Singh v. Valdez et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Case No. 26-cv-04617-NYW
PARJEET SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
GEORGE VALDEZ, in his official capacity,
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official capacity,
TODD BLANCHE, in his official capacity,
DAVID VENTURELLA, in his official capacity, and
JUAN BALTAZAR, in his official capacity,
Respondents.
______________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). 	[Doc. 1]. 	Respondents filed a consolidated Response
to the Petition on October 6, 2026, stating that they “are not submitting a brief in opposition
to the Petition detailing the facts and circumstances of this case.” 	[Doc. 6]. 	For the
reasons set forth in this Order, the Petition is respectfully GRANTED in part.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Parjeet Singh (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Singh”) is a citizen of India who
entered the United States in March 2023. [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 10–11]. On April 1, 2023, after
issuing a Notice to Appear and initiating removal proceedings, “the Department of
Homeland Security released Petitioner on his own recognizance.” [Id. at ¶¶ 11–12]; see
generally [Doc. 1-5]. On July 27, 2025, immigration officers arrested Mr. Singh while he
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was working at a gas station in New Jersey without presenting him with a warrant. [Doc.
1 at ¶ 16].1 	He was detained without custody determination hearing and is currently
detained at the Denver Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado. [Id. at ¶¶ 16–17].
Mr. Singh asserts five claims for relief: 	(1) unlawful detention in violation of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and implementing regulations;
(2) violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights; (3) violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act; 	(4) violation 	of 	his 	Fifth Amendment 	equal 	protection 	rights, 	and
(5) violation of the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 	[Id. at ¶¶ 50–76]. 	He
asks the Court to order Respondents to immediately release him from custody or, in the
alternative, provide him with an individualized bond hearing under § 1226(a). [Id. at 26].
He also asks for the Respondents to be enjoined from transferring him outside of the
District of Colorado or removing him from the United States during the pendency of this
proceeding, and for “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to
Justice Act.” [Id. at 26–27].
This matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. 	No Party has requested an
evidentiary hearing or oral argument, and the Court finds that no hearing is necessary.
Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02677-CNS, 2025 WL 2652880, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept.
16, 2025) (declining to hold a hearing where the petitioner’s habeas challenge was
“fundamentally legal in nature”).
1 Prior to his arrest by immigration officers, Petitioner was issued a criminal summons in
state court, and he was ultimately found guilty of a noncriminal municipal ordinance
violation. [Doc. 1 at 9–10; Doc. 1-9].
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LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2241 of Title 28 authorizes a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus when
a person is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a
person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973). 	“Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001)).
ANALYSIS
There is no dispute that Petitioner is held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).2 	See
[Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 9, 42–49; Doc. 6 at 1 (Respondents conceding that they “are not submitting
a brief in opposition to the Petition” and therefore not disputing Petitioner’s assertion that
§ 1226(a) governs his detention)].
Recently, the Tenth Circuit held that “noncitizens who entered the United States
and were thereafter detained in the interior of the country are usually subject to § 1226(a)
(and thus eligible for bond), not § 1225(b)(2)(A).” 	Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th
1226, 1237 (10th Cir. 2026). By all accounts, Petitioner was most recently detained while
he was in the interior of the United States, see [Doc. 1 at ¶ 16], so his detention is
governed by § 1226(a), Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1237.
Pursuant to Santillan Quiroz, Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing violates
2 Although the immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed from the United States, the
order is not final, as it is still on appeal with the BIA. 	See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(47)(B).
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the INA. See id.; Loa Caballero v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03120-NYW, 2025 WL 2977650,
at *8 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025). 	And the Court “concurs with the numerous other district
courts that have held that denying a bond hearing to a noncitizen detained under
§ 1226(a) violates the noncitizen’s due process rights.” Onate-Brinez v. Baltazar, No. 26-
cv-02768-NYW, 2026 WL 2085090, at *3 (D. Colo. July 20, 2026).
Additionally, although not raised as an independent claim, Mr. Singh also alleged
that he was not arrested pursuant to a warrant. 	[Doc. 1 at ¶ 16]. 	Section 1226(a)
authorizes arrest and detention only “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General.” 	8
U.S.C. § 1226(a) (providing that a noncitizen may be arrested and detained only “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General”). Thus, “[i]ssuance of a warrant is a necessary
condition to justify discretionary detention under section 1226(a). . . . As such, it follows
that absent a warrant a noncitizen may not be arrested and detained under section
1226(a).” Chogllo Chafla v. Scott, 804 F. Supp. 3d 247, 264 (D. Me. 2025); accord, e.g.,
J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 27, 2025); Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-04711-ECT-SGE, 2026 WL 25627, at *3
(D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026). It follows, then, that “[i]f the alien [detained under § 1226(a)] has
not been arrested on a warrant, then the subsequent provisions giving the Attorney
General discretion to detain or release ‘the arrested alien’ are likewise not triggered.”
Florida v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1276 (N.D. Fla. 2023); see also Jennings,
583 U.S. at 302 (“[Section 1226(a)] authorizes detention only ‘[o]n a warrant issued’ by
the Attorney General leading to the alien’s arrest.”); Quezada-Estrada v. Lyons, No. 26-
cv-01599-NYW, 2026 WL 1361880 (D. Colo. May 15, 2026), at *5 (“Fundamentally,
Respondents may not detain first, and justify later.” (collecting cases)).
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This is consistent with Department of Homeland Security regulations permitting
immigration officers to “arrest[] and take[] into custody” individuals suspected of violating
the immigration laws after the officers have obtained a warrant and an NTA. See 8 C.F.R.
§§ 236.1(b), 1236.1(b); see also Ramirez Ovando v. Noem, 810 F. Supp. 3d 1209, 1216
(D. Colo. 2025) (observing that ICE officers “possess extremely broad authority” to arrest
individuals subject to removal proceedings once a warrant and NTA have issued), appeal
docketed sub nom., Ramirez Ovando v. Mullin, No. 26-1027 (10th Cir. Jan. 26, 2026).
Without a warrant, however, the Government’s authority to make immigration
arrests is “more limited.” Ramirez Ovando, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 1216 (quoting Arizona v.
United States, 567 U.S. 387, 408 (2012)). An immigration officer may make a warrantless
arrest “if he has reason to believe” that a noncitizen is unlawfully present in the United
States “and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).
Courts 	have 	interpreted 	the 	“reason 	to 	believe” 	language 	as 	equivalent 	to 	the
constitutional probable cause standard and requiring a particularized finding of probable
cause that the noncitizen is likely to escape. 	See Ramirez Ovando, 810 F. Supp. 3d at
1216–17 (citing Roa-Rodriguez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 1969))
(further citations omitted); Escobar Molina v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 811 F. Supp.
3d 1, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2025).3 Once an officer makes a warrantless arrest, the Government
generally must make a custody determination within 48 hours and decide “whether the
3 In the context of pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act, the Tenth Circuit has
observed that a defendant cannot be detained based on a risk of flight due solely to their
status as a removable non-citizen. 	See United States v. Sanchez-Rivas, 752 F. App’x
601, 604 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Ailon-Ailon, 875 F.3d 1334, 1338 (10th
Cir. 2017)). 	This is equally applicable in this context, because otherwise, the two
requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) would collapse into one.
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alien will be continued in custody or released on bond or recognizance and whether a
notice to appear and warrant of arrest . . . will be issued.” 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d).
The record before the Court demonstrates that the Government did not comply
with these requirements when arresting and detaining Petitioner. The Petition, which is
verified by Petitioner’s counsel, alleges that immigration “agents did not present Petitioner
with a warrant at the time of his arrest.” 	[Doc. 1 at ¶ 16]. 	Respondents do not address
this issue at all in their Response and do not attach any warrant. See generally [Doc. 6].
They have therefore waived any arguments in opposition. 	Quezada-Estrada, 2026 WL
1361880, at *6 (citing Eateries, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 346 F.3d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir.
2003) (“A party forfeits an issue it does not support with legal authority or argument.”
(quotation omitted))).
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	Respondents 	did 	not 	comply 	with 	the
requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) when arresting and detaining Petitioner. The Petition
is therefore respectfully GRANTED as to Petitioner’s first and second claims, as his
detention violates the INA and his due process rights. 	The Court will order Mr. Singh
released, because “[r]elease is an appropriate habeas remedy where a petitioner’s
current detention lacks a ‘lawful predicate.’” Quezada-Estrada, 2026 WL 1361880, at *6
(quoting Ahmed M., 2026 WL 25627, at *3). 	The Court notes that Respondents
acknowledge that release is the appropriate remedy in this case. [Doc. 6 at 2]. Having
granted Petitioner his requested relief, the Court need not reach Petitioner’s other
claims.4
4 Petitioner also seeks attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
[Doc. 1 at 27]; see also Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025). 	But this
District’s Local Rules require that a request for fees be made by separate motion. 	See
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) 	The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[Doc. 1] is GRANTED in part;
(2) 	Within 48 hours of this Order, Respondents SHALL RELEASE Petitioner
from custody; and
(3) 	On or before October 16, 2026, the Parties SHALL FILE a joint status
report confirming that Petitioner was released and indicating whether any
additional proceedings are necessary in this case.
DATED: October 9, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.3. A fee award is thus inappropriate at this juncture. In addition, a
party seeking costs must follow the procedures set forth in D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.1.
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