U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. CAMDEN DEVELOPMENT, INC.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:24-mc-00167-RJL Document8 Filed 12/22/25 Pagelof7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT )
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, )
Petitioner
V. Misc. Action No. 24-167 (RJL)
CAMDEN DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
Respondent )
MEMORANDUM OPINION

December 9Q_ 2025 [Dkt. #1]

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or “Commission”)
seeks enforcement of its administrative subpoena No. WFO-2024-002 (“the subpoena”),
against Camden Development Inc. (“Camden”). The EEOC is currently investigating
Camden based on allegations that its employment practices violated Title VII. Because the
EEOC’s subpoena seeks relevant information and is not overly burdensome, the Court will
GRANT the EEOC’s Application to enforce the subpoena.

I. BACKGROUND

Camden is a mid-sized company that builds and manages apartment communities
across the United States. In March 2023, Kayla Smith (“Smith”), a former Washington
D.C.-based Camden employee, filed a Charge with the EEOC’s Washington Field Office
alleging that Camden violated Title VII by subjecting her to sexual harassment and

retaliation. See Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”) [Dkt. #1-2, Attach. A].

Case 1:24-mc-00167-RJL Document8 Filed 12/22/25 Page2of7

Specifically, Smith alleged that Camden promoted a workplace culture of non-
consensual touching by showing an orientation video to all new hires that encouraged
employees to hug each other. Jd. The video did not discuss permission or consent. Id.
One portion of the video, entitled “The Hug Life,” describes hugging as a part of Camden’s
culture, stating that “hugging is simply a part of who we are.” Declaration of EEOC
Washington Field Office Deputy Director Phillip Hoefs {| 12 (“Hoefs Decl.”) [Dkt. 1-2].
Other parts of the video show images of Camden employees hugging, as well as audio clips
of employees describing Camden’s hug culture. Jd. Smith alleged that Camden’s hugging
culture enabled her manager to sexually assault her at work. See Charge. The manager
allegedly locked himself in a room with Smith and asked her for a hug. /d. And because
of the Camden hugging policy, she complied. Jd. The hug then escalated into further
unwanted kissing and sexual touching. Jd.

The EEOC initiated an investigation concerning Camden’s potentially unlawful
employment practices. Through the investigation, it learned that Camden’s orientation
video was used companywide and that 22 employees across Camden’s offices have
complained about sexual harassment during the relevant timeframe. Hoefs Decl. ¥ 14. As
part of its investigation, the EEOC sent a Request for Information (“RFI”) requesting a
roster of individuals that Camden employed from March 1, 2019, to December 13, 2023,
as well as their contact information, so the Commission could determine whether other
employees have been subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct. Jd. 4] 14, 16. Camden

refused the EEOC’s request several times, despite multiple deficiency letters from the

Case 1:24-mc-00167-RJL Document8 Filed 12/22/25 Page3of7

EEOC, claiming that the request was unduly burdensome. Jd. §{] 17-24. Camden would
only agree to identify its Washington D.C.-based employees. Id.

On July 1, 2024, the EEOC issued the administrative subpoena at issue here,
directing Camden to:

Provide, in an unredacted, sortable Excel spreadsheet, a roster of individuals
employed by Respondent from March 1, 2019, to December 13, 2023. For
each employee, provide the following:

a. Full name;

b. Last known address;

c. Last known email address;

d. Last known phone numbers (home and cell).

Id. § 25. Camden filed a petition to revoke the subpoena, which the EEOC rejected. Id.
4§ 26-27. Camden has continued to refuse to comply with the EEOC’s subpoena, which
the EEOC claims is hampering its investigation. Id. § 28.

On December 18, 2024, the EEOC filed an Application, [Dkt. #1], asking this Court
to issue an order to show cause for why its administrative subpoena should not be enforced.
This Court issued the order to show cause on May 14, 2025. [Dkt. #2]. Camden filed a
response to the order, (“Resp. Br.”) [Dkt. #3], and the EEOC filed a reply brief asking this
Court to enforce the subpoena, (“Petr. Reply Br.”’) [Dkt. #4].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“A district court’s role in a proceeding to enforce an administrative subpoena is
extremely limited.” EEOC v. C & P Tel. Co., 813 F. Supp. 874, 875 (D.D.C. 1993) (citing
FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 871-72 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). The Court must merely

“satisfy itself that the charge is valid and that the material requested is ‘relevant’ to the

Case 1:24-mc-00167-RJL Document8 Filed 12/22/25 Page4of/7

charge.” McLane Co. v. E.E.O.C., 581 U.S. 72, 76 (2017) (quoting Univ. of Pa. v.
E.E.0.C., 493 U.S. 182, 191 (1990)).

Courts have given a generous construction to what material is “relevant” in the
context of EEOC subpoena enforcement actions. The Supreme Court recently reiterated
that the EEOC has the right to access “‘any evidence of any person being investigated or
proceeded against that relates to unlawful employment practices covered by’ Title VII and
is relevant to the charge under investigation.” Jd. “[V]irtually any material that might cast
light on the allegations against the employer” is fair game. E.E.O.C. v. Shell Oil Co., 466
US. 54, 68-69 (1984). If the material requested is relevant, the district court should
enforce the subpoena “unless the employer establishes that the subpoena is ‘too indefinite,’
has been issued for an ‘illegitimate purpose,’ or is unduly burdensome.” McLane Co., 581
U.S. at 72 n.26; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Ekasala, 62 F. Supp. 3d 88,
93 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).

Il. ANALYSIS

The EEOC’s subpoena shall be enforced because it is within the Commission’s
authority, seeks relevant information, and is not overly burdensome.

First, the EEOC has the authority to issue the subpoena. Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 permits the EEOC to issue a subpoena to obtain evidence from an employer
that is relevant to a pending investigation. McLane Co. v. E.E.0.C., 581 U.S. 72, 75-76
(2017). Here, the EEOC is investigating a Charge alleging sexual harassment in violation
of Title VII. The subpoena was issued by an appropriate agency official and contains the

information required in the EEOC’s regulations. See Subpoena [Dkt. #1-2, Attach. K].
4

Case 1:24-mc-00167-RJL Document8 Filed 12/22/25 Page5of7

Second, the information the EEOC seeks—the names and contact information of the
individuals employed by Camden during the five-year period the hug-forward orientation
video was in use—is plainly relevant to the allegations in the Charge. The EEOC is entitled
to access “any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer.” Shell
Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 68-69. Identifying the names and contact information of current and
former Camden employees clearly has the potential to “cast light” on Smith’s allegations
about Camden’s company-wide orientation video and hug culture. As the EEOC explained,
Camden’s employee roster and contact information will allow it to interview employees
around the country to understand the extent to which Camden’s orientation video promoted
a companywide policy requiring non-consensual hugging in the workplace, which
allegedly enabled the sexual harassment of Smith and possibly others. See Memorandum
of Law in Support of Application at 13-15 (“Petr. Mem.”) [Dkt. #1-1].

Camden objects to disclosing the names of its employees nationwide, arguing that
the request is overly broad and irrelevant to Smith’s “geographically limited charge.”
Resp. Br. at 9-11 [Dkt. #3]. But the EEOC has adequately demonstrated the relevancy of
the requested information to its investigation, which extends beyond Camden’s D.C. office.
The EEOC issued the subpoena after learning that Camden’s “hug life” videos were used
nationwide in new-employee orientations and that Camden had received over twenty
sexual harassment complaints from employees across the country during the relevant
period, including two complaints from employees located in Texas and North Carolina

concerning unwelcome hugs or requests for hugs. Petr. Mem. at 15; Petr. Reply Br. at 7.

Case 1:24-mc-00167-RJL Document8 Filed 12/22/25 Page6of/7

Camden’s argument that the subpoena goes beyond the standard articulated in Rule
26(b)(1) is unavailing, since it can point to no binding legal authority holding that the
relevancy standard for civil litigation discovery applies in the administrative subpoena
enforcement action context. See Resp. Br. at 10; Petr. Reply Br. at 5-6. Indeed, many
courts have held that the scope of an EEOC investigation may go beyond the specific
allegations in the original charge. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sol Mexican Grill, LLC, 415 F. Supp.
3d5, 14 (D.D.C. 2019) (“[T]he EEOC is not limited in its investigation by the allegations
in the charge.”); EEOC v. Cambridge Tile Mfg. Co., 590 F.2d 205, 206 (6th Cir. 1979)
(holding that the EEOC has the power to “investigate a broader picture of discrimination
which unfolds in the course of a reasonable investigation of a specific charge’).

Third, the EEOC’s request for Camden’s companywide roster and accompanying
contact information is not overly vague or unduly burdensome. The information the EEOC
seeks is standard and sufficiently specific. And the request is not unduly burdensome
because Camden cannot show that compliance with the subpoena “threatens to unduly
disrupt or seriously hinder normal operations of a business.” Ekasala, 62 F. Supp. 3d at
94. Camden concedes that it has the information the subpoena seeks but complains that it
is not maintained in the format specified by the EEOC. Resp. Br. at 13. While it may be
true that the process of compiling the requested data into the requested format will “divert
personnel from their regular duties and impose considerable administrative costs on the
company,” id., Camden has not made the requisite showing that the burden is excessive in

terms of time, cost, or other resources. See Ekasala, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 94.

Case 1:24-mc-00167-RJL Document8 Filed 12/22/25 Page /7of/7

Camden also argues that this Court should not enforce the subpoena because another
judge dismissed claims Smith brought based, in part, on Camden’s hugging policy. Resp.
Br. at 14-15. But Camden’s claim and issue preclusion arguments fail because, as the
EEOC points out, the doctrine of claim and issue preclusions apply only when successive
litigation has been brought. Petr. Reply Br. at 12-14. See also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S.
880, 892 (2008); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 878-881 (D.C. Cir. 1977). No
successive litigation has yet been brought, and Camden cannot raise preclusion arguments
based on speculation about what future claims the EEOC might bring in the future.

Finally, I will DENY the EEOC’s request to order Camden to pay the costs of
instituting this action. Petr. Mem. at 16. Petitioner failed to cite any legal authority to
support its request, and courts have denied such requests under similar circumstances. See,
e.g., EEOC v. VisionPro Networks, Inc., No. 24-MC-00356, 2024 WL 3643818, at *12
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2024), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. EEOC v.
Visionpro Networks, Inc., 2024 WL 3875945 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2024) (rejecting request
for EEOC enforcement costs citing a lack of supporting legal authority).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, I will GRANT the EEOC’s Application for

Enforcement and ORDER Camden to produce all information requested in the subpoena.

I will DENY the EEOC’s request for costs. An Order consistent with the above

Mn

Richard J. Leon
USS. District Judge

accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.