Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JASPAL SINGH,
Petitioners,
v.
JEREMY CASEY, Warden of the
Imperial Regional Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-CV-1092 JLS (SBC)
ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND (2)
DENYING AS MOOT MOTION
FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
(ECF Nos. 1, 2)
Presently before the Court are Petitioner Jaspal Singh’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1) and Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order (“TRO,” ECF No. 2). Also before the Court is Respondents’ Return to
Habeas Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 5) and Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 6).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) and DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2).
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of India who entered the United States on December
5, 2018, and was briefly detained by the Department of Homeland Security. 	Pet. ¶ 1.
Petitioner was released on a $7,500 bond and placed in the Alternatives to Detention
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monitoring program. 	Id. ¶ 3. 	Petitioner complied fully with all conditions of his
supervision, attended all check-ins, and has no criminal history. 	Id. ¶ 4. Petitioner built
substantial ties to the United States, including having a child, establishing and operating
his own business, working as a commercial truck driver, and paying his taxes. Id. ¶ 5. On
February 18, 2026, Petitioner was re-detained at a gas station. Id. ¶ 6. Petitioner was not
accused of any violation, provided any advance notice, or provided an individualized
custody determination prior to his re-detention. Id. ¶¶ 7–8.
LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his release on bond without
justification or consideration of his individualized circumstances violates the Due Process
Clause. Pet. ¶¶ 40–51. The Court agrees.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
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U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 	Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the
State deprives a person of liberty or property.” 	Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127
(1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose
liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted).
Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the
government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual from custody
creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will
be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial
discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that
individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of
custody.” 	Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508,
2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
Respondents contend that because of Maldonado Bautista, Petitioner is detained
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is only entitled to a bond hearing—making his other
constitutional claims moot. 1 Ret at 2. The Court disagrees. 	Petitioner was released on
bond upon entering the country in 2018. 	Pet. ¶ 21. 	Petitioner is not a newly arrived
noncitizen seeking admission at the border, as Petitioner has been in the United States since
December of 2018. 	Id. ¶ 19. Upon arrival, he was determined to not be a danger to the
community or a flight risk and has no criminal history. 	Id. ¶ 21. Petitioner is not merely
1 The Court notes that on March 6, 2026, the Ninth Circuit granted an administrative stay of the Bautista
decision “insofar as the district court’s judgment extends beyond the Central District of California.”
Maldonado Bautista, et al. v. United States Department of Homeland Security, et al., No. 26-1044, ECF
No. 5 (9th Cir. March 6, 2026). Therefore, the Court resolves the Petition without reliance on Maldonado
Bautista.
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an “applicant for admission” at the border with minimal due process rights; Petitioner has
a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d
at 1034 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a
determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no
longer meets those criteria.”); Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1164 (S.D. Cal.
2025) (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our
country for over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth
Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford,
807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty
interest in his release).
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient
to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. 	See
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. 	Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.” Id.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s
revocation of Petitioner’s release without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be
heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has
a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his parole. “Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in remaining with and providing for his family and
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continuing to work. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of his
parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form
the other enduring attachments of normal life.”).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
release was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an
opportunity to be heard. Pet. ¶¶ 40–51. Since DHS’s initial determination that Petitioner
should be released on bond because he posed no danger to the community and was not a
flight risk, there is no evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions,
280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the
government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”).
Petitioner has no criminal record, has not been arrested or otherwise in criminal trouble,
and has filed an asylum application. Pet. at 10–11. “Once a noncitizen has been released,
the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to
removal proceedings. 	Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of
materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact
dangerous or has become a flight risk. . . .” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1760. Respondents,
failing to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their response, do not point to any
material circumstances that have changed that would warrant reconsideration of his parole.
See generally Ret. “Where as here, ‘the petitioner has not received any bond or custody
hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is high’ because neither the
government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid
basis for her detention.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 803
F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (E.D. Cal. 2025)) (cleaned up).
Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is “low.” 	See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036; Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at
1130; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the
government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail
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to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice,
reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Ret.
Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his parole in
violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v.
Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) (granting
a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole without a pre-
deprivation hearing); Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629,
at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from
custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds).
I. 	Attorney’s Fees
Petitioner has requested costs and attorney’s fees in this action pursuant to the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Pet. at 15. The EAJA provides in part:
A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within
thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an
application for fees and other expenses which shows that the
party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award
under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an
itemized statement from any attorney . . . representing or
appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended
and 	the 	rate 	at 	which 	fees 	and 	other 	expenses 	were
computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the
United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the
position of the United States was substantially justified shall be
determined on the basis of the record . . . which is made in the
civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
The Court will consider an application requesting reasonable fees and costs under
the EAJA that is filed within thirty days of the judgment.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) and DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2). 	The Court 	ORDERS 	Respondents to
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immediately release Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting
supervision. 	The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner
is entitled to notice of the reasons for revocation of his release and a hearing before a neutral
decision maker to determine whether detention is warranted. The Government shall bear
the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger
to the community or a risk of flight.2 The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status
Report by March 16, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released.
Lastly, Petitioner’s attorney is directed to submit an attorney fee application and
corresponding billing records within thirty (30) days of this Order, and Respondents are
instructed to file any opposition within fourteen (14) days of Petitioner’s attorney fee
application.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 10, 2026
2 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1133; Pinchi, 792
F. Supp. 3d at 1038; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez
v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).
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