JACKSON et al v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARQUEZ ANTONIO JACKSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
No. 25-cv-00889 (DLF)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs Marquez Antonio Jackson (individually and as the personal representative of the
estate of Marquez Antonio Parker) and Jewel Parker (Ms. Parker) bring this suit against the District
of Columbia and a group of Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) employees, alleging a mix of
common law and constitutional claims against the defendants arising out of the death of Marquez
Antonio Parker (Mr. Parker) while in police custody. Before the Court is the defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss. See Dkt. 8. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motion in part.
I. BACKGROUND
During a traffic stop on February 2, 2023, Mr. Parker was arrested on an outstanding
warrant while traveling into the District of Columbia with his girlfriend. Compl. ¶ 26, Dkt. 1-1.
At that time, a non-MPD law enforcement officer searched Mr. Parker, but not his “jacket, hooded
sweater, hat, or shoes.” Id. ¶ 28. When an MPD officer arrived to take physical custody of Mr.
Parker and transport him to a local police station, he re-searched Mr. Parker, checking his “front
pant pockets,” the front pocket of his sweater, and the rear of his jacket, but not his “outer jacket
pockets” or “rear pants pockets.” Id. ¶ 31; see id. ¶¶ 30, 33. Mr. Parker “asked to kiss his girlfriend
goodbye and told officers that he would never see her again.” Id. ¶ 32.
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The MPD officer patted Mr. Parker down again upon arrival at the police station, then
escorted him to the cellblock. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. Once Mr. Parker was in the cellblock, defendant
Officer John Doe #1 searched him and discarded a “small brown plastic bag” found on his person,
id. ¶ 38, which Mr. Parker stated contained “just tobacco” and was “trash,” id. ¶ 39 (citation
modified). Officer John Doe #1 threw the item into a trashcan. Id.
Defendants Officer Delozier, Officer Jenkins, and Sergeant Jackson worked the cellblock
that day. Id. ¶ 35. Officer Delozier and Officer Jenkins were responsible for regularly inspecting
the cellblock to physically check on detainees. Id. ¶¶ 36–37. When Mr. Parker was transferred to
an individual cell, Officer Delozier conducted a pat down of Mr. Parker’s upper body by
manipulating his outer jacket. Id. ¶¶ 40–41. A few minutes later, Officer Delozier escorted Mr.
Parker to the cellblock office so that Mr. Parker could call his girlfriend. Id. ¶¶ 44–45. Mr. Parker
cried during the call and told his girlfriend “that he loved her, to be strong, and that he would
always be with her.” Id. ¶ 48 (citation modified); see id. ¶¶ 45–48.
After the phone call, Officer Delozier and Officer Jenkins processed Mr. Parker, taking his
mugshot and fingerprints. Id. ¶ 49. During processing, no one “subjected [Mr. Parker] to a full
custody search,” checked him for metal, or removed his shoes. Id. ¶ 51. Officer Delozier later
recounted that she realized at the time that Mr. Parker had not been scanned for metal but “felt that
the arrest process was too far along” and things were “busy.” Id. ¶ 52 (citation modified). When
told that an MPD detective would be coming to the cellblock to interview him, Mr. Parker “stated
that he did not wish to be interviewed.” Id. ¶ 50. At approximately 8:27 a.m., Mr. Parker was
returned to his individual cell, though his person and clothing were not searched again. Id. ¶ 54.
Around 8:32 a.m., Mr. Parker covered the CCTV camera in his cell with toilet paper and
hung his jacket on the cell bars. Id. ¶ 57. When Officer Jenkins noticed that the CCTV footage
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was obscured, she directed Mr. Parker to remove the toilet paper and jacket. Id. ¶ 58. Mr. Parker
claimed that he wanted privacy while using the toilet, id., but ultimately removed the items, id.
¶ 59. Altogether, the CCTV camera was obscured for approximately four minutes. Id. ¶ 60.
Around 8:39 a.m., “Mr. Parker became unsteady, teetering back and forth as he stood next
to the cell’s bed, scratching his hands and wrists.” Id. ¶ 64. A minute later, “he leaned on the bed
and collapsed backwards.” Id. “[T]he CCTV cameras were not being monitored at the time of his
collapse.” Id. ¶ 117; see id. ¶ 65. Around 8:41 a.m., defendant Detective Lake and a non-MPD
officer approached Mr. Parker’s cell to interview him and discovered him lying on the ground. Id.
¶ 66. Detective Lake “knocked on the cell door and called out to Mr. Parker,” whose “right foot
moved slightly to the side.” Id. ¶ 67. Detective Lake partially entered the cell and shook Mr.
Parker’s leg for about ten seconds but did not receive a response. Id. ¶ 68. About a minute later,
Detective Lake shook Mr. Parker’s leg for about twenty seconds, again receiving no response. Id.
¶¶ 69–70. Detective Lake exited the cell and left with the non-MPD officer. Id. ¶¶ 71–72. He
later stated that he had witnessed Mr. Parker’s chest rising and lowering, had grabbed Mr. Parker’s
leg to “wake him,” and had interpreted Mr. Parker’s lack of response as a refusal to be interviewed.
Id. ¶ 73; see id. ¶¶ 78, 80. After leaving Mr. Parker’s cell, Detective Lake reported to Officer
Delozier only that Mr. Parker “didn’t respond when asked if he wanted to be interviewed.” Id.
¶ 75 (citation modified).
More than one hour and thirty minutes passed, during which time several officers went in
and out of the cellblock without aiding Mr. Parker. See id. ¶¶ 76–77, 79, 81–83. At 10:25 a.m.,
Officer Delozier noticed Mr. Parker on the ground and called out to him. Id. ¶ 83. At 10:27 a.m.,
Officer Jenkins remarked that Mr. Parker “don’t look good” and observed that he was not breathing.
Id. ¶ 84. She then shook him and performed a sternum rub. Id. ¶ 86. Receiving no response,
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Officer Jenkins activated the cellblock’s duress alarm. Id. ¶ 87. The responding officers—among
whom were defendants Captain Savoy and Sergeant Wong—administered Narcan and performed
CPR until emergency services arrived at 10:37 a.m. Id. ¶¶ 87–88. At 11:08 a.m., Mr. Parker was
pronounced deceased at the scene. Id. ¶ 89.
On February 28, 2023, toxicology tests indicated that Mr. Parker died from the “combined
toxic effects of cocaine, fentanyl, fluorofentanyl, and heroin.” Id. ¶ 90 (citation modified). The
tests further indicated that Mr. Parker had ingested heroin within one hour of his death, id. ¶ 91—
likely in the four-minute window when the CCTV footage was obscured, see id. ¶¶ 116–17.
On January 26, 2024, the MPD’s Internal Affairs Division completed a “Final Investigative
Report” regarding Mr. Parker’s death in MPD’s custody. Id. ¶ 113; see Final Investigative Report
Concerning the In-Custody Death of Mr. Marquez Parker (MPD Report), Dkt. 1-2.1 The Report
concluded that Detective Lake failed to adhere to MPD policy by not calling an ambulance when
his first attempt to rouse Mr. Parker failed. See MPD Report 69–70; Compl. ¶¶ 120–21.
Nonetheless, the Report concluded that there was “no evidence” that Detective Lake “was
indifferent or malicious in his interaction with Mr. Parker” or “knew Mr. Parker was in medical
distress and purposefully neglected his duty to provide medical care.” MPD Report 69–70. It did,
however, conclude that the MPD’s searches of Mr. Parker were neither adequate nor within policy.
Id. at 70–72; Compl. ¶ 122.
On January 31, 2025, the plaintiffs—Mr. Parker’s son and mother—filed suit against the
District of Columbia and eight MPD officers in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia,
1 The Court may consider the MPD Report given that it is attached as an exhibit to the Complaint.
See EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“In
determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, we may consider only the facts alleged in
the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of
which we may take judicial notice.”).
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asserting claims for wrongful death (Count I) and survivorship (Count II) against all defendants;
violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts III–
V) against the individual defendants; negligence (Count VI) and gross negligence (Count VII)
against all defendants; and negligent training, supervision, hiring, and retention (Count VIII)
against the District and defendants Captain Savoy, Sergeant Jackson, and Sergeant Wong. See
Compl. ¶¶ 14–24, 125–225. The plaintiffs seek monetary damages on all counts.
The defendants removed the case to this Court, see Notice of Removal, Dkt. 1, and moved
to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims, see Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 8.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move to
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain factual matter sufficient to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). A facially plausible claim is one that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Well-pleaded factual allegations are “entitled to [an] assumption of truth,” id. at 679, and
a court must construe the complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of
all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471,
476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citation modified). A court need not, however, accept “a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation” or an inference unsupported by the facts alleged in the
complaint. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation modified).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Non-Federal Claims (Counts I–II, VI–VIII) Against the District and the
Individual Defendants in Their Official Capacities
The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiffs’ non-federal claims against the District and
the individual defendants in their official capacities for failure to comply with D.C. Code § 12–
309(a)’s timeliness requirement. See Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (Mem. in Supp. of
Mot.) 11–14, Dkt. 8-1. Section 12–309(a) provides:
[A]n action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia for unliquidated
damages to person or property unless, within six months after the injury or damage
was sustained, the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given notice in writing to the
Mayor of the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and
circumstances of the injury or damage. A report in writing by the Metropolitan
Police Department, in regular course of duty, is a sufficient notice under this
section.
D.C. Code § 12–309(a). Compliance with this requirement is “mandatory as a prerequisite” to
filing tort claims against the District or District employees sued in their official capacities.
Barnhardt v. District of Columbia, 8 A.3d 1206, 1209 (D.C. 2010) (citation modified); see Crafton
v. District of Columbia, 132 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 n.8 (D.D.C. 2015) (concluding that § 12–309(a)
applies to official capacity suits against District employees).2 And the D.C. Court of Appeals has
“repeatedly” held that § 12–309(a) “is to be construed narrowly against claimants.” Owens v.
District of Columbia, 993 A.2d 1085, 1088 (D.C. 2010) (citation modified).
Section 12–309(a) bars the plaintiffs’ non-federal claims against the District and the
individual defendants in their official capacities. The plaintiffs did not provide the Mayor with
written notice “of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury,” and MPD’s
2 Compliance with § 12–309(a) is not, however, a prerequisite to federal claims, see Brown v.
United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1509–10 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), or personal capacity suits
against District employees, George v. Dade, 769 A.2d 760, 761 (D.C. 2001).
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Final Investigative Report—produced nearly a year after Mr. Parker’s death—does not satisfy
§ 12–309(a)’s notice requirement because it was not made “within six months” of Mr. Parker’s
injuries. D.C. Code § 12–309(a).
The plaintiffs counter that § 12–309(a)’s six-month limitation does not apply to notice
provided via a written MPD report because the MPD report provision is an “exception” to the
notice requirement. Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (Pls.’ Opp’n) 18, Dkt. 9; see id. at 18–
22. The Court disagrees. Under the text of the statute, a claimant may not maintain an action
against the District for “unliquidated damages to person or property unless, within six months after
the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given notice in writing
to the Mayor of the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 12–309(a). That notice can take two
forms. First, the claimant can “giv[e] notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of Columbia
of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage.” Id.
Alternatively, “[a] report in writing by the Metropolitan Police Department, in regular course of
duty, is a sufficient notice.” Id. The MPD report provision is thus not an exception to § 12–
309(a)’s notice requirement, but an “alternate form of notice.” Stone v. District of Columbia, 237
F.2d 28, 29 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (en banc); see Pitts v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 803, 810
(D.C. 1978); Patrick v. District of Columbia, 126 F. Supp. 3d 132, 137 (D.D.C. 2015).
An example helps to illustrate this point. Consider a rule that provides: “No student may
attend the school field trip unless, no fewer than two days before the field trip, the student’s parents
have given consent in writing to the school. A note in writing from a student aged eighteen or
over is sufficient consent under this provision.” Although a written note from a student aged
eighteen or over serves as an alternative to written parental consent under the rule, nothing in the
student note provision purports to obviate the timing requirement in the rule’s first sentence. In
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other words, a written note from an eighteen-year-old student submitted on the day of the field trip
would not comply.
This interpretation accords with caselaw regarding other elements of § 12–309(a). In
particular, the D.C. Court of Appeals has held that, “[a]lthough section 12–309 expressly provides
that a written police report can be ‘a sufficient notice,’ the police report must contain the same
information that is required in any other notice given under the statute.” Doe by Fein v. District
of Columbia, 697 A.2d 23, 27 (D.C. 1997). “Thus, in order to be considered a sufficient notice, a
police report must include, in the words of the statute, ‘the approximate time, place, cause, and
circumstances of the injury or damage.’” Id. (quoting D.C. Code § 12–309(a)); see Harris v.
Bowser, 404 F. Supp. 3d 190, 199 (D.D.C. 2019). Section 12–309(a) does not offer any textual
basis upon which the Court can conclude that the substantive requirements of the written notice
provision extend to the MPD report provision but the timeliness requirement does not.3
The plaintiffs place substantial weight on the purported purpose of § 12–309(a), noting that
Congress intended the statute “to provide the District with ‘reasonable notice of (an) accident so
that the facts may be ascertained and, if possible, the claim adjusted.’” Pls.’ Opp’n 17 (quoting
Washington v. District of Columbia, 429 A.2d 1362, 1365 (D.C. 1981) (en banc)). Implicit in this
reliance is the view that an MPD report, whenever created, adequately “protect[s] the District
against unreasonable claims.” Id. at 19 (quoting Miller v. Spencer, 330 A.2d 250, 252 (D.C.
1974)).
3 The Court is aware of Mazloum v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t, 522 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2007),
in which another court held that § 12–309(a)’s recipient requirement (“to the Mayor of the District
of Columbia”) does not apply to the MPD report provision. Id. at 52–53. That question is not
before this Court, and Mazloum did not address § 12–309(a)’s timeliness requirement. See id. at
50 & n.12.
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To the extent that statutory purpose is relevant, however, it cuts against the plaintiffs’
position. The D.C. Court of Appeals has explained that Congress enacted § 12–309(a) “to protect
the District of Columbia against unreasonable claims and to assist it in the defense of the public
interest where claims are made within the statute of limitations but so long after the event that it is
impossible for the District of Columbia to obtain evidence for use in litigation which may result.”
Miller, 330 A.2d at 251 (citation modified). Accordingly, the “purpose of the statutory notice
requirement . . . is to give the District timely information concerning a claim against it, so it may
adequately prepare its defense” by “conduct[ing] a prompt, properly focused investigation of the
claim.” Washington, 429 A.2d at 1366 (citation modified). The creation of an MPD report does
not itself fulfill this function. Rather, an MPD report that “contain[s] information as to time, place,
cause and circumstances of injury or damage with at least the same degree of specificity required
of a written notice” provides the District with “actual notice” of a possible claim requiring further
investigation. Miller, 330 A.2d at 252; see id. at 251–52.
The plaintiffs’ proposed reading would undermine this aim. Proper notice under the
statute, however made, must be sufficiently timely and sufficiently detailed to enable the District
to “conduct a prompt, properly focused investigation,” Washington, 429 A.2d at 1366, with access
to evidence relevant to the possible claim, see Miller, 330 A.2d at 251–52. Allowing potential
claimants to rely on any MPD report, no matter when prepared, would hinder the District’s ability
to defend against claims “made within the statute of limitations but so long after the event that it
is impossible for the District of Columbia to obtain evidence for use in litigation which may result.”
Id. at 251 (citation modified).
The Court acknowledges that applying § 12–309(a)’s timeliness requirement to the MPD
report provision may lead to unfavorable results. As the plaintiffs note, an MPD report “would
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provide notice where the police move quickly and make an arrest within six months, but would
not provide notice where the police undertake a lengthier investigation and make the arrest on the
181st day.” Pls.’ Opp’n 21–22 (emphases omitted). The plaintiffs reason that such an approach
would leave potential claimants “at the mercy of the speed of bureaucracy,” id. at 22, or, worse,
encourage MPD to delay in issuing reports, see id. at 21. But potential claimants need not depend
on prompt action from MPD—they may instead give written notice of the injury or damage. And,
in any event, these policy concerns, however forceful, cannot override the statutory text, nor are
they the Court’s to weigh. See BP P.L.C. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 593 U.S. 230, 245
(2021) (“[E]ven the most formidable policy arguments cannot overcome a clear statutory
directive.” (citation modified)); Allman v. Snyder, 888 A.2d 1161, 1169 (D.C. 2005) (“It is not
within the judicial function to rewrite the statute or to supply omissions in it, in order to make it
more fair.” (citation modified)).
Because the MPD report on which the plaintiffs rely does not satisfy § 12–309(a)’s
timeliness requirement, the Court will dismiss without prejudice the plaintiffs’ non-federal claims
against the District and the individual defendants in their official capacities. But, given the
plaintiffs’ representations that, “within a single day of [Mr. Parker’s death], at least nine written
police reports were made relating to this incident,” Pls.’ Opp’n 23; see id. at 23–24, the Court will
entertain a motion from the plaintiffs for “limited discovery to determine which of the numerous
written reports appended to the investigative report—which were not included by the District in
its response to Plaintiffs’ FOIA request—were submitted within the six month period,” id. at 24;
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). The Court will also grant the plaintiffs leave to file an amended
complaint to add allegations about any such police reports. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
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B. Non-Federal Claims (Counts I–II, VI–VIII) Against the Individual Defendants
in Their Personal Capacities
The plaintiffs assert five non-federal personal capacity claims against eight MPD
employees—seven named defendants and one John Doe defendant. See Compl. ¶¶ 17–24. These
claims include wrongful death (Count I), survivorship (Count II), negligence (Count VI), and gross
negligence (Count VII) against all individual defendants; and negligent training, supervision,
hiring, and retention (Count VIII) against Captain Savoy, Sergeant Jackson, and Sergeant Wong.
See id. ¶¶ 125–43, 189–225.
For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss the plaintiffs’ standalone wrongful death
and survivorship claims, Ms. Parker’s non-federal claims against the individual defendants in their
personal capacities, and Mr. Jackson’s non-federal claims against the individual defendants in their
personal capacities, except for his negligence claim as against Lieutenant Bridges, Sergeant
Jackson, Detective Lake, Officer Delozier, Officer Jenkins, and Officer John Doe #1.
1. Proper Framework for Non-Federal Claims
At the outset, the Court must address the proper legal framework for the plaintiffs’
wrongful death (Count I), survivorship (Count II), and negligence-based (Count VI–VIII) claims.
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs cannot plead these claims separately, asserting that the
District of Columbia’s Wrongful Death and Survivorship Acts instead provide the rights of action
for the plaintiffs’ common law negligence claims. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. 15–16; Reply in
Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (Reply) 7–8, Dkt. 13.
The Court agrees that the plaintiffs have pleaded three separate negligence-based claims
through two statutory vehicles. D.C. law provides for two independent rights of action for
negligent conduct resulting in death: one under the Wrongful Death Act, D.C. Code § 16–2701,
and one under the Survivorship Act, D.C. Code § 12–101. See Semler v. Psychiatric Inst. of
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Washington, D.C., Inc., 575 F.2d 922, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1978). “The Wrongful Death Act allows
next of kin to recover monetary losses suffered by them as a result of the decedent’s death (for
example, financial support the deceased would have provided).” Alston v. District of Columbia,
772 F. Supp. 3d 43, 55 (D.D.C. 2025) (emphasis omitted). The Survivorship Act, in turn, “inures
to the benefit of the decedent’s estate by preserving and carrying forward the right of action which
the deceased would have had, had he not died.” Robinson v. District of Columbia, 130 F. Supp.
3d 180, 188 (D.D.C. 2015) (emphasis omitted and citation modified); see Henson v. W.H.H. Trice
& Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 187, 192 (D.D.C. 2006) (“At common law, tort claims do not survive a
plaintiff’s death. However, under District of Columbia statutory law, plaintiffs may recover for
torts that result in death.”); Alston, 772 F. Supp. 3d at 55 (noting that the Act “allows the decedent’s
estate to sue for, among other things, injuries to the decedent that caused the decedent’s death”
(emphasis omitted)). The two statutes “do not create substantive rights but rather provide remedies
for tortious conduct that results in death.” Wallace v. District of Columbia, 685 F. Supp. 2d 104,
113 (D.D.C. 2010); see Buruca v. District of Columbia, 902 F. Supp. 2d 75, 87 (D.D.C. 2012)
(“[N]either statute provides any substantive rights; they simply establish the procedural methods
for filing suit.”). In this way, wrongful death and survivorship claims are derivative in nature—a
plaintiff must have a viable underlying cause of action to proceed. See Wallace, 685 F. Supp. 2d
at 112–13.
Here, the relevant underlying causes of action are found in what the plaintiffs frame as their
three negligence-based claims: ordinary negligence; gross negligence; and negligent training,
supervision, hiring, and retention. See Henson, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 192 (explaining that the
Survivorship Act “is the exclusive means by which an estate may recover for common law torts
resulting in the decedent’s death” and “merg[ing]” the plaintiffs’ common law and survivorship
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claims); cf. Powers–Bunce v. District of Columbia, 479 F. Supp. 2d 146, 160 (D.D.C. 2007)
(dismissing survivorship claim “for failure to state a claim because it allege[d] no underlying,
substantive tort”); Wallace, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 113 (dismissing survivorship and wrongful death
claims where “all substantive causes of action ha[d] been dismissed”); Est. of Wilson v. District of
Columbia, No. 23-cv-1987, 2024 WL 4370850, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2024) (similar).
The plaintiffs argue that their wrongful death and survivorship claims are not coextensive
with their negligence claims, which they contend are necessary to encompass “injuries to Mr.
Parker that caused injury other than death.” Pls.’ Opp’n 28; see id. at 28–29 (“A negligence claim
is much broader, intended to compensate for any injury caused by a breach of duty of care,
regardless of whether such injury resulted in death or not.”). The plain text of the Survivorship
Act cuts against this argument. The Act provides: “On the death of a person in whose favor or
against whom a right of action has accrued for any cause prior to his death, the right of action, for
all such cases, survives in favor of or against the legal representative of the deceased.” D.C. Code
§ 12–101. Nothing in the statutory text limits the plaintiffs’ potential survivorship claims to those
pertaining to “injuries to Mr. Parker that caused Mr. Parker’s death,” Pls.’ Opp’n 28; see Flythe v.
District of Columbia, 994 F. Supp. 2d 50, 76–77 (D.D.C. 2013) (survivorship action against officer
proper even though officer’s “actions did not cause [decedent’s] death”), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 791 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2015), and the plaintiffs have not explained how they can assert
negligence claims outside of the mechanisms provided for by the Wrongful Death and
Survivorship Acts.
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Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the plaintiffs’ standalone wrongful death and
survivorship claims and will construe the plaintiffs’ three negligence-based claims as brought
under both statutes.4
2. Proper Defendants for Non-Federal Claims
The defendants further argue that the plaintiffs’ non-federal claims are properly asserted
against the District alone. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. 16–18. In support of that argument, the
defendants cite to Eskridge v. Jackson, 401 A.2d 986 (D.C. 1979), in which the D.C. Court of
Appeals explained that, “[g]enerally, a plaintiff can bring two types of tort actions against public
officers: (1) he can sue them in their private and individual capacity; (2) he can sue them in their
official capacity as municipal officers.” Id. at 989 n.7. Addressing personal capacity suits, the
court explained that an officer cannot be held liable for tortious acts unless “he transcended his
authority and was acting beyond the scope of official duty.” Id. Because the plaintiffs “do not
allege any type of intentional tort or other conduct that would transcend the scope of [the individual
defendants’] official duties,” the defendants argue, the plaintiffs may not bring their non-federal
claims against the individual defendants in their personal capacities. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. 18.
The Court does not agree that Eskridge is so neatly applied. The quoted language appears
to be no more than a general statement regarding the basic contours of immunity doctrine. See
Cooper v. O’Connor, 99 F.2d 135, 137–38 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Gordon v. District of Columbia, 309
A.3d 543, 559–61 (D.C. 2024). As the defendants have neither asserted nor briefed absolute
official immunity, see Gordon, 309 A.3d at 559 (“[W]hen a government official seeks the
4 The plaintiffs argue that their “survivorship and wrongful death claims are not solely reliant on
negligence but can survive connected to any count that demonstrates . . . a wrongful act or neglect.”
Pl.s’ Opp’n 29. Although the plaintiffs could have brought non-negligence claims under the
Wrongful Death and Survivorship Acts, they did not do so. See Compl. ¶¶ 125–43.
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protection of absolute official immunity against a common law claim, the court must consider
whether (1) the official acted within the ‘outer perimeter’ of his official duties, and (2) the
particular government function at issue was ‘discretionary’ as opposed to ‘ministerial.’” (citation
modified)), Eskridge does not at this time mandate dismissal of the plaintiffs’ non-federal claims
against the individual defendants in their personal capacities.
3. Proper Plaintiffs for Non-Federal Claims
Although the defendants do not contest that Mr. Parker can bring negligence-based claims
under the Wrongful Death and Survivorship Acts, they argue that Ms. Parker is not a proper party
to any such claims under the D.C. statutes. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. 14–15; Reply 5–7. The Court
agrees.
“An action pursuant to [the Wrongful Death Act] shall be brought by and in the name of
the personal representative of the deceased person.” D.C. Code § 16–2702. “The term ‘personal
representative’ has been strictly construed to mean the decedent’s executor or administrator, to the
exclusion of all other persons.” Cole, Raywid & Braverman v. Quadrangle Dev. Corp., 444 A.2d
969, 971 n.6 (D.C. 1982). By the plaintiffs’ own representations, Mr. Jackson is “the Personal
Representative of the Estate of Marquez Antonio Parker,” Compl. ¶ 14; see Pls.’ Opp’n 26,
whereas Ms. Parker is only “a wrongful death beneficiary,” Compl. ¶ 15; see Pls.’ Opp’n 26.
Accordingly, Ms. Parker is not a proper plaintiff to bring claims under the Wrongful Death Act.
On this record, the Court also concludes that Ms. Parker is not a proper plaintiff to bring
claims under the Survivorship Act. That statute provides that, “[o]n the death of a person in whose
favor or against whom a right of action has accrued for any cause prior to his death, the right of
action, for all such cases, survives in favor of or against the legal representative of the deceased.”
D.C. Code § 12–101 (emphasis added). “[A] legal representative under the [Survivorship] Act
may be any person who, whether by virtue of testamentary act or operation of law, stands in the
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place of the decedent with respect to his property.” Strother v. District of Columbia, 372 A.2d
1291, 1295–96 (D.C. 1977). That definition is more capacious than that of “personal
representative,” id. at 1296 n.7, and can encompass more than one person, see Casey v. Ward, 67
F. Supp. 3d 45, 51 (D.D.C. 2014) (only decedent’s father “satisf[ied] the standard for ‘personal
representative’ under the Wrongful Death Act” but decedent’s father and mother “safisf[ied] the
standard for ‘legal representative’ under the [Survivorship] Act”), rev’d in part on other grounds
sub nom., Casey v. McDonald’s Corp., 880 F.3d 564 (D.C. Cir. 2018), including personal
representatives, heirs, and certain non-heir beneficiaries, see Young v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of
Washington, D.C., 463 A.2d 675, 676–77 (D.C. 1983); Strother, 372 A.2d at 1296 n.6.
Ms. Parker has not offered any facts from which the Court can infer that she is a legal
representative for the purposes of the Survivorship Act. As discussed above, Ms. Parker is not Mr.
Parker’s personal representative. Neither is she his heir: Under D.C. law, parents cannot be heirs
if the intestate, as here, had children at the time of death. See D.C. Code §§ 19–305, 19–306, 19–
308; Saunders v. Air Florida, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D.D.C. 1983). And the plaintiffs do
not plead any facts suggesting that Ms. Parker otherwise “stands in the place of [Mr. Parker] with
respect to his property.” Strother, 372 A.2d at 1296. Because the plaintiffs have not alleged any
basis upon which Ms. Parker is a “legal representative” under the Survivorship Act, she is not a
proper party to bring such claims. See Levi v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 851 F. Supp.
2d 8, 9 n.1 (D.D.C. 2012) (plaintiff could not bring claims under the Survivorship Act because he
“d[id] not establish that he [wa]s the court-appointed personal representative of his deceased
mother’s estate, or that, by testamentary act or operation of law, he [wa]s authorized to bring . . .
survivorship claims”).
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Ms. Parker’s negligence-based claims.
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4. Mr. Jackson’s Non-Federal Claims
Mr. Jackson’s claims for negligence; gross negligence; and negligent training, supervision,
hiring, and retention remain. For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss Mr. Jackson’s gross
negligence and negligent training, supervision, hiring, and retention claims in full, and Mr.
Jackson’s negligence claim except as against Lieutenant Bridges, Sergeant Jackson, Detective
Lake, Officer Delozier, Officer Jenkins, and Officer John Doe #1.
i. Negligence Claim (Count VI)
While the defendants acknowledge that Mr. Jackson has pleaded a plausible negligence
claim against Detective Lake, Officer Delozier, and Officer Jenkins—and do not raise any
arguments for dismissal regarding Officer John Doe #1—they move to dismiss the claim as to
Captain Savoy, Lieutenant Bridges, Sergeant Jackson, and Sergeant Wong for failure to state a
claim. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. 18–20.5
“To establish negligence under D.C. law, a plaintiff must prove a duty of care owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty by the defendant, and damage to the interests of the
plaintiff, proximately caused by the breach.” Sigmund v. Starwood Urb. Retail VI, LLC, 617 F.3d
512, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citation modified).6 A plaintiff asserting a personal capacity negligence
5 To the extent that the defendants challenge the plaintiffs’ allegations as to Detective Lake, Officer
Delozier, Officer Jenkins, and Officer John Doe #1 in their reply brief, see Reply 9–12, those
arguments come too late, see United States v. Sitzmann, 893 F.3d 811, 833 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“[I]t
is generally understood that arguments first raised in a reply brief are untimely.” (citation
modified)).
6 While neither party addresses choice of law, the Court concludes that D.C. tort law governs in
this case. The Court “must apply the choice-of-law rules of the jurisdiction in which [it] sit[s]—
namely, the District of Columbia”—which “require that [the Court] apply the tort law of the
jurisdiction that has the most significant relationship to the dispute.” Wu v. Stomber, 750 F.3d
944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation modified). That inquiry requires the Court to consider four
factors: (1) “where the injury occurred”; (2) “where the conduct causing the injury occurred”;
(3) “the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation[,] and place of business of the
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claim against a government official must allege individualized wrongdoing. See Powers–Bunce,
479 F. Supp. 2d at 160. “[U]se of the terms ‘carelessly and negligently,’ without more, [is]
conclusory and do[es] not raise a cognizable claim of negligence.” District of Columbia v. Chinn,
839 A.2d 701, 708 (D.C. 2003).
Applying that standard here, the Court will dismiss Mr. Jackson’s negligence claim as to
Captain Savoy and Sergeant Wong for failure to state a claim. But the Court will permit Mr.
Jackson’s negligence claim against Lieutenant Bridges and Sergeant Jackson to proceed, along
with his negligence claim against Detective Lake, Officer Delozier, Officer Jenkins, and Officer
John Doe #1, which the defendants do not challenge.
a. Captain Savoy and Sergeant Wong
Mr. Jackson alleges that Captain Savoy and Sergeant Wong (1) were at the police station
on the day of Mr. Parker’s death, see Compl. ¶¶ 22–23; (2) responded to Officer Jenkins’s duress
alarm with other MPD employees, id. ¶ 88; (3) alongside Lieutenant Bridges and Sergeant Jackson,
“failed to ensure that the police officers under their command were properly trained and complied
with all policies, procedures, and orders and complete their job duties competently, adequately,
timely, and constitutionally,” id. ¶ 111; and (4) alongside all other individual defendants, “failed
to ensure that the [MPD’s] policies, procedures, and orders were followed,” id. ¶ 109; see id.
¶¶ 101–04, 193–94.
Mr. Jackson has failed to plead a claim of negligence against Captain Savoy and Sergeant
Wong. Although he has adequately alleged that both officers had a duty of care to Mr. Parker, see
Toy v. District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1, 6–7 (D.C. 1988); Powers–Bunce, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 163,
parties”; and (4) “the place where the relationship is centered.” Id. (citation modified). Here,
“those factors point to D.C. law.” Id.; see Martin v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 206 F. Supp. 3d
115, 121 n.3 (D.D.C. 2016).
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his allegations regarding the officers do not “demonstrate some sort of personal involvement in”
Mr. Parker’s death, Tyson v. District of Columbia, No. 20-cv-1450, 2021 WL 860263, at *4 (D.D.C.
Mar. 8, 2021). The first two allegations merely place Captain Savoy and Sergeant Wong in the
vicinity of Mr. Parker’s death. They do not suggest that either official “personally breached any
duty owed to [Mr. Parker], or that any actions or omissions by [them] were the proximate cause of
his injury.” Smith v. District of Columbia, 149 F. Supp. 3d 128, 135 (D.D.C. 2015). Contrast,
e.g., Powers–Bunce, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 163 (complaint “adequately state[d] a claim for negligence”
where it alleged that defendant officers “had a duty to follow standard MPD procedures,” that they
“breached that duty,” and that “their breach of that duty contributed to [the decedent’s] death”).
And the third and fourth allegations are “formulaic” allegations insufficient to state a claim for
relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation modified). As such, the Court will dismiss Mr. Jackson’s
negligence claim against Captain Savoy and Sergeant Wong.
b. Lieutenant Bridges
The Court will not, however, dismiss Mr. Jackson’s negligence claim against Lieutenant
Bridges.
Mr. Jackson alleges that Lieutenant Bridges (1) was present at the station on the day of Mr.
Parker’s death, Compl. ¶ 24; (2) alongside all other individual defendants, “failed to ensure that
the [MPD’s] policies, procedures, and orders were followed,” id. ¶ 109; see id. ¶¶ 101–04, 193–
94; (3) alongside Captain Savoy, Sergeant Jackson, and Sergeant Wong, failed to ensure that
subordinates “were properly trained and complied with all policies, procedures, and orders,” id.
¶ 111; see id. ¶ 110; and (4) breached his duty to staff “a station sergeant . . . who could enter the
cellblock and ensure that the appropriate physical checks of all detainees occurred timely and
competently” by assigning Sergeant Jackson, who lacked proper training, understanding of
relevant policies, and access to the cellblock, id. ¶ 112. This staffing decision, Mr. Jackson alleges,
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contributed to Mr. Parker’s death because neither Sergeant Jackson nor Lieutenant Bridges ensured
that subordinates conducted regular physical checks of detainees. Id.
These allegations are sufficient to state a negligence claim against Lieutenant Bridges. The
defendants do not meaningfully contest that Lieutenant Bridges owed a duty of reasonable care to
Mr. Parker. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. 19–20; Toy, 549 A.2d at 6–7; Powers–Bunce, 479 F. Supp.
2d at 163. And by pointing to Lieutenant Bridges’s allegedly defective staffing decision, Mr.
Jackson properly alleges a specific action representing a breach of duty that proximately caused
Mr. Parker’s death. See Powers–Bunce, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 163.
The defendants counter that Lieutenant Bridges’s actions were “too attenuated,” arguing
that “[t]he harm that befell Mr. Parker could not have been reasonably foreseeable” to Lieutenant
Bridges when he made the staffing decision. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. 19–20. Courts typically treat
foreseeability as an issue of proximate cause, see Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d
789, 793 n.1 (D.C. 2011) (en banc); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C. v. DiSalvo, 974 A.2d 868, 871 n.1
(D.C. 2009) (“There is general support for the practice of confining foreseeability questions to the
proximate cause analysis and basing the duty analysis solely on the relationship between the
parties.”), which is itself “generally a factual issue to be resolved by the jury” and “becomes a
question of law” only in the “exceptional” case in which “no jury could make a rational finding of
proximate cause,” Est. of Botvin v. Heideman, Nudelman & Kalik, P.C., 115 F.4th 594, 600 (D.C.
Cir. 2024) (citation modified); see id. at 599–600; Speights v. 800 Water St., Inc., 4 A.3d 471, 475
(D.C. 2010). This case is not such an exceptional case. Mr. Jackson has adequately stated his
negligence claim against Lieutenant Bridges.
c. Sergeant Jackson
The Court will similarly deny the defendants’ motion as to Mr. Jackson’s negligence claim
against Sergeant Jackson.
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Mr. Jackson alleges that Sergeant Jackson “admitted that she had done nothing to ensure
that the officers under her command performed the required checks other than periodically walk
out of her office to ensure the officers where [sic] ‘doing their jobs,’” Compl. ¶ 99, despite knowing
that “officers assigned to the cellblock were supposed to perform cell checks every 15 minutes and
utilize CCTV monitors in the station area to view prisoners,” id. ¶ 98. He further asserts that
Sergeant Jackson “did not understand the policies and practices she was obligated to ensure her
officers followed,” including General Order 201.23, which “required 30-minute physical checks
of prisoners as a general practice, within [sic] 10-minute checks required for any prisoner deemed
‘high-risk.’” Id. He asserts that these failures “resulted in no physical check of the cellblock
occurring for at least 54 minutes and no physical check of Mr. Parker occurring for at least 1 hour
36 minutes.” Id. ¶ 194; see id. ¶ 100.
Mr. Jackson has adequately stated a negligence claim as to Sergeant Jackson. He has
plausibly pleaded that Sergeant Jackson owed a duty of reasonable care toward Mr. Parker, see
Toy, 549 A.2d at 6–7; Powers–Bunce, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 163, and his allegations that Sergeant
Jackson failed to enforce some policies and was unaware of others plausibly “demonstrate some
sort of personal involvement in” Mr. Parker’s death, Tyson, 2021 WL 860263, at *4. Furthermore,
he has pleaded causation by alleging that Sergeant Jackson’s inaction allowed the cellblock to go
without “visua[l] check[s] for over an hour,” Compl. ¶ 100, and that, “[h]ad these checks been
done, Mr. Parker would have been saved,” id. ¶ 106.
The defendants note that the 54-minute gap in physical checks “occurred almost 45 minutes
after Mr. Parker’s opioid overdose at 8:39 a.m. on drugs [that Mr. Jackson] acknowledge[s] the
decedent brought into the station.” Mem. in Supp. of Mot. 20 (citation modified). To the extent
that the defendants seek to challenge proximate cause or to imply a contributory negligence
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defense, their argument fails. Only in “exceptional” cases does proximate cause or contributory
negligence become a question of law that a court may resolve on a motion to dismiss. Est. of
Botvin, 115 F.4th at 600 (citation modified); Paraskevaides v. Four Seasons Wash., 292 F.3d 886,
893 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citation modified). As previously stated, this case is not such a case. The
Court thus finds that Mr. Jackson’s negligence claim against Sergeant Jackson may proceed.
ii. Gross Negligence Claim (Count VII)
The Court will dismiss Mr. Jackson’s gross negligence claim against the individual
defendants as duplicative of his ordinary negligence claim. “As a general rule, . . . the law of the
District of Columbia does not recognize degrees of negligence.” Hernandez v. District of
Columbia, 845 F. Supp. 2d 112, 115 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation modified). Rather, “courts have
traditionally analyzed whether a defendant acted with gross negligence only in limited
circumstances where gross negligence is a specific element of a claim or defense, or for equitable
reasons.” Id. at 116 (citation modified). Accordingly, “where a plaintiff has already alleged a
negligence claim, the Court defers to the general rule in the District of Columbia against
recognizing degrees of negligence and will dismiss as duplicative [the] plaintiff’s claim for gross
negligence as a separate basis of liability.” Robinson, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 190 (citation modified).
As Mr. Jackson “has already alleged a negligence claim,” and considering that gross
negligence is not “a specific element to any claim or defense at issue in this litigation,” the Court
will “dismiss as duplicative” Mr. Jackson’s gross negligence claim. Id. (citation modified).
Contrast, e.g., Atkinson v. District of Columbia, 281 A.3d 568, 570–72 (D.C. 2022) (vacating
dismissal of gross negligence claim brought under D.C. Code § 2–412, which provides that, “in
the case of a claim arising out of the operation of an emergency vehicle on an emergency run, the
District shall be liable only for gross negligence” (citation modified)).
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iii. Negligent Training, Supervision, Hiring, and Retention Claim
(Count VIII)
Finally, the Court will dismiss Mr. Jackson’s negligent training, supervision, hiring, and
retention claim against Captain Savoy, Sergeant Jackson, and Sergeant Wong.
The elements of negligent training, supervision, hiring, and retention are substantially
similar: A plaintiff must show that “an employer knew or should have known its employee behaved
in a dangerous or otherwise incompetent manner,” and that “the employer, armed with that actual
or constructive knowledge,” did not adequately train, supervise, hire, or retain the employee.
Thorp v. District of Columbia, 319 F. Supp. 3d 1, 21 (D.D.C. 2018) (citation modified) (negligent
supervision and negligent retention), aff’d, 788 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam); see Katz
v. District of Columbia, 285 A.3d 1289, 1317 (D.C. 2022) (negligent hiring and negligent
supervision); Lin v. District of Columbia, 47 F.4th 828, 845–46 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (negligent
supervision and negligent training).7 While the Court finds that Mr. Jackson may bring his
negligent training, supervision, hiring, and retention claim against the individual defendants, it will
dismiss his claim for failure to state a claim.
7 Courts applying D.C. law, however, appear to be divided as to whether the requisite knowledge
of the dangerous or incompetent behavior must predate the incident at issue. Compare, e.g., Spiller
v. District of Columbia, 302 F. Supp. 3d 240, 254–55 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Plaintiffs do not allege that
the District of Columbia had ‘actual or constructive knowledge’ of any problematic behavior on
the part of the officers in question before the incident at issue here.”), with Yarullina v. United
States, 770 F. Supp. 3d 205, 213–14 (D.D.C. 2025) (“Actual knowledge exists when supervisors
are contemporaneously aware of misconduct and either fail to stop it or affirmatively authorize it.
In contrast, constructive knowledge arises from a recurring pattern of similar misconduct.”
(citation modified)), with District of Columbia v. Tulin, 994 A.2d 788, 794–97, 800 (D.C. 2010)
(suggesting that constructive knowledge can be based on conduct related to the incident at issue).
Mr. Jackson’s claim fails under each of these standards.
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a. Proper Defendants
The defendants argue that common law negligent training, supervision, hiring, and
retention claims can be brought only against employers, not employees with supervisory
responsibilities. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. 23–24. In particular, they note that courts assessing
these common law claims under D.C. law typically frame their analyses in terms of what an
employer knew or should have known and the manner in which the employer failed to train,
supervise, hire, or retain. See id. They further assert that they are “unaware of any case law that
suggests an individual supervisor, rather than an employer, may be held liable under this common
law theory of recovery.” Id. at 23.
Whether and under what circumstances an individual supervisor can be held liable for
negligent training, supervision, hiring, or retention appears to be an open question under D.C. law.
While it is true that “District of Columbia courts and courts in this district discuss [such claims] in
the context of an employer-employee relationship,” Roe v. Wilson, 365 F. Supp. 3d 71, 86 (D.D.C.
2019) (emphasis omitted), at least some courts have allowed the claims to proceed against
individual supervisors, see, e.g., id. at 86–87; Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828, 830–
33 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Moore v. District of Columbia, 79 F. Supp. 3d 121, 141–43 (D.D.C. 2015);
Linares v. Jones, 551 F. Supp. 2d 12, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2008), amended in part on other grounds,
No. 04-cv-0247, 2008 WL 2444679 (D.D.C. June 18, 2008); Johnson v. District of Columbia, No.
22-cv-3167, 2023 WL 2770392, at *7–8 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2023). Furthermore, “[t]he District of
Columbia recognizes the tort of negligent supervision as formulated in the Second Restatement of
Agency.” Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 28 F.3d 120, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Under the Restatement,
“[a] person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability for harm
resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless: (a) in giving improper or ambiguous orders
or in failing to make proper regulations; or (b) in the employment of improper persons or
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instrumentalities in work involving risk or harm to others; (c) in the supervision of the activity; or
(d) in permitting, or failing to prevent, negligent or other tortious conduct by persons, whether or
not his servants or agents, upon premises or with instrumentalities under his control.” Id.
(emphasis added) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (1957)). This standard does
not appear to impose the employer-employee distinction that the defendants propose.
At this early stage, the Court preliminarily determines that Mr. Jackson “can get to court”
against Captain Savoy, Sergeant Jackson, and Sergeant Wong on his common law negligent
training, supervision, hiring, and retention claim. Marusa, 484 F.2d at 832. If appropriate, the
Court will revisit this determination at summary judgment following further briefing. See Roe,
365 F. Supp. 3d at 87.
b. Captain Savoy and Sergeant Wong
Mr. Jackson fails to state a claim for negligent training, supervision, hiring, and retention
against Captain Savoy and Sergeant Wong. Each of Mr. Jackson’s allegations against the officers
is conclusory. Although he alleges that Captain Savoy and Sergeant Wong, along with Lieutenant
Bridges and Sergeant Jackson, “failed to ensure that the police officers under their command were
properly trained and complied with all policies, procedures, and orders,” Compl. ¶ 111, he does
not offer any facts to support this allegation. His remaining allegations are even more formulaic
and non-specific, as they are assertions against all “Individual Defendants” based “[u]pon
information and belief.” Id. ¶¶ 212–16; see id. ¶¶ 217–25. Such “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” fall short of the pleading
standard necessary to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
c. Sergeant Jackson
Mr. Jackson has likewise failed to state a negligent training, supervision, hiring, and
retention claim against Sergeant Jackson. Mr. Jackson alleges that Sergeant Jackson “admitted
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that she had done nothing to ensure that the officers under her command performed the required
checks other than periodically walk out of her office to ensure the officers where [sic] ‘doing their
jobs,’” Compl. ¶ 99, even though “she was aware that officers assigned to the cellblock were
supposed to perform cell checks every 15 minutes,” id. ¶ 98, and despite the fact that “[s]he never
observed any officer conducting the required inspections of the cellblock during her tour,” id. ¶ 99.
Under her supervision, Mr. Jackson contends, officers did not step into the cellblock for
approximately 54 minutes, see id. ¶¶ 81–82, and failed to perform a physical check of Mr. Parker’s
cellblock “for at least 1 hour 36 minutes,” id. ¶ 194—violations of General Order 201.23’s
directive to conduct physical checks on detainees at least every 30 minutes, see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 106,
194.
These allegations, though concerning, fall short. Mr. Jackson does not allege that Sergeant
Jackson knew that the officers under her supervision behaved or were behaving “in a dangerous
or otherwise incompetent manner.” Thorp, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 21. He does not, for instance, allege
that Sergeant Jackson “had ‘actual or constructive knowledge’ of any problematic behavior on the
part of the officers in question before the incident at issue here.” Spiller, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 255
(emphasis omitted). Nor does he allege that Sergeant Jackson was “contemporaneously aware of
misconduct and either fail[ed] to stop it or affirmatively authorize[d] it,” Yarullina, 770 F. Supp.
3d at 213, or had constructive knowledge based on conduct related to the incident, see Tulin, 994
A.2d at 794–97, 800. Indeed, he specifically alleges that Sergeant Jackson “periodically” checked
to confirm that the officers were “doing their jobs.” Compl. ¶ 99 (citation modified). As currently
pleaded, the Complaint does not plausibly allege that Sergeant Jackson “was on notice of any
dangerous or incompetent behavior” from the officers she supervised. Yarullina, 770 F. Supp. 3d
at 215.
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C. Federal Claims (Counts III–V)
Finally, the plaintiffs bring three § 1983 claims, asserting violations of the Fourth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Court will dismiss these claims. “Section 1983 provides a remedy for an individual
who has been deprived, by a person acting under color of state law, of ‘any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Watson v. District of
Columbia, No. 23-cv-1670, 2024 WL 3471262, at *3 (D.D.C. July 19, 2024) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983). Here, the plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged constitutional violations to support their
§ 1983 claims.
1. Scope of Claims
Before turning to the plaintiffs’ individual § 1983 claims, the Court must briefly address
the capacity in which the plaintiffs purport to sue the defendants. Because an official capacity
§ 1983 suit is “in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the [municipality],”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985), a plaintiff bringing such a claim “must allege not
only a violation of his rights under the Constitution or federal law, but also that the municipality’s
custom or policy caused the violation,” Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 38 (D.C. Cir.
2004); see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (“Congress did not intend
municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature
caused a constitutional tort.”). For personal capacity § 1983 claims, in contrast, “it is enough to
show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.”
Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,
through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
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676, and liability cannot rest on respondeat superior, Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 600 (D.C. Cir.
2011).8
Because the plaintiffs do not allege that any “District custom or policy caused the claimed
violations of [Mr. Parker’s] constitutional rights,” Warren, 353 F.3d at 39; see also Pls.’ Opp’n 45
(“Plaintiffs did not plead a Monell claim.”), they fail to state a claim for § 1983 liability against
the individual defendants in their official capacities. The Court will address each of the plaintiffs’
personal capacity § 1983 claims in turn.
2. Eighth Amendment Claim (Count V)
The plaintiffs allege that the individual defendants violated Mr. Parker’s Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by deliberately placing him at a
“substantial risk of serious harm” that enabled him to ingest opioids. Compl. ¶ 181; see id. ¶¶ 176–
88. But the proper constitutional vehicle for “the claims of pretrial detainees” like Mr. Parker is
the Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16
(1979); see United States v. Cole, 459 F. Supp. 3d 116, 123 (D.D.C. 2020) (noting that the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees, who have not been “convict[ed] and sentence[d]”
(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 n.6 (1989))); see Pls.’ Opp’n 42 n.5
(acknowledging that the plaintiffs “pled the Eighth Amendment claim as a belt-and-suspenders
count to protect [their] interests in the event of a change in the law”). Accordingly, the Court will
dismiss the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim. See, e.g., Hardy v. District of Columbia, 601 F.
Supp. 2d 182, 187 (D.D.C. 2009).
8 The defendants do not raise any arguments regarding the capacities in which Ms. Parker and Mr.
Jackson can bring their § 1983 claims. See, e.g., Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588–95
(1978) (discussing the survival of § 1983 claims); Harvey v. Mohammed, 951 F. Supp. 2d 47, 57
n.4 (D.D.C. 2013) (conducting analysis with reference to D.C. Code § 12–101). Accordingly, the
Court does not address the issue.
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3. Fourteenth (Fifth) Amendment Claim (Count III)
The plaintiffs also argue that the individual defendants violated Mr. Parker’s due process
rights by “fail[ing] to provide medical care and fail[ing] to protect a detainee in their care.” Pls.’
Opp’n 40.9 In particular, the plaintiffs allege that the individual defendants failed to (1) search Mr.
Parker adequately; (2) identify him as high-risk for suicidal ideation; (3) prevent him from
covering the CCTV; (4) monitor him appropriately; (5) seek timely medical help; and (6) adhere
to applicable policies and procedures. See id.; Compl. ¶¶ 144–61.
This claim relies on two distinct theories—failure to provide medical care and general
failure to protect. For the reasons that follow, the plaintiffs have failed to allege a due process
claim under either theory.
i. Failure to Provide Medical Care
“To constitute a substantive due process violation, [a] defendant official’s behavior must
be so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.”
Harvey v. District of Columbia, 798 F.3d 1042, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation modified); see
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998). “[W]hen the State by the affirmative
exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for
himself, the Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and protection with
respect to that individual.” Harvey, 798 F.3d at 1050 (citation modified). Under such
9 Although the Complaint sets forth a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, see
Compl. ¶¶ 144–61, the plaintiffs acknowledge that the claim should have been brought under the
Fifth Amendment, Pls.’ Opp’n 42; see Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 645 n.7 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (“While the District of Columbia is not a state, it is subject to the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.”). Given the lack of prejudice to the defendants, the Court will construe
the claim as arising under the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Black Lives Matter D.C. v. Trump, 544 F.
Supp. 3d 15, 49–50 (D.D.C. 2021) (construing a due process claim originally brought under the
Fifth Amendment as arising under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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circumstances, “governmental deliberate indifference will shock the conscience sufficiently to
establish a substantive due process violation.” Id. (citation modified); see Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848–
49 (“[T]he Constitution does not guarantee due care on the part of state officials; liability for
negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.”).
“An official is deliberately indifferent when she has subjective knowledge of the plaintiff’s serious
medical need and recklessly disregards the excessive risk to his health or safety from that risk.”
Harvey, 798 F.3d at 1052 (citation modified). “In appropriate situations, subjective knowledge
can be inferred from the obviousness of the risk.” Hardy, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 189–90 (citation
modified).
Although the individual defendants owed Mr. Parker “affirmative duties of care and
protection” by virtue of his detention, Harvey, 798 F.3d at 1050 (citation modified); see Harris v.
District of Columbia, 932 F.2d 10, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the plaintiffs have not adequately alleged
that the individual defendants were deliberately indifferent to Mr. Parker’s medical needs.
Nowhere do they allege that the individual defendants had subjective knowledge of Mr. Parker’s
physical state or medical condition, including his suicidal ideation. See Harvey, 798 F.3d at 1052.
Instead, the plaintiffs argue that the Court should apply the “objectively unreasonable”
standard to their due process claim. See Pls.’ Opp’n 40–41 (citation modified). In Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), the Supreme Court held that a pretrial detainee bringing an
excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause need show only that
the use of force was objectively unreasonable. See id. at 395–400. Following Kingsley, a number
of courts have “extended Kingsley’s objective standard to apply to other due process claims by
pre-trial detainees.” Banks v. Booth, 468 F. Supp. 3d 101, 110 (D.D.C. 2020), appeal dismissed
as moot, 3 F.4th 445 (D.C. Cir. 2021); see, e.g., id. at 109–11 (conditions of confinement); Bah v.
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District of Columbia, No. 23-cv-1248, 2024 WL 983329, at *3–5 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2024)
(conditions of confinement and failure to protect); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 32–36 (2d Cir.
2017) (conditions of confinement); Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 603–12 (4th Cir. 2023)
(serious medical condition); Westmoreland v. Butler County, 29 F.4th 721, 726–30 (6th Cir. 2022)
(failure to protect); Kemp v. Fulton County, 27 F.4th 491, 495–97 (7th Cir. 2022) (conditions of
confinement); Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067–71 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(failure to protect). But see Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 989–93 (10th Cir. 2020)
(“[D]eliberate indifference to a pretrial detainee’s serious medical needs includes both an objective
and a subjective component, even after Kingsley.”). But in Harvey v. District of Columbia, 798
F.3d 1042 (D.C. Cir. 2015), issued after Kingsley was decided, the D.C. Circuit applied a
subjective standard to a pretrial detainee’s denial-of-medical-care claim. See id. at 1049–52. And
the plaintiffs have not pointed to any subsequent D.C. Circuit caselaw applying an objective
standard in that context. Absent such caselaw, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Harvey binds this
Court.
ii. Failure to Protect
A pretrial detainee asserting a failure-to-protect claim under the Fifth Amendment must
allege that (1) he is detained “under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm”; and
(2) “a prison official acted with deliberate indifference with respect to that risk.” Bah, 2024 WL
983329, at *3 (citation modified); see id. at *3 n.4 (explaining that “[t]his framework originated
in the Eighth Amendment context” (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994))); Hardy,
601 F. Supp. 2d at 188–89.10
10 Courts have also taken different positions regarding whether and to what extent this second
prong survives post-Kingsley. Compare Bah, 2024 WL 983329, at *3–5 (pretrial detainees must
allege deliberate indifference, which is subject to an objective standard), with Banks, 468 F. Supp.
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The plaintiffs’ claim fails on the first prong, as they have not plausibly alleged that Mr.
Parker was detained “under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Bah, 2024 WL
983329, at *3 (citation modified). The plaintiffs allege that Captain Savoy, Sergeant Wong,
Officer Delozier, Officer Jenkins, and Officer John Doe #1 failed to adequately monitor and search
Mr. Parker, see Compl. ¶¶ 38–40, 51–52, 54, 58–60, 65, 81–82, 101, 104–07, 109–11, 117, 147,
while Sergeant Jackson failed to fulfill her supervisory duties, see id. ¶¶ 98–100, 147, and
Lieutenant Bridges erred in staffing Sergeant Jackson, id. ¶ 112. But the Court cannot assess Mr.
Parker’s conditions of confinement through the lens of hindsight, and none of the plaintiffs’
allegations suggests that Mr. Parker’s conditions of confinement posed any substantial risk,
whether generalized in nature or particular to him. See Moore v. District of Columbia, No. 25-cv-
2150, 2026 WL 654355, at *4–5 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2026). Contrast, e.g., Bah, 2024 WL 983329, at
*5 n.7 (plaintiff alleged that there was “a general risk of inmate-on-inmate violence at the jail,”
that “the inmate who stabbed [him] had previously stabbed at least two other inmates,” and that he
“had gotten into an argument with that inmate earlier in the day in an area that should have been
supervised”); Hardy, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 190 (plaintiffs alleged that officials knew of “significant
and multiple instances of violence” yet “refused to take reasonable measures to fulfill their duty to
protect inmates, such as properly screening pretrial detainees, ensuring adequate staffing at the jail,
installing metal detectors, and conducting frequent ‘shakedowns’ of inmates and their facilities”).
3d at 110–11 (pretrial detainees “do not need to show deliberate indifference in order to state a due
process claim for inadequate conditions of confinement”). Any disagreement, however, appears
to be one of form, rather than substance. See Banks, 468 F. Supp. 3d at 111 (pretrial detainee must
still show that officials “knew or should have known that the jail conditions posed an excessive
risk to their health and intentionally or recklessly failed to act”). In any event, the Court need not
wade into this disagreement, as it finds that the plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to
satisfy the first prong.
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Absent allegations that the jail conditions posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Mr.
Parker’s health and safety, the plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded a failure-to-protect claim.
4. Fourth Amendment Claim (Count IV)
Finally, the Court will dismiss the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim. The plaintiffs
assert a somewhat novel argument that the individual defendants violated Mr. Parker’s Fourth
Amendment rights by not “conduct[ing] adequate and timely searches of Mr. Parker.” Compl.
¶ 170. To this Court’s knowledge, there is no authority for the assertion that the Fourth
Amendment gives a constitutional right to be searched; in fact, multiple courts have held the
opposite. See, e.g., Est. of Sillah by Carter v. City of Madison, No. 23-cv-96, 2024 WL 4650945,
at *14 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 1, 2024) (“An arrestee has no general right to be searched when taken into
custody.”); Lankamer v. Lalley, No. 24-cv-506, 2024 WL 4119152, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 9, 2024)
(“[T]he Court has not found one case, nor has the Estate presented a case, that establishes that the
Fourth Amendment requires officers to strip search a pretrial detainee to ensure the detainee’s
protection.”); Purvis v. City of Orlando, 273 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1326 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (“The Fourth
Amendment expressly protects against unreasonable searches and seizures; it does not guarantee
the right to be searched and seized.”). And, to the extent that the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment
claim is simply a rearticulation of their Fifth Amendment claim, the plaintiffs have not offered any
authority suggesting that a pretrial detainee may bring failure-to-provide-medical-care and failure-
to-protect claims under the Fourth Amendment. Contrast, e.g., Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, 594
U.S. 464, 466 n.2 (2021) (per curiam) (“We need not address whether the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendment provides the proper basis for a claim of excessive force against a pretrial detainee in
[the decedent’s] position.” (emphasis added)); Jalloh v. Underwood, 464 F. Supp. 3d 125, 130
(D.D.C. 2020) (“[T]he D.C. Circuit has not addressed whether an arrestee’s claim that authorities
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failed to provide him medical assistance may be grounded in the Fourth Amendment.” (emphasis
added)). The Court will thus dismiss the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 8, is granted in part.
Counts I–V, VII, and VIII are dismissed without prejudice. Count VI is construed as a negligence
claim under the Wrongful Death and Survivorship Acts and is dismissed without prejudice except
as to Mr. Jackson’s negligence claim against Lieutenant Bridges, Sergeant Jackson, Detective Lake,
Officer Delozier, Officer Jenkins, and Officer John Doe #1 in their personal capacities.
________________________
DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
March 31, 2026 United States District Judge
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