Y.S. v. John Doe

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 25-cv-03129-DDD-KAS
Y.S.,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN DOE et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KATHRYN A. STARNELLA
This 	matter 	is 	before 	the 	Court 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to 	Proceed 	Under
Pseudonym [#2] (the “Motion”). The Motion [#2] has been referred to the undersigned.
See Order Referring Motion [#18]. The Court has reviewed the Motion [#2], the applicable
case law, and the entire case file. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion [#2] is
DENIED.
I. 	Background
This case involves a cryptocurrency transaction wherein Plaintiff transferred
approximately $100,000.00 in digital currency to various unknown individuals, who
allegedly 	later 	blocked 	Plaintiff’s 	requested 	withdrawals 	and 	absconded 	with 	the
remaining funds. First Am. Compl. [#36] at 3-5. Plaintiff seeks equitable relief and asserts
claims against these unidentified individuals for (1) violations of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (2) common law fraud, (3)
conversion, and (4) unjust enrichment. Id. at 5-8. Plaintiff allegedly confronted one of the
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wrongdoers by text message, noting that the individual is a “scam business.” See Ex. 1
to Motion [#2] at 6; see also Motion [#2] at 2. On September 25, 2025, the individual
allegedly threatened to send a hitman to kill Plaintiff no later than “12 o’clock” the next
day and confirmed he knew Plaintiff’s home address. See Ex. 1 to Motion [#2] at 6-7; see
also Motion [#2] at 1. In addition, the individual allegedly made various antisemitic
remarks. Ex. 1 to Motion [#2] at 7-8; see also Motion [#2] at 1. Based on this threat,
Plaintiff seeks to proceed anonymously in this lawsuit. See generally Motion [#2].
II. 	Applicable Law
“Lawsuits are public events.” M.M. v. Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 803 (10th Cir.
1998) (quoting Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992)). “Courts are public
institutions which exist for the public to serve the public interest” and “secret court
proceedings are anathema to a free society.” Id. at 800. Therefore, “[o]rdinarily, those
using the courts must be prepared to accept the public scrutiny that is an inherent part of
public trials.” Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000). The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate the naming of the parties. Rule 10(a) requires that
a complaint “name all the parties,” and Rule 17(a) requires the prosecution of an action
“in the name of the real party in interest.” FED. R. CIV . P. 10(a), 17(a); Raiser v. Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 182 F. App'x 810, 811 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that
“there is no explicit congressional grant of a right of a party to proceed anonymously”);
Coe v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Colo., 676 F.2d 411, 415 (10th Cir. 1982) (“There is no
provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for suit against persons under fictitious
names, and there are likewise no provisions for anonymous plaintiffs.”).
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Following these general principles, in this Circuit, plaintiffs are generally allowed
to proceed anonymously only in “exceptional cases” that fall into one of three categories:
(1) cases “involving matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature”; (2) where the
plaintiff is threatened with “real danger or physical harm”; or (3) “where the injury litigated
against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity.” Doe v.
Regents of Univ. of Colo., 603 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1018-19 (D. Colo. 2022) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The decision whether to allow a plaintiff to proceed
pseudonymously is within the trial court’s sound discretion. See Zavaras, 139 F.3d at 802.
Ultimately, “[p]roceeding under a pseudonym in federal court is, by all accounts, an
unusual procedure.” Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1246 (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff asks the Court to proceed pseudonymously in this litigation because he
received a death threat from an unidentified individual who is, at least in part, allegedly
responsible for the underlying cryptocurrency scam. Motion [#2] at 1-2. The text message
exchange indicates this individual told Plaintiff, “I’m going to send a hitman after you!” and
that “[he] just contacted the hitman, [the hitman] checked [Plaintiff’s] address” and the
hitman would “find [Plaintiff] before 12 o’clock tomorrow[.]” Ex. 1 to Motion [#2] at 6; see
also Motion [#2] at 2. The individual further stated the hitman would kill Plaintiff, and
informed Plaintiff he knew his home address. See Ex. 1 to Motion [#2] at 7; see also
Motion [#2] at 2. This exchange occurred after Plaintiff confronted the individual about the
alleged fraudulent crypto scheme that gives rise to this suit. Motion [#2] at 2. For the
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reasons expressed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s need for anonymity does not
outweigh the presumption of openness.
Plaintiff seeks anonymity because of the alleged threat of real danger or physical
harm, i.e., death. In these situations, the Tenth Circuit has recognized that the party
seeking anonymity must demonstrate “real, imminent personal danger” to overcome the
public’s interest in court proceedings. See Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1246; see also Doe v.
Kappa Kappa Gamma Fraternity, No. 23-CV-51-ABJ, 2023 WL 4894429, at *2-3 (D. Wyo.
Apr. 	14, 	2023) 	(noting 	that 	the 	plaintiffs 	“present 	little 	to 	demonstrate 	that 	they,
themselves, are in ‘real, imminent personal danger.’”) (emphasis omitted).
Plaintiff cites multiple cases to support his argument that the at-issue threat
warrants his anonymity. First, Plaintiff cites Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir.
1997) for the proposition that courts routinely grant anonymity in cases involving violent
or retaliatory threats. Motion [#2] at 3. Frank, however, stands for no such proposition and
is distinguishable from the instant case. There, the plaintiff, an alcoholic, sued the United
States Postal Service. Frank, 951 F.2d at 323-24. The plaintiff sought anonymity because
(1) he was suing a government agency and (2) he feared disclosure of his alcoholism
would force him to face the community’s disapproval. Id. The court affirmed the denial of
the plaintiff’s request to proceed anonymously because the plaintiff’s asserted need for
anonymity did not outweigh the presumption of openness. Id. at 324. Frank did not involve
a situation where the plaintiff faced violent or retaliatory threats.
Plaintiff next cites Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2004). Motion [#2] at 3.
Porter involved minor plaintiffs who challenged a public elementary school’s practice of
teaching the Christian Bible as religious truth. Porter, 370 F.3d at 560. The Sixth Circuit
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upheld the district court’s grant of pseudonymity because the plaintiffs were minors
challenging a governmental activity, which would require them to disclose their beliefs on
a sensitive topic, i.e., religion, “that could subject them to considerable harassment.” Id.
at 560-61. Referring to the harassment at issue, the Court pointed to a letter written by a
community member which called the plaintiffs “cowards” and stated that “the people in
Rhea County would come up to [their] face[s] and tell [them] what we think of [them]” and
that the author “would love to come face to face with [them] because yes I would tell
[them] what I thought of [them] and I would let my sons tell [them] too.” Id. at 560. The
court also referred to a statement from the school principal in which he stated: “This is a
rural, conservative place, and [the community is] very emotional about religion. Attack
religion and crusades begin.” Id. at 560-61. In addressing anonymity, the court weighed
the considerable harassment and violent reprisals the plaintiffs would face, the sensitive
nature of the topic at issue, and the fact that plaintiffs were minors—entitling them to
heightened protections under the law. Id.
Finally, Plaintiff cites Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981). Motion [#2] at
3. Like Porter, Stegall involved minor plaintiffs and their mother challenging public
schools’ daily religious activities. Stegall, 653 F.2d at 182. In affirming the grant of
anonymity, the appellate court was “especially persua[ded]” by the plaintiffs’ status as
children. See id. at 186. However, like the court in Porter, the court also considered other
factors. 	For 	instance, 	the 	court 	acknowledged 	that 	the 	issue 	of 	religion 	is 	a
“quintessentially private matter” and evidence on the record demonstrated the plaintiffs
“may expect extensive harassment and perhaps even violent reprisals if their identities
are disclosed.” Id. Considering the plaintiffs’ status as minors, coupled with the threats of
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violence generated by the case, the court found that maintaining the plaintiffs’ anonymity
“tip[ped] the balance against the customary practice of judicial openness.” Id.
While not binding on this Court, Stegall and Porter as applied to this case are
distinguishable in a few key respects. For instance, Porter and Stegall involved the
personal topic of religion, which was a highly sensitive and polarizing topic in the
communities in which those cases originated. The instant case is a cryptocurrency theft
case and presents no sensitive, controversial topic, and is therefore unlikely to provoke
the community. Moreover, and perhaps most distinctly, the plaintiffs in Porter and Stegall
were minor children. As each court noted, the plaintiffs’ minor status was “especially
persuasive” and, as a result, those courts afforded the minor plaintiffs “heightened
protection.” See Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186; Porter, 370 F.3d at 561. Here, however, Plaintiff
is an adult.
Additionally, unlike Porter and Stegall where the litigants faced harassment from
community members, the threat Plaintiff received came from one of the unidentified John
Doe defendants “following Plaintiff’s confrontation of the perpetrator regarding the theft of
funds and possible identity fraud.” Motion [#2] at 1; see also id. at 2 (explaining that
Plaintiff has an “ongoing fear for his life and safety” because “the threats stemmed directly
from 	Plaintiff’s 	confrontation 	of 	the 	perpetrator 	about 	a 	fraudulent 	cryptocurrency
investment”). In essence, Plaintiff seeks to conceal his identity from the individuals he has
sued. See id. at 3 (“Because the perpetrators remain unidentified and continue to operate
online, public disclosure of Plaintiff’s full name and address on the court’s docket would
increase the risk of renewed harassment or retaliation.”). Plaintiff’s request to proceed
pseudonymously will not provide the relief he seeks, namely protection from further
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threats from the John Doe defendants. The John Doe defendants Plaintiff has sued are
apparently already aware of his identity and address. See id. (“[The identification of
Plaintiff’s home address in the threatening text message] confirms that the perpetrators
are capable of doxing and are aware of Plaintiff’s physical location.”); see also Ex. 1 to
Motion [#2] at 7 (text message containing Plaintiff’s address). While Plaintiff contends that
“[p]roceeding pseudonymously is . . . necessary to prevent further targeting or harm,”
Motion [#2] at 3, the Court disagrees. The proverbial cat is already out of the bag; at least
one of the John Doe defendants apparently has the information Plaintiff seeks to conceal.
Therefore, the Court is disinclined to allow Plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously. See
GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. M.O., No. 21-2164-DDC-ADM, 2021 WL 4476783, at *10 (D.
Kan. Sept. 30, 2021) (“[C]ourts are generally disinclined to allow parties to proceed
anonymously if their identity has already been disclosed[.]”); see also Dotson v. Acord,
No. 25-509 SCY/JHR, 2025 WL 2522380, at *2 (D.N.M. Sept. 25, 2025) (finding lack of
clarity as to “how disclosure of [the] [p]laintiffs’ names would open them to further
retaliation from [the] [d]efendants” where the defendants already knew of their identities).
To the extent Plaintiff is concerned that the John Doe defendants will improperly
use and distribute his identifying information, Plaintiff may file a motion for an order that
limits the John Doe defendants’ use and dissemination of the information already in their
possession. See Dotson, 2025 WL 2522380 at *3-4 (denying the plaintiffs’ request to
proceed pseudonymously but inviting them to file a motion to protect information already
in the defendant’s possession). Plaintiff may file that motion once the John Doe
defendants have been identified and served process.
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IV. Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion [#2] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all future filings shall identify Plaintiff by his real
name.
Dated: December 3, 2025 	BY THE COURT:
Kathryn A. Starnella
United States Magistrate Judge
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