Hu v. Larose et al

3:26-cv-00946Casd25 de fev. de 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
YIQIAN HU,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Warden of Otay
Mesa Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-00946-RBM-SBC
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Docs. 1, 2]
Before the Court are Petitioner Yiqian Hu’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) (Doc. 1) and Application for
Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO Motion”) (Doc. 2). For the reasons set forth below,
the Petition is GRANTED and the TRO Motion is DENIED as moot.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a citizen of China who entered the United States in or around June 2023
without inspection. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 4, 16.)1 On or around June 5, 2023, she was released from
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody “pursuant to an Order of Release
on Recognizance under 8 U.S.C. § 1226.” (Id. ¶ 17.) That same day, the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear, charging her as
1 The Court cites the paragraph numbers of the Petition and the CM/ECF electronic
pagination for other filings unless otherwise noted.
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inadmissible under Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i). 	(Id.)
“Following her release, Petitioner resided continuously in California and complied with
the reporting requirements and all other terms set forth in the Order of Release on
Recognizance.” 	(Id. ¶ 19.) 	On or about May 29, 2025, ICE agents detained Petitioner
when she was attending a gathering with friends. (Id. ¶ 22.) On November 10, 2025, an
immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed. 	(Id. ¶ 21.) 	Petitioner appealed that
decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and that appeal remains pending. (Id.)2 To
date, she has not been provided with a bond hearing. (Id. ¶ 24.)
B. 	Procedural Background
On February 13, 2026, Petitioner filed the Petition. (Doc. 1.) On February 18, 2026,
she filed the TRO Motion. (Doc. 2). Shortly thereafter, the Court issued an Order to Show
Cause and set a briefing schedule. 	(Doc. 3.) 	On February 23, 2026, Respondents filed
their Response to Petition (“Response”). (Doc. 5.) On February 24, 2026, Petitioner filed
her Reply to Respondents’ Response to Petition (“Reply”). (Doc. 6.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
2 The effect of this appeal is that the removal order is not administratively final. 	See
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B); Muhammad A. v. Noem, No. 1:26-cv-00950-KES-SKO (HC),
2026 WL 395900, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2026).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims that her detention violates the INA, the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, and the court’s orders in Bautista v. Santacruz.3 (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 25–44.)
Respondents concede “that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is entitled
to an order from this Court directing a bond hearing,” and argue only that Petitioner is not
a member of the class certified in Bautista because Petitioner was apprehended upon
arrival. 	(Doc. 5 at 2.) 	But Petitioner argues that the Court should order her immediate
release. 	(Doc. 1, Prayer for Relief ¶ 4; Doc. 6 at 2–3.) 	Because the Parties agree that
Petitioner is detained under § 1226, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 	The Court next
addresses whether Petitioner is entitled to immediate release.4
The Due Process Clause prohibits deprivations of life, liberty, and property without
due process of law. 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all
‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient to satisfy the Due Process
Clause, the Court applies the three-part test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
The Court must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action;” (2) the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and
(3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
3 See Bautista v. Santacruz, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25,
2025).
4 The Court notes that Respondents did not respond to Petitioner’s argument that
immediate release is proper. “Generally, a party waives argument when it fails to respond
to an argument made to the court.” 	United States v. Cabrera, 796 F. Supp. 3d 660, 664
(S.D. Cal. 2025) (citing United States v. Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051, 1053 n.1 (9th Cir.
2013)). Therefore, this alone may be grounds to grant Petitioner’s immediate release.
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entail.” Id. at 335.
The Court has granted several habeas petitions filed by similarly situated petitioners.
For example, in Faizyan v. Casey, the Court applied the Mathews test and found that the
respondents’ summary revocation of the petitioner’s “conditional parole without an
opportunity to be heard deprived [him] of his due process rights.” 	Case No.: 3:25-cv-
02884-BM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); accord C.A.R.V. v.
Wofford, Case No. 1:25-CV-01395, JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov.
3, 2025) (finding due process violation where the petitioner was originally released on an
order of release on own recognizance). Here, like in Faizyan, Petitioner was released on
her own recognizance and lived in the United States for over two years before being re-
detained. (Doc. 1 ¶ 19.) The Court adopts its reasoning in Faizyan and applies it here. For
those same reasons, ICE’s revocation of Petitioner’s release on her own recognizance
without a pre-deprivation hearing violates her due process rights.
The Court thus concludes that due process requires Petitioner to be released from
custody and receive a bond hearing before an immigration judge before she can be re-
detained. To the extent Respondents argue that Petitioner is entitled only to a bond hearing,
this argument “misapprehend[s] the purpose of a pre-detention hearing: if Petitioner is
detained, [s]he will already have suffered the injury [s]he is now seeking to avoid.” Jorge
M.F. v. Jennings, 534 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2021); see also E.A. T.-B. v.
Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1324 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“Although the Government
notes that Petitioner may request a bond hearing while detained, such a post-deprivation
hearing cannot serve as an adequate procedural safeguard because it is after the fact and
cannot prevent an erroneous deprivation of liberty.”); Domingo v. Kaiser, Case No. 25-cv-
05893 (RFL), 2025 WL 1940179, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (“Even if Petitioner[ ]
received a prompt post-detention bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and was released
at that point, [s]he will have already suffered the harm that is the subject of h[er] motion;
that is, h[er] potentially erroneous detention.”).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly:
1. Respondents are 	ORDERED 	to immediately release Petitioner from custody,
subject to the conditions of her preexisting Order of Release on Recognizance.
2. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner shall
receive notice of the reasons for revocation of her parole and a hearing before an
immigration judge to determine whether detention is warranted. Respondents shall
bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence,5 that Petitioner
poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.
3. The TRO Motion (Doc. 2) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: February 25, 2026
____________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5 See Sadeqi v. LaRose, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 3154520, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12,
2025) (“Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at which
Respondents must justify her continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing
evidence that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released.”)
(citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds
by Jennings, 583 U.S. 281 (explaining that “the substantial liberty interest at stake”
warranted placing the burden on the government to “prove by clear and convincing
evidence that [a noncitizen] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial
of bond”)).
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