Singh v. Warden et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
KAMALPREET SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, Imperial Regional Detention
Facility, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26cv1211-LL-JLB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[ECF No. 1]
Before the Court are Petitioner Kamalpreet Singh’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”)] and Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order [ECF No. 2]. Respondents filed a Response [ECF No. 5, (“Ret.”)], and
Petitioner filed a Traverse [ECF No. 6]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
GRANTS the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a noncitizen, entered the United States on or around April 24, 2023 near
San Luiz, Arizona. Pet. at 2. Petitioner was apprehended after his entry but was released
on his own recognizance on or around April 25, 2023. Id. On February 20, 2026, Petitioner
was arrested at a truck stop near Chowchilla. Id. Petitioner alleges that at the time of his
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re-detention, he was not provided with any written notice or a hearing explaining the
revocation of his release. Id. at 2, 6. Petitioner is currently detained at Imperial Regional
Detention Facility. Id. at 2. Petitioner alleges that his re-detention without notice and
hearing violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Id. at 11–12. Petitioner seeks a
writ of habeas corpus directing Respondents to, inter alia, release him from custody. Id. at
12.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl.
2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
that custody, and [] the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of
habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates she is “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally,
“the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive
detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” Hamdi, 542
U.S. at 536 (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his parole without notice or a
hearing violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Pet. at 11–12. Respondents do
not dispute that no notice or hearing was provided; instead they argue that Petitioner is
lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is well established that
the 	Fifth 	Amendment 	entitles 	[noncitizens] 	to 	due 	process 	of 	law 	in 	deportation
proceedings.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 306 (1993)). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing
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before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
127 (1990).
The Court finds that having been previously released on parole, Petitioner has a
protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention. “Even individuals who face
significant constraints on their liberty or over whose liberty the government wields
significant discretion retain a protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F.
Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to
detain 	or 	release 	an 	individual 	may 	be 	within 	the 	government’s 	discretion, 	“the
government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’
upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[]
to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 482 (1972)) (alterations in original).
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 	To determine which procedures are constitutionally
sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court considers the following factors:
(1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the [g]overnment’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335.
Here, Petitioner alleges that he was detained without 	any written 	notice or
opportunity to be heard as to why his parole was terminated prior to being arrested and
detained. Pet. at 2, 6. Respondents claim that the termination of Petitioner’s parole was
“exercise of [ICE’s] discretion” but provided no explanation for terminating Petitioner’s
parole. Ret. at 3.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the revocation of
Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be heard denied
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Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has a significant
liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his parole. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp.
3d at 1032 (“Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen
pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a
protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” (citations omitted)). Freedom from
detention is a fundamental part of due process protection. See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872
F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[F]reedom from imprisonment is at the ‘core of the liberty
protected 	by 	the 	Due 	Process 	Clause.’” 	(quoting 	Foucha 	v. 	Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992))).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
parole was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an
opportunity to be heard. After the initial determination that Petitioner should be paroled
because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, Respondents have
not produced any argument or evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia v.
Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v.
Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018) 	(“Release reflects a determination by the
government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). There
is no indication that Petitioner has failed to abide by the conditions of his release. “Once a
noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely
because he is subject to removal proceedings.” Id. “Rather, the federal agents must be able
to present evidence of materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the
noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk . . . .” Id. The risk of erroneous
deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty is high because neither the government nor Petitioner has
had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for his detention. Pinchi,
792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (citation omitted). It follows that the probable value of additional
procedural safeguards, such as notice and a pre-deprivation hearing, is also high.
Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is low. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036 (“[T]he government has
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articulated no legitimate interest that would support arresting [petitioner] without a pre-
detention hearing.”); Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01206-KES-SKO (HC),
2025 WL 2817795, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963,
970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the government wishes to re-arrest [petitioner] at any
point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a
hearing is low.”). There is no indication that providing proper notice, reasoning, and a pre-
deprivation hearing would be fiscally or administratively burdensome on the government.
See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036 (“In immigration court, custody hearings are routine
and impose a minimal cost.” (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00801-KES-SKO
(HC), 2025 WL 1918679, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025))).
Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his parole without
notice or a pre-deprivation hearing in violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is
unlawful. See, e.g., Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629,
at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (finding the petitioner’s parole was revoked without notice
and a hearing and without a showing of a change of circumstances, thus violating her due
process rights and rendering her detention unlawful). The proper remedy for the unlawful
detention is Petitioner’s immediate release subject only to the conditions of his preexisting
parole. See Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *1 (finding DHS violated the petitioner’s due
process rights by revoking his parole without notice or a hearing and ordering his
immediate release); Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (same); Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at
970 (ordering immediate release after the petitioner was detained while out on bond
without notice or pre-deprivation hearing).
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
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Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition.1
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, DENIES AS MOOT the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, and ORDERS
that Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody subject only to the
conditions of his preexisting parole. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in Petitioner’s
favor and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 5, 2026
1 In his prayer for relief, Petitioner requests attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal
Access to Justice Act, which the Court DENIES without prejudice. Pet. at 18.
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