Ahmed v. Casey

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MAHAD ABDI AHMED,
Petitioner,
v.
JEREMY CASEY, Warden, Imperial
Regional Detention Center,
Respondent.
Case No.: 26-cv-981-RSH-DDL
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
On February 13, 2026, Petitioner Mahad Abdi Ahmed filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). ECF No. 1. Petitioner, a citizen
of Somalia, is detained by U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement (“ICE”) at the
Imperial Regional Detention Facility in Calexico, California. Respondents have filed a
return. ECF No. 7. As set forth below, the Court grants the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On December 20, 2024, Petitioner was apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol near the
U.S.-Mexico border. ECF No. 7 at 2. Petitioner was taken into immigration custody. After
receiving a positive credible fear determination he was placed in removal proceedings. Id.
On May 30, 2025, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed to Somalia.
ECF No. 7-1, Ex. 4. Although not clear from the record before the Court, it appears that
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Petitioner intended to file an asylum application, and at the May 30, 2025 hearing requested
additional time to do so and was denied this request. Id. Ex. 3. It also appears that Petitioner
filed one or more motions to reopen his removal proceedings after having been ordered
removed. Id. Petitioner thereafter filed an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) on June 26, 2025. ECF No. 7 at 2. Petitioner filed his appellate brief on November
25, 2026, and his appeal remains pending. Id.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A detainee bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Petitioner is currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), which
provides that where an asylum officer has made a determination of credible fear, “the alien
shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” The issue
presented here is whether, in the circumstances of this case and at this point in time,
applying this mandatory detention regime violates Petitioner’s due process rights.
A. 	Whether Petitioner Has a Due Process Claim
Respondents argue that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of
Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), Petitioner has no due process
rights beyond those that Congress has provided, and that his due process claim therefore
fails. ECF No. 7 at 7–8. In Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court rejected a habeas petitioner’s
argument that the due process clause conferred rights to challenge his expedited removal
beyond those established by Congress, stating that “an alien at the threshold of initial entry
cannot claim any greater rights under the Due Process Clause.” 591 U.S. at 107. The
petitioner in that case had “attempted to enter the country illegally and was apprehended
just 25 yards from the border.” Id. The Supreme Court determined that the “political
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department of the government” had plenary authority to admit or exclude aliens seeking
initial entry, and thus “an alien in respondent’s position has only those rights regarding
admission that Congress has provided by statute.” Id. at 139–40.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Thuraissigiam, some district courts have
adopted Respondents’ reasoning to dismiss or deny habeas petitions in the context of
arriving aliens subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b). See Petgrave v.
Aleman, 529 F. Supp. 3d 665, 679 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (“As far as Petitioner is concerned,
whatever procedure Congress has authorized is sufficient due process.”); Gonzales Garcia
v. Rosen, 513 F. Supp. 3d 329, 536 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Petitioner is on the threshold of
initial entry into the United States and . . . he accordingly is not entitled to procedural
protections beyond those provided by statute.”).
Most courts have ruled otherwise. See Abdul-Samed v. Warden of Golden State
Annex Det. Facility, No. 25-cv-98-SAB-HC, 2025 WL 2099343, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 25,
2025) (“Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process
requires a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) … ‘essentially
all district courts that have considered the issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention
pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, “will—at some point—violate the
right to due process.”’”) (quoting Martinez v. Clark, No. C18-1669-RAJ-MAT, 2019 WL
5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019)); Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 772
(S.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he Court joins the majority of courts across the country in concluding
that 	an 	unreasonably 	prolonged 	detention 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(b) 	without 	an
individualized bond hearing violates due process.”). This Court agrees with the majority
position that a person detained under Section 1225(b) may assert a due process challenge
to prolonged mandatory detention without a bond hearing.
This Court likewise agrees with those district courts that interpret Thuraissigiam as
circumscribing an arriving alien’s due process rights to admission, rather than limiting that
person’s ability to challenge detention. See A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F. Supp. 3d 822, 825 (W.D.
Pa. 2025) (“Nowhere in [Thuraissigiam] did the Supreme Court suggest that arriving aliens
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being held under § 1225(b) may be held indefinitely and unreasonably with no due process
implications, nor that such aliens have no due process rights whatsoever.”); Hernandez v.
Wofford, No. 25-cv-986-KES-CDB (HC), 2025 WL 2420390, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21,
2025) (“Although the Supreme Court has described Congress’s power over the ‘policies
and rules for exclusion of aliens’ as ‘plenary,’ and held that this court must generally ‘defer
to Executive and Legislative Branch decisionmaking in that area,’ it is well-established
that the Due Process Clause stands as a significant constraint on the manner in which the
political branches may exercise their plenary authority’—through detention or otherwise.”)
(citations omitted); Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“The
holding in Thuraissigiam does not foreclose Plaintiffs’ due process claims which seek to
vindicate a right to a bond hearing with certain procedural protections.”).
Respondents also argue that a much older case, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 207–09 (1953), establishes that arriving aliens subject to a mandatory
detention scheme, regardless of the length of their detention, never become entitled by the
due process clause to a bond hearing. ECF No. 7 at 6–7. This Court does not read Mezei to
establish such a proposition. Mezei involved a noncitizen who had been “permanently
excluded from the United States on security grounds but [who was] stranded in his
temporary haven on Ellis Island because other countries [would] not take him back.” 345
U.S. at 207. In 1950, pursuant to emergency regulations, the Attorney General determined
that, based on certain confidential information, the noncitizen should be excluded from the
United States “for security reasons.” Id. at 208-10, 214–15. The Supreme Court rejected
the noncitizen’s constitutional challenge, citing “considerations” of “danger to the national
security”:
Thus we do not think that respondent’s continued exclusion deprives
him of any statutory or constitutional right. It is true that resident aliens
temporarily detained pending expeditious consummation of deportation
proceedings may be released on bond by the Attorney General whose
discretion is subject to judicial review. By that procedure aliens
uprooted 	from 	our 	midst 	may 	rejoin 	the 	community 	until 	the
Government effects their leave. An exclusion proceeding grounded on
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danger 	to 	the 	national 	security, 	however, 	presents 	different
considerations; neither the rationale nor the statutory authority for such
release exists. Ordinarily to admit an alien barred from entry on
security grounds nullifies the very purpose of the exclusion proceeding
….
Id. at 215-16 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
This Court agrees with those courts that distinguish the constitutional holding in
Mezei as addressing the national security considerations presented in that case. See
Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Mezei Court
explicitly grounded its decision in the special circumstances of a national emergency and
the determination by the Attorney General that Mezei presented a threat to national
security.”); Lett v. Decker, 346 F. Supp. 3d 379, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Mezei may compel
the conclusion that arriving aliens already excluded on national security grounds are not
entitled to a bond hearing prior to their arranged deportation. However, Mezei does not
compel the categorical conclusion that all arriving aliens may be subject to prolonged
confinement without a bond hearing.”); Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 772 (finding Mezei
inapposite to the issue of whether prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates due
process); Rash v. LaRose, No. 26-cv-8-LL-DEB, 2026 WL 249324, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan.
30, 2026) (same). Here, in contrast, neither the Attorney General nor any other government
component has made a determination that Petitioner should be excluded on grounds of
national security; Petitioner is not seeking to circumvent such a determination. Petitioner
is instead seeking a bond hearing.
Respondents also cite Barrera-Echavarria v. Rinson, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir.
1995) (en banc), superseded by statute as stated in Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir.
2002). Barrera-Echavarria stated that Mezei “suggests that the Court found that excludable
aliens simply enjoy no constitutional right to be paroled into the United States, even if the
only alternative is prolonged detention.” 44 F.3d at 1450. But the Ninth Circuit went on to
say that the case before it did not involve indefinite detention; instead, the noncitizen in
that case was subject to a set of regulations known as the Cuban Parole Plan, under which
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he had “the opportunity on an annual basis to show that since the previous review he has
changed his behavior and would no longer constitute a danger to society if paroled.” Id.
This case, too, is inapposite here. Petitioner here has never received a consideration of
whether he should be granted release on bond, and it appears that in Respondents’ view,
no length of detention would entitle him to such a review.
The Court concludes that it has authority to review whether Petitioner’s detention,
pursuant to a scheme of mandatory detention, has become unconstitutionally prolonged.
B. 	Whether Petitioner’s Detention is Prolonged in Violation of Due Process
In determining whether Petitioner’s detention has become prolonged, the Court
applies a six-factor balancing test used by some district courts. See Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp.
3d at 773–74; Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2019). That
test considers: (1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future
detention; (3) conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the
detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the
likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal. See Kydyrali,
499 F. Supp. 3d at 773–74.
Here, Petitioner has been detained for almost 15 months. Respondents argue that
“[i]n general, as detention continues past a year, courts become extremely wary of
permitting continued custody absent a bond hearing.” ECF No. 7 at 8 (quoting Sibomana
v. LaRose, No. 22-cv-933-LL-NLS, 2023 WL 3028093, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2023)).
This proposition, applied to Petitioner’s length of detention, favors a bond hearing. The
fact that courts have granted habeas relief in some other cases involving longer periods of
detention does not indicate that Petitioner is ineligible for such relief; still other courts have
granted habeas relief in cases involving shorter periods of detention.1
1 See, e.g., Hoyos Amado v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 25-cv-2687-LL-DDL, 2025 WL
3079052, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (“Courts have found detention over seven months
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As for the remaining factors to the extent addressed in the briefing, Respondents
argue, “Petitioner is responsible for months of delay by failing to even request relief for
almost six months from December [2024] until May 30, 2025.” ECF No. 7 at 10. Looking
at the present status of Petitioner’s appeal before the BIA, however, the Court does not
conclude that those proceedings are delayed, and does not ascribe to Petitioner blame for
delay. Indeed, if Petitioner had timely filed a request for relief prior to May 30, 2025, his
application would likely have taken more time to adjudicate than it has.
Respondents further argue that once the BIA rules on Petitioner’s appeal, “his path
to removal or release will become clearer.” ECF No. 7 at 10. This statement is true as far
as it goes, but given Petitioner’s expressed intent to seek review from the U.S. Court of
Appeals of any adverse decision from the BIA, ECF No. 1 at 7, absent a bond hearing
Petitioner faces a likelihood of significant continued detention.
Petitioner also argues that his conditions of confinement at the Imperial Regional
Detention Facility involve significant restrictions that are affecting specific physical issues
requiring medical attention outside the confines of Petitioner’s detention facility. Id.
Respondents do not address these allegations.
On balance, the Court determines that Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing
has become unreasonable and violates due process. Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and
individualized bond hearing, at which Respondents must justify his continued detention by
without a bond hearing weighs toward a finding that it is unreasonable.”) (collecting cases);
Tanoyan v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-00815-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3013684, at *4 (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 28, 2025) (“Petitioner has been detained approximately 11 months. This period …
qualifies as prolonged.”); Gao v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-2084-RSH-SBC, 2025 WL 2770633,
at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (“The Court finds that Petitioner’s detention for over 10
months without a bond hearing, in the context of the specific circumstances described
above, has become unreasonable and violates due process.”); Lopez v. Garland, 631 F.
Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (“Petitioner has been in immigration detention …
approximately one year. District courts have found shorter lengths of detention … without
a bond hearing to be unreasonable.”) (collecting cases).
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a showing of clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a
danger to the community if released. See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir.
2011), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018)
(explaining that “the substantial liberty interest at stake” warranted placing the burden on
the government to “prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is a flight risk or
a danger to the community to justify denial of bond”); see also Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th
775, 785–86 (9th Cir. 2024) (stating that “the BIA properly noted that the government bore
the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Martinez is a danger to the
community” with respect to a bond hearing for a noncitizen detained under § 1226(c)).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents are directed to
arrange a bond hearing for petitioner Mahad Abdi Ahmed before an immigration court
within seven (7) days of this order as described above.
No later than fourteen (14) days after the date of this order, Respondents shall file
a status report advising the Court of when Petitioner’s bond hearing occurred, as well as
the outcome of that hearing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 9, 2026
____________________
Hon. Robert S. Huie
United States District Judge
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