PINNEY v. BRIDENSTINE

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PATRICIA L. PINNEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
JARED ISAACMAN, Administrator, National
Aeronautics & Space Administration,
Defendant.
Case No. 19-cv-2259 (JMC)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Patricia 	Pinney 	sued 	the 	Administrator 	of 	the 	National 	Aeronautics 	and 	Space
Administration (NASA)—her former employer—alleging that her managers at the agency
discriminated and retaliated against her in myriad ways.1 Both sides moved for summary
judgment. Pinney’s motion, ECF 54, is DENIED and NASA’s, ECF 55, is GRANTED. No
reasonable jury could find for Pinney on any of her claims.2
I. 	BACKGROUND
Although both sides filed motions for summary judgment, Pinney has—as the Court
explains further below—effectively abandoned her motion. See infra 15–16. The Court therefore
only considers NASA’s motion for summary judgment and accordingly recounts the evidence here
in the light most favorable to Pinney. See Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
1 Administrator Isaacman has been substituted as the Defendant in this case for his predecessor in office. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 25(d). The Court refers to the Defendant as NASA throughout the opinion.
2 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by
omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to
documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the
top of each page.
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 1 of 33

2
A. Pinney’s experience with Laura Koren.
After a stint at the agency in the mid-2000’s, Patricia Pinney returned to work at NASA as
an accountant in 2015. See ECF 56-3 ¶¶ 1–3; ECF 68-2 ¶¶ 1–3. The issues that led to this case
began in 2017. Early that year, Pinney missed the first half of a two-hour committee meeting at
which she was scheduled to give a presentation. See ECF 56-3 ¶ 22; ECF 68-2 ¶ 22 (admitting she
missed “roughly half” of this meeting); ECF 57 at 80–82. Another member of that committee then
asked Pinney’s manager at the time—Laura Koren—to remove Pinney from the committee.
ECF 57 at 86. When Koren communicated that request to Pinney and expressed a willingness to
try to keep Pinney on the committee, Pinney responded bluntly: “Go ahead and remove me then.”
Id. Koren then removed Pinney from the committee. See id.
Within the next month or two, another conflict that plays a role in this case arose. One of
Pinney’s colleagues filed a complaint against Koren and Pinney provided evidence in the
investigation of that complaint. See ECF 58-2 ¶ 21; ECF 58-6 at 35–38 (Pinney describing her role
in this incident and saying the incident began in “March or April of 2017”).3 Pinney says that in
the months that ensued she “receiv[ed] threatening and intimidating e-mails from” Koren, which
prompted her to complain to a more senior official in Pinney’s division at NASA. ECF 58-2 ¶ 23.
That complaint led to an investigation in which the senior official ultimately concluded that “there
had been no formal harassment.” ECF 68-3 at 24.
Meanwhile, the conflict between Pinney and Koren was roiling. In notes Pinney took, she
described a series of complaints Koren lobbed at her. See ECF 68-3 at 27–32. Among other things,
Koren accused Pinney during this time of “refusing to complete an assignment,” id. at 27, failing
3 In her opposition to NASA’s motion, Pinney argues that she provided evidence in this matter on February 10, 2017.
See ECF 68-2 ¶ 23. None of the record citations she includes in that section of her filing suggest that date is correct,
and her own prior testimony puts the date in March or April of 2017. See ECF 58-6 at 35–38; ECF 58-2 ¶ 21 (claiming
the incident happened in “Spring 2017”).
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 2 of 33

3
to “understand . . . work requirements,” id. at 28, and disobeying the “requirements with regard to
Telework,” id. at 31. This string of events culminated in Pinney’s “interim” performance review
in November 2017. Id. Both Koren and Koren’s manager—Pinney’s second-level manager—
attended that review. See id. at 31–32 (describing Koren and Kevin Buford’s conduct during this
meeting); ECF 56-3 ¶ 8; ECF 68-2 ¶ 8. The second-level manager told Pinney that “people were
complaining” about her and “did not like” her, that he “could claim” Pinney had “been harassing”
a coworker, and that she “was incompetent,” did “sloppy” work, and “could not be trusted.”
ECF 68-3 at 31–32. Despite the harsh feedback at that “interim” performance review, when Pinney
received her final performance review for the year around seven months later, she was given a
rating of “Level 3 Fully Successful.” ECF 57 at 55. That score was in the middle of the scale that
ran from “Level 5 Distinguished” and “Level 4 Accomplished,” to “Level 1 Unacceptable,” with
seemingly no option to give a “Level 2” score. Id.
Things were apparently calmer for Pinney in the first half of 2018, but that summer her
conflict with her supervisors kicked off again. See ECF 58-2 ¶¶ 23–26, 29 (Pinney describes the
next incident after she complained in November 2017 as taking place in summer 2018). That
summer, Pinney’s son’s schizophrenia worsened. See id. ¶ 26. So that she could care for her son,
she contacted a human resources specialist to ask about using Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) leave. See id. ¶ 27. Around the same time, Koren took away some of Pinney’s substantive
responsibilities, “severely curtailing [Pinney’s] workload.” Id. ¶ 29.
Then, another dispute about Pinney’s attendance arose. At the end of July 2018, Pinney
went to what she describes as a “business lunch” with a “former NASA policy analyst and a current
NASA manager.” Id. ¶ 30. Building records show that Pinney left her building at NASA at 11:57
A.M. and returned at 2:03 P.M. ECF 56-3 ¶ 38; ECF 68-2 ¶ 38 (admitting that time stamps are
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 3 of 33

4
uncontested). But when Pinney entered her hours for that day in July, she did not account for the
missed time, instead recording her time as if she had worked a full day. See ECF 56-3 ¶ 39;
ECF 68-2 ¶ 39 (explaining why she felt she was justified in not modifying time, but not denying
she entered time this way); see also ECF 57 at 104. After some back and forth between Koren and
Pinney about Pinney’s time sheet, Koren charged Pinney with being “AWOL” (absent without
leave) for one hour. See ECF 68-12 at 2; ECF 68-13 at 2. Pinney says this was unjustified. She
testifies that her second-level supervisor was “aware of” this lunch meeting and says that the other
NASA employee at the meeting also “reported” the “meeting as a business meeting.” ECF 58-2
¶ 30. Pinney also says that she attempted to edit her time entry to use leave for the lunch after
Koren confronted her about the issue, but that Koren’s directions were unclear and led her to only
use an hour of leave rather than the two hours that Koren was apparently requiring. ECF 68-2 ¶ 40.
Several days after Koren issued Pinney the AWOL citation for this lunch, Koren and a
human resources specialist met with Pinney to discuss her request for FMLA leave. ECF 56-3
¶ 41; ECF 68-2 ¶ 41. Koren emailed Pinney after that meeting to memorialize their discussion. See
ECF 57 at 106; see also ECF 56-3 ¶ 42; ECF 68-2 ¶ 42. Koren instructed Pinney that “Telework
cannot be used as a method to care for a loved one.” ECF 57 at 106. Koren also laid out the
requirements for Pinney’s use of FMLA leave, including that Pinney would request the leave in
advance wherever possible. See id. Koren concluded that “FMLA still requires an employee to
adhere to authorized and established work schedules[,] as the purpose of FMLA is to provide a
work/life balance while still meeting work requirements as work still has to get done.” Id.
Within the next month, Pinney had further issues with Koren related to leave. At the end
of August, Pinney left the office 30 minutes early because she was suffering a “severe headache.”
ECF 58-2 ¶ 33. Pinney says that Koren and her second-level supervisor “appeared to have” already
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 4 of 33

5
“left their offices” when Pinney was leaving that day, but Pinney “reported to them by email at the
beginning of the next business day” and asked “to use available sick or annual leave.” Id. Koren,
however, “refused” Pinney’s request and charged Pinney with being AWOL for 30 minutes.
Id. ¶ 34. 	That 	same 	week, 	Koren 	sent 	Pinney 	an 	email 	“confirm[ing] 	[their]
conversation . . . concerning [Pinney’s] unscheduled leave usage.” ECF 57 at 114. Koren wrote
that, “[o]ver the past several months,” Pinney had “taken an increased amount of unscheduled
absences,” and that there had “been repeated instances” in which Pinney had “failed to inform”
Koren that Pinney was “not in a work status.” Id. Koren then listed her expectations for Pinney
with regard to leave and included a bulleted list of issues Koren had identified with Pinney’s time
keeping for the “current pay period.” Id. at 114–15. The letter concluded by warning Pinney that
“unscheduled absences may lead to administrative actions” and that “AWOL charges or any
misconduct” could “result in disciplinary action.” Id. at 115. Then, within the next couple of days,
Koren sent Pinney another email informing Pinney that going forward she needed to provide a
doctor’s note for any medical appointment that took place during Pinney’s official work hours. See
ECF 57 at 120; ECF 58-2 ¶ 42; ECF 56-3 ¶ 52.
Two weeks later, Koren issued Pinney a “counseling” letter “concerning [Pinney’s] failure
to follow” the directions Koren had outlined. ECF 57 at 122. Koren wrote that although she “could
have issued [Pinney] a disciplinary action” based on her conduct, Koren would instead “like to
work with [Pinney] to establish better communication.” Id. Koren “advised” Pinney “that future
incidents of this type . . . may result in AWOL charges, telework termination and/or disciplinary
action,” but confirmed that the counseling letter “is non-disciplinary.” Id. Despite that, in an email
Koren sent the same day she sent the letter, Koren informed Pinney that she was issuing AWOL
charges for two recent days on which Koren said Pinney entered time for doctor’s appointments
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 5 of 33

6
but did not submit doctor’s notes before the end of the relevant pay period. See id. at 126. Pinney
points out that she emailed Koren the day before the pay period ended notifying her that she was
“waiting for the medical invoices,” to which Koren responded that she was “not waiting for the
medical invoices” but instead needed only a doctor’s note “that state[d] the day and time of the
appointment.” ECF 68-3 at 56. And Pinney did ultimately submit a doctor’s note for these two
appointments, but she acknowledges that she did so after the pay period ended. See ECF 68-2 at
25 (describing Pinney Decl., Ex. I, filed at ECF 68-3 at 62).
In the next month, Koren charged Pinney with being AWOL five more times. See ECF 56-
3 ¶¶ 59, 67; ECF 68-2 ¶¶ 59, 67 (Pinney contests whether the AWOL notices were “authorized”
and seeks to explain why they were not justified but does not contest that Koren issued them).
Meanwhile in that same month, Koren and Pinney were in conflict about whether Pinney was
performing her work as expected. Pinney had recently been assigned a project by her second-level
supervisor. See ECF 58-2 ¶ 53. When Koren met with Pinney to discuss the project, Koren told
Pinney that Pinney had failed to meet certain “deliverable requirements” Koren had set for the
project. Id. ¶ 55. Pinney then asked Koren for resources she would need to meet those requirements
but says the tool Koren provided was not yet usable. See id. ¶ 58. That same day, Koren cancelled
Pinney’s scheduled telework for later in the week and told Pinney that she should be in the office
to meet with Koren. See id. ¶ 59. Pinney asked Koren to delay the meeting for two days because
Pinney’s husband was travelling at the time and unavailable to stay home with their son while she
went to the office. See id. ¶ 60. Koren refused that request and Pinney then called in sick on the
day of the scheduled meeting. See id. ¶¶ 60, 62. Koren rescheduled that meeting, and Pinney again
used sick leave on the date of the rescheduled meeting. See id. ¶¶ 63–64; see also ECF 57 at 136.
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 6 of 33

7
The week of the cancelled in-person meetings, Pinney contacted NASA’s Office of
Diversity and Equal Opportunity and NASA’s Anti-Harassment office “regarding the ongoing
harassment and discrimination” that Pinney was “experiencing from Ms. Koren.” ECF 58-2 ¶ 65.
And within a few weeks, in early November 2018, Pinney’s attorney had notified NASA of “his
representation and Ms. Koren’s ongoing harassment concerning [Pinney’s] usage of FMLA and
other leave.” Id. ¶ 51.
B. Pinney’s experience with Nestor Tezna.
In the meantime, however, Pinney was assigned a new manager. At the end of October
2018, Nestor Tezna became Pinney’s immediate supervisor. ECF 56-3 ¶ 6; ECF 68-2 ¶ 6. Tezna,
in turn, reported to Koren. ECF 56-3 ¶¶ 6–7; ECF 68-2 ¶¶ 6–7. When it was time for Pinney’s
interim review in November 2018, both Tezna and Koren attended. ECF 58-2 ¶ 67. Koren “led the
meeting.” Id. She told Pinney that her “NASA employment was at risk” and that she was “failing
in several performance elements.” Id. Koren also told Pinney that her “telework privileges were
being suspended.” Id. ¶ 68. Pinney “wrote a rebuttal” of Koren’s “charges against [her] in [her]
mid-term performance review,” and, among other things, claims that Koren “admitted” she “never
assigned” Pinney one of the projects that Koren accused her of “failing” in the review. Id. ¶ 67.
Around the time of the review or shortly thereafter, Tezna began to change some of the
leave requirements Koren had imposed on Pinney. See ECF 58-2 ¶ 68. He “rescinded . . . Koren’s
documentation and notification requirements” for Pinney’s usage of FMLA leave. Id. That, Pinney
says, allowed her to “use the same sick-time requirements as [her] coworkers.” Id. And because
her telework privileges had been suspended, Pinney was in fact using more FMLA leave in this
period. Whereas she used one day of FMLA leave per pay period while she was allowed to
telework, she was now using five days of FMLA leave per period. See id. ¶ 69.
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 7 of 33

8
Pinney did have an incident related to her use of FMLA leave in December 2018. That
month, Pinney asked to use four weeks of her annual leave so that she could take her son to China.
See ECF 58-2 ¶ 70; ECF 57 at 28:23–29:9. Pinney explained to Tezna that her “son was suicidal
unless he” could travel to China “to visit his son on his first birthday.” ECF 58-2 ¶ 70. Pinney
hoped that while she was in China with her son, she could prepare her son’s wife to care for the
son so that he could stay in China. See id. That, Pinney told Tezna, would enable Pinney to stop
using FMLA leave when she returned from the trip. See id. Tezna denied Pinney’s request to use
her annual leave for this trip. See id. In response, Pinney applied to use FMLA leave, rather than
annual leave, for the same trip. See id. ¶ 71. That leave request was denied too. See id. ¶ 72. But
within days of the denial, the federal government shut down and Pinney was furloughed. ECF 56-
3 ¶ 85; ECF 68-2 ¶ 85. Because she was furloughed for the entirety of the trip, Pinney was able to
travel to China despite the denial of her leave requests. ECF 56-3 ¶ 86; ECF 68-2 ¶ 86; ECF 57 at
27:8–15. And based on additional documentation that Pinney submitted two days before the
government shutdown began, NASA ultimately determined—retroactively—that Pinney was
allowed to use FMLA leave for the China trip. ECF 56-3 ¶¶ 83, 87–88; ECF 68-2 ¶¶ 83, 87–88.
Despite this hiccup, things seemingly went well between Tezna and Pinney in the first half
of 2019. See ECF 56-3 ¶ 92; ECF 68-2 ¶ 92. In early April, Tezna told Pinney that he was “pleased
with the work [she had] been doing” and that he thought that “overall [she] ha[d] been performing
at the satisfactory level or above.” ECF 57 at 153. He reinstated her telework privileges and
allowed her to work remotely two days a week. See id. Shortly thereafter, he upped the number to
allow three days a week. See ECF 58-2 ¶ 78. In the annual performance review that Tezna
delivered in the first half of 2019—the review covered the period from May 1, 2018, to April 30,
2019—Tezna rated Pinney as “Level 3 Fully Successful.” ECF 60-1 at 1.
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 8 of 33

9
But things took a turn in August. Pinney had recently given Tezna a NASA policy
document she had rewritten. ECF 56-3 ¶ 93; ECF 68-2 ¶ 93. After reviewing the policy, Tezna
“notified [Pinney that] he was not satisfied with” the work she had done. ECF 57 at 9. Tezna
apparently did not want Pinney to “rewrite” the policy document, but instead to start with the
existing policy document’s text and “only mak[e] necessary changes to it.” Id. In response, Pinney
explained why the “policy had been rewritten,” but Tezna “remained firm” that Pinney “was to
start with the older, original policy and to ‘keep’ as much as possible.” Id. at 9–10. Tezna gave
Pinney twelve days to turn in the revised draft. See ECF 58-2 ¶ 83.
During those twelve days, Tezna gave Pinney some additional direction. First, Tezna
forwarded Pinney an email with information about the compliance review process that applies to
policy documents and asked Pinney to “ensure that” she followed that direction in completing the
policy documents she was working on. ECF 57 at 157. Next, a couple of days after that, Tezna
sent Pinney an email in which he provided bulleted feedback on Pinney’s draft of the policy
document. See ECF 57 at 161. In that email, Tezna wrote that he was “concerned” that he was “not
able to use [Pinney’s] revision” because he was “having to rewrite nearly every paragraph and
every section.” Id. Tezna sent back to Pinney what he had “done so far” so that she could “see the
changes” he had made and asked Pinney to “give [it] another try.” Id. He concluded the email with
a note that, because Pinney was a “senior policy analyst,” Tezna “expect[ed] a higher level of care
and caution when updating policies.” Id.
Pinney, for her part, thinks Tezna’s criticism of her rewrite was unfounded. She points out
that she had worked on the rewrite in “late 2018 and 2019”—indeed she testified that she had been
working on the project since 2016, see ECF 58-6 at 66—and it had already been “reviewed and
approved” by Koren and Koren’s supervisor. ECF 58-2 ¶ 81. Pinney chalks Tezna’s criticism of
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 9 of 33

10
this policy document up to retaliation. On July 29, 2019—the day before she gave Tezna the first
draft of this policy document—she filed her complaint in this case. See ECF 1; ECF 68-2 ¶ 93.
Pinney submitted a revised version of the policy document on September 16, 2019.
ECF 56-3 ¶ 106; ECF 68-2 ¶ 106. Around a month later, Tezna sent Pinney a warning letter
notifying her that her “performance” on the policy document “was at unacceptable levels.” ECF 57
at 11. In that letter, Tezna “cited examples of issues with [Pinney’s] last revision.” Id. A week after
she received the letter, Pinney responded, “rebutting” each of the examples Tezna identified. Id.
Meanwhile in September, two other relevant events took place. First, Tezna announced a
change to the telework policy for his entire division. ECF 56-3 ¶ 103; ECF 68-2 ¶ 103. Everyone
would now be limited to two days of telework per week, and everyone was required to be in the
office on Tuesdays. ECF 56-3 ¶ 103; ECF 68-2 ¶ 103. Pinney, however, informed Tezna that she
could only come in every other Tuesday. See ECF 57 at 166. That was because her husband’s work
schedule did not allow him to stay home every Tuesday “to monitor [their] son’s mental control.”
Id. Tezna agreed to allow Pinney to telework on the Tuesdays she needed to stay home. See id. at
165. Second, at the end of September, Pinney contracted shingles. See ECF 58-2 ¶ 87. Pinney told
Tezna about her diagnosis. See ECF 57 at 165.
As for the conflict about the policy document, Pinney’s “rebuttal” of Tezna’s warning letter
did not put the issue to rest. See ECF 58-2 ¶¶ 89–90. Rather than respond to that letter, Tezna’s
next step was to issue a performance improvement plan. See id. ¶ 90. The plan described Pinney’s
performance as “unacceptable” and said it was being implemented “to afford [Pinney] a
demonstration period to raise [her] performance to at least the minimal acceptable level of ‘Fully
Successful.’” ECF 57 at 168. According to the document, Pinney was “failing to . . . [p]rovide
comprehensive, clear, and concise advice, assistance and interpretive guidance on complex issues
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 10 of 33

11
in Supervisor assigned Subject Matter area of expertise to stakeholders.” Id. at 169. The document
listed Pinney’s work on the revised policy document as an “example[]” of her “unacceptable
performance.” Id. And the “[r]equirement” for her to “bring [her] performance up to” the needed
level was to complete the revised version of that policy as laid out in the performance plan. Id. The
plan was effective from November 1 to December 3, 2019. See id. at 168. On December 3, Pinney’s
“performance [would] be reviewed and rated based on the criteria outlined” in the plan. Id.
When Tezna emailed Pinney a copy of the performance improvement plan, he asked her to
submit her revised version of the policy document by November 22. See ECF 57 at 177. A few
days later, Pinney had her “first (and last) meeting with . . . Tezna about” the performance plan.
ECF 58-2 ¶ 93. At the meeting, Tezna “handed” Pinney a “printed copy of [her] last submission
with his comments handwritten to the side.” Id. According to Pinney, Tezna “emphasiz[ed] that
his ‘comments’ primarily were questions.” Id. Pinney “typed all of . . . Tezna’s comments into
[her] next submission and made the edits indicated.” Id. ¶ 94.
Around the same time as that meeting, Tezna moved Pinney from her “office cubicle
within” her division’s area “to a cubicle” in a “common area.” ECF 58-2 ¶ 92. Her new location
was “isolated,” “unsecure, noisy[,] and generally used for . . . meetings and birthday parties.” Id.
Coworkers asked Pinney “[w]hat happened.” Id. Pinney’s second-level supervisor at the time—
Koren had by this point moved on from that role—testified that Pinney was moved from one of
the “preferred spaces” to “one of the two wors[t] places in the whole office.” ECF 58-5 at 8. He
also explained that Pinney was the “only person” at her seniority level who was moved, and that
he was “surprised” Tezna had made Pinney move. Id. at 6, 8.
Turning back to the revisions of the policy document, Pinney gave Tezna her revision on
November 15, which she described at the time as the due date. See ECF 57 at 180. It is unclear
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 11 of 33

12
when or why the due date changed from November 22—as indicated in Tezna’s email delivering
the performance plan—to November 15. After Pinney turned in her revised version, Tezna told
her he was “too busy to review” the performance plan. ECF 58-2 ¶ 95. But Tezna did assign Pinney
another project on November 15. See id. ¶ 96. He asked Pinney to revise a different policy
document and set an “aggressive deadline” of December 6. Id. Pinney describes this new project
as “major” and “complex,” and says that, as of November 2023, a public NASA database estimated
its date of completion as December 24, 2024. Id. ¶ 97. Near the end of November, Pinney was
experiencing technical problems with her computer so requested an extension of two business days
for this project, which pushed the deadline to December 10. See ECF 57 at 184. Tezna had
previously offered a one-day extension, but he approved the additional day when Pinney asked for
it. See id. A week later, Pinney told Tezna that she would not be able to meet the extended deadline.
See id. at 186–87. She had experienced further technical problems and lost saved versions of her
work, and apparently had come to realize that the project was more complex than she initially
thought. See id. Pinney said she would “work steadily on th[e] project” but said she could not “give
[Tezna] a deadline” of when she would “complete th[e] project.” Id. at 187.
In her email notifying Tezna that she would not make the deadline, Pinney also discussed
another recent event that was making it difficult for her to complete the project. In early November,
Pinney had been diagnosed with breast cancer. See ECF 58-2 ¶ 91. In this email in early December,
Pinney told Tezna that it was “stupid” for her to “hav[e] this kind of pressure on [her] right now”
because she was “on the fast track for a lumpectomy surgery” and had a range of things to deal
with given her cancer diagnosis. ECF 57 at 187.
Tezna responded to this email the next day. He wrote that if Pinney was “planning to take
time off due to illness [he] would imagine that [Pinney] would need to plan (especially if it’s
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 12 of 33

13
surgery).” ECF 57 at 190. As for Pinney’s explanation that she could not make the deadline or set
a new one, Tezna wrote: “I am not sure what you mean by you can’t provide me a deadline. I
actually have given you a deadline and extended it once already. I can extend it again and give you
through December 19th to complete.” Id. Tezna also extended the end date on Pinney’s
performance plan to December 19 “for this reason as well.” Id. Pinney responded almost
immediately to Tezna “[a]gree[ing]” that “an additional week should be about right,” but saying
“let’s make the deadline due COB Friday December 20th, instead of Thursday.” Id. Tezna did not
object to Pinney’s proposal of moving the deadline. See ECF 56-3 ¶ 127; ECF 68-2 ¶ 127. Pinney
ultimately submitted this project on December 22. See ECF 58-2 ¶ 105.
Tezna never responded to Pinney about this project. See ECF 58-2 ¶ 105. Instead, at their
next meeting on January 15, he gave Pinney a notice of proposed removal. See id. ¶ 107; ECF 57
at 194 (document is dated January 14). In that letter, Tezna notified Pinney that he was “proposing
to remove [her] from her position.” ECF 57 at 194. He also told Pinney—for the first time, she
says—that she had “failed to demonstrate acceptable performance” during her performance plan.
Id. at 195; see ECF 58-2 ¶ 107. Tezna explained that “[a]fter three attempts at revising” the policy
document that was the subject of the performance plan—not the second one that he assigned while
Pinney was on the performance plan—“the document [Pinney] submitted still requires a significant
number of updates before it can be moved forward to the next phase in the policy review cycle.”
ECF 57 at 195. Tezna then gave several examples of issues with Pinney’s revision of the document.
See id. The notice of proposed removal concluded with a section outlining Pinney’s “right to
answer” the notice “orally and/or in writing” within 15 calendar days and explained that “[n]o final
decision will be made until [her] reply or replies have been received and considered, or if no reply
is received, until after the 15-day time period has expired.” Id. at 196.
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 13 of 33

14
On January 30, Pinney submitted her response to the notice, arguing that it should be
“rescinded or withdrawn.” ECF 56-3 ¶ 136; ECF 68-2 ¶ 136; see ECF 57 at 204–11. The same
day, Pinney applied to retire, with her retirement effective the very next day. See ECF 57 at 202.
Pinney had not been planning to retire prior to receiving the notice of proposed removal but made
the decision to do so in light of her mental health care provider’s “recommendation that [Pinney]
take a leave of absence” and what Pinney describes as the “vile discrimination and retaliation” she
was experiencing at work. ECF 60-10 at 1; ECF 58-2 ¶ 109. Because Pinney retired, NASA
“canceled” Pinney’s proposed removal and no decision was made as to whether she would, in fact,
be removed. ECF 57 at 201; see ECF 56-3 ¶ 139; ECF 68-2 ¶ 139 (not contesting this aspect of
NASA’s statement of undisputed facts).
C. This lawsuit.
Pinney’s complaint was already pending in this Court at the time of her retirement. See
ECF 1. The then-assigned Judge stayed the case in March 2020 to allow Pinney time to
administratively exhaust additional claims that she wished to add to her complaint given her
retirement. See ECF 11. In January 2021, Pinney filed an amended complaint. See ECF 16. The
amended complaint alleges that a slew of actions taken by Pinney’s managers—the AWOL
notices, leave requirements, performance reviews, letters of warning, performance improvement
plan, notice of removal, and several other actions, see, e.g., id. ¶ 105—violated the Family and
Medical Leave Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See
id. ¶¶ 98–175. Pinney also brings a claim for constructive discharge. See id. ¶¶ 176–84. Both sides
moved for summary judgment. See ECF 54; ECF 55.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must “show[] that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 14 of 33

15
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court “may neither make credibility determinations nor weigh the
evidence.” Steele v. Mattis, 899 F.3d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 2018). “Instead, summary judgment is
proper only when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and drawing all
reasonable inferences accordingly, no reasonable jury could find in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id.
III. 	ANALYSIS
Pinney brought nine claims in her complaint. See ECF 16 ¶¶ 98–184. She has abandoned
the first three of those claims, all of which arose under the Family and Medical Leave Act. See id.
¶¶ 98–125; ECF 68-1 at 9 n.3 (“Plaintiff . . . does not object to the dismissal of Counts I–III of her
Amended Complaint.”). The Court therefore grants judgment to NASA on those counts.
That leaves Pinney’s claims for disparate treatment, retaliation, and constructive discharge
under the Rehabilitation Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). As to those
claims, Pinney has effectively conceded the Court must deny her motion for summary judgment.
The opening sentence in her reply brief says that the “main facts in this case are disputed such that
a jury trial is warranted.” ECF 71 at 4. That assertion, of course, squarely contradicts Pinney’s
request for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). Nor is Pinney’s fallback request coherent.
She says that if “there are not enough genuine issues of material fact” to warrant a trial the Court
should grant her summary judgment because “the preponderance of [the] evidence weighs in her
favor.” ECF 71 at 4. But Pinney “bears the burden of proof” on her claims at trial; that means to
win on summary judgment she must “demonstrat[e] why the record is so one-sided as to rule out
the prospect of” NASA “prevailing” at trial. Wright & Miller, 10A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.
§ 2727.1 (4th ed. 2025). Pinney would therefore not be entitled to summary judgment even if she
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 15 of 33

16
was right that the “preponderance of [the] evidence weighs in her favor.” ECF 71 at 4. Given the
position Pinney took in her reply brief, the Court denies her motion for summary judgment. The
Court takes NASA’s motion for summary judgment on each of the remaining claims in turn.
A. Associational discrimination on the basis of Pinney’s association with her son
“The Rehabilitation 	Act 	prohibits 	federal 	agencies 	from 	engaging 	in 	employment
discrimination against disabled individuals.” Nurriddin v. Bolden, 818 F.3d 751, 756 (D.C. Cir.
2016). Among other things, the law prohibits federal employers from “excluding or otherwise
denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an
individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association.”
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4); see 29 U.S.C. § 791(f) (Rehabilitation Act incorporating this provision
of Title I of the ADA).4 Pinney claims that her managers violated that prohibition, subjecting her
to several adverse employment actions because of her son’s disability.
On 	a 	defendant’s 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	“in 	an 	association 	case,” 	the
“question . . . is whether the plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury
could infer that the defendant terminated her because of her” associate’s disability. Chisholm v.
District of Columbia, 666 F. Supp. 2d 96, 111 (D.D.C. 2009). Crucially, “there is a distinction
between” taking adverse action against “an employee because of a relative’s disability” and taking
adverse action against “an employee because of the need to take time off to care for the relative.”
Id. (citing Erdman v. Nationwide Ins., 582 F.3d 500, 509–10 (3d Cir. 2009)). The former is
4 NASA has not argued that associational discrimination is not cognizable under the Rehabilitation Act. Given the
Act’s incorporation of the standards from Title I of the ADA, the Court has no reason to doubt that it is. See Brown v.
Snow, 407 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that the Rehabilitation Act “expressly incorporates the standards
of the ADA for claims of employment discrimination”); Popovich v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, Domestic
Rels. Div., 150 F. App’x 424, 427 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting claim that “the Rehabilitation Act does not have an
associational discrimination component”). Nevertheless, because the issue is not briefed here the Court will merely
assume without deciding that the Rehabilitation Act, like Title I of the ADA, prohibits associational discrimination.
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 16 of 33

17
unlawful discrimination “because of the known disability of an individual with whom” the
employee has a relationship, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4), while the latter is not.
Pinney’s associational discrimination claim fails because no reasonable jury could
conclude that she suffered adverse employment actions because of her son’s disability. Pinney first
identifies Koren’s imposition of AWOL citations and “draconian, unauthorized and unprecedented
leave approval requirements” as relevant adverse employment actions. ECF 54 at 32. The problem
for Pinney on this front is that the story with these actions begins in 2017, well before she told her
managers about her son’s medical condition—indeed, even before she claims to have begun
associating with an individual with a disability. See ECF 58-2 ¶¶ 4, 9. It was early in 2017 that
Pinney arrived an hour late to the meeting at which she was scheduled to present. See ECF 56-
3 ¶ 22; ECF 68-2 ¶ 22. And later in 2017, Koren again accused Pinney of disobeying the
“requirements with regard to Telework.” ECF 68-3 at 31. Koren’s issues with Pinney’s attendance
and teleworking therefore began well before Koren was aware that Pinney was associating with a
person with a disability. That Koren’s proffered reason for imposing AWOL citations and stringent
leave requirements—Pinney’s apparent difficulties in consistently working her expected hours—
existed before the associational disability arose undermines Pinney’s discrimination claim. Cf.
Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272 (2001) (“Employers need not suspend
previously planned transfers upon discovering that a Title VII suit has been filed, and their
proceeding along lines previously contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no
evidence whatever of causality.”).
The timeline similarly dispels Pinney’s claim that Tezna discriminated against Pinney
because of her son’s disability. Recall that Tezna became Pinney’s supervisor late in 2018, but
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 17 of 33

18
that—after some initial issues related to Pinney’s trip to China5—things went well between he and
Pinney until the end of July 2019. See ECF 56-3 ¶ 92; ECF 68-2 ¶ 92. But Pinney also testifies
that, “[b]eginning in June 2018,” she “regularly told [her] managers about [her] son’s medical
condition and [her] caretaking responsibilities.” ECF 58-2 at 2. So Tezna was aware of Pinney’s
son’s disability throughout the entire first half of 2019, during which time Pinney says she had no
issues with Tezna. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the change in August 2019 was
related to or caused by Pinney’s relationship with her son. If Tezna “did not want to work with”
Pinney because of Pinney’s association with her son, “it would be odd” to treat her well for half-
a-year before suddenly “start[ing] [to] gin[] up reasons to dismiss her.” Vatel v. All. of Auto Mfrs.,
627 F.3d 1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Pinney does, to be sure, have a theory of what led to the
change in Tezna’s behavior—she filed this lawsuit. The Court addresses that claim below, but it
suffices to say here that this fact does not support her claim of associational discrimination.
Because the record Pinney has compiled suggests that, at worst, NASA treated her worse
because of “actions occasioned by [her] association” with a person with a disability—her need to
take significant amounts of leave and regularly work from home—no “reasonable jury could infer
that” NASA discriminated against Pinney “because of her [son’s] disability.” Chisholm, 666 F.
Supp. 2d at 112. NASA is therefore entitled to judgment on this claim.
The Court does not reach NASA’s argument that Pinney has not exhausted many, if not
all, of the discrete claims she bundles into her associational disability claim. See ECF 55-1 at 14.
NASA does not contest that Pinney “filed and received a final disposition of her administrative
complaint.” Doak v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1096, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see ECF 56-3 ¶¶ 142, 156;
5 Pinney concedes that the initial denial of her leave request to travel to China does not constitute an adverse
employment action because, given the government shutdown, she was able to take the trip and ultimately was granted
permission to use FMLA leave for the trip. See ECF 68-1 at 39 n.32.
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 18 of 33

19
ECF 68-2 ¶¶ 142, 156. NASA’s argument is that the administrative complaint did not include the
claims she is pressing here. See ECF 55-1 at 14. Because “issues concerning how a claimant
participates in th[e] administrative process, both procedurally and substantively, are not of
jurisdictional moment,” Doak, 798 F.3d at 1104, the Court need not address these questions and
can instead rest on the independent ground that Pinney has failed to create a genuine dispute as to
whether NASA discriminated against her because of her son’s disability.
B. Discrimination on the basis of Pinney’s disability
In addition to her claim that NASA discriminated against Pinney because of her association
with a person with a disability, Pinney also claims NASA discriminated against her because of her
own disabilities—shingles and breast cancer. See ECF 16 ¶¶ 138–49 (Count V). While the Court
did not need to address NASA’s exhaustion argument as to the associational discrimination claim,
that defense is dispositive for this claim.
“The Rehabilitation Act requires individuals to exhaust administrative remedies before
they can file suit to enforce the Act’s protections.” Doak, 798 F.3d at 1099; see 29 U.S.C.
§ 794a(a)(1) (Rehabilitation Act adopting the “remedies, procedures, and rights” in the federal
employment provisions of Title VII, which includes administrative exhaustion). Although the
exhaustion requirement is undisputable, there is a dispute in this case about how to determine
whether it was satisfied. Pinney argues that so long as her claims in federal court are “like and
related to[] or grow out of” the claims she put before the agency, she has satisfied the exhaustion
requirement. ECF 71 at 5. NASA, on the other hand, argues that “each discrete claim of
discrimination or retaliation must be separately exhausted.” ECF 55-1 at 13.
The parties’ disagreement reflects an unsettled legal question in this Circuit. In Park v.
Howard University, the D.C. Circuit held that claims that are “like or reasonably related to the
allegations” in the administrative complaint and “growing out of such allegations” are exhausted.
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 19 of 33

20
71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995). But seven years after that, in National Railroad Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, the Supreme Court held that “[e]ach incident of discrimination . . . constitutes a
separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice’” for purposes of Title VII’s procedural
requirements. 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002). Since Morgan, “most judges in this district” have held
that Park’s “reasonably related” rule was abrogated and that “plaintiffs alleging discrete acts of
discrimination” must instead “exhaust the administrative process regardless of any relationship
that may exist between those discrete claims and any others.” Wilson v. Noem, No. 20-cv-100,
2025 WL 1000666, at *17 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2025) (collecting cases). The Circuit, for its part, has
repeatedly reserved the question of Park’s vitality in the wake of Morgan. See Webster v. Del
Toro, 49 F.4th 562, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
This Court takes the same approach the Circuit has and leaves the question to the side for
now.6 Even under the more lenient “reasonably related” test, Pinney failed to exhaust this claim.
At the time Pinney filed her first administrative complaint, she was not yet disabled. See ECF 56-
3 ¶ 142 (first complaint filed March 2019); ECF 58-6 at 48–49 (Pinney developed shingles in
September 	2019 	and 	breast 	cancer 	in 	November 	2019). 	Pinney’s 	second—and 	final—
administrative complaint makes no mention of her having a disability, either. See ECF 57 at 242–
43. She did check the box for “mental” disability when indicating why she believed she was
discriminated 	against, 	but 	that 	only 	indicated 	discrimination 	on 	the 	basis 	of 	her 	son’s
schizophrenia, as she raised in her first complaint. Id. at 242. Pinney expressly confirmed as much
in an affidavit she filed as part of the second administrative complaint, writing unequivocally that
6 The Court thinks that tack particularly wise because the Rehabilitation Act’s federal employment provision
incorporates a different exhaustion provision than the one at issue in Morgan. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1)
(incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16); Morgan, 536 U.S. at 104–05 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)).
Morgan’s textual analysis therefore may not apply to this Rehabilitation Act claim even if it does govern exhaustion
in other employment discrimination cases.
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 20 of 33

21
her “claim of disability discrimination is not based on any physical or mental limitation that [she]
personally suffer[s],” but instead “is associational, based on [Pinney’s] role as primary caregiver
for [her] son.” ECF 57 at 5. Because Pinney’s administrative “charge contained no claims or
factual allegations that could reasonably be expected upon investigation to lead to a” claim that
she was discriminated against on the basis of her own disability—indeed, she expressly disavowed
that claim—“she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies” for this claim and cannot press it
here. Park, 71 F.3d at 909.
Finally, and for good measure, the Court notes that Pinney conceded this argument by
failing to address it. See Uranga v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 490 F. Supp. 3d 86, 109
(D.D.C. 2020). NASA raised precisely this point in its motion for summary judgment. See ECF 55-
1 at 16. In her response, Pinney responded to other of the exhaustion issues NASA raised but did
not say a word about her exhaustion of this claim. See ECF 68-1 at 29–33. For this reason, and
because Pinney did in fact fail to exhaust this claim, the Court grants summary judgment to NASA
on this count of the complaint.
C. Discrimination on the basis of age
“The federal-sector provision of the ADEA provides that ‘[a]ll personnel actions affecting
employees or applicants for employment who are at least 40 years of age . . . shall be made free
from any discrimination based on age.’” Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 479 (2008) (quoting
29 U.S.C. § 633a(a)). The familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to
ADEA claims under this provision. See Ford v. Mabus, 629 F.3d 198, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Because NASA has “proffer[ed] a non-[discriminatory] reason for [each of] the challenged
employment action[s]” at issue here, however, “the burden-shifting framework falls away, and the
central question becomes whether [Pinney] produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
find that [NASA’s] asserted nondiscriminatory . . . reason was not the actual reason and that
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 21 of 33

22
[NASA] intentionally discriminated” on the basis of age. Allen v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 34, 39 (D.C.
Cir. 2015). Pinney has not cleared that bar.7
Pinney’s case for age discrimination is predicated on a claim that her “substantially
younger . . . co-workers” were not subjected to the same adverse actions she was, and on her many
efforts to prove that NASA’s explanations for the actions it took against her were pretextual.
ECF 54 at 47–48.
Pinney’s first effort—to suggest differential treatment by way of reference to her
coworkers—fails because she has not identified a meaningful comparator. Pinney identifies five
coworkers as benchmarks. See ECF 54 at 48. One of those coworkers left Pinney’s division before
any of the actions Pinney challenges took place and was never managed by Tezna at all. See
ECF 67-5 at 2 (Hollowell); see Burley v. Nat’l Passenger Rail Corp., 801 F.3d 290, 301–02 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (listing as a “[f]actor[] that bear[s] on whether someone is an appropriate comparator”
whether that person was “disciplined by the same supervisor”). Another was hired after Tezna
started as a manager, so never worked for Koren. See ECF 58-4 at 5 (May).
Most importantly, Pinney has failed to “demonstrate that all of the relevant aspects of [her]
employment situation were nearly identical to those of the other employee[s].” Burley, 801 F.3d
at 301. The only evidence she cites to establish the comparison are her declaration and deposition.
See ECF 54 at 40, 47 (citing “Pinney Dep. II” and “Pinney Decl.”). Pinney’s “testimony is itself,”
7 As with the associational discrimination claim, NASA offers several reasons this claim fails. Those include Pinney’s
supposed failure to exhaust many of her claims and the fact that NASA says most—although seemingly not all—of
the actions Pinney complains about do not constitute “personnel actions” under the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a); see
ECF 55-1 at 16–18, 22; but see id. at 26 (seemingly not arguing that AWOL citations and suspension of telework do
not constitute “personnel actions”); 5 U.S.C § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii) (defining “personnel action” in manner that might
reach those actions). The exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, see Koch v. Schapiro, 699 F. Supp. 2d 3, 12
(D.D.C. 2010), and nothing in the text of 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) suggests that the “personnel actions” element of an
ADEA claim is either, see Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006) (asking if statute “speak[s] in
jurisdictional terms or refer[s] in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts”). The Court therefore does not reach
those issues, and instead rests its decision on Pinney’s failure to create a genuine dispute about whether NASA
intentionally discriminated against her because of her age.
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 22 of 33

23
of course, “competent evidence.” Allen, 795 F.3d at 41. But the problem for Pinney is that none of
that testimony demonstrates that these coworkers “were charged with offenses of comparable
seriousness” to the ones that led to Pinney’s discipline—showing up late for a meeting at which
she was scheduled to present, incorrectly entering time sheets, failing to comply with telework
requirements, and doing sloppy or inadequate work on policy documents. Burley, 801 F.3d at 301.
Instead, Pinney says only that her coworkers also took “extended lunch hours,” ECF 58-2 ¶ 32,
and would “start work late, or leave work early,” id. ¶ 37. The Court, as it must, takes that
testimony as true. But even granting that, Pinney has not established that she was treated worse
than her younger colleagues, because the reasons given for her discipline went beyond merely
taking long lunches or starting work late or leaving early.
Indeed, one of the comparators Pinney points to undermines, rather than strengthens, her
age discrimination claim. Pinney cites Chandran Pillai as a coworker who was treated better than
her. ECF 54 at 48. But Pillai is five years older than Pinney. See ECF 56-3 ¶ 150; ECF 68-2 ¶ 150.
That alone defeats Pinney’s attempt to show she was discriminated against based on NASA’s
treatment of Pillai. See Huckstep v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 216 F. Supp. 3d 69, 83
(D.D.C. 2016) (“A comparator offered to show an employer’s better treatment of similarly situated
employees must be outside the plaintiff’s protected group.”). And that Pillai was in Pinney’s age
group and had also taken FMLA leave and participated as a witness in a discrimination
investigation—like Pinney—yet was not subjected to the same claimed discriminatory actions
Pinney challenges here suggests that neither Koren nor Tezna were engaged in a pattern of age-
based discrimination. See ECF 67-8 at 2–5; Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (“A plaintiff may support an inference that the employer’s . . . real reasons were prohibited
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 23 of 33

24
discrimination . . . by citing . . . the employer’s pattern of poor treatment of other employees in the
same protected group as the plaintiff.”).
As for Pinney’s attempt to create a genuine dispute about age discrimination by showing
NASA’s proffered reasons were pretextual, that too fails. NASA has justified the actions Pinney
alleges Koren took against her—issuance of the AWOL notices and counseling letter, the low
interim performance score, revoking telework privileges, and the leave requirements, see ECF 16
¶ 161; ECF 54 at 47; id. at 32—on the basis of Pinney’s “repeated failures to follow leave
instructions” and “deficiencies in [Pinney’s] work performance,” ECF 55-1 at 26–27, 29. It is
undisputed that Pinney had a history of attendance issues dating to the missed meeting in 2017 and
had been cited in 2017 by Koren for failing to comply with telework requirements. See ECF 56-
3 ¶ 22; ECF 68-2 ¶ 22; ECF 68-3 at 31. So too is it undisputed that Koren communicated
requirements for taking leave to Pinney in 2018. See ECF 57 at 106; see also ECF 56-3 ¶ 42; ECF
68-2 ¶ 42. Pinney says those requirements were themselves discriminatory, and for evidence points
to the fact that NASA’s human resources department leaves it to the manager to decide how leave
will be requested and approved. See ECF 58-9 at 4. But it was evidently Koren’s belief, based on
Pinney’s history of leave and telework related issues, that Pinney needed somewhat stringent
tracking requirements to ensure leave was properly used. Because that belief was “reasonable in
light of the evidence” and Pinney has not put forward evidence that creates a doubt about whether
it was “honestly held,” there is no reason to “put the case to a jury” based on Koren’s imposition
of leave requirements. Allen, 795 F.3d at 41. Nor is there any reason to doubt that the actions Koren
took against Pinney based on Pinney’s failure to follow those requirements—submitting doctors’
notes late, for instance, see ECF 68-2 at 25—were sincerely based on that failure.
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 24 of 33

25
Same for Koren’s feedback to Pinney in the interim performance review that led to
revocation of her telework privileges. See ECF 57 at 141. Pinney tries to poke holes in that
feedback. For example, she says that she was unfairly maligned for failing to provide any “analysis
or review” of a piece of legislation she was asked to provide “review comments” on. Id. at 137.
That request, according to Pinney, did not call for “analysis”—only “comments”—so she was
unfairly “failed . . . for not completing a project she had never been assigned.” ECF 71 at 19.
Pinney’s interpretation of the assignment—that a request for “comments” called only for the “brief
summary” she delivered, ECF 57 at 137—strikes the Court as borderline implausible, Goodrich v.
Bank of Am. N.A., 136 F.4th 347, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (courts must draw “all reasonable
inferences” in non-movant’s favor on summary judgment (emphasis added)). But even granting
that Pinney reasonably understood the assignment as she says she did, she has failed to create a
genuine dispute about whether Koren “honestly and reasonably believed” the assignment to
require far more than what Pinney did, and therefore “honestly and reasonably” docked Pinney for
her performance on that assignment. George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
The story is similar for Tezna. There is some evidence in the record that raises questions
about why Tezna imposed the performance improvement plan when there were perhaps less drastic
ways to address his concerns about Pinney’s work performance: Tezna’s supervisor at the time the
performance plan was imposed—Kevin Buford—“disagree[d]” with Tezna’s decision to impose
the performance plan. ECF 58-5 at 7. Buford’s view, having reviewed the issues Tezna identified
with Pinney’s revision of the policy document, was that the problems were “relatively minor” and
should have been easily cleared up by Tezna “engaging with [Pinney], even just sitting down for
a couple hours.” Id. at 7. That internal disagreement among Pinney’s management chain, however,
is not sufficient to create a genuine dispute about the ultimate question of whether the imposition
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 25 of 33

26
of the performance plan and later issuance of the notice of proposed removal were “[]tainted by
any consideration of age.” Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. 399, 402 (2020).
The reason why is three-fold. First, Pinney has not created a dispute about the sincerity of
Tezna’s belief that Pinney’s revisions of the policy document were inadequate. Even on Buford’s
telling, Tezna was “disappoint[ed]” with Pinney’s work on that assignment. ECF 58-5 at 6. That
Tezna “honestly” believed Pinney had performed poorly on the revision, Allen, 795 F.3d at 41,
undermines Pinney’s argument that the actions he later took against Pinney based on that
assignment were actually based on any consideration of age. Second, it is undisputed that Pinney
and Tezna worked well together until she turned in the policy revision at the end of July 2019. See
ECF 56-3 ¶ 92; ECF 68-2 ¶ 92. But Pinney was above the age of 40, so in the protected class,
throughout that period. ECF 54 at 7 (Pinney was born in 1953). As it was with the associational
discrimination claim, that Tezna seemingly had no issue with Pinney—despite her age—until the
problem with the policy document arose undermines the age discrimination claim, too. See Vatel,
627 F.3d at 1247. Finally, it is undisputed that after Tezna “removed” Pinney’s responsibility for
revising the policy document, the task was reassigned to a group of employees that included
someone who was older than Pinney. ECF 54 at 29 ¶ 115 (listing Chandran Pillai); ECF 67-1
¶ 115; ECF 56-3 ¶ 150 (discussing Pillai’s age); ECF 68-2 ¶ 150. That an older employee was
tasked with finishing the assignment suggests Tezna’s concerns had nothing to do with Pinney’s
age and everything to do with Pinney’s performance on the assignment. For all of these reasons,
Pinney has not created a genuine dispute as to her age discrimination claim, so the Court grants
judgment to NASA on that claim.
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 26 of 33

27
D. Retaliation
Both the ADEA and Rehabilitation Act protect federal-sector employees from retaliation.
See Gomez-Perez, 553 U.S. at 491 (ADEA); 29 U.S.C. § 791(f) (Rehabilitation Act incorporating
ADA’s retaliation provision at 42 U.S.C. § 12203). “To prove retaliation, the plaintiff generally
must establish that he or she suffered (i) a materially adverse action (ii) because he or she had
brought or threatened to bring a discrimination claim.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191,
1198 (D.C. Cir. 2008). As with the discrimination claims, the McDonnell Douglas framework
applies but, because NASA has proffered non-retaliatory justifications for its actions, the
“framework falls away” and the “central question” is whether a reasonable jury could find that the
“non-retaliatory reason was not the actual reason” and NASA “retaliated against” Pinney. Allen,
795 F.3d at 39. Because Pinney has not put forward evidence from which a reasonable jury could
draw that conclusion about her treatment by either Koren or Tezna, NASA is entitled to summary
judgment on this claim, as well.
Beginning with Koren, as it was with the associational discrimination claim, the timeline
belies Pinney’s claim. Koren’s issues with Pinney’s attendance began in February 2017. See
ECF 56-3 ¶ 22; ECF 68-2 ¶ 22. At the earliest, Pinney’s protected activity began after that, when
Pinney “provided evidence” in support of another employee’s discrimination complaint against
Koren. ECF 58-2 ¶ 21. That Koren’s issues with Pinney’s attendance predate any protected activity
cuts strongly against the suggestion that the later actions she took based on those issues were
retaliatory. See Doe v. Columbia, 151 F.4th 435, 450 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (concluding no reasonable
jury could find for plaintiff where defendant’s allegedly retaliatory conduct “began before”
defendant “became aware” of protected activity).
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 27 of 33

28
Pinney tries to resist this conclusion in two ways, neither of which holds up to scrutiny.
First, Pinney’s counsel baldly asserts in her response to NASA’s statement of undisputed facts that
Pinney provided evidence in this investigation on February 10, 2017—before Pinney missed the
meeting—and that this “is documented.” ECF 68-2 at 7. But none of the materials Pinney cites in
support of that statement include that date. See ECF 68-2 at 8 (citing the Currier Declaration filed
at ECF 68-6 at 2–9, and ECF 58-6 at 36). In a footnote, Pinney offers what looks like a quote from
an “intake” for Currier’s complaint, ECF 68-2 at 8 n.4, but does not point the Court to that
document anywhere in the record. The local rules require “references to the parts of the record
relied on to support the statement,” LCvR. 7(h)(1), and although the Court did look—in vain—to
see if this date was established somewhere in the record, it was under no obligation to do so, see
Est. of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth., 651 F.3d 118, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[J]udges are not like
pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs or the record.”) (Tatel, J., concurring). Second, Pinney
confusingly “objects generally to the 2017 timeframe . . . as it is outside the relevant time frame”
in her complaint. ECF 68-2 at 6 n.3. That assertion is confusing because Pinney included in her
complaint 	allegations 	about 	the 	2017 	investigation 	that 	she 	provided 	evidence 	for, 	see
ECF 16 ¶¶ 21–24, and relies on that protected activity as a basis for her retaliation claim
throughout her summary judgment briefing, see, e.g., ECF 54 at 39. Regardless, this argument is
unfounded: Pinney’s conduct in 2017 is surely relevant evidence for NASA in establishing its
proffered reason for taking actions against Pinney, and Pinney has offered no reason to think
NASA could not admit this evidence at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Fed. R. Evid. 401.
What’s more, the sequence of events in 2017 is not the only thing that undermines Pinney’s
retaliation claim as it relates to Koren. There are similar problems when it comes to the AWOL
citations in 2018. The first of those citations was issued on August 3, 2018. ECF 56-3 ¶ 45;
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 28 of 33

29
ECF 68-2 ¶ 45. True, that was after Pinney filed a complaint about Koren in November 2017. See
ECF 58-2 ¶ 23. But that complaint was filed almost ten months before the first AWOL citation.
And even if measuring from the moment the investigation of that complaint wrapped up, there was
a four-month gap between the protected activity and first citation. See id. ¶ 24. “[A]n inference of
retaliatory motive based upon the mere proximity in time between [Pinney’s complaint] and the
[first] AWOL listing” is therefore “untenable on the record here.” Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313,
1322 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding same where AWOL was issued “two and one-half months” after
plaintiff’s protected activity). And—for the reasons already discussed in relation to the ADEA
claim—Pinney has not created a genuine dispute about whether Koren’s rationales for the various
actions taken against Pinney were pretextual. See supra 24–25. Given that neither temporal
proximity nor the possibility of pretext suggests Koren retaliated against Pinney, there is no
genuine dispute as to this aspect of Pinney’s retaliation claims.
The same is true of Pinney’s allegation that Tezna retaliated against her after she filed this
lawsuit in July 2019. Recall that, after a rocky start to their relationship, things went well between
Tezna and Pinney in the first half of 2019. See ECF 56-3 ¶ 92; ECF 68-2 ¶ 92. Tezna told Pinney
that he was “pleased with the work [she had] been doing,” reinstated her telework privileges, and
rated her as fully successful in her annual review. ECF 57 at 153; ECF 60-1 at 1. But things began
to change on August 16, 2019. That is the day Tezna first “notified [Pinney that] he was not
satisfied with” the work she had done revising a policy document. ECF 57 at 9. Around two months
after that, on October 15, Tezna sent Pinney the letter of warning notifying Pinney that her
“performance” on the policy document “was at unacceptable levels.” Id. at 11. About two weeks
later, Tezna issued the performance improvement plan, and six weeks after that, the notice of
proposed removal. See ECF 58-2 ¶¶ 90, 107. NASA, of course, says all of this was done because
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 29 of 33

30
Pinney’s work really was deficient. See ECF 67 at 27–28. Pinney, however, says that all of this
was retaliation in response to her “commencement of this lawsuit.” ECF 54 at 43.
The problem with Pinney’s argument is that she has not identified facts from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that Tezna was aware Pinney filed this lawsuit at the time he took
the allegedly retaliatory actions. Pinney filed this lawsuit on July 29, 2019. See ECF 1. The
complaint was not served until late September. See ECF 67 at 27 (identifying this date based on a
previous motion for an extension). Tezna first told Pinney he was “not satisfied with” the work
she had done on the policy document on August 16. ECF 57 at 9. In other words, Tezna’s issues
with Pinney’s performance on the policy document—issues which became the basis for the
performance improvement plan and later notice of removal, see ECF 57 at 168—“began before”
Pinney even served the complaint on NASA. Doe, 151 F.4th at 450. Pinney has identified no
evidence in the record—despite NASA squarely making this argument, see ECF 67 at 27—from
which a reasonable jury could conclude Tezna was aware, before Pinney even effectuated service,
of her filing this lawsuit. See ECF 54 at 43–44 (discussing only the fact that the lawsuit was filed);
ECF 71 at 22–24 (relevant section of Pinney’s reply brief failing to respond to argument that Tezna
lacked notice of the lawsuit).
Because every allegedly retaliatory action Tezna took against Pinney flows from his
complaints about Pinney’s revisions of the policy document, and because those complaints began
before Pinney even served NASA, this case closely resembles Clark County School District v.
Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001). There, the employee’s supervisor said he was “contemplating”
taking the putatively retaliatory action against the employee the day before the “summons and
complaint” were served. 532 U.S. at 272. Given that sequence, the Court—in a case that came to
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 30 of 33

31
it from a grant of summary judgment to the employer—held that no reasonable jury could find that
the employee had been retaliated against. See id. The same is true here.
And even granting the possibility that Tezna had not yet decided to issue the performance
improvement plan before the end of September—when the complaint was served—Pinney has still
failed to identify any fact from which the jury could conclude that Tezna was aware of this case
when he later issued the performance plan. Tezna was not personally named as a defendant, see
ECF 1 at 1, and Pinney has not put forward an iota of evidence that suggests the NASA
administrator who was sued, the Department of Justice lawyers who entered an appearance in the
case, or anyone else in the federal government notified Tezna about the litigation before he issued
the performance plan on November 1, 2019, see ECF 58-2 ¶ 90. In an organization as large and
complex as NASA (and layer on top of that the Department of Justice) it is not reasonable to infer
just from the mere fact that the complaint has been served and a lawyer has entered an appearance
that an individual employee involved in the underlying dispute would quickly learn of the lawsuit.
To be sure, there may be cases in which a supervisor’s abrupt change in behavior shortly after
service of a complaint could give rise to an inference that the supervisor was aware of the lawsuit.
But here, where the supervisor’s concerns predate service of the complaint and it was those same
concerns that were acted on after service, the supervisor’s actions themselves do not give rise to
an inference that the supervisor was aware of the case’s filing. See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 272
(“[P]roceeding along lines previously contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no
evidence whatever of causality.”). The filing of the complaint and the lawyer’s entry of an
appearance are, then, the only facts from which Pinney draws the inference that Tezna was aware
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 31 of 33

32
of this lawsuit. See ECF 54 at 44. On this record, no reasonable jury could find that Tezna took his
allegedly retaliatory actions because Pinney filed this case.8
Pinney’s discussion of an affidavit in which Tezna’s supervisor said he was aware of
Pinney having filed EEO complaints does not change that conclusion. See ECF 60-19 at 3–4. For
one, Pinney filed EEO complaints in March 2019 and March 2020. See ECF 56-3 ¶¶ 142, 154;
ECF 68-2 ¶¶ 142, 154. Pinney has offered no reason to think Tezna’s supervisor was referring in
that affidavit to this lawsuit, rather than the actual EEO complaints Pinney filed. Those EEO
complaints, however, are far too temporally removed from Tezna’s allegedly retaliatory actions—
which took place in late 2019—to suggest that Tezna’s supervisor’s awareness of them somehow
contributed to the actions Tezna took. See Iyoha v. Architect of the Capitol, 927 F.3d 561, 574
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[O]nly where the two events are very close in time does temporal proximity
support an inference of causation.”). For another, Pinney has not identified any evidence to suggest
that it was Tezna’s supervisor, rather than Tezna, who decided to issue the performance
improvement plan and eventual notice of removal. Tezna’s supervisor acknowledged that he
advised Tezna on how he should go about taking those actions, but his undisputed testimony is
that the performance plan was “proposed” by Tezna, and it was that plan that led to the notice of
proposed removal. ECF 60-19 at 4–5. That there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude Tezna was aware of Pinney having filed this lawsuit at the time he made those decisions
is fatal to this retaliation claim.
E. Constructive discharge
Pinney’s final claim is that, although she retired, she only did so because NASA “created
intolerable working conditions that forced her to retire.” ECF 54 at 48. Because no reasonable jury
8 To the extent Pinney tries to bring a retaliation claim based on Tezna reassigning her to a new cubicle, see ECF 68-
1 at 19, that claim fails for the same reason. That relocation also took place in early November 2019. See id.
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 32 of 33

33
could conclude that Pinney was “discriminated” or “retaliate[ed]” against, this claim necessarily
fails, too. Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 555 (2016) (describing one of the “two basic elements”
of a constructive discharge claim as proof that plaintiff was “discriminated against”); Richardson
v. Petasis, 160 F. Supp. 3d 88, 137 (D.D.C. 2015) (explaining that “retaliation can be the basis for
a constructive discharge claim”).
* 	* 	*
Pinney’s motion for summary judgment, ECF 54, is DENIED, and NASA’s motion for
summary judgment, ECF 55, is GRANTED. The Court will issue a separate order consistent with
this memorandum opinion.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
JIA M. COBB
United States District Judge
Date: March 5, 2026
Case 1:19-cv-02259-JMC Document 72 Filed 03/05/26 Page 33 of 33