Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
EGIT TABAK,
Petitioner,
v.
SIXTO MARRERO, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-cv-01441-BAS-DEB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(ECF No. 1)
Petitioner Egit Tabak filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241, claiming he was denied due process in his removal hearing and that he is
entitled to a bond hearing. (ECF No. 1.) The Government responded. (ECF No. 6.) For
the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Petition and orders that Petitioner be
released from custody on the same terms and conditions as he was previously released.
(ECF No. 1.)
I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” 	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). 	“The traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
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(1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or
she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). It
applies to non-citizens detained within the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
687 (2001). Since Petitioner is in custody and since he is seeking release from custody, he
has standing to pursue this Petition.
II. 	STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner, a citizen of Turkey, entered the United States on September 6, 2024,
seeking asylum. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1.) He was released after Border Patrol determined he was
not a flight risk or danger to the community. (Id.) On February 2, 2026, the Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) re-detained Petitioner without notice or an opportunity to
be heard and without any changed circumstances with respect to his flight risk or danger
to the community. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 5.) Petitioner seeks immediate release or a bond hearing.
(Id.)
III. 	ANALYSIS
Petitioner first claims he has not been afforded due process in his removal hearing
because he has not been given sufficient time to prepare or find a new attorney. 	(ECF
No. 1.) Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), the Court is prohibited from assuming jurisdiction over
such a claim. See id. (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or
on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien
under this chapter.”).
Petitioner also suggests he has been subjected to unreasonable or arbitrarily
prolonged detention. 	However, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) arrested
him just over a month ago and appears to be trying to expedite his case. 	Therefore, the
Court finds Petitioner’s detention has not been arbitrarily or unreasonably prolonged. See
Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[A]rbitrary prolonged detention
without any process is [likely] [un]constitutional.”).
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Petitioner next claims he was improperly subjected to mandatory detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) when he should have been subject to discretionary detention under
§ 1226(a) and given the opportunity for a bond hearing. “We begin, as always, with the
text.” 	Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385, 391 (2017). 	Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies to an applicant “seeking admission” to the United States, whereas Section 1226(a)
applies to individuals who have been arrested “on a warrant issued by the Attorney
General.” 	According to the Petition, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
arrested Petitioner at the border as he was seeking admission to the United States, and thus
he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Nonetheless, 	this 	Court 	finds 	Petitioner’s 	re-detention 	without 	notice 	or 	an
opportunity to be heard and without noticeably changed circumstances violated Petitioner’s
due process rights.
Individuals released from custody, even where such release is conditional, have a
liberty interest in continued liberty. 	See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482
(1972) (parolees); Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 150 (1997) (pre-parolees); Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (probationers). 	Thus, this Court agrees with those
courts that have held:
[O]nce a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from
rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal proceedings. Rather,
the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed
circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or
has become a flight risk, or is now subject to a final order of removal. And if
the noncitizen disputes the notion that changed circumstances justify his
rearrest, he is entitled to a prompt hearing before an Immigration Judge.
Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176–77 (N.D. Cal. 2017); see also Kamalpreet
v. Singh, No. 26-cv-1211-LL-JLB, 2026 WL 622687, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026)
(“Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the
government’s discretion, the government’s decision to release an individual from custody
creates an implicit promise, upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty will be
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revoked only if they fail to live up to the conditions of release.” (citation modified) (quoting
Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025))).
Because DHS released Petitioner, finding he was not a flight risk or a danger to the
community in September 2024, and because there is no evidence those circumstances have
changed, Petitioner is entitled to remain released on the same conditions as he was initially
released. 	If DHS believes circumstances have changed, it must provide notice of these
changed circumstances to Petitioner and provide Petitioner an opportunity to be heard
promptly before an Immigration Judge. Hence, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court issues the following writ:
The Court ORDERS that Egit Tabak (A# 226-133-865) be released on the
same terms and conditions as he was previously released in September 2024.
The Clerk of the Court shall close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 17, 2026
Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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