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3:26-cv-04322Casd9 de out. de 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JORGE LUIS SANTOS-CRUZ,
Petitioner,
v.
TODD M. LYONS, et al.
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-4322-BJC-MMP
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS, MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND EMERGENCY
MOTION FOR EXPEDITED
HEARING
[ECF Nos. 1-3, 14]
On July 27, 2026, Petitioner Jorge Santos Cruz (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”). ECF No. 1. The same day, Petitioner also filed a Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order and an Emergency Motion for Expedited Hearing on his
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 	ECF Nos. 2-3. 	On August 31, 2026, Respondents
filed a return. ECF No. 14. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the Petition
(ECF No. 1) and DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Emergency Motion for Expedited Heading on the Petition as MOOT. ECF Nos. 2-3.
//
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BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico who has lived in the United States for
approximately ten years. 	ECF No. 1 at 1. 	It is not clear based on the Petition when or
how the Petitioner entered the United States. Petitioner was apprehended by Immigration
Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) following his arrest for alleged domestic violence, and
he was detained at the North Florida Detention Facility in Sanderson, Florida. Id. at 8. On
June 18, 2026, an immigration judge denied Petitioner’s request for bond after finding he
was a danger to the community. ECF No. 14 at 2; ECF No. 14-1 at 2. Petitioner was then
transferred to Otay Mesa Detention Facility in San Diego, California. ECF No. 1 at 8.
On July 27, 2026, Petitioner filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. See ECF
No. 1. 	On the same day, he also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Emergency Motion for Expedited Hearing on his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. ECF
Nos. 2-3. 	On July 31, 2026, the Court issued an order setting a briefing schedule and
conditionally appointed Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc. (“Federal Defenders”) to
represent Petitioner. 	ECF No. 5. 	On August 10, 2026, Federal Defenders informed this
Court that it was “necessary to obtain an audio of the bond hearing held before the
immigration judge to determine whether appointment will be beneficial to Petitioner”
before moving forward. ECF No. 9. Accordingly, the parties jointly proposed an amended
briefing schedule to allow time for Federal Defenders to review the audio of the bond
hearing, which this Court granted. ECF Nos. 9-10.
On August 20, 2026, Federal Defenders filed a status report, indicating their belief
that, after an evaluation of Petitioner’s case, appointment of counsel would not be
“appropriate or otherwise beneficial to Petitioner.” ECF No. 12. The Court issued an order
withdrawing the appointment of Federal Defenders as counsel for Petitioner and set a
briefing schedule, allowing Respondents to file a return by August 31, 2026, and permitting
Petitioner to file a traverse by September 8, 2026. 	ECF No. 13. 	On August 31, 2026,
Respondents filed their return, claiming that, although Petitioner reserved appeal, he had
not appealed the adverse bond decision to date with the BIA. ECF No. 14 at 2. Petitioner
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did not file a traverse.
LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” 	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl.
2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
that custody, and [] the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). 	Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a
district court has authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). The Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Id.
Noncitizens present without admission who are apprehended in the interior of the
United States are subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 183 F.4th
1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2026). Section 1226(a) provides that a “[noncitizen] may be arrested
and detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the
United States.” Noncitizens detained pursuant to Section 1226(a), may request a custody
redetermination (i.e., a bond hearing) by an immigration judge at any time before a final
order of removal is issued. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1),
1003.19. Although Section 1226 allows for the possibility of bond, noncitizens “may be
denied bond and held pending their removal proceedings if they pose flight risks or dangers
to the community.” 	Rodriguez Vazquez, 183 F.4th at 1165; see also Rodriguez Diaz v.
Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2022) (no deprivation of due process where
petitioner received a bond hearing but was denied bond upon a finding that he was likely a
potential danger to community).
I. 	Petitioner Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
When a petitioner’s claims are reviewable by the BIA on appeal, the petitioner must
exhaust administrative remedies before raising the claims in a habeas petition. 	Rojas-
Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2003). 	Exhaustion “‘avoids premature
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interference with the agency’s processes and helps to compile a full judicial record.’” Id.
(quoting Liu v. Waters, 55 F.3d 421, 424 (9th Cir.1995)). “The exhaustion requirement is
prudential, rather than jurisdictional, for habeas claims.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d
976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 	A court may require prudential exhaustion
when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a
proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement
would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3)
administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)). If a petitioner fails to
exhaust prudentially required administrative remedies, “a district court ordinarily should
either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has
exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157,
1160 (9th Cir. 2011). However, a court may waive the prudential exhaustion requirement
if “administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative
remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative
proceedings would be void.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004).
Here, Petitioner has failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. Although
Petitioner expressly reserved his right to appeal the immigration judge’s denial of bond,
see ECF No. 14 at 2; ECF No. 14-1 at 3, he did not file an appeal with the BIA. A bond
determination is directly reviewable by the BIA. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(f), 1003.38; see also
Chacon v. Mullin, 2026 WL 2127177, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2026) (challenges to bond
denials 	have 	a 	“direct 	administrative 	remedy: 	appeal 	to 	the 	BIA”). 	Accordingly,
administrative appeal is an available and adequate remedy that Petitioner was required to
pursue before seeking habeas relief. 	Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that
exhaustion should be excused in this case. Petitioner does not contend that administrative
review before the BIA would be inadequate or ineffective, nor does he argue that pursuing
such relief would have been futile. 	There is likewise no showing that irreparable harm
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would have resulted from complying with the administrative process. Given Petitioner’s
failure to pursue a readily available avenue of administrative review, dismissal without
prejudice is warranted.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s Petition is DENIED without prejudice. 	ECF
No. 1. Petitioner may file an amended petition on or before November 9, 2026. The Court
also DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Emergency
Motion for Expedited Heading on the Petition as MOOT. ECF Nos. 2-3.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 9, 2026
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