Guerrero-Medina v. Brightman et al

1 26-cv-1433-AGS-DEB
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Johnson Jose GUERRERO-MEDINA,
Petitioner,
v.
Daniel A. Brightman, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-1433-AGS-DEB
ORDER REQUIRING RETURN
Petitioner Johnson Guerrero-Medina seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 to free him from immigration detention. At this stage, he need only make out a
claim that is sufficiently cognizable to warrant an answer or return. See Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary
dismissal “if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner
is not entitled to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section
2254 Cases to any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules
permit “summary dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth,
114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any
potential merit, it is not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id.
In August 2022, Guerrero-Medina, a “citizen of Venezuela,” crossed into the United
States “without inspection.” (ECF 1, at 2.) The Department of Homeland Security
“encounter[ed]” him after he crossed and then “exercised its discretion to release him into
the United States on humanitarian parole” that same week. (Id.) Years later, in February
2026, despite the fact that he had “obtained employment authorization” and was “lawfully
work[ing] while residing in the United States,” he “was stopped by U.S. Border Patrol
agents” and arrested. (Id. at 9–10.) He “remains detained” and asserts that his detention
violates his “Due Process” rights because “Respondents have not provided Petitioner with
any meaningful, individualized custody determination demonstrating that his continued
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detention is necessary to mitigate a particularized risk of flight or danger to the
community.” (Id. at 10, 14.) Specifically, he argues that when “the government has
previously determined that a noncitizen may safely remain at liberty, due process requires
meaningful procedures before that liberty can be withdrawn.” (Id. at 14.)
This challenge merits an answer. District courts have ordered petitioners released on
similar grounds. See, e.g., Pablo Sequen v. Albarran, __ F. Supp. 3d. __, No. 25-cv-06487-
PCP, 2025 WL 2935630, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2025); (“[Petitioners] have demonstrated
a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment entitles them to a hearing before ICE may re-detain them.”); Salazar v. Casey,
No. 25-cv-2784 JLS (VET), 2025 WL 3063629, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (granting
habeas relief because respondents failed to provide “proper notice, reasoning, and a
pre-deprivation hearing,” and thus “detained Petitioner . . . in violation of the Due Process
Clause”); Hyppolite v. Noem, No. 24-cv-4304 (NRM), 2025 WL 2829511, at *7 (E.D. N.Y.
Oct. 6, 2025) (“When Respondents placed [petitioner] under arrest without notice and an
opportunity to be heard,” and “then imprisoned him . . . without a pre-deprivation bond
hearing, they violated his established right to procedural due process.”).
By Tuesday, March 10, 2026, the government must answer the petition. Any reply
by petitioner is due March 13, 2026.
Dated: March 6, 2026
___________________________
Hon. Andrew G. Schopler
United States District Judge
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