Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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26-cv-1097-CAB-DEB
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
RAFAEL MONTEPEQUE RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-1097-CAB-DEB
ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS
Petitioner Rafael Montepeque Rodriguez has filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	[Doc. No. 1 (“Petition”).] 	He alleges that he was
detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on February 9, 2026 as he was
exiting a Walmart in New York “because of the way he looks, latino.” [Id. at 3–4.] 	He
claims his detention violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Administrative
Procedure Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), and various regulations governing the provision of
bond. [Id. at 4–9.] For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a Guatemalan citizen who came to the United States as a minor in 2018.
[Petition at 4.] He was ordered removed in absentia. [Id.] He claims he was a minor when
this happened and never received notice of the hearing. 	[Id.] 	At a later date, Petitioner
moved to re-open his immigration case; the immigration judge denied the motion on
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several grounds, including that it was untimely. [Doc. No. 7 at 2.] Petitioner did not appeal
or otherwise seek judicial review of that denial. [Id. at 3.]
Respondents state that Petitioner is subject to a Final Order of Removal and that his
home country (Guatemala) is prepared to accept him. [Id. at 2.]
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus challenges the legality of a petitioner’s custody and seeks
to secure release from that illegal custody. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a district court may
grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” The petitioner bears the burden of
demonstrating that he is in illegal custody. 	See Martinez v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2740-
BJCBJW, 2025 WL 3171738, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents contend that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) bars judicial review of Petitioner’s
claim 	because 	his 	detention 	arises 	from 	the 	government’s 	decision 	to 	commence
proceedings. [Doc. No. 7 at 3.] Because Petitioner’s claim challenges his detention and
not the decision to commence or adjudicate removal proceedings or execute removal
orders, the Court is satisfied of its jurisdiction and proceeds to the merits. See Reno v. Am.-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (“It is implausible that the
mention of three discrete events along the road to deportation was a shorthand way of
referring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings.”); see also Arce v. United
States, 899 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have limited [§ 1252(g)]’s jurisdiction-
stripping power to actions challenging the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions to
initiate proceedings, adjudicate cases, and execute removal orders.”)
B. 	Merits
Petitioner primarily asserts several claims under the Fourth Amendment and related
regulations that he was unlawfully detained at Walmart without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion. [Petition at 4–6.] He provides few details about the circumstances
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of his detention beyond his claim that the only reason it occurred was because of his
appearance and that Respondents “fabricat[ed] a false scheme” to establish reasonable
suspicion. 	[Id. at 5.] 	Even assuming Petitioner was detained based on his appearance,
Petitioner does not explain why release is the appropriate remedy. For example, Petitioner
cites Sanchez v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 643, 650 (9th Cir. 2018) for the proposition that arrest
in violation of immigration regulations without reasonable suspicion is unlawful. [Petition
at 	6.] 	But 	the 	question 	in 	Sanchez 	was 	whether 	the 	noncitizen’s 	Record 	of
Deportable/Inadmissible Alien (Form 1-213) was admissible evidence of his nationality
and entry without inspection in his subsequent removal proceedings. 904 F.3d at 646. No
such issue exists here. See also Cruz v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1128, 1146 (9th Cir. 2019) (ordering
termination of removal proceedings on Fourth Amendment grounds because fruits of the
regulatory violation were the only evidence of petitioner’s alienage); United States v.
Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary
sanctions prohibit the use of unlawfully obtained evidence against the accused at trial). At
the time of his detention at Walmart, Petitioner was already subject to a Final Order of
Removal and no evidence from the allegedly unlawful detention contributed to that pre-
existing Final Order of Removal.
Petitioner next asserts that he is eligible for a bond hearing under several theories,
including 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and the Fifth Amendment. 	[Petition at 7–9.] 	None of these
theories succeed. 	In particular, § 1226 governs arrest and detention “pending a decision
on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” Here, Petitioner has already
been ordered removed and so Respondents’ detention authority does not stem from § 1226.
Instead, as Respondents argue, Petitioner is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)
and Zadvydas because he is subject to a Final Order of Removal and Respondents have the
necessary documents to remove him to Guatemala. [Doc. No. 7 at 4.]
In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 683 (2001), the Supreme Court limited the time
that a noncitizen subject to a final order of removal may be detained pending their removal.
The 	noncitizen 	shall 	be 	detained 	for 	a 	90-day 	removal 	period 	under 	8 	U.S.C.
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§ 1231(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). 	However, after a presumptively reasonable 6-month detention
period, “once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond
with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
Here, Petitioner has not shown good reason to believe there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Indeed, Petitioner provides no
information to show he cannot be removed to Guatemala. 	Moreover, Respondents have
asserted—and Petitioner has not contested—that Petitioner can be repatriated to Guatemala
“forthwith” because Guatemala is prepared to accept Petitioner, he has the required
documentation for return, there are regular flights to Guatemala, and the only thing
prohibiting Petitioner’s removal is the pendency of this Petition. [Doc. No. 7 at 2–3.] 	The
Court therefore finds that Petitioner’s detention is lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and the
Supreme Court’s Zadvydas decision.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the request for a writ of habeas corpus.
The Clerk of the Court shall close the case.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 24, 2026
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