Archer v. Stucker et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Civil Action No. 24-cv-02297-NYW
ASHFORD ARCHER,
Petitioner,
v.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, and
SHANE STUCKER,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner 	Ashford 	Archer 	(“Petitioner” 	or 	“Mr. 	Archer”) 	is 	a 	convicted 	and
sentenced state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Sterling Correctional Facility in
Sterling, Colorado. 	He is serving three criminal sentences after a jury convicted him of
two counts of child abuse resulting in death and one count of accessory to a crime. The
sentences were imposed by the San Miguel County District Court in case number
2017CR28. 	Mr. Archer brings this habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to
challenge the child abuse convictions. One claim remains for federal habeas review on
the merits: 	Mr. Archer’s claim that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
sustain his convictions for child abuse resulting in death. After reviewing the application,
the answer, and the state-court record, no basis for habeas relief has been shown. For
the reasons below, Mr. Archer’s habeas application will be denied on the merits.
Case No. 1:24-cv-02297-NYW Document 23 filed 01/02/26 USDC Colorado pg 1
of 13

2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) requires a
prisoner
who challenges (in a federal habeas court) a matter “adjudicated on the
merits in State court” to show that the relevant state-court “decision”
(1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established 	Federal 	law,” 	or 	(2) 	“was 	based 	on 	an 	unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.”
Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 124–25 (2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2)). Mr.
Archer’s claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court. As such, it is well-settled that
“when the last state court to decide a prisoner’s federal claim explains its decision on the
merits in a reasoned opinion,” a “federal habeas court simply reviews the specific reasons
given by the state court and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable.” Id. at 125.
“[A] state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in
federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). 	Mr. Archer bears the burden of proof
under § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam).
Because Mr. Archer proceeds pro se, the Court liberally construes his filings, but
will not act as an advocate. James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).
BACKGROUND
The Colorado Court of Appeals (“CCA”) summarized the underlying factual
background of this case in addressing Mr. Archer’s direct appeal:
Archer was part of an itinerant religious group that, in the summer of 2017,
met Alec Blair by chance at a gas station east of Grand Junction. 	Blair
owned twenty acres of land near Norwood where he was attempting to grow
Case No. 1:24-cv-02297-NYW Document 23 filed 01/02/26 USDC Colorado pg 2
of 13

3
vegetables and marijuana. 	The land was undeveloped and had no
electricity, plumbing, power, or water rights, but, after getting to know some
of the members of the group during their chance meeting, Blair invited them
to stay there.
When Archer and the others met Blair, their group was made up of . . . five
adults and four children traveling in two vehicles. 	Codefendant Madani
Ceus was the group’s spiritual leader; she and Archer were the biological
parents of two of the children. 	The other two children — the victims, who
were approximately ten and eight years old — were the daughters of
codefendant Nashika Bramble, another member.
Blair’s property had no permanent structures, so when the group arrived,
they set up camp in tents, shacks, and their cars. Their spiritual beliefs were
complex, but, as relevant here, they claimed to be “metaphysical healers”
and sought spiritual purity by observing strict dietary rules and limiting
personal possessions. Adhering rigorously to the group’s rules was the only
way that followers could acquire “light bodies” that would be able to enter
heaven after the coming “purge.”
Although Ceus was the group’s spiritual head, she did not make decisions
on her own. Rather, according to Blair, a three-person “hierarchy” including
Ceus and Archer “collectively as a unit ma[de] decisions for things.”
The victims died after they were banished to a vehicle in an isolated part of
the property to work on their spiritual development. Ceus declared that the
victims were no longer allowed to eat the food that she cooked, so on one
occasion Blair and others gave them food that they had collected at a local
food bank. But then Ceus barred anyone from leaving the property to obtain
provisions, and no one gave the victims food, water, or other assistance
again. They died some time later and, a month after that, Archer and Blair
covered the car with a tarp to hide the bodies from law enforcement officers
coming to the farm for periodic marijuana compliance checks.
[Doc. 10-5 at 3–5 (footnote omitted)]. The CCA affirmed Mr. Archer’s convictions. [Id. at
20].
After the CCA affirmed Mr. Archer’s convictions, he initiated this habeas corpus
action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. 1]. On initial review, the Court ordered Mr. Archer
to show cause why his Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 should not be dismissed as a “mixed petition”—a petition containing both
Case No. 1:24-cv-02297-NYW Document 23 filed 01/02/26 USDC Colorado pg 3
of 13

4
exhausted and unexhausted claims. 	[Doc. 11]. 	Because he had submitted a mixed
petition, the Court advised Mr. Archer that he “may elect to amend his application to delete
the unexhausted claims (Claims 2 and 4) and pursue in this action the claims which have
been properly exhausted in state court (Claims 1 and 3).” [Id. at 9]. On January 2, 2025,
Mr. Archer submitted the operative pleading, an amended Application for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, [Doc. 14], deleting all claims except for Claim 1.
Mr. Archer’s remaining claim is that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient
to sustain Mr. Archer’s convictions for child abuse resulting in death. 	[Id. at 7–9].
Respondents have answered the petition, contending that the CCA’s resolution of the
claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law, which bars habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1). 	See [Doc. 22]. 	Respondents further
argue that the state court’s decision was not based on unreasonable factual findings,
making relief unavailable under § 2254(d)(2). [Id.]. Mr. Archer has not filed a reply brief,
and the time to do so has passed.
The Court now turns to the merits of Mr. Archer’s claim.
ANALYSIS
Mr. 	Archer 	claims 	that 	his 	child 	abuse 	convictions 	violate 	the 	Fourteenth
Amendment because the prosecution did not prove all elements of the crime he was found
to have committed. Mr. Archer argues that the “State did not prove that the inaction of the
petitioner gave rise to any neglect on his part.” [Doc. 14 at 8]. According to Mr. Archer,
“[a]t no point during the trial did the State allege the Petitioner (1) caused an injury to the
children or (4) his actions create an accumulation of injuries that ultimately result[ed] in
death of child.” [Id. at 7].
Case No. 1:24-cv-02297-NYW Document 23 filed 01/02/26 USDC Colorado pg 4
of 13

5
The Court will first recount why the CCA rejected Mr. Archer’s claim and then
address whether habeas relief is available under § 2254.
I. 	CCA’s Rejection of the Claim
The CCA rejected this claim, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict
on the two convictions for child abuse resulting in death. 	[Doc. 10-5 at 6]. 	Specifically,
the CCA found as follows:
A. 	Sufficiency of the Evidence
We 	first 	conclude 	that 	because 	the 	prosecution 	presented 	sufficient
evidence to support the jury’s verdict on the two charges of child abuse
resulting in death, the trial court properly denied Archer’s motion for
judgment of acquittal.
1. 	Standard of Review
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the
record de novo to determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support the
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800,
807 (Colo. 2005). In doing so, we do not act as a thirteenth juror; whether
we would have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
based on the evidence presented is irrelevant. 	Clark v. People, 232 P.3d
1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010). Instead, the pertinent question for us is whether
a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution. Id.
2. 	Act or Omission
Under section 18-6-401(1)(a), C.R.S. 2021, a person commits child abuse
if he
causes an injury to a child’s life or health, or permits a child to be
unreasonably placed in a situation that poses a threat of injury to the child’s
life or health, or engages in a continued pattern of conduct that results in
malnourishment, 	lack 	of 	proper 	medical 	care, 	cruel 	punishment,
mistreatment, or an accumulation of injuries that ultimately results in the
death of a child or serious bodily injury to a child.
Archer contends that he did not engage in conduct prohibited by this statute,
Case No. 1:24-cv-02297-NYW Document 23 filed 01/02/26 USDC Colorado pg 5
of 13

6
and thus cannot stand convicted of child abuse resulting in death, because
he (1) did not take any actions that injured the victims, and (2) had no
special relationship with the victims that required him to take any action to
save them from the neglect that he claims was the fault of their mother and
others on the property. We disagree with both arguments.
First, although the parties dispute whether Archer was required under
section 18-6-401(1)(a) to intervene on the victims’ behalf despite the fact
that he was not their biological father, the prosecution presented substantial
evidence that Archer did not simply fail to intervene; to the contrary, he
engaged in affirmative acts of mistreatment, thereby rendering irrelevant the
question of his relationship with the victims. 	For example, as we have
already discussed, there was evidence at trial that, as a member of the
group’s inner circle, Archer regularly participated in council meetings in
which he, along with the other members, “collectively as a unit ma[de]
decisions for things.” 	And although the girls’ banishment and deprivation
may have been pronounced by Ceus, there was ample evidence that it
resulted from a collective decision in which Archer participated. 	For
example, Blair testified that Archer participated in conversations about the
two girls during council meetings, and that Archer had not revealed to him
that there were four children with the group, rather than three, until they had
been on the property for nearly two months. 	When he overheard a
conversation about a fourth child, Blair asked Ceus and Archer about that
child because no one had ever mentioned her to him and he had not seen
her around the property. After they “stepped aside and conferred,” Archer
“brought [Blair] over to the gray sedan[,] . . . opened up the door of the
vehicle[,] and showed [Blair] that there were two children inside of the
vehicle, one of [whom Blair] had never seen before.” 	This testimony
supports an inference that the younger child had been confined to the
vehicle for many weeks, during the summer, with Archer’s full knowledge
and participation, even before the group began to deprive her and her sister
of food and water.
Moreover, Archer’s actions led to Ceus’s decree that the girls should be
abandoned in the car. 	For example, after Archer siphoned gas from the
car, Ceus declared that he had “gray energy,” and then “cleansed him by
performing a blessing,” but then “essentially ordered [the members of the
group]” to stay away from the car. 	Someone drew a “physical perimeter”
around the vehicle that no one was allowed to enter, and the group then
moved to another part of the property, leaving the victims to die.
Second, even if Archer had not affirmatively contributed to the conditions
that led to the girls’ deaths, and even if section 18-6-401(1)(a) does not
broadly impose a duty to rescue, 2 there was ample evidence at trial showing
that he was far more than an innocent bystander. 	Indeed, he admitted to
the investigating police officer that the girls had been placed in the car as
Case No. 1:24-cv-02297-NYW Document 23 filed 01/02/26 USDC Colorado pg 6
of 13

7
punishment, and he was a leader of a nine-member group that had traveled
around the country in two vehicles for years, moved to the Blair property
together, and referred to itself as a “family” as it proselytized and attempted
to recruit new followers like Blair. 	Under these circumstances, whether
Archer had a formal familial relationship with the victims is beside the point.
He was responsible, along with all the other adults, for the well-being of
those children who were in the group’s care.
[Id. at 6–11 (alterations in original)]. In a footnote, the CCA also observed that “[a]t least
one division of this court has held that the statute does impose such a duty.” 	[Id. at 10
n.2 (citing People v. Arevalo, 725 P.2d 41, 48 (Colo. App. 1986))]; see also Arevalo, 725
P.2d at 48 (“The statute refers to no external source of duty, and we do not believe the
general assembly intended that a duty between an adult and a child [must] necessarily
be established before a person may be charged with child abuse. The law is intended to
prevent child abuse, and it applies to any person.”). The CCA then considered whether
the conduct was knowing or reckless:
3. 	Knowing or Reckless
The 	prosecution 	also 	presented 	sufficient 	evidence 	to 	establish 	that
Archer’s actions were knowing or reckless.
As relevant here, child abuse requires that the defendant knowingly or
recklessly causes serious bodily injury to a child. 	§ 18-6-401(1)(a),
(7)(a)(III). 	For most offenses, “knowingly” means that the defendant is
aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause a particular
result. 	§ 18-1-501(6), C.R.S. 2021. 	And “recklessly” means that the
defendant consciously disregards an unjustifiable risk that a result will occur
or a circumstance exists. § 18-1-501(8). In other words, for most offenses,
the mental states of knowingly and recklessly relate to the result of the
conduct (often an injury to the victim).
But child abuse is different. 	For this offense, the culpable mental states
relate “to the nature of the offender’s conduct in relation to the child or to
the circumstances under which the act or omission occurred,” not a
particular injury to the child. 	People v. Deskins, 927 P.2d 368, 371 (Colo.
1996). Thus, “knowing” child abuse does not require that the defendant is
aware that his conduct will cause serious bodily injury. Instead, to knowingly
commit child abuse, a defendant need only be aware of the conduct he is
Case No. 1:24-cv-02297-NYW Document 23 filed 01/02/26 USDC Colorado pg 7
of 13

8
engaging in with the child. 	Similarly, to recklessly commit child abuse, a
defendant need only consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that, given the child’s circumstances, the child may be injured. Id.
There was sufficient evidence that Archer acted knowingly or recklessly
because, even though he was aware that the victims were confined to a car
during the summer and then abandoned there without food or water, he did
nothing to help them, and in fact he consciously disregarded the substantial
risk that they would die as a result of being abandoned. 	Accordingly, the
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Archer’s convictions for
child abuse resulting in death.
[Doc. 10-5 at 11–12].
II. 	Application of § 2254
Respondents answer that the CCA’s decision did not contradict or unreasonably
apply 	binding 	Supreme 	Court 	precedent, 	nor 	was 	it 	based 	on 	an 	unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented, which spells the end of the
claim under §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2). The Court respectfully agrees.
The standard for evaluating a claim challenging the sufficiency of evidence is found
in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). In Jackson, the Supreme Court held that “the
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” 	Id. at 319. 	“This familiar standard gives full play to the
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” 	Id.
“Under Jackson, federal courts must look to state law for ‘the substantive elements of the
criminal offense,’ . . . but the minimum amount of evidence that the Due Process Clause
requires to prove the offense is purely a matter of federal law.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566
U.S. 650, 655 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16). To the extent
Case No. 1:24-cv-02297-NYW Document 23 filed 01/02/26 USDC Colorado pg 8
of 13

9
an insufficient evidence claim involves an interpretation of state law, the state court’s
interpretation “binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. Richey, 546
U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam).
“Sufficiency of the evidence is a mixed question of law and fact.” 	Maynard v.
Boone, 468 F.3d 665, 673 (10th Cir. 2006). The Court must apply both § 2254(d)(1) and
§ 2254(d)(2) and “ask whether the facts are correct and whether the law was properly
applied to the facts.” 	Id. 	The Court is “required to defer to any determination of factual
issue by the state court due to the presumption of correctness afforded by § 2254(e),”
unless Petitioner overcomes that presumption with “clear and convincing” evidence. Id.
“Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject
to two layers of judicial deference.” Coleman, 566 U.S. at 651. “First, on direct appeal,
it is the responsibility of the jury—not the [state] court—to decide what conclusions should
be drawn from the evidence admitted at trial.” 	Id. (quotation omitted). 	Second, “on
habeas review, a federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a
sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the
state court. 	The federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was
objectively unreasonable.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The 	CCA 	was 	not 	objectively 	unreasonable 	when 	it 	rejected 	Mr. 	Archer’s
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. 	As explained in the CCA’s opinion, Colorado’s child
abuse statute may be violated under either a “caused injury” or “permitted injury” theory.
Insofar 	as 	Mr. Archer’s 	habeas 	application 	can 	be 	read 	to 	argue 	that 	the 	CCA
misinterpreted Colorado’s child abuse statute, the argument fails because this Court is
bound to accept the CCA’s conclusion regarding its interpretation of Colorado criminal
Case No. 1:24-cv-02297-NYW Document 23 filed 01/02/26 USDC Colorado pg 9
of 13

10
law. 	Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76 (holding that a state court’s interpretation of its criminal
law “binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus”).
Moreover, the evidence against Mr. Archer was sufficient for a rational jury to find
him guilty under a “caused injury” or “permitted injury” theory. 	In affirming Mr. Archer’s
convictions, the CCA relied on evidence that:
• 	As a member of the group’s leadership circle, Mr. Archer regularly participated
in council meetings where he, along with other members, made collective
decisions about the group, and specifically discussed the victims. 	[March 11,
2019, Trial Tr. at 94–96, 122–24]. 	This evidence supports a reasonable
inference that Mr. Archer knew of and was at least partially responsible for the
decision to banish the victims and deprive them of food and water.
• 	After being at the property for two months and never seeing the victims, Blair was
taken to the children by Mr. Archer, where they were inside of a gray sedan.
[March 11, 2019, Trial Tr. at 129–33].
• 	Mr. Archer siphoned gas from the gray sedan while the children were inside. After
siphoning the gas, Mr. Ceus declared that he had “gray energy,” cleansed him,
ordered the members to stay away from the car, and a physical perimeter was
drawn around the vehicle. The group then moved to another part of the property,
leaving the victims to die. [March 11, 2019, Trial Tr. at 216–22]. Mr. Archer was
aware that the victims were confined to a car during the summer, abandoned
without food or water, and he did nothing to help them despite this knowledge.
Case No. 1:24-cv-02297-NYW Document 23 filed 01/02/26 USDC Colorado pg 10
of 13

11
• 	Mr. Archer admitted to the police that the girls had been placed in the car as
punishment, and, as noted above, he was a leader of the group to which the
victims were part of. [March 14, 2019, Trial Tr. at 67–68].
• 	After the victims died, Mr. Archer covered the car containing their bodies with a
tarp to conceal them from law enforcement. [March 11, 2019, Trial Tr. at 35–38].
These facts are supported by the state-court record as indicated by the above
citations. 	And Mr. Archer does not rebut the presumption of correctness with clear and
convincing evidence of his own. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). When viewing the foregoing
evidence as a whole, and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the CCA
reasonably concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found Mr. Archer guilty under
either a “caused injury” or “permitted injury” theory of child abuse in violation of Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 18-6-401(1)(a). 	Vann v. Broaddus, 349 F. App’x 265, 267 (10th Cir. 2009)
(affirming denial of § 2254 habeas challenge where the petitioner challenged his child
abuse convictions under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-401(1)(a) where the prosecution
presented both theories of culpability, finding “the evidence . . . adequate to support the
actual-abuse theory”).
Mr. Archer resists this conclusion, maintaining that his inaction did not cause the
children to die, that he had no “duty to rescue” the children, “or that he knew the mother
had mistreated her children.” 	[Doc. 14 at 8]. 	Evidence in the state-court record
contradicts these arguments, and there was ample evidence presented that could lead a
rational jury to conclude otherwise. 	In the end, it is the jury’s responsibility “to resolve
conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
basic facts to ultimate facts.” 	Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The fact that the jury weighed
Case No. 1:24-cv-02297-NYW Document 23 filed 01/02/26 USDC Colorado pg 11
of 13

12
the evidence against Mr. Archer is not a ground for habeas relief. The Court therefore
finds that, under §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2), the CCA got the facts correct and properly
applied those facts to the law. Mr. Archer’s claim will be denied.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Archer points to nothing from the state criminal proceedings that qualifies as
the sort of extreme malfunction in the state criminal justice system that § 2254 guards
against. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
(1) 	The amended Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 [Doc. 14] is DENIED, and this case is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE;
(2) 	Leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to the filing of a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit;
(3) 	A certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) will not issue
because Mr. Archer has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right;
(4) 	The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case; and
Case No. 1:24-cv-02297-NYW Document 23 filed 01/02/26 USDC Colorado pg 12
of 13

13
(5) 	A copy of this Order shall be sent to:
Ashford Archer, #185188
Sterling Correctional Facility (SCF)
P.O. Box 6000
Sterling, CO 80751
DATED: January 2, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
Case No. 1:24-cv-02297-NYW Document 23 filed 01/02/26 USDC Colorado pg 13
of 13