Ronnie A. Lawson

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
In re
RONNIE A. LAWSON,
Debtor.
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 05-01194
(Chapter 13)
OPINION REGARDING DEBTOR’S MOTION TO DETERMINE IF AUTOMATIC STAY
APPLIES TO CHEVY CHASE BANK, FSB AND DAVID PRENSKY, ESQ.
REGARDING THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT
1147 44TH PLACE, S.E., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20019
This opinion and order resolves the Debtor’s Motion to
Determine if Automatic Stay Applies to Chevy Chase Bank, FSB and
David Prensky, Esq. Regarding the Property Located at 1147 44rh
Place, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20019 (D.E. No. 9, filed Aug. 31,
2005) (the “Motion”). In his Motion, the Debtor asks this Court
to hold that Chevy Chase Bank, FSB (“Chevy Chase”) has violated
the automatic stay of all actions commenced against property of
the estate provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362 by foreclosing on and
auctioning off certain real property owned by the debtor’s wife
without obtaining prior approval from this Court. The debtor
requests that the Court void the foreclosure of the property in
question and direct Chevy Chase and its agents to cease all
The order below is hereby signed.
Signed: October 28, 2005.
_____________________________
S. Martin Teel, Jr.
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Case 05-01194 Doc 25 Filed 11/01/05 Entered 11/01/05 13:37:08 Desc Main
Document Page 1 of 7

2
collection efforts with respect to the note secured by the
foreclosed property. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
will deny the debtor’s motion.
I
Chevy Chase is the holder of a note dated January 31, 2001,
in the original principal sum of $150,234.00 (the “Note”). The
sole maker of the Note is Lavita Bryant-Lawson, the wife of the
debtor. The debtor is neither a maker of the Note nor a
guarantor of the obligation. (Opp. at Ex. A).
The Note was secured by a deed of trust dated January 31,
2001, and recorded on February 12, 2001, as the instrument
numbered 2001012938 (the “Deed of Trust”). (Opp. at Ex. B). The
Deed of Trust was filed against the real property situated in the
District of Columbia described for assessment and taxation
purposes as Lot 802 in Square 5361, improved by the premises
known as 1147 44th Place, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20019 (the
“Property”). The Property is, and at all relevant times
heretofore was, titled solely in the name of Lavita Bryant-
Lawson. (Opp. at Ex. C). The Deed of Trust conveys both Ms.
Bryant-Lawson’s interest and the inchoate dower interest of the
debtor. (Opp. at Ex. B).
Ms. Bryant-Lawson filed for bankruptcy protection under
chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Court in this Court on June 29,
2004. See generally In re Bryant-Lawson, Case No. 04-01017
Case 05-01194 Doc 25 Filed 11/01/05 Entered 11/01/05 13:37:08 Desc Main
Document Page 2 of 7

3
(Bankr. D.D.C.). Ms. Bryant-Lawson’s bankruptcy filing
forestalled pending foreclosure proceedings on the Property
initiated by Chevy Chase due to her default on the Note.
Subsequently, Chevy Chase and Ms. Bryant-Lawson entered into an
amended agreement whereby Ms. Bryan-Lawson was required to make
regular monthly payments under the Note and cure her post-
petition default through additional installments over a period of
six months. The agreement was memorialized in this Court’s Order
Modifying Automatic Stay by Consent on January 5, 2005 (D.E. No.
34 in Case No. 04-01017) (the “Consent Order”).
After Ms. Bryant-Lawson failed to cure her second default
under the terms of the Consent Order, Chevy Chase issued a Notice
of Termination of Automatic Stay on July 5, 2005 (D.E. No. 39 in
Case No. 04-01017) (the “Notice of Termination”). Ms. Bryant-
Lawson did not file an opposition to or motion for relief from
the Notice of Termination. Chevy Chase sold the Property through
a public auction on August 16, 2005. (Opp. at Ex. H). The
purchasers of the Property have not yet settled on the sale due
to the instant dispute.
On August 15, 2005 – one day before the auction of the
Property – the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition in this
Court. (D.E. No. 1). The debtor contends that his bankruptcy
filing voids the sale of the Property under section 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code because any foreclosure on the Property is an
Case 05-01194 Doc 25 Filed 11/01/05 Entered 11/01/05 13:37:08 Desc Main
Document Page 3 of 7

4
action against property of the estate. The debtor has filed this
motion in an attempt to enforce this supposed right.
II
The debtor argues that Chevy Chase’s foreclosure and sale of
the Property violated section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. That
section provides in pertinent part that “a petition filed
under . . . this title . . . operates as a stay, applicable to
all entities, of . . . any act to obtain possession of property
of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise
control over property of the estate . . . .” 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a)(3). “[P]roperty of the estate” includes all legal and
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the petition
date. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). The debtor argues that he held an
inchoate dower interest in the Property on the petition date and
that he held a possessory interest in the Property by virtue of
residing there, and claims that these interests suffice under §
362(a)(3) to bar foreclosure and sale of the Property. (Mot. at
¶¶ 24, 30). Both assertions are wrong.
First, while the Deed of Trust reflects the dower interest
that the debtor once possessed in the Property, that interest was
extinguished by the District of Columbia legislature on April 27,
2001. See D.C. CODE § 19-102 (“The estates of dower and curtesy
are abolished.”). Thus, the debtor has no interest whatsoever in
the title of the Property. Nor does the debtor have any
Case 05-01194 Doc 25 Filed 11/01/05 Entered 11/01/05 13:37:08 Desc Main
Document Page 4 of 7

1 Chevy Chase’s assertion that the debtor was a tenant at
will pre- and post-foreclosure is incorrect. (Opp. at 11). As
the grantor of the mortgage, Ms. Bryant-Lawson is considered a
tenant at will upon the conveyance of the Property. See D.C.
CODE § 45-222. But Mr. Lawson was a grantor of the mortgage only
with respect to his dower interest. (Opp. at Ex. B). Once his
dower interest evaporated, Mr. Lawson had nothing to mortgage
with respect to the Property.
2 The debtor does not possess a one-half interest in the
Property as a tenant in the entirety because the Property was not
conveyed jointly to Ms. Bryant-Lawson and the debtor. See Daniel
v. Wright, 352 F. Supp. 1, 3 n.6 (D.D.C. 1972). Rather, the
Property was conveyed entirely to Ms. Bryant-Lawson.
5
possessory interest – even as a tenant at will or at sufferance –
in the Property simply because he was living and continues to
live there. See D.C. CODE § 45-222 (“An estate at
will . . . shall not exist or be created except by express
contract . . . .”);1 Jackson v. U.S., 357 A.2d 409, 410 (D.C.
1976) (person occupying apartment rent-free and at owner’s
indulgence was not a “tenant at sufferance” because his occupancy
was not procured in exchange for formal consideration); Smith v.
Town Center Mgmt. Corp., 329 A.2d 779, 779-80 (D.C. 1974) (absent
contractual relationship, person residing on property owned by
another is merely a “permissive user or licensee,” not a tenant
of the property).2
The debtor had no rights in the Property rising to the level
of a legal or equitable interest accorded protection by the law:
he fares no better than would a luncheon guest who happened to be
on the premises at the time of the foreclosure sale. Had Ms.
Case 05-01194 Doc 25 Filed 11/01/05 Entered 11/01/05 13:37:08 Desc Main
Document Page 5 of 7

3 But see Roslyn Savings Bank v. Comcoach Corp. (In re
Comcoach Corp.), 698 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1983) (so long as
lessee was not named party in foreclosure proceeding, her rights
were not affected by foreclosure and the foreclosure would not be
stayed by section 362).
4 A voluntary conveyance of the Property by Ms. Bryant-Lawson
would not have violated any rights of the debtor. Similarly, an
involuntary conveyance of the Property by Chevy Chase violated no
rights of the debtor.
6
Bryant-Lawson conveyed any interest – even a leasehold – to the
debtor, he might have been able to assert the protections of the
automatic stay based on his possessory interest in the Property.
See 48th Street Steakhouse, Inc. v. Rockefeller Group, Inc. (In
re 48th Street Steakhouse, Inc.), 835 F.2d 427, 431 (2d Cir.
1987) (even “a mere possessory interest in real property, without
any accompanying legal interest, is sufficient to trigger the
protection of the automatic stay”).3 But the debtor has
submitted no evidence suggesting such a transfer, leaving the
Court to conclude that he lived on the Property solely at Ms.
Bryant-Lawson’s discretion. Consequently, the debtor’s “rights”
to the Property as a guest of Ms. Bryant-Lawson are in reality
not his at all, but rather belong to Ms. Bryant-Lawson.4
Because the debtor has no possessory interest in the
Property, the foreclosure of the Property does not affect
property of the estate in any way. The debtor’s motion will be
denied. An order follows.
[Signed and dated above.]
Case 05-01194 Doc 25 Filed 11/01/05 Entered 11/01/05 13:37:08 Desc Main
Document Page 6 of 7

7	O:\Andrew Fausett\Lawson_stay foreclosure.wpd
Copies to: Counsel for the debtor; counsel for Chevy Chase;
chapter 13 trustee.
Case 05-01194 Doc 25 Filed 11/01/05 Entered 11/01/05 13:37:08 Desc Main
Document Page 7 of 7