USA v. BLYTHE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
VICTOR RENATO BLYTHE,
Defendant.
No. 25-cr-253 (DLF)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Victor Blythe is charged with distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(2), and possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4). Before
the Court is Blythe’s motion to suppress evidence discovered as a result of the search of an iPhone
seized from his residence. See Dkt. 22. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the motion.
I. BACKGROUND1
The FBI’s Child Exploitation and Human Trafficking Task Force first became aware of
Blythe when it received from the Fairfax County Police Department information related to an
individual the Department had arrested, “C.D.,” with whom Blythe had been communicating. Tr.
of Evidentiary Hr’g 18:8–25. In particular, the Department provided the Task Force with
electronic messages between C.D. and Blythe that discussed their sexual interest in minors and
appeared to involve the exchange of child sexual abuse material. Id. at 18:17–25.
1 The Court held an evidentiary hearing on Blythe’s motion to suppress on October 23, 2025. The
Court stated its factual findings on the record on November 13, 2025, before hearing argument on
the motion. This opinion highlights those factual findings that are most pertinent to this decision.
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The FBI obtained a search warrant for Blythe’s residence in Northwest D.C. Id. at 19:18–
20:8. The search warrant permitted agents to seize electronic devices, including cellphones. Gov’t
Ex. 1, at 6–9 (“Warrant”). As to those devices, the warrant provided:
During the execution of the search of the PREMISES . . . law enforcement
personnel are also specifically authorized to obtain from Victor Renato BLYTHE
(but not any other individuals present at the PREMISES at the time of execution of
the warrant) the compelled display of any physical biometric characteristics (such
as fingerprint/thumbprint, facial characteristics, or iris display) necessary to unlock
any Device(s) requiring such biometric access subject to seizure pursuant to this
warrant for which law enforcement has reasonable suspicion that the
aforementioned person(s)’ physical biometric characteristics will unlock the
Device(s). Law enforcement are authorized to attempt to unlock any such
Device(s)’s security features in order to search the contents as authorized by this
warrant by compelling the display of such a physical biometric characteristic; that
is, (1) by pressing or swiping the fingers or thumbs of the aforementioned person
against the fingerprint scanner of any such Device(s) and/or (2) by holding in front
of the face of the aforementioned person to activate the facial recognition or iris
recognition feature of any such Device(s).
Id. at 9. At the same time, the warrant contained the following restriction:
While attempting to unlock the device by use of the compelled display of biometric
characteristics pursuant to this warrant, law enforcement is not authorized to
demand that the aforementioned person state or otherwise provide the password or
identify the specific biometric characteristics (including the unique finger(s) or
other physical features), that may be used to unlock or access the Device(s). Nor
does the warrant authorize law enforcement to use the fact that the warrant allows
law enforcement to obtain the display of any biometric characteristics to compel
the aforementioned person to state or otherwise provide that information. However,
the voluntary disclosure of such information by the aforementioned person is
permitted. Specifically, [if] agents in executing the warrant ask any of the
aforementioned person[(s)] for the password to any Device(s), or to identify which
biometric characteristic (including the unique finger or other physical features)
unlocks any Device(s), the agents will not state or otherwise imply that the warrant
requires the person to provide such information, and will make clear that providing
any such information is voluntary and that the person is free to refuse the request.
Id. at 9–10. In other words, under the terms of the search warrant, agents could compel the display
of Blythe’s physical biometric characteristics, but they could not (1) order Blythe to unlock a
device; or (2) ask Blythe for information regarding how to unlock the device, or state or imply that
the warrant required him to provide such information. Materially similar parameters were detailed
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in paragraphs 49 and 58 of the affidavit in support of the warrant application. Id. at 42–43, 45–
46. The terms of the search warrant required the FBI to execute the warrant within 14 days. See
id. at 2.
The FBI executed the search warrant at approximately 6:00 a.m. on August 12, 2025. Tr.
of Evidentiary Hr’g 23:6–11. FBI Special Agent Blake Frohnapfel—the lead agent investigating
Blythe’s case—was present on scene, along with over 20 other law enforcement personnel from
the FBI, Metropolitan Police Department, and Fairfax County Police Department. See id. at 18:8–
10, 24:3–23, 57:7–20.
FBI agents approached the residence with weapons drawn. Id. at 27:1–13. Agent
Frohnapfel carried a rifle and a battering ram; another agent carried a tool that would spread open
the door to allow the agents to gain entry to the residence. Id. at 27:1–28:19, 58:7–13. Within
approximately 20 seconds of first announcing their presence and knocking on the front door, agents
began forcibly breaking the door using the battering ram and tool. See Gov’t Ex. 2, at 2:54–3:27;
Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 60:22–62:10. After the door had been forced open, Blythe emerged from
a room in the back right of the house, wearing only a t-shirt and socks. Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g
62:11–13, 66:12–17; Gov’t Ex. 2, at 3:27–3:47. Agents ordered Blythe to put his hands up and
walk backwards toward the door. Gov’t Ex. 2, at 3:47–4:20. When Blythe reached the front door,
an agent placed him in handcuffs. Id. at 4:20–4:45. Agents asked Blythe who else was in the
home. Id. at 4:45–4:47. Blythe responded that his brother was inside. Id. at 4:45–4:48. The
agents asked where in the home his brother was located, and Blythe answered that his brother was
in the basement. Id. at 4:48–4:54. An agent yelled for Blythe’s brother, Robert Blythe, to come
to the front door. Id. at 4:55–5:18.
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An agent walked Blythe to an unmarked police vehicle parked in front of the residence,
where Agent Tonya Griffith—a certified digital extraction technician and the search team lead—
waited. Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 33:10–18, 102:8–103:17, 104:7–14; Gov’t Ex 6, at 5:10–5:20.
Agent Griffith and another agent, both armed, stood with Blythe as agents secured the home. Tr.
of Evidentiary Hr’g 33:10–18, 106:9–14, 129:10–22, 131:21–132:5. Agent Griffith advised
Blythe that the FBI had a search warrant and that agents would explain more once the home was
secure. Gov’t Ex 6, at 5:20–5:34. Although she denied Blythe’s requests to sit inside the vehicle
and to go back inside, she positioned Blythe behind the vehicle’s door and stood behind him to
attempt to provide some privacy and shield him from view. Id. at 5:34–6:15, 11:35–11:45, 14:38–
14:45, 15:37–15:42; Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 107:12–14. Agent Griffith asked Blythe whether his
brother was in the basement level of the home; Blythe confirmed that he was. Gov’t Ex 6, at 5:34–
5:38. The agents later asked Blythe to describe the location of his brother’s bedroom, and he did
so. Id. at 9:15–9:45.
While Agent Griffith and Blythe waited outside, agents continued to secure the home.
Once the main level of the home had been cleared, a group of agents exited the residence and went
to a basement level entrance in the rear of the home. Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 32:1–22; Gov’t Ex.
2, at 8:55–9:40. An agent called for Robert Blythe to come to that back door. Gov’t Ex. 2, at
9:40–9:52. Although Robert Blythe emerged from an interior room and was visible through a
window, he did not immediately open the door. Id. at 9:55–10:10. Agents broke open the
basement door, handcuffed Robert Blythe, and took him outside of the home. Id. at 10:10–11:15.
Approximately 13 minutes after Blythe was escorted to the vehicle to wait with Agent
Griffith, an agent announced that the home was clear. See id. at 5:10, 17:59–18:08; Tr. of
Evidentiary Hr’g 68:6–9. Agent Griffith escorted Blythe—still handcuffed—back inside, bringing
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him to a sitting room on the main level of the home. Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 34:11–15, 108:1–16.
She did not advise Blythe that he was free to leave. Id. at 134:14–135:3. An agent removed his
handcuffs, and Agent Frohnapfel brought him a pair of shorts. Id. at 34:13–20, 108:1–16.
Agent Frohnapfel introduced himself to Blythe and explained that the FBI was executing
a search warrant. Id. at 35:22–36:8. He told Blythe that he wanted to speak to him and gave him
the option of speaking in the home or outside in a law enforcement vehicle. Id. at 36:2–16, 69:8–
18. Blythe chose to speak in the vehicle. Id. at 36:9–16, 69:15–18.
Agent Frohnapfel and Blythe were joined in the vehicle by Special Agent Matt Lee. Id. at
36:20–37:2. The agents made an audio recording of the interview, which lasted approximately 12
minutes. See generally Gov’t Ex. 3. At the outset of the conversation, Agent Frohnapfel explained
that he and Agent Lee worked on the FBI’s Child Exploitation and Human Trafficking Task Force
and had a search warrant for Blythe’s home. Id. at 0:00–1:35. Agent Frohnapfel read Blythe his
Miranda rights, and the agents explained that Blythe was free to leave, that his participation in the
interview was voluntary, and that he could terminate the interview or decline to answer particular
questions at any time. Id. at 1:36–4:13. Agent Frohnapfel proceeded to give Blythe high-level
background on the investigation and explained that the search warrant permitted them to collect
certain electronic devices in the home and to review their contents for child sexual abuse material.
Id. at 4:13–6:55.
After Agent Frohnapfel collected Blythe’s biographical and contact information, the agents
asked Blythe a series of questions regarding his relationship with C.D. Id. at 6:56–9:10. Agent
Frohnapfel explained that they had “read basically every text message” that Blythe and C.D. had
exchanged over the past “five or six years,” noting that the messages included attachments and
links. Id. at 9:11–9:49. Shortly after Agent Frohnapfel asked Blythe to provide background on
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the nature of those attachments and links, Blythe stated that he wanted to speak with an attorney.
Id. at 9:50–10:45. Agent Frohnapfel and Agent Lee terminated the interview. Id. at 10:46–11:40.
Agent Frohnapfel told Blythe that it would take FBI agents approximately one and a half
to two hours to finish searching the home. Id. at 11:00–11:12. He also told Blythe that he was
free to leave the premises while the search continued. Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 39:4–22. He further
explained that, if Blythe chose instead to stay in the home, he must remain within one room. Id.2
Blythe chose to stay in the home. Id. at 39:23–24.
Blythe was escorted back to the sitting room on the main level of the home, where he took
a seat on a couch that agents had cleared. Id. at 39:25–41:6, 135:13–22. He was not re-handcuffed.
Id. at 41:16–18. After Blythe returned inside, Agent Griffith entered the sitting room with an
iPhone that she had located on the floor in a main-level bedroom in the back right of the home—
the same area of the home from which Blythe had appeared when agents broke open the front door.
Id. at 42:14–43:9, 73:9–74:15, 90:4–16, 108:21–110:1, 136:18–137:1; see Gov’t Ex. 7; Gov’t Ex.
8. The iPhone was powered on and in the after-first-unlock state, meaning that, although the phone
was locked, the passcode had been entered at least one time since the phone was powered on. Tr.
of Evidentiary Hr’g 111:4–6, 119:17–120:1, 122:6–125:10. A phone in after-first-unlock state can
be opened using a passcode or physical biometric characteristics. Id. at 122:11–124:23.
Agent Griffith approached Blythe and told him that the search warrant authorized her to
hold the phone up to his face to obtain his facial biometrics. Id. at 43:10–21, 74:1–75:3, 109:19–
111:3, 136:18–137:6. When she proceeded to do so, however, Blythe closed his eyes and turned
his head away, saying something to the effect of “I don’t want to do this.” Id. at 43:10–21, 74:1–
2 Agent Frohnapfel testified that Blythe would need to remain in a single room during the execution
of the search warrant so that the FBI could ensure officer safety and maintain the security of the
scene. Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 39:13–22.
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75:22, 111:7–12, 136:25–137:14. Agent Griffith and Agent Frohnapfel again explained that the
warrant permitted them to compel the display of Blythe’s physical biometric characteristics. Id.
at 43:10–44:7, 111:17–24. Because Agent Frohnapfel did not have a physical copy of the warrant
with him, he attempted to open a copy on his phone. Id. at 43:22–44:7, 75:23–76:9. He read
Blythe paragraph 49 of the affidavit in support of the warrant, which authorized agents to compel
the display of physical biometric characteristics; he did not read the portion of the warrant or of
the affidavit that prohibited agents from (1) ordering Blythe to unlock a device; or (2) asking
Blythe for information regarding how to unlock a device, or stating or implying that the warrant
required him to provide such information. Id. at 44:1–7, 75:23–77:3. Agent Griffith again held
the phone to Blythe’s face; Blythe again indicated that he did not want to comply. Id. at 44:20–
45:2, 111:25–112:9. When face ID again failed, Blythe entered a passcode, saying “it’s just easier
this way.” Id. at 44:20–45:2, 54:2–7, 112:2–9, 141:10–142:3. Agents did not ask Blythe whether
or which physical biometric characteristics could open the phone. Id. at 44:10–19, 110:16–111:1.
They also neither asked Blythe to unlock the device using the passcode nor advised him that the
warrant did not authorize them to compel him to do so. Id. at 44:8–9, 83:7–18, 110:23–24. Agent
Griffith saw some, but not all, of the digits that Blythe entered to unlock the phone. Id. at 112:17–
25. Agent Frohnapfel was not able to see any digits. Id. at 45:7–9. The phone’s passcode prompt
screen indicated that the passcode to the phone was six digits. Id. at 52:11–14, 110:4–10.
Agent Griffith took the unlocked iPhone to a different room to begin an on-scene preview
that would allow the FBI to determine to whom the phone belonged and to perform a preliminary
review of the phone’s contents. Id. at 46:3–15, 85:1–87:3, 113:1–17.
While FBI agents reviewed the contents of the iPhone, Agent Frohnapfel located on the
dining room table a laptop that, based on the user profile, appeared to be associated with Blythe.
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Id. at 46:16–47:4. Agent Frohnapfel brought the laptop to Blythe and explained that he was going
to unlock the laptop using face ID. Id. at 47:2–8. When attempts to unlock the laptop using face
ID failed, the login screen prompted entry of a password. Id. at 47:6–11. Agent Frohnapfel spent
some time trying to back out of the password screen to return to face ID but was unable to do so.
Id. at 47:9–13. At that point, Agent Frohnapfel handed Blythe the laptop and said, “we can try
this”—as in the password—“we can try the facial thing,” adding “that’s up to you.” Gov’t Ex. 5,
at 0:00–0:05; see Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 47:13–18, 49:1–7. Blythe took the computer, entered a
four-character password, and handed back the unlocked laptop. Gov’t Ex. 5, at 0:05–0:15; see Tr.
of Evidentiary Hr’g 54:8–10. Fairfax County Detective Blake Allbritton recorded on his cellphone
a video of Blythe entering the password into the computer. See Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 168:14–
169:14; see Gov’t Ex. 5, at 0:05–0:15.
As Agent Frohnapfel left with the laptop, Agent Griffith returned with the iPhone, which
had locked while law enforcement was conducting the on-scene preview. Gov’t Ex. 5, at 0:15–
0:20; Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 84:14–25, 114:2–7. Agent Griffith approached Blythe, saying,
“sorry, I just need your face again on your phone.” Gov’t Ex. 5, at 0:15–0:20; Tr. of Evidentiary
Hr’g 49:20–25, 114:2–15. Detective Allbritton added, “or you can do password—whatever’s
easier for you.” Gov’t Ex. 5, at 0:20–0:22; Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 50:1–14, 114:13–22. Blythe
took the cellphone from Agent Griffith and entered the passcode, then handed the unlocked device
back to her. Gov’t Ex. 5, at 0:22–0:30. Agents did not advise Blythe that the search warrant did
not authorize law enforcement to compel him to enter the passcode. Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g
147:12–16. Detective Allbritton also recorded this interaction on video. Id. at 168:14–23. The
video recording captures Blythe entering a passcode into the phone. Gov’t Ex. 5, at 0:22–0:30.
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Agents ultimately learned that the iPhone passcode was 082864 and that the laptop
password was 0828—both abbreviated versions of Blythe’s birth date. Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g
54:2–12.
Agents petitioned for an arrest warrant based on the materials discovered on the iPhone
during the on-scene preview, including messages between Blythe and C.D. and images stored on
the phone. Id. at 87:4–90:3, 146:24–147:11, 154:22–155:1. Blythe was arrested on scene. Id. at
90:2–3. Agent Frohnapfel testified that he did not know the extent of the on-scene preview
conducted after Blythe first unlocked the phone. Id. at 89:5–23. His review of the messages and
images, however, took place after Blythe unlocked the phone a second time. Id. Agent Griffith
testified that she did not know what content was observed after the first unlock. Id. at 113:1–10.
After Blythe was arrested, Agent Griffith took the iPhone to an FBI facility and connected
it to Graykey, a device capable of extracting data from cellphones. Id. at 121:23–122:11, 125:19–
21. Graykey extracts data from locked cellphones using various methods. For some cellphones,
Graykey is able to guess the phone passcode using a passcode database; for others, Graykey is able
to bypass the passcode completely. Id. at 118:10–14, 151:25–152:12. Graykey is not always
successful—whether it is able to extract data from a cellphone depends on such variables as the
state the phone is in (e.g., locked or unlocked; before-first-unlock or after-first-unlock), the model
of phone, and the phone’s operating system. Id. at 149:23–153:25. Graykey also cannot extract
certain information from a locked phone, including some types of GPS and health data. Id. at
164:2–165:6. When Graykey extracts data from a cellphone, it provides the extracted data in raw
form. Id. at 117:19–22. Other software must be used to view and analyze the data. Id. at 117:23–
118:4.
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Because Agent Griffith had the passcode to the seized iPhone, she used the passcode to
unlock the phone and performed a full data extraction on the unlocked phone using Graykey. Id.
at 122:6–125:21, 156:14–18.
On October 2, 2025, Agent Griffith checked the iPhone out of evidence to determine what
data Graykey would have extracted from the phone during the first extraction had she not unlocked
the phone using the passcode. Id. at 119:7–126:5, 163:5–12. Because the phone had died while
in evidence, Agent Griffith plugged it in and allowed it to charge. Id. at 119:10–13. Once charged,
the phone was in before-first-unlock state, meaning that the passcode had not been entered since
the phone had powered on. Id. at 119:10–121:8. On October 3, 2025, Agent Griffith replicated
the after-first-unlock state in which the FBI first found the phone in August by entering the
passcode and then locking the phone. Id. at 119:10–126:5, 159:2–4. She then connected the phone
to Graykey and performed a data extraction. Id. at 126:6–16.
The data that Graykey extracted from the iPhone during the October extraction mirrored in
material respects the initial extraction the FBI performed upon seizing the phone. Id. at 126:1–
127:4, 154:18–155:1, 159:8–10. Although Agent Griffith did not conduct a file-by-file
comparison of the extractions, she confirmed that both extractions contained the files and messages
identified in the complaint, as well as other child sexual abuse material. Id. at 155:9–17, 159:8–
18, 163:23–166:3. Agent Griffith testified that, based on her training and experience, the first data
extraction did not impact the second—the extraction profiles would have been the same no matter
the order in which they were performed. Id. at 155:18–157:14.
Agent Griffith further testified that it is the FBI’s standard practice to transport all seized
cellphones back to an FBI office and to connect them to an extraction device like Graykey. Id. at
127:5–9. It is only in rare circumstances that the FBI does not follow that standard practice, such
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as when the phone is a work phone or belongs to another individual. Id. at 53:10–15, 116:16–
117:11, 127:5–15. If a cellphone is in the after-first-unlock state and FBI agents do not have the
phone’s passcode, agents will keep the phone charged while transporting the device to an FBI
office, as it is easier for Graykey to extract data from a cellphone in that state. Id. at 161:13–162:3.
The FBI’s search of the iPhone and of a Samsung storage device also seized during the
search of Blythe’s home remains ongoing. Id. 94:2–9. Although the FBI seized a second cellphone
during the search, the phone was in factory reset mode and did not contain any data. Id. at 127:22–
25.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
While the amendment “contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in
violation of its commands,” Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995), the Supreme Court has
“establish[ed] an exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained
evidence at trial,” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009). When this rule applies, it
“prohibits the government from introducing in its case in chief evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Weaver, 808 F.3d 26, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “To qualify for the Fifth Amendment
privilege, a communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled.” Hiibel v. Sixth
Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nevada, Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004). Furthermore, to protect the
right against compelled self-incrimination, the Supreme Court has held that the government may
not introduce at trial statements made by a defendant during custodial interrogation unless the
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government “demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). When an individual
“in custody is subjected to interrogation,” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980), those
procedural safeguards typically take the form of Miranda warnings, which include warning the
individual “prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can
be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that
if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. For these purposes, “the term ‘interrogation’ . . . refers not
only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
III. ANALYSIS
Blythe moves to suppress the evidence discovered on the seized iPhone under both the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. His primary argument is that the search warrant,
which purported to authorize law enforcement agents to compel him to display his physical
biometric characteristics, violated his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination
and was facially unconstitutional. See Mot. to Suppress 4–6, Dkt. 22. Alternatively, he argues
that, even if the warrant was constitutional on its face, law enforcement violated the Fourth
Amendment because they did not comply with the terms of the warrant. See id. at 6–9. Finally,
Blythe argues that law enforcement violated his Fifth Amendment rights by questioning him after
he invoked his right to counsel. See Reply in Support of Mot. to Suppress 1–5, Dkt. 27.
For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the search warrant was not
unconstitutional on its face. The Court further concludes that, even if law enforcement violated
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the terms of the warrant or Blythe’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the
government has established by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have been able to
gain access to evidence on the cellphone using lawful methods. Accordingly, the evidence
discovered on the seized iPhone is admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.
A. The Search Warrant Was Not Unconstitutional On Its Face
Blythe’s Fifth Amendment argument relies principally on the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision
in United States v. Brown, 125 F.4th 1186 (D.C. 2025). See Mot. to Suppress 4–6. In his telling,
Brown makes clear that “[t]he use of facial recognition or fingerprints to open an electronic device
is ‘testimonial’” and that “the compulsion of such actions is a violation of the Fifth Amendment.”
Id. at 4; see id. (“In Brown, the Circuit was clear that commands to unlock a phone via the use of
a thumbprint was a ‘compelled opening’ that violates the Fifth Amendment.”). The Court
disagrees.
1. The D.C. Circuit’s Analysis In Brown
Brown involved the seizure and compelled opening of an electronic device. While
executing a search warrant at the appellant’s residence, law enforcement found and ordered the
appellant—Peter Schwartz—to open a locked cellphone. Brown, 125 F.4th at 1200–02. “Schwartz
complied by placing his thumb on the cellphone.” Id. at 1202. He later moved to suppress
evidence obtained from subsequent searches of the device. See id. at 1200, 1204–05.
The D.C. Circuit held that the manner in which law enforcement compelled Schwartz to
unlock the cellphone violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See id. at
1201. The government had conceded that “Schwartz’s opening of the cellphone with his
thumbprint was involuntary,” id. at 1200, and that the compelled opening “was incriminating as it
identified Schwartz as the likely owner of, and a person with access to and control over, the phone
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and its inculpatory messages,” id. at 1201. As such, the D.C. Circuit was left to assess only the
first prong of Schwartz’s Fifth Amendment claim: “whether disclosing to police Schwartz’s way
of opening the cellphone and his ability to do so was testimonial.” Id. The court concluded that,
“under both the physical-trait and act-of-production caselaw, Schwartz’s compelled unlocking of
the phone was testimonial.” Id. at 1204; see id. at 1202 (“Th[e] compelled biometric unlock of a
cellphone arises at the intersection of the Fifth Amendment’s physical-trait and act-of-production
precedents.”).
Starting with the physical-trait caselaw, the D.C. Circuit explained that, although law
enforcement’s use of an individual’s physical traits is generally not considered testimonial, “the
inquiry is contextual.” Id. at 1202. The court noted that the Fifth Amendment does not, for
example, “protect against the involuntary furnishing of a blood sample, submitting to
fingerprinting, providing a handwriting exemplar, providing a voice exemplar, standing in a police
lineup, or donning particular clothing,” none of which requires an individual to “disclose any
knowledge he might have” or to “speak his guilt.” Id. (citation modified). At the same time,
however, the court recognized that certain displays of physical traits—such as “physiological
changes observed during a lie detector test”—can be testimonial, as they are tangible
“manifestations” of the testimonial knowledge and thoughts in an individual’s mind. Id.
The court reasoned that, “[t]hough placing a thumb on a phone may seem akin to submitting
to fingerprinting or providing a handwriting exemplar,” Schwartz’s compelled unlocking was
“much closer to responding to a lie detector test or complying with a command to say a password.”
Id. “When Schwartz was ordered to open the cellphone,” the court explained, “his act of unlocking
the phone represented the thoughts ‘I know how to open the phone,’ ‘I have control over and access
to this phone,’ and ‘the print of this specific finger is the password to this phone.” Id. The court
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reasoned that, had Schwartz “instead been compelled to disclose whether he could open the phone,
and made to say yes or to verbally disclose the password, those answers unquestionably would be
testimonial communications.” Id. at 1202–03. Because Schwartz’s compelled opening of the
cellphone conveyed the same information, the court concluded that it was a testimonial act. See
id. at 1203; see also id. (“[T]he compelled opening of a cellphone itself directly announces the
owner’s access to and control over the phone, as well as his mental knowledge of how to unlock
the device.”).
The D.C. Circuit further found that “[t]he act-of-production line of cases confirm[ed] that
compelling Schwartz to open the phone was testimonial.” Id. Although typically applied in cases
involving responses to document subpoenas, that doctrine “recognizes that physical acts can be
communicative wholly aside from the contents of anything produced when the action implies
assertions of fact.” Id. (citation modified). Applying the doctrine in Brown, the court concluded
that Schwartz’s compelled opening of the cellphone communicated testimonial messages. Id. at
1203–04. As the court reasoned, when Schwartz complied with law enforcement’s command to
unlock the phone, “that act disclosed his control over the phone, his knowledge of how to access
it, and the existence, authenticity, and ownership of documents within it.” Id. at 1204; see id. at
1203–04 (“Because the FBI directed Schwartz to open the phone, the government compelled
Schwartz to disclose his knowledge of how the phone could be opened, and specifically his
understanding that his thumb would unlock the device, and those disclosures revealed his
ownership or control over the phone and the messages it contained.”). The act of unlocking the
phone, the court concluded, “was tantamount to answering a series of questions about ownership
or control over the phone, including how it could be opened and by whom” and was thus
testimonial under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1204.
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In reaching this holding, the D.C. Circuit distinguished the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024). In Payne, law enforcement “forcibly grabbed
[the appellant’s] thumb and used it to unlock” a cellphone. Id. at 500. Applying the Supreme
Court’s physical-trait and act-of-production caselaw, the Ninth Circuit held that the act was not
testimonial. See id. at 508–13. Like a blood draw or fingerprinting at booking, the court reasoned,
using an individual’s thumb to unlock a phone “do[es] not involve the testimonial capacities of the
accused and instead only compel[s] an individual to provide law enforcement with access to an
immutable physical characteristic.” Id. at 509. The court further concluded that the physical act
of unlocking the phone did not implicitly communicate testimonial information, as the act neither
required “cognitive exertion,” id. at 512, nor “divulge[d] the contents of [the appellant’s] mind,”
id. at 511; see id. at 509–13. The “level of existence, control, and authentication established
through a biometric unlock,” id. at 511, the court found, was either absent or, at a minimum,
“significantly less compelling,” id. at 513, than in those act-of-production cases in which a
response to a document subpoena “implicitly conced[es] the existence, authenticity, and custody
of specific documents that prosecutors could use in building its case against the respondent,” id.
at 511–12 (citation modified).
The Ninth Circuit emphasized, however, that its reasoning in Payne “should not be read to
extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock an electronic device.” Id. at 513. The
court noted, for instance, that “the outcome on the testimonial prong may have been different had
[law enforcement] required [the appellant] to independently select the finger that he placed on the
phone.” Id. Such a command, the Ninth Circuit suggested, may have required the appellant to
“engage in some thought process” that could, in turn, be conveyed via the physical act of unlocking
the device. Id.
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Noting that the facts before it presented the very scenario that the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged might lead to a different result, the D.C. Circuit concluded that its holding in Brown
was “consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Payne.” Brown, 125 F.4th at 1204 n.2.
2. The Search Warrant In This Case
The search warrant in this case was not unconstitutional on its face under the analysis set
forth in Brown. The warrant authorized law enforcement to compel the display of Blythe’s
physical biometric characteristics, while prohibiting agents from (1) ordering him to unlock a
device; or (2) asking him for information regarding how to unlock a device, or stating or implying
that the warrant required him to provide such information. See Warrant 10–11. Neither the
permissive nor the restrictive aspect of those compelled-unlock parameters ran afoul of Brown.
Start with the permissive aspect. In Brown, the D.C. Circuit concluded that its holding was
“consistent” with the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the compelled unlocking of a cellphone is
not testimonial where law enforcement compels an individual to produce only a physical biometric
characteristic, such as the individual’s face or fingerprint. Brown, 125 F.4th at 1204 n.2; see
Payne, 99 F.4th at 508–13. The permissive aspect of the warrant’s compelled-unlock parameters
allowed for that very type of compelled display. See Warrant 9 (“Law enforcement are authorized
to attempt to unlock any such Device(s)’s security features in order to search the contents as
authorized by this warrant by compelling the display of such a physical biometric characteristic;
that is, (1) by pressing or swiping the fingers or thumbs of [Blythe] against the fingerprint scanner
of any such Device(s) and/or (2) by holding in front of the face of [Blythe] to activate the facial
recognition or iris recognition feature of any such Device(s).”).
The restrictive aspect, for its part, tracked precisely the activity held unlawful in Brown.
The D.C. Circuit held in Brown that Schwartz’s compelled unlocking of the cellphone was
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testimonial because, in ordering Schwartz to unlock the phone, law enforcement compelled
Schwartz to disclose how to unlock the phone and his ability to do so. See Brown, 125 F.4th at
1202–04. By prohibiting law enforcement from, among other things, ordering Blythe to unlock or
provide information regarding how to unlock a device, the warrant in this case specifically
prohibited law enforcement from compelling such a testimonial response.
Blythe resists this conclusion, arguing that the search warrant contravened Brown because
compelling the display an individual’s physical biometric characteristics discloses the individual’s
“knowledge of and relationship to” a seized cellphone. Mot. to Suppress 5. But while the fact that
an individual’s face or finger unlocks a cellphone may reveal that the individual has control over
or ownership of the phone, that information is not sufficient to make the compelled display of such
characteristics testimonial under Brown. The compelled unlocking in Brown conveyed not only
Schwartz’s control over the phone, but also “his knowledge of how to access it.” Brown, 125 F.4th
at 1204; see id. at 1202 (“When Schwartz was ordered to open the cellphone, his act of unlocking
the phone represented the thoughts ‘I know how to open the phone,’ ‘I have control over and access
to this phone,’ and ‘the print of this specific finger is the password to this phone.’”); id. at 1203
(“[T]he compelled opening of a cellphone itself directly announces the owner’s access to and
control over the phone, as well as his mental knowledge of how to unlock the device.” (emphasis
added)). A compelled display of a physical biometric characteristic, in contrast, does not convey
an individual’s “mental knowledge of how to unlock [a] device.” Id. at 1203. Furthermore, Brown
does not stand for the proposition that the compelled display of a physical biometric characteristic
to unlock a device is testimonial. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit took care to note that its holding was
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consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s determination that it is not. See id. at 1204 n.2. The Court will
not expand Brown’s reasoning to encompass an act that the D.C. Circuit specifically carved out.3
B. Even If Law Enforcement Exceeded The Restrictions In The Search Warrant,
The Evidence Discovered On The Seized iPhone Is Admissible Under The
Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
Blythe alternatively argues that, even if the search warrant was constitutional on its face,
law enforcement did not lawfully execute it. See Mot. to Suppress 6–9. While the Court finds the
question whether law enforcement complied with the warrant to be close, it ultimately need not
decide the issue. Even if law enforcement violated the terms of the warrant, the government has
established by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have been able to gain access to the
relevant evidence using lawful methods.
1. Law Enforcement’s Compliance With The Search Warrant
i. The Warrant’s Terms
As an initial matter, Blythe’s argument relies, in part, on a misreading of the search warrant.
Blythe argues that law enforcement failed to comply with the terms of the warrant that “explicitly
directed law enforcement not to ‘state or otherwise imply that the warrant requires the person to
provide such [biometric or password] information’ and affirmatively required that law
enforcement ‘will make clear that providing any such [biometric or password] information is
3 In passing, Blythe argues that “[t]he warrant was additionally unconstitutional to the extent it
compelled [him] to provide biometric password information based on law enforcement’s
determination that there was ‘reasonable suspicion that [his] physical biometric characteristics
[would] unlock the device,’” rather than probable cause. Mot. to Suppress 6 (fourth alteration in
original) (quoting Warrant 9). The Court will reject this challenge. In the context of a search
warrant that is itself based on probable cause, compelling the display of physical biometric
characteristics is the kind of non-intrusive, external search subject only to reasonable suspicion.
See In re Search of [Redacted], Washington, D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 531–33 (D.D.C. 2018).
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voluntary and that the person is free to refuse the request.’” Id. at 6 (alterations in original)
(quoting Warrant 10).
Considering Blythe’s quoted language in context makes clear that his substituted language
is in error. The relevant text of the search warrant reads, in full:
While attempting to unlock the device by use of the compelled display of biometric
characteristics pursuant to this warrant, law enforcement is not authorized to
demand that the aforementioned person state or otherwise provide the password or
identify the specific biometric characteristics (including the unique finger(s) or
other physical features), that may be used to unlock or access the Device(s). Nor
does the warrant authorize law enforcement to use the fact that the warrant allows
law enforcement to obtain the display of any biometric characteristics to compel
the aforementioned person to state or otherwise provide that information.
However, the voluntary disclosure of such information by the aforementioned
person is permitted. Specifically, [if] agents in executing the warrant ask any of
the aforementioned person[(s)] for the password to any Device(s), or to identify
which biometric characteristic (including the unique finger or other physical
features) unlocks any Device(s), the agents will not state or otherwise imply that
the warrant requires the person to provide such information, and will make clear
that providing any such information is voluntary and that the person is free to
refuse the request.
Warrant 9–10 (emphases added). “Such information” does not, as Blythe suggests, refer generally
to all biometric and password information. Rather, the phrase refers to “the password” and “the
specific biometric characteristics (including the unique finger(s) or other physical features), that
may be used to unlock or access the Device(s).” Id. at 9. Put differently, the warrant prohibited
law enforcement from compelling Blythe to provide the password for a device or to identify the
biometric characteristic(s) that would open a device; if law enforcement did ask Blythe for any
such information, the warrant required them to make clear that he was free to decline to answer.
This reading is bolstered by the permissive aspect of the warrant’s compelled-unlock
parameters, which specifically permitted law enforcement to compel Blythe to display certain
physical biometric characteristics. See id. Blythe’s proposed reading would impose an internal
contradiction on the warrant under which law enforcement could compel the display of certain
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physical biometric characteristics but could not state or imply that the warrant allowed them to do
so. The text of the warrant neither suggests nor requires such a reading.
ii. The First And Second Unlockings Of The iPhone
Even still, the Court finds that the question whether law enforcement complied with the
terms of the search warrant to be a difficult one, at least as to the second unlocking of the seized
iPhone.
a. The First Unlocking
Law enforcement lawfully executed the search warrant as to the first unlocking of the
iPhone. Leading up to that first unlocking, Agent Griffith and Agent Frohnapfel attempted to
unlock the phone using Blythe’s facial biometrics, twice explaining that the warrant authorized
them to do so. Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 43:10–44:7, 74:1–77:3, 109:19–111:24, 136:18–137:6.
After Blythe declined to comply with Agent Griffith’s second attempt to unlock the phone using
his facial biometrics, he entered the passcode. Id. at 44:20–45:2, 54:2–7, 112:2–9, 141:10–142:3.
The agents’ actions in this exchange did not violate the search warrant’s express terms.
Agent Griffith and Agent Frohnapfel did not demand that Blythe provide the iPhone’s passcode
or identify the biometric characteristics that would open the phone. Nor did they imply that the
warrant authorized them to compel Blythe to disclose that information. The agents simply
attempted to compel the display of Blythe’s facial biometrics, an act clearly authorized by the
warrant’s terms. Contra Mot. to Suppress 8 (“By repeatedly placing the phone to Mr. Blythe’s
face, agents communicated a demand that he unlock it.”); id. at 9 (“Through a show of authority
that contravened the express limitations on their authority articulated in the warrant, law
enforcement made clear that Mr. Blythe had no choice but to unlock the phone.”).
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Nonetheless, Blythe contends that Agent Griffith and Agent Frohnapfel had an affirmative
obligation to “make clear to [Blythe] that providing password information had to be voluntary.”
Id. at 9. That argument is misplaced. While the terms of the warrant required the agents to give
such a warning if they asked Blythe to provide any password information, see Warrant 10
(requiring agents to “make clear that providing any such information is voluntary and that the
person is free to refuse the request” (emphasis added)), the agents never made such a request. The
warrant did not impose on the agents a general obligation to ensure that Blythe knew that he could
refuse to enter a password into any device.
As to the first unlocking, Agent Griffith and Agent Frohnapfel’s attempts to compel Blythe
to display his facial biometrics did not amount to an attempt to “compel [Blythe] to state or
otherwise provide” any password information in violation of the warrant’s terms. Id.
a. The Second Unlocking
The circumstances surrounding the second unlocking, however, present a closer question.
When Agent Griffith returned with the locked iPhone and told Blythe that she “need[ed] [his] face
again on [the] phone,” Detective Allbritton added, “or you can do password—whatever’s easier
for you.” Gov’t Ex. 5 0:20–0:22; see Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 49:20–50:14, 84:14–25, 114:2–15.
Although Detective Allbritton did not directly ask for the iPhone’s passcode or demand that Blythe
open the phone using the passcode, his words in context could be understood as such. A person
in Blythe’s position, that is, might have reasonably understood Agent Griffith and Detective
Allbritton’s statements to mean, “you can either allow us to use your facial biometrics or you can
enter the passcode, but you must do one or the other,” not, “you must allow us to use your facial
biometrics but you may instead choose to enter the passcode if you prefer.” Although the
distinction is slight, Blythe raises at least a plausible argument that the agents’ statements
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amounted to a request that Blythe enter the phone’s passcode, unaccompanied by a clarification
that he was free to refuse the request.
2. Inevitable Discovery
The Court need not, however, resolve whether law enforcement’s actions surrounding the
second unlocking complied with the terms of the search warrant. Even assuming a constitutional
violation occurred, the Court concludes that law enforcement would have inevitably succeeded in
extracting the relevant data from the seized iPhone using lawful means.4
“[T]he inevitable discovery doctrine allows for the admission of evidence that would have
been discovered even without the unconstitutional source.” Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 238
(2016); see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984) (“[W]hen . . . the evidence in question would
inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct, there is no
nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible.”). “[I]nevitable discovery
involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready
verification or impeachment.” Nix, 446 U.S. at 444 n.5. “To prevail on an inevitable discovery
theory, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, even without the
unlawful [search], the evidence it seeks to admit would have been discovered” by lawful means.
United States v. Holmes, 505 F.3d 1288, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5.
4 This analysis applies whether Blythe’s argument is framed in Fourth Amendment terms (i.e., law
enforcement exceeded the scope of the warrant) or Fifth Amendment terms (i.e., Blythe did not
enter the passcode voluntarily). See Brown, 125 F.4th at 1205 (inevitable discovery doctrine
applies to both Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations); see also, e.g., Reply in Support of Mot.
to Suppress 8 (“Each time Mr. Blythe unlocked a device, he did so under duress because agents
made him feel as though he could not refuse and had no choice given the judicial warrant. Even
if he simply acquiesced with the agents’ commands, his acquiescence was not free from coercion
and his act of production conveyed incriminating information.”).
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Here, the government has met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that law enforcement would have been able to extract the relevant data from the seized iPhone
without the passcode Blythe provided. Agent Griffith testified that, had the FBI not obtained the
passcode, the FBI’s standard practice would be to keep the device charged—and thus in the after-
first-unlock state in which it was seized—and transport it to an FBI office to connect it to an
extraction device like Graykey. Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 53:10–15, 116:16–117:11, 127:5–15,
161:13–162:3. No “speculative elements” are necessary to conclude that the resulting extraction
would have been successful. Nix, 446 U.S. at 444 n.5. When Agent Griffith put the seized iPhone
into after-first-unlock state and connected it to Graykey in October 2025, the content of the
extraction mirrored in material respects that of the initial extraction, including with respect to the
messages and child sexual abuse material identified in the complaint. Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g
126:1–127:4, 154:18–155:17, 159:8–10, 163:23–166:3. Contrast, e.g., United States v. Raymond,
No. 21-cr-380, 2023 WL 7005341, at *12 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2023) (“The evidentiary record
establishes that it is indeed wholly speculative that [Computer Investigation and Forensics] would
have ever gained access to either phone’s contents, and even then precisely what would have been
forensically imageable.”).5
5 At the evidentiary hearing, Agent Griffith testified that Graykey would have been equally
successful on any iPhone of the same model and running the same operating system as the seized
iPhone. See Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 156:5–158:22. She further testified that there is a matrix that
indicates whether or not Graykey will be able to extract data from a given device. See id. at 151:6–
15. This testimony provides further support for the government’s inevitable discovery argument.
But because Agent Griffith did not testify that she consulted that matrix or any source beyond the
October 2025 extraction to determine whether Graykey would have been successful based on the
phone, see also id. at 158:23–159:4 (“Q: And so when you conducted this, you know, the most
recent extraction, you didn’t know if Graykey was going to be able to do it? A: I was not sure
until I plugged it into the Graykey.”), the Court does not rely on Agent Griffith’s matrix testimony
in its inevitable discovery analysis.
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Blythe argues that the Court cannot rely on the October 2025 extraction to conclude that
law enforcement would have been able to extract data from the iPhone without the passcode. In
particular, he contends that the search warrant did not authorize law enforcement (1) to
“continuously search” the cellphone outside of the warrant’s “explicitly delineated 14-day period,”
Def.’s First Notice of Additional Authority 2, Dkt. 29; or (2) to search the cellphone for the purpose
of performing an experiment to bolster the government’s inevitable discovery argument, Def.’s
Resp. to Order of the Ct. Regarding Additional Briefing 2–3, Dkt. 35. Neither argument succeeds.6
As the defense conceded at the November 13 motion hearing, Blythe’s first argument fails
under the clear text of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. That rule provides, in relevant part:
A warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the seizure of electronic storage
media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored information. Unless
otherwise specified, the warrant authorizes a later review of the media or
information consistent with the warrant. The time for executing the warrant in Rule
41(e)(2)(A) and (f)(1)(A) refers to the seizure or on-site copying of the media or
information, and not to any later off-site copying or review.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Here, law enforcement seized the iPhone within
the 14-day time period set forth in the warrant. The warrant did not place any limitations on the
time in which law enforcement was required to search the device once seized. Cf. United States
6 To the extent that Blythe also argues that the Court cannot consider the October 2025 extraction
in its inevitable discovery analysis because Agent Griffith utilized the passcode to perform that
extraction, see Reply in Support of Mot. to Suppress 10; Def.’s Second Notice of Additional
Authority 1–2, Dkt. 38, his argument misconstrues the role the passcode played in that extraction.
Agent Griffith used the passcode only to replicate the after-first-unlock state in which law
enforcement initially seized and would have maintained the iPhone absent knowledge of its
passcode. Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 119:10–126:5, 159:2–4. That Graykey was able to perform an
extraction on the phone in that state establishes that law enforcement would have been able to
extract the relevant data from the phone even without the passcode. Blythe himself acknowledges
that the inevitable discovery doctrine is applicable if the government “can show that evidence
would have been acquired lawfully through an independent source absent the government
misconduct.” Def.’s Second Notice of Additional Authority 2 (emphasis omitted). Here, the
government makes such a showing by way of the October 2025 extraction.
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v. Gorrell, 360 F. Supp. 2d 48, 55 n.5 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[T]he warrant only required that the search
of the defendant’s home occur on or before January 10, 2003. The warrant did not limit the amount
of time in which the government was required to complete its off-site forensic analysis of the
seized items and the courts have not imposed such a prophylactic constraint on law enforcement.”).
Blythe further argues that the October 2025 extraction was beyond the scope of the search
warrant because it was “experimental” in nature and aimed at bolstering the government’s
inevitable discovery argument. See Def.’s Resp. to Order of the Ct. Regarding Additional Briefing
3. This argument, however, takes too narrow a view of the scope of the warrant and of the purpose
of the October 2025 search. The warrant “authorize[d] a review of electronic storage media and
electronically stored information seized or copied pursuant to th[e] warrant in order to locate
evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities described [therein],” including evidence of child sexual
abuse material. Warrant 10. Blythe does not contest that the first extraction fell within the scope
of this authorization. Because Agent Griffith performed the October 2025 extraction in order to
uncover the very same child sexual abuse material and related evidence found in the first
extraction, it was no less “directed at uncovering the evidence specified in the search warrant” than
was the first. United States v. Loera, 923 F.3d 907, 917 (10th Cir. 2019); see United States v.
Castro, 881 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Officers may conduct a more detailed search of an
electronic device after it was properly seized so long as the later search does not exceed the
probable cause articulated in the original warrant and the device remained secured.”). Contrast,
e.g., Loera, 923 F.3d at 916–21 (collecting cases in which law enforcement searched electronic
data for evidence of crimes different from those identified in the search warrant). The fact that the
government could also use data from the October 2025 extraction to bolster its inevitable discovery
argument does not bring the extraction outside of the warrant’s scope.
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Blythe counters that law enforcement cannot, without securing a new warrant, conduct a
second extraction of an electronic device once an initial extraction is “deemed complete.” Def.’s
Resp. to Order of the Ct. Regarding Additional Briefing 4; see id. at 3–4.7 That argument is
unpersuasive. To start, it is not clear that a data extraction itself constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search. See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 531, 551
(2005) (“[A] search occurs when information from or about the data is exposed to possible human
observation, such as when it appears on a screen, rather than when it is copied by the hard drive or
processed by the computer.”). If a “search” does not occur until law enforcement examines the
contents of an extraction, the focus of the inquiry is not the purpose of the extraction, but the scope
of the review of the extracted data. Here, there is no debate that Agent Griffith examined the data
in the second extraction for evidence of the crimes identified in the warrant. See Tr. of Evidentiary
Hr’g 126:1–127:4, 154:18–155:17, 159:8–10, 163:23–166:3.
In any event, the Court does not perceive a basis for the rigid line Blythe draws. Imagine
that, after performing a full extraction of an electronic device, law enforcement realized that a
subset of the extracted data had been inadvertently deleted, or learned after completing an
extraction using Graykey that an updated version of the software could extract additional data.
The Court is skeptical that, in either context, law enforcement would need to obtain a new search
warrant to conduct a second extraction simply because the process of performing the first
extraction was “complete.” Cf. United States v. White, No. 25-5158, 2025 WL 2946149, at *4–5
(6th Cir. Oct. 17, 2025) (continued searches of electronic devices and digital copies thereof did
7 As the search of the extracted data remains ongoing, see Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g 94:2–9, the
Court interprets Blythe’s argument as centering on the fact that law enforcement had completed
the process of extracting data from the seized iPhone, not on the extent of law enforcement’s
review of that data.
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not violate Fourth Amendment where “the record show[ed] that several devices had encryption
software that prevented the government from fully reviewing those devices in 2021, and with
forensic technology upgrades the government was able to defeat the encryption software in 2023”).
Contra Def.’s Resp. to Order of the Ct. Regarding Additional Briefing 3–4. The relevant analysis
hinges not on whether a given extraction was second in time but on whether it was reasonably
“directed at the evidence specified in the warrant.” Loera, 923 F.3d at 919; see id. at 922
(subsequent search of seized CDs unreasonable because it was “directed at uncovering evidence”
of crime outside the scope of warrant); see also Castro, 881 F.3d at 968 (distinguishing subsequent
searches of electronic devices from subsequent searches of homes); cf. Maryland v. Garrison, 480
U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“[T]he scope of a lawful search is defined by the object of the search and the
places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.” (citation modified)).
Contrast, e.g., United States v. Keszthelyi, 308 F.3d 557, 568–73 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding
subsequent search of residence unlawful because, among other reasons, “[o]nce the execution of a
warrant is complete, . . . the authority conferred by the warrant terminates”). For the reasons
already stated, the Court concludes that the October 2025 extraction was so directed. As such, the
Court finds that the government has established by a preponderance of the evidence that, even
without the iPhone passcode, law enforcement would have been able to gain access to the evidence
discovered on the phone using Graykey.
C. Even If Law Enforcement Violated Blythe’s Fifth Amendment Rights By
Questioning Him After He Invoked His Right To Counsel, The Evidence
Discovered On The Seized iPhone Is Admissible Under The Inevitable
Discovery Doctrine
Finally, Blythe argues that law enforcement violated his Fifth Amendment rights “by
failing to cease all questioning after he invoked his right to counsel” during the voluntary
interview, Def.’s First Notice of Additional Authority 1, and “instead t[aking] him into the house
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and sa[ying] and d[oing] things to him in order to obtain from him passcode information for the
seized devices,” id. at 2. Because law enforcement “‘should have known’ that their words and
actions ‘were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response,’” Blythe contends, they were
unlawful. Id. (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301). As such, he argues that “the fruits of [his]
unlawfully compelled statements, including all passcode information and the evidence derived
from the use thereof, must be suppressed.” Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
As to the evidence found on the seized iPhone, the same inevitable discovery analysis that
applies to Blythe’s Fourth Amendment scope-of-warrant argument resolves his Fifth Amendment
invocation-of-counsel claim. See Brown, 125 F.4th at 1205 (inevitable discovery doctrine
encompasses both Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations). Even if law enforcement violated
Blythe’s Fifth Amendment rights by continuing to question him after he invoked his right to
counsel, suppression of the evidence found on the iPhone is not proper. For the reasons stated, the
government has met its burden of establishing that, even without the passcode, law enforcement
would have gained access to the evidence using Graykey.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s Motion to Suppress, Dkt. 22, is DENIED.8
SO ORDERED.
________________________
DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
United States District Judge
November 23, 2025
8 This decision is without prejudice to any future motion to suppress evidence from the seized
laptop. The Court further defers ruling on Blythe’s argument—raised for the first time in his reply
in support of his motion to suppress—that any statements that he made prior to being read his
Miranda rights must be suppressed. See Reply in Support of Mot. to Suppress 1–5. Finally, this
decision resolves Blythe’s arguments as to the suppression of “evidence discovered as a result of
the search of a cell phone seized from his residence.” Mot. to Suppress 1. It does not resolve any
arguments regarding other evidence, including statements and password information.
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