Hoid v. Boulder County Sheriff's Office

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 23-cv-00616-PAB-TPO
EDWARD HOID,
Plaintiff,
v.
BOULDER COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
Defendant.
ORDER
This matter comes before me on Plaintiff’s Emergency Notice of Refiled Tenth
Circuit Mandamus, Motion to Stay Proceedings, and Motion for Recusal of Chief Judge
Philip A. Brimmer [Docket No. 171]. Plaintiff Edward Hoid requests that I recuse myself
from this case. 1 This is Mr. Hoid’s sixth motion requesting that I recuse myself. See
Docket Nos. 106, 107, 113, 117, 142.
Mr. Hoid seeks my recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455. Docket No. 171 at 2. Under
28 U.S.C. § 455, a federal judge is required to recuse himself “in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned” or “[w]here he has a personal
1 Mr. Hoid filed this action pro se. Mr. Hoid filed a motion to appoint counsel,
Docket No. 103, which was granted on February 11, 2026. Docket No. 120. Mr. Hoid
was appointed counsel on March 18, 2026, Docket No. 130, and counsel entered an
appearance on April 9, 2026. Docket No. 139. On April 23, 2026, Mr. Hoid’s counsel
filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, stating that Mr. Hoid has expressly terminated his
representation. Docket No. 143. On May 11, 2026, Magistrate Judge Timothy P.
O’Hara granted the motion to withdraw as counsel. Docket No. 154. Thus, Mr. Hoid is
now proceeding pro se, and I therefore construe his filing liberally without serving as his
advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
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bias or prejudice concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). “Section 455
establishes ‘an objective standard: disqualification is appropriate only where the
reasonable person, were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about
the judge’s impartiality.’” United States v. Mobley, 971 F.3d 1187, 1205 (10th Cir. 2020)
(quoting United States v. Wells, 873 F.3d 1241, 1251 (10th Cir. 2017)). “In conducting
this review, [the court] must ask how these facts would appear to a well-informed,
thoughtful and objective observer, who is an average member of the public, not a
hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious person.” Id. (internal quotations and citation
omitted). “[T]he initial inquiry is whether a reasonable factual basis exists for calling the
judge’s impartiality into question.” Clark v. Time Inc., 727 F. App’x 975, 978 (10th Cir.
2018) (unpublished) (citation omitted).
The basis for Mr. Hoid’s recusal is that my “impartiality has been compromised
by a clear conflict of interest regarding the systematic restriction of Plaintiff’s filings and
the institutional shielding of adverse defense actors.” Docket No. 171 at 2. Mr. Hoid
does not elaborate on how I have restricted his filings or how I have shielded “defense
actors” in this case. See id. Furthermore, Mr. Hoid attaches a document he titled an
“[EMERGENCY] PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND EMERGENCY STAY OF
PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO 10th CIR. R. 27.3.” Id. at 3. The document calls for
my “immediate arrest” based on an alleged attempt to “facilitate the Petitioner’s certain
death.” Id. at 4. Presumably these allegations demonstrate that I am biased against
Mr. Hoid.
Mr. Hoid, however, provides no explanation or evidence to support his
allegations. “[S]uch unsupported accusations carry no weight in the recusal calculus.”
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Lawton v. Ctr. Stock Co., LLC, No. 06-cv-01125-REB-MEH, 2007 WL 1491269, at *1
(D. Colo. May 21, 2007). “The requirements for disqualification under § 455 are not
satisfied by ‘[r]umor, speculation, beliefs, conclusions, innuendo, suspicion, opinion, and
similar non-factual matters.’” Clark, 727 F. App’x at 978 (quoting United States v.
Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993)). A well-informed, thoughtful, and objective
observer who is an average member of the public would not find that these
unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations establish that I am biased against Mr. Hoid.
See Mobley, 971 F.3d at 1205.
Importantly, under § 455, “there is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse
when there is no occasion to do so as there is to recuse when there is a reasonable
basis to do so. A judge should not recuse based on unsupported, irrational, or highly
tenuous speculation and accusations.” Drevaleva v. Johnson, 2023 WL 5564098, at * 5
(D.N.M. Aug. 29, 2023) (citing In re Am. Ready Mix, Inc., 14 F.3d 1497, 1501 (10th Cir.
1994)); see also Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939-40 (10th Cir. 1987). Thus,
because Mr. Hoid’s motion is based on unsupported accusations, I will deny the motion
to recuse.
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Emergency Notice of Refiled Tenth Circuit Mandamus,
Motion to Stay Proceedings, and Motion for Recusal of Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer
[Docket No. 171] is DENIED in part. It is further
ORDERED that the portion of Docket No. 171 that requests recusal is denied. It
is further
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ORDERED that the portions of Docket No. 171 that request a stay of
proceedings and leave to file an amended complaint are REFERRED to Magistrate
Judge Timothy P. O’Hara.
DATED June 9, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge
__________________________
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