Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WINDER MUNOZ NIEVES,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security,
PAMELA JO BONDI, Attorney General,
TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
JESUS ROCHA, Acting Field Office
Director, San Diego Field Office,
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden at
Otay Mesa Detention Center,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-CV-1497 JLS (JLB)
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(ECF No. 6)
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Winder Munoz Nieves’s Amended Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 6). Also before
the Court are Respondents’ Response to Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 10) and Petitioner’s
Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 11). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the
Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
/ / /
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BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a Venezuelan national, alleges that he has been detained by the United
States 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security’s 	(“DHS”) 	Immigration 	and 	Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) division at the Otay Mesa Detention Center since October 10, 2025.
Pet. at 3. 	Petitioner entered the United States on December 19, 2023, was detained for
three nights, and then released on parole. 	Id. at 2. 	Petitioner thereafter married a U.S.
citizen and applied for adjustment of status and asylum. Id. at 2–3. Petitioner has complied
with all the conditions of his release and has attended court hearings. 	Id. 	On the day his
asylum hearing was scheduled, October 10, 2025, ICE arrested him without providing “any
paperwork or any opportunity to explain why he should not be re-detained.” 	Id. at 3.
Petitioner later learned that an Immigration Judge denied his asylum claim several days
prior without providing him notice because he failed to file “a renewal fee that was required
following the recent passage of the . . . Big Beautiful Bill.” Id. Petitioner’s asylum claim
remains on appeal. Id. Petitioner alleges that his detention violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. See generally id.
LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(citations omitted).
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DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his parole without justification or
consideration of his individualized circumstances violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. at
7–10. The Court agrees.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 	Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the
State deprives a person of liberty or property.” 	Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127
(1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose
liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-5632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July
25, 2025) (citations omitted). 	Although the initial decision to detain or release an
individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to
release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that
individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the
. . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
“Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending
removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected
liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” 	Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (citing
Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
Respondents suggest that Petitioner is lawfully detained as an “applicant for
admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and is thus entitled only to a bond hearing. Ret. at 2.
The Court disagrees. 	Petitioner was released on parole upon entering the United States.
Pet. at 2. Petitioner is not a newly arrived noncitizen seeking admission at the border, as
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Petitioner has been in the United States since 2023. 	Id. 	Petitioner is not merely an
“applicant for admission” at the border with minimal due process rights; Petitioner has a
protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921,
at *4 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a
determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no
longer meets those criteria.”); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 (“Petitioner is not an
‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our country for over a year. This
substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due
process before removal.”); Matute v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-1206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL
2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty interest
in his release).
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient
to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. 	See
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. 	Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.” Id.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s
revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be
heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has
a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his parole. “Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533
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U.S. at 690. 	Petitioner has an interest “in remaining with his family and continuing the
process of adjusting status to a lawful permanent resident and asylum.” 	Pet. at 9; see
Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of [her] parole, [she] can be
gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring
attachments of normal life.”).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
parole was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an
opportunity to be heard. 	Pet. at 9. 	Since DHS’s determination that Petitioner should be
granted release because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk,
there is no evidence that these findings have changed. 	See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F.
Supp. 3d 1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the
government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). “Once
a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting [her]
merely because [she] is subject to removal proceedings. 	Rather, the federal agents must
be able to present evidence of materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that
the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk. . . .” Saravia, 280 F. Supp.
3d at 1760. 	Respondents, failing to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their
response, do not point to any material circumstances that have changed that would warrant
reconsideration of his deferred action status. 	See generally Ret. 	“Where as here, ‘the
petitioner has not received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of liberty is high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an
opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for her detention.” Pinchi, 2025
WL 2084921, at *5 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL
1918679, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025)) (cleaned up).
Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Matute, 2025 WL 2817795,
at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the
government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
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toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail
to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice,
reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Ret.
Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his parole in
violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v.
Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) (granting
a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole without a pre-
deprivation hearing); Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (granting a writ of habeas
corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due
process grounds). 	Because the Court finds that release on due process grounds is
appropriate, it need not address Petitioner’s claim under the Administrative Procedure Act.
See generally Pet.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 6) and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release
Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting release with no
additional requirements. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that
Petitioner is entitled to notice of the reasons for revocation of his release and a hearing
before a neutral decision maker to determine whether detention is warranted. 	The
Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that
Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.1 The Parties are ORDERED
to file a Joint Status Report by April 16, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released.
As this concludes the litigation in this matter, the Clerk of Court SHALL CLOSE the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 26, 2026
1 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, at *8; Pinchi, 2025
WL 2084921, at *5; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez
v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).
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