the Eighth Amendment, “the prisoner must prove that a
government official acted ‘“maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,”’
and that the consequent injury was more than de minimis.” Chandler v. District of Columbia, 145
F.3d 1355, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
320-21 (1986)). “Courts considering such claims must make an objective inquiry to determine
whether the alleged wrongdoing is sufficiently harmful to establish a constitutional violation, and
a subjective inquiry[] regarding the prison official’s state of mind.” Thomas v. District of
Columbia, 887 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1995). Claims involving excessive force under the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are typically subjected to a lower, more
plaintiff-friendly standard. For example, a pretrial detainee alleging excessive force “must show
only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.”
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015). That is because “pretrial detainees (unlike
convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically.’” Id.
at 400-01 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n.40 (1977)).
6 J.D. additionally argues that if the court limits Count IV at this stage, it should allow him to
proceed under the Fifth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. ECF No. 33, at 11-22.
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accordingly, it denies the District’s partial motion to dismiss the Fifth Amendment claim in
Count IV.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the government from requiring “[e]xcessive bail,”
imposing “excessive fines,” and, relevant here, inflicting “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. In contrast, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees that no
person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property[] without due process of law,” U.S. Const.
amend. V, and it contains a “substantive component . . . that protects individual liberty against
‘certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them,’”
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). “Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not
the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing the[]
claims.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998) (quoting Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994)). At the same time, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d)(2) affords a
party considerable flexibility in framing a pleading by expressly permitting claims for relief . . . to
be set forth in an alternative . . . manner.” 5 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1282 (4th ed. 2025). Because the District argues that J.D. may proceed on Count IV
only under the Eighth Amendment, the question for the court is whether the Eighth Amendment
explicitly protects J.D. from the District’s alleged policy or custom of allowing DYRS staff to use
excessive force. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 154. The Eighth Amendment would be the sole “guide for
analyzing” that claim only if it offers such explicit protection. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842.
The court concludes that the Eighth Amendment does not provide an explicit textual source
of constitutional protection for J.D. because the relevant part of the Eighth Amendment is
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concerned with “cruel and unusual punishments,” U.S. Const. amend. VIII (emphasis added), and
juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent are not punished but instead receive “care” and
“rehabilitation,” D.C. Code § 16-2301(6). In other words, because the District’s juvenile justice
system is not punitive, the consequences stemming from an adjudication of juvenile delinquency
are not explicitly subjected to the Eighth Amendment’s requirements.
In arguing otherwise, the District ignores the stated goals of the juvenile justice system and
focuses narrowly on how the process of adjudicating a juvenile to be delinquent “parallels the
criminal system” for adults. ECF No. 35, at 8; see ECF No. 21, at 7-9. In the District’s view, the
Eighth Amendment attaches after an “adjudication following a proceeding that adheres to manifold
procedural safeguards,” ECF No. 35, at 6, regardless of whether the consequences following that
adjudication are punitive or not. That argument is wrong as a matter of fact because juvenile
delinquency proceedings lack several critical procedural safeguards available in adult criminal
proceedings, and it is wrong as a matter of law because the Eighth Amendment fundamentally
concerns punishment, rather than guaranteeing process.
A. The District’s Juvenile Justice System Is Not Punitive
“The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions,’” only “cruel and
unusual ‘punishments.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment “is specifically concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain in penal institutions,” and it thus “serves as the primary source of substantive protection to
convicted prisoners” challenging “the deliberate use of force . . . as excessive and unjustified.”
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (emphasis added). Put differently, the Eighth
Amendment is implicated when a court “evaluate[s] penal measures.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 102 (1976) (emphasis added). Against this metric, the Eighth Amendment does not explicitly
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protect J.D. if the District was not “punishing [him] by incarceration” when it committed him to
DYRS custody. Id. at 103.
The most cursory review of the District’s juvenile justice system demonstrates that it is not
concerned with punishment, but instead with providing care and rehabilitation. To begin, District
law defines a “delinquent child” to be “a child who has committed a delinquent act and is in need
of care or rehabilitation.” D.C. Code § 16-2301(6) (emphasis added). An adjudication of juvenile
delinquency “is not a conviction of crime,” id. § 16-2318, and juvenile delinquency proceedings
are held in the Family Division of the Superior Court, not the court’s Criminal Division, compare
id. § 16-2301(1) (clarifying that the “Division” for delinquency proceedings is the “Family
Division of the Superior Court”), and id. § 16-2317 (explaining that the “Division” conducts
factfinding and dispositional hearings in delinquency cases), with id. §§ 16-701 to 16-714
(providing for criminal proceedings in the Superior Court’s Criminal Division).7 Perhaps most
critically, “[n]o child who is found to be delinquent . . . shall be committed to a penal or
correctional institution for adult offenders.” Id. § 16-2320(e). Instead, if a judge in the Family
Division determines that the “allegations in a delinquency petition have been established by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt,” the judge “shall proceed to hold a dispositional hearing.” Id.
§ 16-2317(c). At that hearing, the judge considers whether there is a “need for care or
rehabilitation”—not punishment. Id.; see id. § 16-2317(d)(2).8 The judge has a range of options
for disposition, the most severe of which is committing the child to the custody of DYRS. Id.
7 The District argues that it merely “exercises its discretion to avoid the term ‘conviction,’” ECF
No. 35, at 7, but this misses the fundamental point that an adjudication of juvenile delinquency
does not operate like an adult criminal conviction, D.C. Code § 16-2318.
8 In contrast, after a criminal adjudication for a felony offense, the Superior Court must impose a
sentence that “[p]rovides for just punishment and affords adequate deterrence to potential criminal
conduct of the offender and others.” D.C. Code § 24-403.01(a)(2).
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§ 16-2320(c). When a child is committed to DYRS custody, DYRS must develop an
“individualized rehabilitation plan for the child.” Id. § 16-2319(d)(1)(C); see id.
§ 16-2319(d)(2)(C). After assuming custody of the child, DYRS is “vest[ed]” with legal
“responsibility” for the child, including “the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline [him].”
Id. § 16-2301(21)(B); see id. § 2-1510.01(5)(A)(ii). As part of this responsibility, DYRS is
required by law to “implement the [child’s] individualized rehabilitation plan.” Id. § 16-2319(f).
The District’s creation of a legal regime for delinquency adjudications that stands wholly
apart from the criminal process is not an act of administrative grace. The District has “accept[ed]
[that its] juvenile courts [are] distinct from the adult criminal justice system, [which] assumes that
juvenile offenders constitutionally may be treated differently from adults.” Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 635 (1979). Indeed, the District has a mechanism for prosecuting children as adults
when certain criteria are met. D.C. Code § 16-2307(a). Specifically, if a “child was fifteen or
more years of age at the time of the conduct charged[] and is alleged to have committed an act
which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult,” the Attorney General for the District
of Columbia may seek “transfer of the child for criminal prosecution” by the U.S. Attorney’s
Office for the District of Columbia. Id. The Family Division judge considering the District’s
motion must transfer the case to the Criminal Division if doing so “is in the interest of the public
welfare and protection of the public security and there are no reasonable prospects for
rehabilitation of the child.” Id. § 16-2307(d)(2)(A). Only after the case is transferred to the
Criminal Division may the U.S. Attorney’s Office proceed with criminal charges, seek a criminal
conviction, and request imposition of a criminal sentence. But juveniles who remain in the Family
Division are beyond the reach of the District’s criminal-law apparatus.
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The District does not seriously contend that its juvenile justice system is focused on
punishment rather than care and rehabilitation. The strongest arguments the District offers are that
DYRS has the authority to “discipline” juveniles in its custody, ECF No. 21, at 9 (quoting D.C.
Code § 16-2301(21)(b)), and that the District’s Department of Corrections, which holds adult
offenders at the D.C. Jail, also focuses on providing inmates with “proper treatment, care,
rehabilitation, and reformation,” D.C. Code § 24-211.02(a); see ECF No. 35, at 7. The court does
not doubt that DYRS and the Department of Corrections may share some similar responsibilities
and goals despite the different populations in their custody. But the fact that DYRS has the
authority to discipline juveniles in its custody does not mean that the discipline it imposes is the
same as that dispensed by the Department of Corrections, just as the Department of Corrections’
consideration of adult inmates’ rehabilitation does not render the D.C. Jail a non-penal institution.
Instead, what matters for Eighth Amendment purposes is that the District’s juvenile justice system
“place[s] a premium on the rehabilitation of children with the goal of creating productive citizens.”
D.C. Code § 16-2301.02(5). The system’s simultaneous concerns “for the safety of the public,”
id. § 16-2301.02(8), and “hold[ing] a child found to be delinquent accountable for his . . . actions,”
id. § 16-2301.02(4), do not disturb the fundamental distinction that the District has drawn between
DYRS custody and “penal or correctional institutions,” id. § 16-2320(e). Only in DYRS custody
is the District primarily focused on “care or rehabilitation,” id. § 16-2317(d)—by “implement[ing]
[the child’s] individualized rehabilitation plan,” id. § 16-2319(f)—rather than carrying out
whatever criminal sentence constitutes “just punishment,” id. § 24-403.01(a)(2). At bottom, a
juvenile’s commitment to DYRS custody is not punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.
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B. Delinquency Adjudications in the District Lack Important Procedural Protections
Rather than dispute the non-penal nature of the District’s juvenile justice system, the
District focuses on the ways in which the procedural safeguards provided to juveniles in
delinquency proceedings are similar to those afforded to adults in criminal proceedings. The
District’s argument starts from the uncontested observation that the Eighth Amendment governs
the punishment imposed on an adult following a criminal conviction. The District then asserts that
the Eighth Amendment applies with equal force to the consequences imposed on a juvenile who
has been adjudicated delinquent solely because the process for securing a delinquency adjudication
mirrors that for securing a criminal conviction. See ECF No. 21, at 8-9; see also ECF No. 35,
at 6-7. The court disagrees.
To be sure, District law grants a juvenile in delinquency proceedings several important
protections that are available to adults in the criminal system. He has a constitutional and statutory
right to an attorney—including appointed counsel if he cannot afford one. In re R.K.S., 905 A.2d
201, 209 (D.C. 2006); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36, 41 (1967); D.C. Code § 16-2304(a). He enjoys
the privilege against self-incrimination. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 47-50; see In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 368 (1970). He is also entitled, as a matter of due process, to adequate notice of the
charges against him, In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-34, and to confront witnesses against him, In re
J.W., 258 A.3d 195, 201 (D.C. 2021). And, after a hearing, he may be adjudicated delinquent only
if the District proves the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. D.C. Code §§ 16-2316, 16-2317.
The Supreme Court has recognized that juvenile delinquency proceedings “must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment,” In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30, which the District ensures
through these protections.
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But juveniles do not receive at least two foundational protections that are hallmarks of adult
criminal proceedings: the right to a public trial by a jury of peers. The Sixth Amendment promises
that “‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused’ has ‘the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury.’” Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 830 (2024) (alteration in original)
(quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). Both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments “placed the jury at the
heart of our criminal justice system.” Id. at 831. And, as relevant here, the “Fifth and Sixth
Amendments sought to ensure that a judge’s power to punish would ‘deriv[e] wholly’ from, and
remain always ‘control[led]’ by, the jury and its verdict.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004)). The jury function is “no mere procedural
formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.” Blakely, 542
U.S. at 305-06. “By requiring a unanimous jury to find every fact essential to an offender’s
punishment, [the Fifth and Sixth Amendments] similarly seek to constrain the Judicial Branch,
ensuring that the punishments courts issue are not the result of a judicial ‘inquisition’ but are
premised on laws adopted by the people’s elected representatives and facts found by members of
the community.” Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 832 (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 307).
Despite the jury’s crucial role in legitimizing the court’s imposition of punishment—which
triggers the Eighth Amendment’s application—the Supreme Court has concluded that “trial by
jury in the juvenile court’s adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement.” McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). The Court reasoned that requiring jury verdicts “w[ould]
remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversar[ial] process and w[ould] put an effective end
to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding.” Id.
Consistent with McKeiver, the District prohibits public jury trials in juvenile delinquency cases.
D.C. Code § 16-2316(e)(2). The District’s decision to forgo juries in these cases reflects its ability
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“to adjust its legal system to account for children’s vulnerability and their needs for
‘concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal attention.’” Baird, 443 U.S. at 635 (alterations in
original) (quoting McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550). Because juveniles in delinquency proceedings do
not receive a component of constitutional criminal procedure that plays an important role in
justifying post-conviction punishment, the court is not persuaded by the District’s insistence that
its juvenile delinquency and criminal systems afford sufficiently similar procedural protections.9
Aside from resting on an incomplete factual premise, the District’s argument relies on a
mistaken legal assumption—that the Eighth Amendment is concerned only with the manner of
adjudication, rather than the punitive nature of a penal sentence. If the District were correct, then
the Eighth Amendment would apply to every consequence that flows from an adult criminal
conviction. But the “mere fact that a criminal conviction triggers a consequence has never been
the operative test to determine whether that consequence is punitive or otherwise implicates the
cruel and unusual punishment clause.” Hinds v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 259, 265 (1st Cir. 2015). Courts
have therefore determined that certain consequences—among them deportation and a deprivation
of the right to vote—are not Eighth Amendment punishments. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 668 (1977) (“[D]eportation is not a punishment for crime.” (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893))); Hopkins v. Watson, 108 F.4th 371, 382-83 (5th Cir. 2024) (en
9 In Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 699 n.37, the Supreme Court observed that “[s]ome
punishments . . . may be sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments in the circumstances in
which they are administered” and noted the open question “whether or under what circumstances
persons involuntarily confined in . . . juvenile institutions can claim the protection of the Eighth
Amendment.” Notwithstanding the Court’s dicta about juvenile justice systems generally, the
circumstances surrounding the District’s scheme—an absence of specific procedural protections
necessary to justify imposing a penal sentence, the Family Division judge’s focus on a child’s need
for care and rehabilitation, and DYRS’s responsibility for implementing the child’s individualized
rehabilitation plan—warrant the conclusion that the commitment of a juvenile to DYRS custody
is not punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes.
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banc) (“[F]elon disenfranchisement is not a punishment, much less cruel or unusual.”); cf. Hudson
v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997) (stating in the Fifth Amendment double-jeopardy context
that “neither money penalties nor [occupational] debarment has historically been viewed as
punishment” because both lack “‘the punitive criminal element’” (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938))); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting in an
analysis under the Ex Post Facto Clause that a state law disenfranchising felons was not punitive).
But see Jones v. Governor of Fla., 950 F.3d 795, 819 (11th Cir.) (“Disenfranchisement is
punishment.”), rev’d on other grounds, 975 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc); Muntaqim v.
Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 123 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]here is a longstanding practice . . . of
disenfranchising felons as a form of punishment.”), vacated on other grounds, 449 F.3d 371
(2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the District’s argument is inherently flawed, and the observation that
a juvenile’s commitment to DYRS custody follows a delinquency adjudication cannot, on its own,
prove that the Eighth Amendment applies.
* * *
J.D. was not in DYRS’s custody to be punished; he was there to receive care and
rehabilitation. Because the Eighth Amendment is concerned with punishment and not care and
rehabilitation, it does not “provide[] an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against
[the] particular sort of government behavior” that would foreclose J.D. from alternatively
proceeding on Count IV under the Fifth Amendment. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842 (emphasis added);
see Jackson v. Johnson, 118 F. Supp. 2d 278, 286-87 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the Fourteenth
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Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment, applied to a juvenile’s constitutional claims).10
Accordingly, the court denies the District’s partial motion to dismiss J.D.’s Fifth Amendment
claim in Count IV.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the District of Columbia’s Partial
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 21, is GRANTED as it concerns J.D.’s claims for injunctive and
prospective declaratory relief and DENIED as it concerns J.D.’s Fifth Amendment claim in
Count IV. It is further ORDERED that the District of Columbia shall file its answer to J.D.’s
complaint, ECF No. 1, on or before March 31, 2026. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A).
SO ORDERED.
LOREN L. ALIKHAN
United States District Judge
Date: March 17, 2026
10 The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Instead, the District is “subject to the [due process] restrictions of the Fifth
Amendment.” Propert v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1330 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see
Matthews v. District of Columbia, 507 F. Supp. 3d 203, 210 (D.D.C. 2020).
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