Molina Quijano v. Baltasar et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00706-CNS
CARLOS ALBERTO MOLINA QUIJANO,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTASAR, Warden, GEO Group ICE Processing Center;
GEORGE VALDEZ, Director of the Denver Field Office, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement;
TODD LYONS, Acting Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, United States Department of Homeland Security; and
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the United States,
Respondents.
ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner’s habeas petition, his supporting traverse, and
Respondent’s response. ECF Nos. 1, 9, 10. Essentially, and presuming familiarity with
this case’s background, Respondents have released Petitioner from detention, see ECF
No. 9 at 1, and argue his petition is moot as a result, id. In his traverse, Petitioner contends
that Respondents have not returned his “Colorado driver’s license and” Employment
Authorization Document (collectively, the documents) and seeks their return to him. ECF
No. 10 at 2. The parties essentially dispute whether such a request is moot. See, e.g., id.
at 6.
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Explained further below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the
petition. The Court DENIES IN PART the petition to the extent Petitioner seeks immediate
release, as Respondents have granted Petitioner this relief. Cf. ECF No. 1 at 19.
However, the Court GRANTS IN PART the petition to the extent it seeks the just and
proper relief, see id., of the return of Petitioner’s documents, as well an order prohibiting
Respondents from imposing any additional conditions of release and supervision beyond
those imposed in the Order of Supervision. Consistent with the Court granting in part and
denying in part the petition, and as explained further below, dismissal of this case on
mootness grounds is improper.
First, the Court rejects Respondents’ contention that this entire case should be
dismissed as moot. See ECF No. 9 at 3. To be sure, Petitioner’s specific request for
immediate release is moot—he has received such relief. But “[a] case is not moot where
any effective relief may be granted.” White v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 659 F.
Supp. 3d 1045, 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (citation modified); In re Navy Chaplaincy, 850 F.
Supp. 2d 86, 107 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[E]ven the availability of a partial remedy is sufficient to
prevent a case from being moot.” (citation modified)). And here the Court may provide
Petitioner with a partial remedy, see id., in the form of an order requiring Respondents to
return the documents. Accordingly, Respondents have not met their “heavy” burden,
White, 659 F. Supp. 3d at 1051 (citation modified), of showing dismissal based on
mootness is warranted at this time. See also In re Mercury Fin. Co., 240 B.R. 270, 275
(N.D. Ill. 1999) (“A case is moot if there is no possible relief which the court could order
that would benefit the party seeking it.” (citation modified)).
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Second, courts have granted similarly situated individuals relief in the form of an
order requiring respondents to return comparable documents, and the Court discerns no
reason to part ways with them and deny Petitioner his requested relief—particularly where
he has been released from detention. See, e.g., Kumar Taya v. Anda-Ybarra, et al., 1:26–
cv–00480–MIS–SCY, 2026 WL 622385, at *2 (D.N.M. Mar. 5, 2026) (ordering immediate
release and further ordering respondents to “return all of petitioner’s personal belongings”
(citation modified)); Garcia v. Noem, No. 25cv3759–LL–BLM, 2026 WL 194745, at *4
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2026) (“Respondents shall return all of Petitioner’s belongings,
including his identification documents.”). Courts have likewise—including this Court—
ordered respondents to release habeas petitioners without the imposition of conditions
such as ankle or GPS monitoring, and granting Petitioner similar relief is proper here as
well. See, e.g., Cortes v. Guadian, No. 1:26–cv–00294–CNS, 2026 WL 265688, at *2 (D.
Colo. Feb. 2, 2026); Singh v. Baltazar, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 1:26–cv–00336–CNS,
2026 WL 352870, at *6 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2026).
* * *
Consistent with the above analysis, Petitioner’s petition, ECF No. 1, is GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
It is GRANTED to the extent that Petitioner seeks the return of the documents.
Respondents SHALL RETURN the documents to Petitioner within TWO DAYS of this
Order.
The Court further GRANTS the petition to the extent that Petitioner seeks an order
prohibiting 	Respondents 	from 	imposing 	any 	electronic 	monitoring 	conditions 	not
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previously imposed in the Order of Supervision. The Court FURTHER ORDERS that
Respondents SHALL NOT impose any additional conditions of release or supervision not
previously imposed in connection with Petitioner’s prior Order of Supervision.
Respondents SHALL FILE a status report within THREE DAYS of this order to
certify compliance.
Respondents 	are 	further 	ENJOINED 	AND 	RESTRAINED 	from 	re-detaining
Petitioner unless they demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation
bond hearing, that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that his
physical custody is legally justified. At any such bond hearing, the government shall bear
the burden of proof.
DATED this 13 th day of March, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________
Charlotte N. Sweeney
United States District Judge
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