Schmitt v. UMB Financial Corporation

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
District Judge S. Kato Crews
Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-01900-SKC-SBP
SARA SCHMITT,
an individual
Plaintiff,
v.
UMB FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
a Missouri corporation,
Defendant.
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 33)
This case arises from Defendant UMB Financial Corporation’s purported
denial of Plaintiff Sara Schmitt’s disability accommodation request. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff
asserts claims pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Act and contends UMB discriminated against her based on her
disability. Id. She seeks to recover “[e]conomic damages, including without limitation,
lost wages, lost benefits and out of pocket medical expenses; [n]on-economic damages
for emotional distress; [p]unitive and/or liquidated damages as permitted by law;
[and] [f]ront pay.” Id. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this
matter arises under Federal law, and it has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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Before the Court is UMB’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 33. The
Motion is fully briefed. Dkts. 38 (Response), 51 (Reply). The Court has carefully
considered the Motion and related briefing, the exhibit attachments, the entire case
file, and the applicable law and legal authorities. No hearing is necessary. Because,
when considering the undisputed material facts, no reasonable jury could conclude
UMB discriminated against Plaintiff, UMB’s Motion is GRANTED.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The purpose of summary judgment is to assess whether a trial is necessary.
White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is
appropriate “when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant
bears the “responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
If the movant meets this burden, then the nonmoving party must identify material
facts showing there is a genuine dispute for trial. Id. at 324. A fact is “material” if it
has the potential to affect the outcome of a dispute under applicable law. Ulissey v.
Shvartsman, 61 F.3d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1995). An issue is “genuine” if a rational
trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party on the evidence presented. Adams v.
Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 233 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000). In performing
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this analysis, the factual record and any reasonable inferences from it are construed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
Even when a party fails to appropriately respond to the request for summary
judgment and its purportedly undisputed facts, the Court is nevertheless obligated
to ensure the movant has satisfied the standard under Rule 56. As the Tenth Circuit
explained in Perez v. El Tequila, LLC, 847 F.3d 1247, 1255 (10th Cir. 2017), “in
granting summary judgment based upon a failure to respond, a district court must
still determine that summary judgment is appropriate.” See also Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)(3) advisory committee’s notes to 2010 amendment.
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), when parties assert that a fact is genuinely
disputed, they must support the assertion with citations to specific parts of the record.
When they fail to, the Court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of deciding
the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). Additionally, in reference to motions for summary
judgment, this Court’s Standing Order for Civil Cases directs that general references
to record materials are insufficient where the cited document exceeds one page. See
SKC Standing Order Civ. § C.4.4. When the document contains multiple pages, the
Court requires the parties to make specific references to the evidence. Id. As the
Standing Order says, a “specific reference” means reference to page numbers, line
numbers, paragraph numbers, or any combination of these to assist the Court in
locating the pertinent materials. Id.
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At various times in her response to UMB’s statement of undisputed facts,
Plaintiff disputes particular facts or asserts new facts and then generally cites to
deposition testimony—some sections over ten pages long—without any specificity as
to what statements the Court ought to rely on. See, e.g., Dkt. 52, (Additional Facts)
¶9 (supporting a factual assertion with unspecified string cite of 15 pages of
deposition testimony). This roughshod approach leaves it to the Court and UMB to
speculate on what portion of Plaintiff’s exhibits could possibly support her arguments.
That is not the Court’s function.
“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” Gross v.
Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation and quotations
omitted). The Court has no obligation to scour the record in search of evidence to
support a party’s factual assertions. And where Plaintiff has directed the Court to
broad-swath record citations, the Court has ignored them because they equate to no
citation at all. See id. (“Without a specific reference, [courts] will not search the record
in an effort to determine whether there exists dormant evidence. . . .”) (cleaned up);
see also Mitchell v. City of Moore, 218 F.3d 1190, 1199 (10th Cir. 2000) (“The district
court was not obligated to comb the record in order to make [the plaintiff’s] arguments
for him.”).
In addition, Plaintiff frequently engages in strawman arguments wherein she
purportedly disputes UMB’s facts but does not directly address the factual contention
and instead injects tangential issues into the response. See, e.g., Dkt. 52, ¶¶16, 17,
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24, 31, 35, 51. This is insufficient to establish a genuine dispute for a jury. Ayon v.
Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1252 (D. Colo. 1998) (evidence that is not significantly
probative and immaterial factual disputes will not defeat a motion for summary
judgment). With these observations in mind, the Court accepts the following facts,
which UMB has appropriately supported by competent evidence and specific record
citations, as undisputed:
Plaintiff joined UMB in March 2021 as a Relationship Manager and Vice
President Institutional Banking and Corporate Trust Services, and worked primarily
on municipal bond deals, closing transactions, and servicing clients. Dkt. 52, ¶¶1, 2.
Plaintiff had a hybrid work schedule and sometimes spent weeks without working in
the office. Id. at ¶5.
On November 15, 2022, Plaintiff was diagnosed with cancer. Id. at ¶6. Plaintiff
informed her supervisor, John Wahl, of her diagnosis and that her surgery was
scheduled for December 6, 2022.1 Id. at ¶7. Plaintiff also requested and was approved
for FMLA2 leave from December 6, 2022, to February 27, 2023. Id. at ¶24. On January
23, 2023, Plaintiff requested additional leave and was approved for non-FMLA leave
from February 28, 2023, to May 28, 2023. Id. at ¶26. She made a third request for
1 Other facts regarding Plaintiff’s relationship and interactions with Mr. Wahl are
discussed below as relevant to Plaintiff’s claims.
2 The Family and Medical Leave Act provides eligible employees with up to 12 weeks
of unpaid, job-protected leave in a 12-month period. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq.
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leave on March 22, 2023, which was approved and extended her non-FMLA leave
until August 6, 2023. Id. at ¶27.
On June 8, 2023, Plaintiff made a final request for leave and sought until
September 10, 2023, to return to work. Id. at ¶28. Upon receiving this request, Mr.
Wahl met with Doug Hare (his direct supervisor), Austin Braithwait (EVP, Executive
Director – Investor Solutions and Corporate Trust), and Lynda Beahm-Lemmer
(Senior Associate Relations Partner) (collectively “the UMB executives”). Id. at ¶29.
In this meeting, the UMB executives discussed the company’s needs in Colorado, the
continued viability of holding Plaintiff’s position open, and the possibility Plaintiff
could make even further requests for leave Id. at ¶30. The executives ultimately
concluded this fourth request would cause UMB undue hardship.3 Id. at ¶¶31-33.
Consequently, on June 21, 2023, UMB denied Plaintiff’s fourth request for leave. Id.
at ¶34.
After learning of the denial, Plaintiff contacted Mr. Hare to discuss her
request. Id. at ¶40. During their conversation, Plaintiff assured Mr. Hare she could
return to work on September 10, 2023, and that she did not anticipate needing any
further time off. Id. at ¶41. Based on this, Mr. Hare told Plaintiff he would discuss
her request with Mr. Wahl and Mr. Braithwait and follow up with her. Id. at ¶42.
3 The Court includes additional undisputed facts regarding UMB’s reasoning in its
discussion of Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim. See Infra, Section B.
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When Mr. Hare informed the other UMB executives that he was confident
Plaintiff would return in September, they decided to grant Plaintiff’s leave request
through September 10, 2023. Id. at ¶43. UMB’s third-party leave administrator,
Unum, sent Plaintiff notice that her fourth leave request was granted and that the
previous denial was now superseded. Id. at ¶46. In addition, Mr. Hare called Plaintiff
on two occasions to tell her the UMB executives had reconsidered the denial and
granted her final request; however, he did not feel comfortable leaving details
regarding personal matters on her voicemail. Id. at ¶¶45, 52. Plaintiff returned Mr.
Hare’s first call while he was out of the office, and she never responded to his second
voicemail. Id. at ¶¶51, 53.
On August 29, 2023, UMB’s in-house counsel contacted Plaintiff’s attorney to
inquire whether Plaintiff would be returning to work. Id. at ¶53. Plaintiff responded
that she would not. Id. at ¶54. Accordingly, UMB processed Plaintiff’s separation on
September 8, 2023. See Dkt. 34-9, p.4; Dkt. 52-3, p.2. This lawsuit followed. Dkt. 1.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Plaintiff’s 	claims 	in 	this 	matter 	are 	based 	on 	her 	contention 	UMB
discriminated against her, failed to accommodate her disability, and retaliated
against her for engaging in protected conduct. She brings her claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., and the Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-34-402, et seq. The ADA and
CADA 	both 	prohibit 	discrimination 	against 	qualified 	individuals 	because 	of 	a
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disability. 	42 U.S.C. § 	12112(a); 	Colo. Rev. 	Stat. 	§ 24-34-402(1)(a). 	“Whenever
possible, the CADA should be interpreted consistently with the [ADA].” Tesmer v.
Colorado High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 140 P.3d 249, 253 (Colo. App. 2006).
In its Motion, UMB contends that based on the undisputed material facts, no
jury could reasonably conclude it violated either statute. The Court agrees.
A. 	Discrimination (Claim One)
The ADA provides that a “covered entity” may not discriminate “against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” Dansie v. Union
Pacific 	Railroad 	Co., 	42 	F.4th 	1148, 	1192 	(10th 	Cir. 	2022) 	(citing 	42 	U.S.C.
§ 12112(a)). In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, courts use the
McDonnell Douglas4 burden-shifting framework. Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d
1166, 1192 (10th Cir. 2018).
Under this framework, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 802. Should the plaintiff meet her burden, it then shifts to the defendant
employer to articulate a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action. Barlow v. C.R. England, Inc., 703 F.3d 497, 505 (10th Cir. 2012).
4 The framework is from the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
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If the employer successfully states a non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory reason(s)
for its actions, the plaintiff must then present evidence to show the employer’s
reason(s) is pretextual. See Fye v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1227 (10th
Cir. 	2008). 	“Mere 	conjecture 	that 	the 	employer’s 	explanation 	is 	pretextual 	is
insufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d
1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th
Cir. 1997)).
To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, Plaintiff must show
“(1) that [she] is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that [she] is qualified
for the job held or desired; and (3) that [she] was discriminated against because of
[her] disability”. Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d at 1192 (citing Kilcrease v.
Domenico Transp. Co., 828 F.3d 1214, 1218-19 (10th Cir. 2016)). To demonstrate
“discrimination,” a plaintiff generally must show that she has suffered an “adverse
employment action because of the disability.” E.E.O.C. v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d
1028, 1038 (10th Cir. 2011). An employment action is adverse if a plaintiff can
demonstrate she experienced “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition
of employment” because of that action. Scheer v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth
Health Sys., Inc., 144 F.4th 1212, 1216 (10th Cir. 2025)5 (quoting Muldrow v. City of
St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024)). This means an employer’s action “must have left
5 In Scheer, the Tenth Circuit joined its sister circuits in applying Muldrow’s some-
harm standard not only to Title VII claims, but also to ADA claims. Scheer, 144 F.4th
at 1216, n.3.
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[the plaintiff] worse off, but need not have left her significantly so.” Id. (recognizing
Muldrow, “unambiguously changed the legal standard in [the Tenth Circuit], that
has previously required significant, material, or serious injury”).
In her discrimination claims, Plaintiff alleges that after disclosing her cancer
diagnosis 	she 	was 	treated 	less 	favorably 	than 	others 	who 	had 	not 	disclosed
disabilities or requested medical leave. She also alleges she was given an increased
workload and asked to complete future tasks early; her manager berated her and
yelled 	at 	her 	for 	requesting 	PTO; 	and 	her 	manager 	created 	a 	hostile 	work
environment by “guilting her and treating her with hostility.” Dkt. 1, ¶89(a) – (e).
UMB contends Plaintiff has failed to establish any genuine issue of material fact as
to whether she was subject to an adverse action.
Regarding her allegation she was treated less favorably than others, Plaintiff
cites no evidence and makes no arguments regarding any other employees who were
treated better. This undeveloped contention, therefore, is a nonstarter.
In her Response to UMB’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff disavows
that she is asserting a separate claim for hostile work environment. She instead
clarifies that her use of the term “hostile work environment” is simply to describe Mr.
Wahl’s behavior toward her after she requested leave. Dkt. 38, p.14. But the only
evidence of this hostile behavior is Plaintiff’s deposition testimony that Mr. Wahl
yelled at her on a single occasion. Dkt. 52, ¶14. But the ADA, like Title VII, is neither
a “general civility code” nor a statute making actionable the “ordinary tribulations of
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the workplace.” Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152 F.3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir.
1998). “[P]etty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” don’t
qualify as adverse employment actions. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,
548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). A single incidence of discourteous behavior does not rise to a
change in the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment even under Muldrow, supra,
because there is no evidence this single slight made Plaintiff worse off.
The only adverse action remaining, therefore, is Mr. Wahl’s purported increase
in Plaintiff’s workload and his demands that she complete work early. But the
evidence does not support these contentions either. For example, Plaintiff relies
heavily on Mr. Wahl’s email dated November 19, 2022, which reads:
Dkt. 34-2, p.2.
It is plain from the content of this email that Mr. Wahl neither demands that
Plaintiff complete additional work nor accelerates the timeline for her to complete
any tasks. He merely asks her about the status of various accounts and whether she
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had begun working on them. To be sure, in her deposition Plaintiff admitted that at
the time she believed Mr. Wahl was simply asking about her accounts so he could
cover for her while she was on leave. Dkt. 34-1, p.13.
Similarly, Plaintiff cites another email exchange dated November 25, 2022, as
evidence that Mr. Wahl was hostile and added to her workload. But in this message,
Mr. Wahl again simply makes inquiries over matters pertaining to her accounts. Dkt.
34-4. Plaintiff’s characterizations of these communications are simply not supported
by the evidence. Without more, no reasonable jury could conclude Mr. Wahl increased
or accelerated Plaintiff’s workload such that it constituted a negative change in the
conditions of her employment.
UMB is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
B. 	Failure to Accommodate (Claim Two)
Discrimination 	under 	the 	ADA 	is 	also 	defined 	to 	include 	“not 	making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless the employer can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of the employer.” Punt v. Kelly Servs., 862 F.3d 1040, 1048 (10th Cir. 2017).
Because the Tenth Circuit has concluded that any failure to provide a reasonable
accommodation for a disability is necessarily because of the disability, employees need
not prove discriminatory intent on the part of the employer. Id. Consequently, courts
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apply 	a 	modified 	McDonnell 	Douglas 	burden-shifting 	framework 	to 	failure-to-
accommodate claims. Lincoln, 900F.3d at 1204.
“Under this modified framework, the employee must make an initial showing
that (1) she is disabled; (2) she is otherwise qualified; and (3) she requested a
plausibly reasonable accommodation.” Punt, 862 F.3d at 1050 (cleaned up). Should
the employee meet this burden, it then shifts to the employer “to present evidence
either (1) conclusively rebutting one or more elements of plaintiff’s prima facie case
or (2) establishing an affirmative defense, such as undue hardship or one of the other
affirmative defenses available to the employer.” Id. If the employer presents evidence
of either, the burden then shifts back to the employee to establish a genuine dispute
regarding those affirmative defenses or to rehabilitate the elements of her prima facie
case. Id. Should the employee fail to do so, summary judgment is appropriate. Id.
According to Plaintiff, UMB violated the ADA and CADA when it denied her
accommodation 	request 	to 	extend 	her medical 	leave 	from 	August 	7, 	2023, 	to
September 10, 2023. Dkt. 1, ¶104. Setting aside the undisputed evidence that UMB
reconsidered its original denial and ultimately granted Plaintiff’s request to extend
her leave, the Court will—for the sake of argument—operate under the presumption
that 	UMB 	denied Plaintiff’s 	accommodation 	request. 	Even 	so, 	the 	undisputed
material facts establish UMB’s affirmative defense of undue hardship, and therefore,
summary judgment is warranted on this claim.
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As described in the Court’s recitation of undisputed material facts, upon
receiving Plaintiff’s fourth request for medical leave, the UMB executives met to
discuss the matter.6 Dkt. 52, ¶29. They evaluated UMB’s Colorado business needs
and the viability of holding Plaintiff’s position open particularly with the fourth
quarter—the busiest time of year—approaching. Id. at ¶30. In addition, because
Plaintiff had already requested several extensions, it is undisputed that the group
believed there was a likelihood she would make a fifth request. Id. at ¶¶30, 34.
Mr. Wahl, who had been primarily responsible for covering Plaintiff’s work
while she was gone, felt it would be difficult to continue managing Plaintiff’s books
beyond August 6, 2023. Id. at ¶32. The UMB executives concluded that if Plaintiff’s
absence continued past August, UMB would need to hire a replacement to ensure this
individual could be trained appropriately to meet the company’s end-of-year needs.
Id. at ¶33. If the position was not filled by August, a new employee would not have
enough time for training, and UMB would not be able to meet its end-of-year
demands. Id.
Plaintiff attempts to discredit UMB’s affirmative defense by characterizing her
accommodation request as seeking only 33 days of leave with a definite return date
6 Plaintiff suggests this fact is disputed because the evidence shows there were two
meetings, one in mid-June and one on June 29, 2023. The Court agrees there were
two meetings, but this is not material to the issue regarding Defendant’s affirmative
defense. It was at the first meeting that UMB considered the request and determined
that granting it would be unduly burdensome. On June 29, 2023, the UMB executives
met again to discuss Plaintiff’s newly provided assurance the fourth request would
be her last. Thus, it is of no moment that there were two meetings in June.
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of September 10, 2023. Dkt. 38, p.5. Her effort is unavailing though because “the
Tenth Circuit considers leave time in the aggregate when considering whether a
request for additional leave is reasonable.” Forge v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth,
No. 18-2204-JWL, 2019 WL 4241130, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 6, 2019) (collecting Tenth
Circuit cases wherein the circuit panels considered the total amount of time the
employee was unable to work). To be sure, if an employer could only consider the most
recent request for additional leave, “an employee could simply keep requesting leave
in one-week or one-month increments in the hopes that such requests, standing alone,
would be facially reasonable.” Id. So, in its full context, Plaintiff’s requested leave,
December 6, 2023, to September 10, 2024, spanned over 9 months, which is
presumptively unreasonable. Cline v. Clinical Perfusion Sys., Inc., 92 F.4th 926, 933
(10th Cir. 2024) (In the Tenth Circuit “a leave of absence exceeding six months is per
se unreasonable.”).
Plaintiff’s insistence that her fourth request for leave included a definite return
date is similarly unconvincing. While the fourth leave request lists September 10,
2024, as Plaintiff’s return date, so too did all of Plaintiff’s prior requests include
return dates. Each request included a return date that was ultimately extended. See
Dkts. 34-6, 34-7, 34-18. There is nothing in Plaintiff’s fourth request that assures
UMB it will be the final one. Dkt. 34-8. It was not until after UMB considered the
burdens and denied the request did Plaintiff assure Mr. Hare that she would, in fact,
return to work in September.
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Because Plaintiff has failed to create a disputed issue of material fact as to
UMB’s affirmative defense, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of UMB on
Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim. Punt, 862 F.3d at 1050.
C. 	Retaliation
Turning to Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation, the ADA prohibits employers from
discriminating “against any individual because such individual has opposed any act
or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). Where, as here, Plaintiff seeks to
prove her claim via circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the Court returns to
the unmodified McDonnell Douglas framework. Foster v. Mountain Coal Co., LLC,
830 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2016).
A prima facie case of ADA retaliation requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that
“[she] (1) engaged in a protected activity; (2) [she] was subjected to [an] adverse
employment action subsequent to or contemporaneous with the protected activity;
and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action.” Id. at 1186-87 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Requesting a reasonable accommodation is a protected activity under the ADA. Jones
v. UPS, Inc., 502 F.3d 1176, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by
Lincoln, 900 F.3d at 1185-86.
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According to Plaintiff, she engaged in the protected activities of reporting Mr.
Wahl’s hostile behavior to Mr. Hare and requesting her fourth extension of medical
leave. Dkt. 1, ¶¶121(a), (b). She contends UMB then retaliated against her for this
conduct by denying her accommodation request and firing her.
With respect to UMB’s initial denial of Plaintiff’s accommodation request, this
Court has already discussed the matter in addressing her failure to accommodate
claim. Its reasoning is equally applicable here. UMB articulated a legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, that is, it would have
been an undue burden to grant Plaintiff a further extension of medical leave. Barlow
v. C.R. England, Inc., 703 F.3d 497, 505 (10th Cir. 2012). And Plaintiff failed to
establish any dispute of material facts undermining UMB’s reasons. See Section B,
supra.
In her response, Plaintiff attempts to establish pretext by arguing that UMB
did not follow normal procedures regarding the denial of her request. Dkt. 38, p.20.
However, she then cites only to purported irregularities in the way UMB attempted
to communicate its reconsideration and granting of her request. Id. She also lists
numerous other actions that she considers evidence of pretext but offers no analysis
of how they are so. Id. at pp.20-21. The Court will neither guess as to the connections
nor craft the explanations for Plaintiff. 	See A Brighter Day, Inc. v. Barnes, 860 F.
App’ x 569, 575 (10th Cir. 2021) (declining to consider “underdeveloped” arguments
that contained “mostly general legal statements and empty platitudes”); Tillmon v.
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Douglas Cty., 817 F. App’x 586, 589-90 (10th Cir. 2020) (declining to address a legal
question where defendants’ analysis was “cursory at best”).
The Court next turns to Plaintiff’s contention she was fired in retaliation for
complaining about Mr. Wahl’s conduct and making accommodation requests. While
termination of employment is an adverse employment action, the Court nevertheless
concludes UMB is entitled to judgment in its favor because the undisputed material
facts show Plaintiff was not fired, she voluntarily resigned.
According to the undisputed evidence, UMB’s initial accommodation denial
letter, dated June 22, 2023, informed Plaintiff that if she did not return to work on
August 7, 2023, her employment would end as of that date. Dkt. 52, ¶35. But on June
29, 2023, while Plaintiff was undisputedly still employed, the UMB executives
reconsidered the denial and granted Plaintiff’s request to extend her leave until
September 10, 2023. Id. at ¶¶43-44. After sending Plaintiff notice that her request
had been granted and after several attempts to contact Plaintiff by phone, UMB’s
counsel sent Plaintiff’s attorney a letter noting that her extension had been granted
and asking whether she would be returning to work on September 11, 2023. Id. at
¶¶45-46, 51-52, 54. Plaintiff, via her counsel, stated she would not. Id. at ¶54.
In her Response, Plaintiff insists she was fired because UMB never told her
about the reconsideration. Dkt. 38, pp.16-17. She contends that UMB did not in fact
mail her any notice that her request had been granted. See Dkt. 52, ¶46. Her
deposition testimony, however, is that she does not remember receiving any letter.
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Dkt.39-1, p.26. These are two very different facts; her inability to recall receiving the
letter does not refute the undisputed material fact that UMB sent the letter.
But even setting the letter aside, the facts show Plaintiff knew that Mr. Hare
intended to speak with the other UMB executives about Plaintiff’s request. Dkt. 39-
1, p.25. And she knew he planned to tell them that September 10, 2023, was a definite
end date for her leave. Id. Plaintiff further admits Mr. Hare told her he would get
back to her about the request, and she admits receiving his voice messages. Id. at
pp.25-26. Thus, it is undisputed that UMB attempted to inform Plaintiff that her
extension was granted. That Plaintiff—perhaps willfully—remained ignorant of their
decision does not change the fact that it was made and she in fact remained employed.
Despite 	her 	insistence 	on 	the 	matter, 	Plaintiff 	has 	cited 	no 	authority
supporting the proposition that an employee is deemed terminated whenever she
believes it to be so, and the Court is aware of none. Because no reasonable jury could
conclude either that UMB’s reasons for initially denying Plaintiff’s fourth request
were pretextual or that UMB fired Plaintiff, the Court will enter summary judgment
in UMB’s favor on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
C. 	Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act
Each of Plaintiff’s ADA claims are also asserted pursuant to the Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-34-402 et. seq. See generally Dkt. 1. Because
these statutes are analyzed under the same legal standards, Tesmer, 140 P.3d at 253,
the Court concludes UMB is also entitled to judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims.
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* 	* 	*
For the reasons shared above, IT IS ORDERED:
1. 	Defendant 	UMB’s 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	(Dkt. 	33) 	is
GRANTED and the claims against it are dismissed;
2. 	The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of UMB, which is
entitled to an award of its costs.
DATED: January 7, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
S. Kato Crews
United States District Judge
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