Diallo v. Baltazar et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
District Judge S. Kato Crews
Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-3548-SKC
YOUSSOUF DIALLO,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
Petitioner Youssouf Diallo is a citizen of Guinea who is currently being
detained at the Aurora Contract Detention Facility. Dkt. 1, ¶¶1, 2. Petitioner
entered the United States without inspection and has resided here continuously
since at least January 2024. Id. at ¶50.
On January 9, 2024, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement officers
encountered Mr. Diallo near the Mexico – Arizona border. Id. at ¶3. 	The officers
detained Mr. Diallo pending a credible fear interview, which he was found to have,
and issued a Notice to Appear dated January 10, 2024. Id. at ¶1. The Department
of Homeland Security issued a superseding Notice to Appear on January 25, 2025.
Id. at ¶4. This second notice designated Mr. Diallo as a noncitizen “present in the
United States without being admitted or paroled” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
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Id.; 	see 	also 	Dkt. 	1-2, 	p.5. 	Thereafter, 	Petitioner was 	released 	on 	his 	own
recognizance pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id. at ¶5.
In December 2024, Mr. Diallo filed an application for asylum, and he was
issued a work authorization and social security number in connection with his
asylum case. Id. at ¶6. 	According to his paperwork, Mr. Diallo missed a remote
check-in appointment in July 2025, but he did subsequently appear at the ERO
Newark Field Office on September 27, 2025, based on a “call in” letter he received.
Dkt. 1-2, pp.10, 13. Mr. Diallo was detained at the September check-in purportedly
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Dkt. 1, ¶9. He was transferred to Colorado in
October 2025. See Dkt. 1-2, p.19-20.
Mr. Diallo filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on November 6, 2025,
seeking an order from this Court directing Respondents to affect his immediate
release, or in the alternative, to provide him with a bond hearing. Dkt. 1. He
contends he is subject to detention, if at all, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id.
Magistrate Judge Starnella, who was assigned to the case at the time, ordered
Respondents1 to respond to the Petition within sixty days of service and show cause
why it should not be granted. Dkt. 4. Respondents filed their Response on January
20, 2026. Dkt. 7. Judge Starnella also gave Petitioner 21 days from Respondents’
1 “Respondents” refers to Juan Baltazar, the Warden of the Aurora ICE Processing
Center; Robert Hagan, the Director of the Denver ICE Field Office; Kristi Noem, the
Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security; Todd Lyons, the
Acting Director of ICE; and Pamela Bondi, the United States Attorney General.
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answer to file a Reply. Dkt. 4. Although Mr. Diallo has not yet filed his Reply, the
Court, in its discretion, addresses the Petition without awaiting further briefing.
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 2241 of Title
28, which authorizes it to issue a writ of habeas corpus when a person is “in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody
upon the legality of that custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).
“[T]he traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Id.
Noncitizens may properly challenge the lawfulness of their detention through
habeas proceedings. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001).
The Court has considered the Petition, the Response, the various attachments,
and the governing law. Because Petitioner’s challenge is fundamentally legal in
nature, the Court declines to hold a hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243. For the reasons
shared in the following discussion, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
ANALYSIS
This matter presents a similar factual background and procedural posture to
another of the Court’s recent cases, Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 1:25-cv-3688-SKC-
SBP, 2025 WL 3718159, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2025). In Hernandez, this Court
conducted a review of the governing statutes relied on by the parties here and
concluded that when 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226 are read together, they “cover
[noncitizens] presenting at arrival (under § 1225) and then everybody else (under
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§ 1226).” Hernandez, 2025 WL 3718159, at *6 (citing J.G.O. v. Francis, No. 25-CV-
7233 (AS), 2025 WL 3040142, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2025)) (emphasis in original).
Because Mr. Hernandez had been present in the United States for more than a
decade, the Court found that Respondents were unlawfully detaining him under
§ 1225, and that he was only properly detained under § 1226. Id.
In their Response to the Petition for Habeas Corpus, Respondents argue Mr.
Diallo’s request should be denied because he is properly detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention provision as an “applicant for admission” to
the United States. Dkt. 7. These arguments and Respondents’ statutory analysis,
however, 	are 	indistinguishable 	from 	those 	the 	Court 	has 	already 	rejected 	in
materially similar habeas cases. Consequently, the Court adopts and incorporates its
statutory analysis and conclusions from Hernandez, supra, as though stated fully
herein.
Even more, in this case, the Government has consistently treated Mr. Diallo
as detained under § 1226(a) since the date he was first apprehended, and settled law
precludes the Government from switching gears to argue he is now somehow subject
to § 1225(b)(2). Patel v. Crowley, No. 25 C 11180, 2025 WL 2996787, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 24, 2025). To begin, immigration officials apprehended Mr. Diallo near the
Mexico – Arizona border, but then released him on his own recognizance.2 Contrary
2 That he was released on his own recognizance reflects “a determination by the
government that [Mr. Diallo] is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”
Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, at *7
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to Respondents’ argument that Mr. Diallo has not been released or paroled into the
United States, “[c]ourts have recognized that release on recognizance constitutes a
form of conditional parole from detention housed in the provisions of § 1226’s
discretionary detention.” Patel, 2025 WL 2996787, at *5. See also J.U. v. Maldonado,
No. 	25-CV-04836 	(OEM), 	2025 	WL 	2772765, 	at 	*6 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Sept. 	29, 	2025)
(collecting cases); Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 215 (D. Mass. 2025)
(Respondents’ contrary theory of the procedural history cannot make sense of
Petitioner’s 	release 	on 	recognizance 	because 	individuals 	detained 	following
examination under section 1225 can only be paroled into the United States “for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.”).3
In addition, on Mr. Diallo’s Notice to Appear, the immigration official checked
the box stating, “You are [a noncitizen] present in the United States who has not been
admitted or paroled,” rather than the box stating Mr. Diallo was “an arriving
[noncitizen].” Dkt. 1-2, p.5. And Mr. Diallo was given an authorization to work and
an accompanying social security number. Dkt. 1, ¶6; Dkt. 1-2, pp.9-10. To be sure, a
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). And his DHS file confirms that he has no prior criminal
history and does not appear to be a threat to national security, border security, or
public safety. Dkt. 1-2, pp.10. Indeed, Mr. Diallo has secured employment, is engaged
to be married, and recently purchased property with his fiancée, all of which
undercuts any notion that he is a flight risk. Id. at pp.18-21.
3 According to his DHS file, Mr. Diallo was released on his own recognizance due to a
lack of bed space (Dkt. 1-2, p.10), which is neither a humanitarian reason nor one of
significant public benefit. Thus, there can be no credible argument Mr. Diallo was
released pursuant to § 1225.
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noncitizen cannot be given a work authorization, “unless the [noncitizen] is lawfully
admitted for permanent residence or otherwise would (without regard to removal
proceedings) be provided such authorization.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(a)(3) (emphasis
added). Because “the Government has affirmatively decided to treat [Petitioner] as
being detained under Section 1226(a)[,] it cannot now be heard to change its position
to claim that he is detained under Section 1225(b).” Patel, 2025 WL 2996787, at *6.
See also Kennedy v. Kijakazi, No. 22-2258, 2023 WL 1990303, at *3 (7th Cir. Feb. 14,
2023), quoting DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 24 (2020) (the “[SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943)] doctrine requires an agency to ‘defend its
actions based on the reasons it gave when it acted’ in the interest of promoting agency
accountability, instilling confidence in agency decisions, and maintaining an orderly
process of review.”). Therefore, Mr. Diallo’s continued detention pursuant to § 1225
is unlawful.
REMEDY
The Court turns now to the question of relief. In this instance, the Court cannot
conclude that ordering Respondents to provide Mr. Diallo with a bond hearing under
§ 1226 is an appropriate remedy. Not only is Petitioner’s continued detention
unlawful, but his original arrest pursuant to the “call in” letter was also unlawful.
Under § 1226, a noncitizen may only be arrested pursuant to a “warrant issued by
the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). But in this case, erroneously believing it
had authorization to detain Mr. Diallo pursuant to § 1225(b)(2), Respondents simply
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placed him under arrest.
Respondents had an opportunity in their papers to argue in the alternative
that Mr. Diallo was subject to detention under § 1226 or provide some evidence that
a warrant for his arrest had been issued. But they did not. Because Respondents have
offered no lawful basis for his detention, the Court concludes Mr. Diallo is entitled to
immediate release. Rivero v. Mina, No. 6:26-cv-66-RBD-NWH, 2026 WL 199319, at
*4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026); see also Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, ---F.Supp.3d---, 2025
WL 2976572, at *9 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025). “Forcing a detainee to wait for a hearing
for days or weeks more in custody—under who knows what conditions—when he is
not lawfully detained in the first place would gut the purpose of habeas review.”
Rivero v. Mina, 2026 WL 199319, at *4. To be sure, there is some indication that
immigration judges are refusing to conduct bond hearings entirely under § 1226, so
“the grant of a hearing is no remedy at all.” Marco M. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-4816
(MJD/JFD), 2026 WL 194406, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 25, 2026).
* 	* 	*
For the reasons shared above, Youssouf Diallo’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus is GRANTED4 and the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	Mr. Diallo is not subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
4 To the extent Petitioner’s Counsel seeks an award of attorney’s fees, he must file a
separate motion for fees that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Local Rules of Practice for this District.
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§ 1225(b)(2), and Respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from re-
detaining him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
2. 	Respondents shall immediately release Mr. Diallo from detention; however,
he shall remain in Respondents’ temporary custody for the sole purpose of
Respondents effectuating his return to Newark, New Jersey.
3. 	Respondents SHALL transport Mr. Diallo back to Newark, New Jersey, at
their own expense, within 36 hours of the date and time of this Order.
4. 	To effectuate the purpose of this Court’s Order and allow Mr. Diallo to
return home, Respondents are also temporarily enjoined from detaining
Mr. Diallo pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 for a period of fourteen days.
5. 	On or before Monday, February 2, 2026, Respondents shall confirm in
writing Petitioner’s release from custody and his return to New Jersey.
6. 	This Court retains jurisdiction over this matter to ensure Respondents
comply with this Order.
DATED: 	January 29, 2026.
3:20:24 PM
BY THE COURT
_____________________________
S. Kato Crews
United States District Judge
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