Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LUJUN WANG,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-1133-JES-BJW
ORDER:
(1) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS WITHOUT
PREJUDICE; and
(2) DENYING MOTION TO
VACATE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
AS MOOT
[ECF Nos. 6, 11]
Before the Court is Petitioner Lujun Wang’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 6. Pursuant to the Court’s Order to
Show Cause (ECF No. 8), Respondents filed a return and Petitioner filed a traverse. ECF
Nos. 9-10. After due consideration and for the reasons below, the Court DENIES
WITHOUT PREJUDICE the petition. The Court also DENIES AS MOOT
Respondents’ motion to vacate the Order to Show Cause. ECF No. 11.
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I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native of China, and crossed into the United States on February 4,
2023. ECF No. 6 at 3. He was apprehended and placed into removal proceedings. ECF No.
9 at 1-2. On February 8, 2023, he was released on his own recognizance. Id. Since his
release, he has been living in Los Angeles, applied for asylum, obtained a work permit, and
has a social security number and driver’s license. ECF No. 6 at 3.
On May 29, 2025, after he dropped an Uber customer off in San Diego, he was
apprehended by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents. Id. At that time,
he alleges that he was never given any reasons for his detention, nor provided any notice
or opportunity to contest his detention. Id. He has since been held at Otay Mesa Detention
Center. Id.
While he was in detention, on October 3, 2025, Petitioner requested and was granted
voluntary departure. Id.; ECF No. 9 at 2. Subsequently, on October 26, 2025, Petitioner
filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, which was granted but resulted now in a final
order of removal. Id.
Based on these facts, Petitioner raises two claims. First, Petitioner argues that
Respondents violated procedural due process in the manner that he was re-detained due to
his preexisting parole. ECF No. 6 at 4-7. Second, Petitioner argues that removal is not
likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at 8-12.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of
habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas
corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in
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that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301
(2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview
of a district court’s habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see
also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
III. DISCUSSION
Respondents argue that with a final order of removal, Petitioner is now detained
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. ECF No. 9 at 2. Due to the unique procedural posture of this case
resulting in the final order of removal during the pendency of Petitioner’s current detention,
the Court agrees.
Petitioner was previously released on his own recognizance (“OREC”). Courts have
recognized that typically, the term “released on their own recognizance” or “OREC” refers
to conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). J.S.H.M v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309
JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2938808, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025); see also Ortega-Cervantes
v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is apparent that the INS used the
phrase ‘released on recognizance’ as another name for ‘conditional parole’ under §
1226(a)”). When Petitioner was detained in May 2025, within the borders of the United
States, courts have held that such detention is still governed by § 1226. See Salcedo Aceros
v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12,
2025) (holding § 1226 applies to petitioner who was paroled into the country on her own
recognizance); Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924, at *8 (D.
Mass. Sept. 9, 2025) (same); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL
2371588, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025) (same).
However, once an immigration court enters a final order of removal, § 1231 governs
the detention. Under this provision, the government “shall remove the alien from the United
States within a period of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)-(a)(2)(A). The government
shall detain the alien in custody during the initial 90-day removal period by statute. Id. In
Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that when the government is unable to remove an alien
within 90 days, the alien may seek review of the reasonableness of their continued
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detention under the due process clause through petition for writ of habeas corpus. 533 U.S.
at 687. The Court instructed courts to analyze whether continued detention beyond the 90-
day period “exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal,” based on “the
[removal detention] statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the
moment of removal.” Id. at 699. The Court has held that it is presumptively reasonable for
the government to detain an alien for a period of 6 months while it works to effectuate his
removal after issuing a final order of removal against him. Id. at 701. Beyond that period,
“if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention
unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute” and grant the petition for writ of habeas
corpus. Id. at 699-700.
It is not disputed that there is now a final order of removal against Petitioner. Thus,
detention is now governed by § 1231 by statute. The Court finds that the issues raised in
the petition related to the validity of detention under § 1226 are no longer properly before
it. Under the § 1231 framework as outlined above, Petitioner’s removal period clock started
on October 26, 2025, when his removal became final. Thus, to date, his detention period is
just under five months, which is still within the presumptively reasonable period articulated
in Zadvydas.
Accordingly, at this time, the Court must DENY Petitioner’s petition. The denial,
however, is WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Petitioner refiling should his detention post-
removal detention extend past the 6-month period of presumptive reasonableness.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES the Petition without prejudice.
In light of this ruling, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Respondents’ motion to vacate the
order to show cause.
//
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The Clerk is directed to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 20, 2026
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