Hernandez v. Baltazar et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 26-cv-0524-WJM
WILMER ANTONIO HERNANDEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, in his official capacity as warden
of the Denver Contract Detention Facility, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING HABEAS CORPUS PETITION
Before the Court is Petitioner Wilmer Antonio Hernandez’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) (ECF No. 1), and
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“Motion”) (ECF No. 3). Respondents Juan
Baltazar, in his official capacity as Warden of the Denver Contract Detention Facility;
Robert Hagan, in his official capacity as Field Office Director of the Denver Field Office
of U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); Kristi Noem, in her official capacity
as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); Todd M. Lyons, in
his official capacity as Acting Director of ICE; Pam Bondi, in her official capacity as
Attorney General of the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”); (collectively,
“Respondents” or “the Government”) filed a response. (ECF No. 15.) The Court did not
order Hernandez to file a reply.
For the following reasons, the Petition is granted.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
This case involves an all-too-familiar fact pattern: Hernandez is a noncitizen who
has lived in the United States for over 20 years. (ECF No. 1 at 14.) He “is a devoted
father to his fifteen-year-old U.S. citizen daughter [sic]. His daughter has been severely
and emotionally affected by her father’s detention and has exhibited suicidal ideation.”
(Id. at 1.) Hernandez has no criminal history or “criminal legal contact” that would
subject him to mandatory detention. (Id. at 4.)
Despite all this, the Government has detained Hernandez pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1225—not 8 U.S.C. § 1226—at the Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora,
Colorado, without the opportunity to post bond. (Id. at 1, 14–15.)
Hernandez now challenges the legality of his detention.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004). More
specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear [such
cases.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(authorizing any person to claim in federal court that they are being held “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States”)). “The fundamental
purpose of a § 2241 habeas proceeding is the same as that of § 2254 habeas and §
2255 proceedings: they are an ‘attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.’” McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)).
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III. 	ANALYSIS
Hernandez contends that his mandatory detention under section 1225 violates
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and his Fifth Amendment Due Process
rights. (See generally ECF No. 1.) As a result, Hernandez seeks immediate release or,
alternatively, a bond hearing pursuant to section 1226(a), at which 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A) cannot be applied. (Id. at 21.)
The Government submits that “[t]he central legal issue presented in this case
concerns whether a noncitizen who is present in the United States and has not been
admitted or paroled is subject to mandatory detention by [ICE] under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2), or whether such a noncitizen is entitled by § 1226(a) to seek a bond
hearing.” (ECF No. 15 at 1.) The Government further submits that the particular facts
of this case are not germane to this central legal issue. (Id. at 2.) On the contrary, the
Government acknowledges that “[t]his issue is not materially different from an issue this
Court has resolved in a prior ruling in another case.” (Id. (citing Morales Lopez v.
Baltazar, 2026 WL 25161, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 5, 2026).)
In Morales Lopez, the Court made the following very clear: “Like dozens of other
federal district courts across the country, including in this Circuit, the Court concludes
that Morales Lopez's detention is properly governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A).” Id. at *4 (citing Nava Hernandez v. Baltazar, et al., 2025 WL 2996643,
at *4 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025)). The Morales Lopez case involved facts substantially
similar to those at issue in Hernandez’s case. See generally id.
Then, only a week or so later, the Court fleshed out the reasoning behind this
ruling in Garcia Abanil v. Baltazar, — F.Supp.3d —, 2026 WL 100587, at *4 (D. Colo.
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Jan. 14, 2026). The Court set up the issue presented as follows:
[S]ince Yajure Hurtado, many lawsuits have been filed
challenging Respondents’ recent practice of subjecting all
noncitizen immigrants present in the United States to
mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A). As in
many of those previously filed actions, Garcia Abanil alleges
here that his continued detention under 1225(b)(2)(A)
violates the INA, as well as his substantive due process
rights. (ECF No. 1.) The Court analyzes each of these
claims below. Ultimately, it joins the many federal courts
across the country that have been faced with virtually
identical challenges in concluding that Garcia Abanil is
subject to detention only under § 1226(a)—not §
1225(b)(2)(A)—and his continued detention without an
individualized custody determination accordingly violates his
constitutional right to due process.
2026 WL 100587, at *4.
The Court held in that case:
The Court, like numerous other courts presented with this
very same question of statutory interpretation, agrees with
Garcia Abanil. ‘The weight of authority interpreting §
1225 has recognized that ‘for section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply,
several conditions must be met—in particular, an ‘examining
immigration officer’ must determine that the individual is: (1)
an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking admission’; and (3)
‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.’ Loa
Caballero v. Baltazar, 2025 WL 2977650, at *6 (D. Colo. Oct.
22, 2025) (quoting Martinez v. Hyde, 2025 WL 2084238, at
*2 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (internal citations omitted)).
. . .
At bottom, ‘[n]oncitizens who are just ‘present’ in the country
. . ., who have been here for years upon years and never
proceeded to obtain any form of citizenship[,] . . . are not
‘seeking’ admission.’ Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d at
781. And “[a]s § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to those
noncitizens who are actively ‘seeking admission’ to the
United States, it cannot, according to its ordinary meaning,
apply to [persons who have] already been residing in the
United States for several years.’ Lopez Benitez v. Francis,
795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). Put another way,
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noncitizens in Garcia Abanil's position, who entered the
United States many years ago, are not ‘seeking admission’
to the United States but are instead “seeking to remain in the
United States.’ Lepe v. Andrews, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025
WL 2716910, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); see also
J.G.O. v. Francis, 2025 WL 3040142, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
28, 2025) (‘[S]eeking admission’ requires an alien to
continue to want to go into the country. The problem, as
[petitioner] points out, is that he's already here; you can't go
into a place where you already are.’ (emphasis in original)).
Id. at *4–5.
The Court did not, however, base its conclusion on the plain text of the
controlling statutes alone. The Court went on to observe that
Respondents’ proffered interpretation of § 1225 appears
facially inconsistent with related implementing regulations.
Though, “[w]ith Chevron laid to rest,” the Court must “follow
the Supreme Court's charge to ‘exercise independent
judgment’ in interpreting the relevant statutory language,”
Rangel-Fuentes v. Bondi, 155 F.4th 1138, 1143 (10th Cir.
2025) (internal citation omitted), courts may nonetheless
‘seek aid from the interpretations of those responsible for
implementing particular statutes,’ Loper Bright Enters. v.
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024). “[I]nterpretations
issued contemporaneously with the statute at issue, and
which have remained consistent over time, may be
especially useful in determining the statute's meaning.” Id.
As relevant here, the implementing regulation for § 1225(b)
states that ‘any arriving alien who appears to the inspecting
officer to be inadmissible, and who is placed in removal
proceedings pursuant to section 240 of the Act shall be
detained in accordance with section 235(b) of the Act.’ 8
C.F.R. § 235(c)(1) (emphasis added). In this way, “[t]he
regulation appears to contemplate that applicants seeking
admission are a subset of applicants ‘roughly
interchangeable’ with ‘arriving aliens.’ Cordero Pelico v.
Kaiser, 2025 WL 2822876, at *11 (Oct. 3, 2025) (quoting
Martinez, 2025 WL 2084238, at *6) (emphasis in original).
An ‘arriving alien’ is defined under the regulatory scheme as
‘an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come
into the United States at a port-of-entry.’ 8 C.F.R. § 1.2.
‘This plainly does not describe petitioners,’ like Garcia
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Abanil, who already ‘reside in the United States.’ Kaiser,
2025 WL 28227876, at *11.
Id.
Finally, the Court observed that Garcia Abanil’s illegal detention violated his
substantive due process rights. See id. at 6 (“Here, the parties’ arguments appear, at
least implicitly, to acknowledge that Garcia Abanil's due process claim rises and falls
with the Court's determination of whether he is detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) or
§ 1226(a).”). The Court expounded: “[B]ecause Garcia Abanil is statutorily entitled
under § 1226 to more process than he has thus far received, his continued detention
without an individualized bond hearing necessarily violates his Fifth Amendment right to
due process.” Id.; cf. Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 495 (concluding, at least as it
pertains to the first factor set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), that
“the facts clearly demonstrate[d] that [petitioner] was ‘entitled to more process than he
received’ pursuant to § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations” and thus “a violation
of [petitioner's] ‘liberty interest is clearly established’ here”).
Respondents “respectfully disagree with th[ese] ruling[s].” (ECF No. 15 at 2.)
Respondents further point out that the Fifth Circuit has since agreed with their
interpretation of the statute. (Id. at 2 (citing Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ---,
2026 WL 323330, at *5–10 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).) Nevertheless, “Respondents
acknowledge that until the Tenth Circuit rules on this issue, this Court’s prior ruling on
this issue would lead the Court to reach the same result here if the Court adheres to
that decision, as the facts of this case are not materially distinguishable from that case
for purposes of the Court’s decision on the legal issue of whether Petitioner is subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).” (Id. at 2.) As a result, “while
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Respondents do not consent to issuance of the writ and reserve the right to appeal, in
order to conserve judicial and party resources,” they submit that they have nothing to
add beyond the arguments the undersigned has already fully considered and rejected
elsewhere. (Id.)
The Court sees no basis to depart from the extensive reasoning outlined in its
published decision in Garcia Abanil. More to the point, not only is it not bound by the
Fifth Circuit’s intervening decision, it is singularly unpersuaded by it. See Singh v.
Baltazar, — F. Supp. 3d. —, 2026 WL 352870, at *3–4 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2026) (similarly
rejecting Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Buenrostro-Mendez). Furthermore, unlike the
circumstances of the Buenrostro-Mendez decision, the petitioner here does not concede
that he is an applicant “for admission within the meaning of § 1225(a)(1).” See Bautista
v. Santacruz, — F. Supp. 3d. —, 2026 WL 468284, at *7 n.6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2026)
(observing that the petitioners in that case did not concede the “seeking admission”
point as did the petitioners in Buenrostro-Mendez).
Hernandez’s detention properly falls under section 1226(a). As such, the Court
readily finds and concludes that Respondents have violated his statutory and
constitutional rights by arguing otherwise and denying him an opportunity to post bond.1
Accordingly, the Court shall order the Government to provide Hernandez with a
1 Notably, the Court’s conclusion here is consistent with the numerous other
decisions the undersigned has reached in the very recent past. Cf. Fuentes Bonilla v.
Baltazar et al., 2026 WL 452365, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 18, 2026); Martinez-Orellana v.
Hagan et al., Civil Action No. 26-cv-0355-WJM (D. Colo. Feb. 13, 2026) (ECF No. 14);
Alvarez Hernandez v. Baltazar et al., 2026 WL 304362, at *1–4 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 2026);
Garcia Abanil, — F.Supp.3d —, 2026 WL 100587, at *4; Morales Lopez, 2026 WL
25161, at *4–5.
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bond hearing pursuant to section 1226(a) within seven days of this Order. The Court
believes, on the limited record before it, that an Immigration Judge is better suited to
consider whether he poses a flight risk or danger to the community in the first instance.
Cf. Loa Caballero, 2025 WL 2977650, at *9; Alvarez v. Noem, 2025 WL 2942648, at *9
(W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025).
The Court pauses to observe that Hernandez develops a robust argument for
why immediate release, and not a bond hearing, is the more appropriate remedy here—
especially because the Government has failed to comply with numerous federal court
orders across the country (See generally ECF No. 3 at 14–27). To date, however, the
undersigned has not yet encountered such failure to adhere to the rule of law on the
part of the Government. Should it fail to fully and timely comply with this Court’s orders,
however, the Government is on clear notice that the Court will not hesitate to order the
immediate release of noncitizens in future, appropriate cases.
As for the procedures that will govern at that bond hearing, the Court reiterates
its holding in Garcia Abanil: It is the Government's burden to “justify[] a noncitizen's
continued detention at a bond hearing.” 2026 WL 100587, at *4; Arauz v. Baltazar,
2025 WL 3041840, at *4 n.3 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2025); see also Espinoza Ruiz v.
Baltazar, 2025 WL 3294762, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 26, 2025) (ordering that the
Government would carry the burden of proof for the bond hearing under § 1226(a)); Loa
Caballero, 2025 WL 2977650, at *9 (“During such [§ 1226(a) hearing], the Respondents
bear the burden of justifying detention.”); Mendoza Gutierrez, 2025 WL 2962908, at *14
(directing that “the Government shall bear the burden of justifying [detention] by clear
and convincing evidence of dangerousness of risk of flight”).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	The Court’s Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 11) is MADE ABSOLUTE and
Hernandez’s Petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED;
2. 	The Court GRANTS this relief to Hernandez pursuant to his individual
claims for relief asserted in the Petition. It does not reach the merits of Hernandez’s
contention that he is entitled to substantially the same relief as a member of the class
certified in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, Case No. 5:25-CV-1873-SSS-BFM (C.D.
Cal.);
3. 	The Motion is DENIED AS MOOT (ECF No. 3);
4. 	Within seven days of this Order, the Government shall provide
Hernandez with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
5. 	At the bond hearing, the Government shall bear the burden to justify
Hernandez’s continued detention by clear and convincing evidence;
6. 	Should the Immigration Judge determine that release on bond is
appropriate, no onerous conditions of release shall be unilaterally imposed by
Respondents on Hernandez, including without limitation mandating that he wear GPS
monitoring, submit to mandatory reporting, or have his movements otherwise restricted;
7. 	Respondents are further hereby ENJOINED from removing or transferring,
or causing to remove or transfer, Hernandez from the District of Colorado while his
Petition remains pending;
8. 	Should Hernandez believe he has a good faith basis to seek attorney's
fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, he is GRANTED leave to file a motion
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seeking the same, along with all supporting documentation, by no later than March 24,
2026. The Government shall file a response by no later than April 14, 2026, and
Hernandez shall file a reply by no later than April 28, 2026; and
9. 	Judgment shall enter in Hernandez’s favor and against the Government
on March 10, 2026, UNLESS prior thereto the Court is informed that the Government
has failed to fully and timely comply with the terms of this Order.
Dated this 24 th day of February, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
______________________
William J. Martinez
Senior United States District Judge
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