Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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26-CV-980 JLS (DEB)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
OLGA ZVORYGINA,
Petitioners,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden of
the Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-CV-980 JLS (DEB)
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS
(ECF No. 4)
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Olga Zvorygina’s Amended Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 4). Also before the
Court is Respondents’ Return to Habeas Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 6) and Petitioner’s
Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 7). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS
IN PART Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 4).
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Russia who entered the United States on April
10, 2022, and was briefly detained by the Department of Homeland Security. 	Pet. ¶ 1.
Petitioner was released on parole valid through April 8, 2023. 	Id. 	Petitioner fled Russia
to escape persecution by the Russian government on account of her political opinions. Id.
¶ 2. Since her release, Petitioner complied fully with all conditions of her parole, attended
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all check-ins, applied for asylum, received work authorization, was issued a Florida
driver’s license and a U.S. Social Security Card, and has no criminal history. Id. ¶ 5. On
December 30, 2025, Petitioner was stopped by a U.S. Border Patrol Agent “without
probable cause” and was taken into immigration custody. Id. ¶ 4. Petitioner’s parole was
terminated without notice. Id.
LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(g). Ret.
at 3–4. Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause
or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Respondents claim that “Petitioner’s claims
necessarily arise from the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to commence
removal proceedings against him.” Ret. at 4 (simplified). The Court disagrees.
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Section 1252(g) should be read “narrowly” as to apply “only to three discrete actions
that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631,
2025 WL 2461663, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 482, 487 (1999)). 	Section 1252(g) “does not
prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they are in some fashion
connected to removal orders.” Id. at *7. Section 1252(g) does not bar due process claims.
Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the petitioners’
objective was not to review the merits of their proceeding, but rather “to enforce their
constitutional rights to due process in the context of those proceedings”).
Here, Petitioner does not challenge the decision to commence removal proceedings
or any act to adjudicate or execute a removal order. Pet. ¶¶ 24–31. Rather, Petitioner is
challenging the legality of her parole revocation, alleged wrongful arrest, and continued
detention. Id. Petitioner is enforcing her “constitutional rights to due process in the context
of the removal proceedings—not the legitimacy of the removal proceedings or any removal
order.” 	Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, at *4 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 3, 2025). Therefore, § 1252(g) does not strip the Court of jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Navarro Sanchez v. Larose et al., 25-cv-2396 JES (MMP), 2025 WL 2770629, at *2 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (finding the Court had jurisdiction in a similar matter); Noori v. Larose
et al., 25-cv-1824 GPC (MSB), 2025 WL 2800149, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (same).
II. 	Merits
Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of her parole without justification or
consideration of her individualized circumstances violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. ¶¶
24–31. The Court agrees.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
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U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 	Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the
State deprives a person of liberty or property.” 	Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127
(1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose
liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-5632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July
25, 2025) (citations omitted). 	Although the initial decision to detain or release an
individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to
release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that
individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the
. . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
“Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending
removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected
liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” 	Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (citing
Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
Respondents contend that as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225
Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention and therefore her alleged statutory and
constitutional violations fail. Ret. at 4. The Court disagrees. Petitioner has been granted
humanitarian parole, granting her parole for a year.1 Pet. ¶ 1. 	Petitioner is not a newly
1 Respondents contend that because Petitioner’s parole expired after a year, any due process arguments
are foreclosed. Ret. at 4–6. The Court disagrees because Petitioner’s liberty “interest did not expire along
with Petitioner’s parole agreement.” 	Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1136 (W.D.
Wash. 2025). “Once established, Petitioner’s interest in liberty is a constitutional right which may only
be revoked through methods that comport with due process, such as a hearing in front of a neutral party
to determine whether Petitioner’s re-detainment is warranted.” 	Id. (citing Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. &
Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023)). Therefore, the expiration of Petitioner’s
parole does not impact the liberty interest in her release. See, e.g., Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-CV-
01471-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 3254999, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (finding the expiration of
petitioner’s parole did not extinguish his liberty interest); Quiroga-Chaparro v. Warden of Golden State
Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-CV-1731 AC, 2025 WL 3771473, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025) (same);
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arrived noncitizen seeking admission at the border, as Petitioner has been in the United
States since April 2022. Pet. ¶ 1. Upon arrival, she was determined to not be a danger to
the community or a flight risk, has attended his check-in appointments, applied for asylum,
received work authorization, was issued a Florida driver’s license and a U.S. Social
Security Card, and has no criminal history. 	Id. ¶¶ 1–5. 	Petitioner is not merely an
“applicant for admission” at the border with minimal due process rights; Petitioner has a
protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921,
at *4 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a
determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no
longer meets those criteria.”); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 (“Petitioner is not an
‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our country for over a year. This
substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due
process before removal.”); Matute v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-1206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL
2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty interest
in his release).
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before she can be deprived of that interest. 	See Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally
sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors.
See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved
Kazybayeva v. Warden of Otay Mesa Det. Ctr., No. 26-CV-0421-GPC-MMP, 2026 WL 280478, at *3
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2026) (same).
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and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.” Id.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s
revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be
heard, denied Petitioner of her due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has
a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to her parole. “Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in remaining with and providing for her family and
continuing the asylum process. 	See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the
conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and
friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.”).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
parole was revoked without providing her a reason for revocation or giving him an
opportunity to be heard. Pet. ¶ 8. Since DHS’s initial determination that Petitioner should
be paroled because she posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there
is no evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d
1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the
noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). Petitioner has no criminal
record, has not been arrested or otherwise in criminal trouble, has work authorization, and
has filed an asylum application. 	Pet. ¶¶ 1–5. 	“Once a noncitizen has been released, the
law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal
proceedings. 	Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially
changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has
become a flight risk. . . .” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1760. Respondents, failing to address
Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their response, do not point to any material
circumstances that have changed that would warrant reconsideration of her parole. 	See
generally Ret. 	“Where as here, ‘the petitioner has not received any bond or custody
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hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is high’ because neither the
government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid
basis for her detention.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No.
25-cv-801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1918679, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025)) (cleaned
up).
Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Matute, 2025 WL 2817795,
at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the
government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail
to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice,
reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Ret.
Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking her parole in
violation of the Due Process Clause, her detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v.
Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) (granting
a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole without a pre-
deprivation hearing); Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (granting a writ of habeas
corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due
process grounds).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Amended
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 4). 	The Court ORDERS Respondents to
immediately release Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of her preexisting
parole. 	The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is
entitled to notice of the reasons for revocation of her parole and a hearing before a neutral
decision maker to determine whether detention is warranted. The Government shall bear
the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger
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to the community or a risk of flight.2 The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status
Report by March 16, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released. 	The Clerk of
Court SHALL close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 10, 2026
2 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, at *8; Pinchi, 2025
WL 2084921, at *5; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez
v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).
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