Herrera v. Reed's, Inc.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DANIEL HERRERA, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
REED’S, INC.,
Defendant.
Case No.: 26-cv-756-RSH-JLB
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
[ECF No. 10]
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss plaintiff Daniel Herrera’s Complaint, filed
by defendant Reed’s, Inc. ECF No. 10. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court
finds the motion presented appropriate for resolution without oral argument. For the
reasons below, the Court denies the motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Plaintiff’s Allegations
The instant putative class action arises from Defendant’s labeling of its Real Ginger
Ale and Zero Real Ginger Ale products. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges as follows.
Defendant is a Delaware corporation that sells Real Ginger Ale and Zero Real Ginger
Ale (the “Products”). ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 7, 11. The Products bear the statements “All Natural”
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or “Natural Ingredients” on their front labels and “Nothing Artificial” on their cartons. Id.
at ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges that through these statements, the Products are misleadingly
represented to contain “only natural ingredients and no artificial components.” Id. at ¶ 13.
At issue in this case is the source of the citric acid Defendant uses in its Products.
Plaintiff alleges this citric acid is produced through an industrial fermentation process using
engineered strains of the mold, 	Aspergillus niger, and extracted through chemical
processing involving solvents, acids, and other synthetic inputs. Id. at ¶ 15. In contrast,
citric acid may also be extracted from fruit juices, but this “traditional” method is allegedly
unavailable at the scale of Defendant’s commercial operations. Id. at ¶ 16. Manufactured
citric acid allegedly differs from naturally produced citric acid because it can contain
residues 	of 	the 	synthetic 	chemicals 	used 	in 	its 	production, 	including 	isoparaffinic
petroleum hydrocarbons. Id. at ¶¶ 21–22. Manufactured citric acid may also contain
impurities or fragments from Aspergillus niger. Id. at ¶ 23.
According to the Complaint, the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”)
and the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) recognize citric acid manufactured using
Aspergillus niger as synthetic. Id. at ¶¶ 19–20. The FDA has also allegedly sent warning
letters to companies stating that certain products labeled “natural” are misbranded because
they contain citric acid. Id. at ¶ 24.
Plaintiff is a San Diego resident. Id. at ¶ 6. As recently as February 2025, Plaintiff
purchased the Products at Food Bowl Market and Barons Market in San Diego. Id. at ¶ 34.
Plaintiff alleges that he would not have purchased the Products, or would have paid less,
had he known they contained manufactured citric acid. Id. at ¶ 36.
B. 	Procedural Background
On February 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant putative class action. ECF No. 1. The
Complaint asserts causes of action for: (1) violation of California’s Consumers Legal
Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq.; (2) violation of California’s
Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.; and (3) breach
of express warranty under California law. Id. at ¶¶ 49–68. Plaintiff brings these claims
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individually and on behalf of a proposed class consisting of:
All persons who purchased one or more of the Products for personal
use in California within the applicable statute of limitations until the
date class notice is disseminated.
Id. at ¶ 39.
On March 18, 2026, Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint. ECF No. 10.
Plaintiff filed a response and Defendant filed a reply. ECF Nos. 11, 12.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Failure to Plead a Claim Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.”
Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[T]he non-conclusory ‘factual content,’
and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim
entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
The plausibility review is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Pleading facts “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of a
plausible entitlement to relief. Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A court “accept[s] factual allegations in
the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th
Cir. 2008). On the other hand, a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
///
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B. 	Failure to Plead Fraud with Particularity Pursuant to Rule 9(b)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 9(b). “To satisfy Rule 9(b), a pleading must identify the who, what, when, where, and
how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is false or misleading about [the
purportedly fraudulent] statement, and why it is false.” Trammell v. KLN Enters., Inc., 176
F.4th 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2026) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Vess v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Averments of fraud must be
accompanied by the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	CLRA and UCL (Claims 1 and 2)
Plaintiff’s first two causes of action allege violations of the CLRA and UCL,
respectively. Both claims are based on Plaintiff’s theory that the statements “All Natural,”
“Natural Ingredients,” and “Nothing Artificial” on the Products’ labels are likely to deceive
reasonable consumers. See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 51–52, 60.
Defendant moves to dismiss these claims, arguing that the Complaint does not
satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement and Plaintiff fails to connect his generalized
allegations about citric acid production to the citric acid used in the Products. ECF No. 10-
1 at 4, 6. Defendant additionally contends that Ninth Circuit precedent and federal agency
materials undermine Plaintiff’s theory that the challenged representations are misleading.
Id. at 5–6. Finally, Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s price premium allegations and standing
to seek injunctive relief. Id. at 6–7. The Court addresses these arguments, in turn, below.
1. 	The CLRA and UCL—Generally
California’s CLRA prohibits specified unfair or deceptive practices in transactions
involving goods or services, including misrepresentations concerning a good’s “standard,
quality, or grade,” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(7), while the UCL proscribes business
practices that are “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent,” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “Courts
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often analyze these statutes together because they share similar attributes.” In re Sony
Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 985 (S.D.
Cal. 2014) (collecting cases).
Claims brought under the CLRA and UCL “are governed by the ‘reasonable
consumer’ test.” McGinity v. P&G, 69 F.4th 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2023). The reasonable
consumer test “requires more than a mere possibility” that a defendant’s labeling “might
conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an unreasonable
manner.” Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lavie v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 105 Cal. App. 4th 496, 508 (Ct. App. 2003)). Rather, a plaintiff must
plausibly allege “a probability ‘that a significant portion of the general consuming public
or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.’” Id.
(quoting Lavie, 105 Cal. App. 4th at 508). “Put another way, ‘[a] representation does not
become false and deceptive merely because it will be unreasonably misunderstood by an
insignificant 	and 	unrepresentative 	segment 	of 	the 	class 	of 	persons 	to 	whom 	the
representation is addressed.’” Wiliams v. Cove Drinks, Inc., No. 26-CV-03374-H-JLB,
2026 WL 2908617, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2026) (quoting Lavie, 105 Cal. App. 4th at
507). “The touchstone under the ‘reasonable consumer’ test is whether the product labeling
and ads promoting the products have a meaningful capacity to deceive consumers.”
McGinity, 69 F.4th at 1097.
“In general, dismissal for failure to state a claim in this context is ‘rare’ and
California courts have ‘recognized that whether a business practice is deceptive will
usually be a question of fact not appropriate for decision on demurrer.’” Albrigo v.
Chobani, LLC, No. 3:24-CV-01418-BJC-KSC, 2025 WL 1930007, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July
11, 2025) (quoting Williams v. Gerber Products Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938–939 (9th Cir.
2009)); Hawyuan Yu v. Dr Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 18-CV-06664-BLF, 2020 WL
5910071, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2020) (“Normally the reasonable consumer question is
not resolved at the motion to dismiss stage, but in rare circumstances the Court may
determine, as a matter of law, that the alleged violations are simply not plausible.”).
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2. 	Failure to Allege Fraud with Particularity
Defendant contends Plaintiff’s CLRA and UCL claims fail to plead the “who, what,
when, where, and how” of the alleged misconduct with the particularity required by Rule
9(b). ECF No. 10-1 at 6. Specifically, Defendant argues that the Complaint does not explain
“how” the citric acid used in the Products is artificial beyond generalized allegations about
industry practices. Id.1
The Court is not persuaded. Here, the Complaint identifies the “who” (Defendant);
the “what” (the representations “All Natural,” “Natural Ingredients,” and “Nothing
Artificial”); the “when” (Plaintiff’s purchases as recently as February 2025); and the
“where” (Food Bowl Market and Barons Market in San Diego). ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 11–12,
34. The Complaint also explains “how” the statements are allegedly false—namely, that
the Products, contrary to their labeling, contain citric acid created by industrial production,
rather than traditional extraction from fruit juices. Id. at ¶¶ 15–17. These allegations are
sufficient to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement. See Balser v. Hain Celestial
Grp., Inc., 640 F. App’x 694, 695–96 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding Rule 9(b) satisfied where
plaintiffs alleged that “natural” meant free of synthetic ingredients and that products
bearing that label nevertheless contained synthetic ingredients); 	Albrigo, 2025 WL
1930007, at *7 (holding complaint met requirements of Rule 9 “by asserting that
[manufactured citric acid] is not a ‘natural’ ingredient and that reasonable consumers,
including Plaintiff, are likely to be deceived by the ‘All Natural Ingredients’ label”); Von
Koenig v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1077–78 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
(finding Rule 9(b) satisfied where plaintiffs identified the challenged “All Natural” labels
1 There is no dispute that Plaintiff’s CLRA and UCL claims sound in fraud, thereby
requiring Plaintiff to satisfy the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). See Kearns v.
Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e have specifically ruled that
Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standards apply to claims for violations of the CLRA and
UCL.”).
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and alleged that they were misleading because the drinks contained high fructose corn
syrup, which plaintiffs asserted was not natural).
3. 	Connection to the Products
Defendant next argues that the Complaint’s generalized allegations do not plausibly
establish that the Products contain citric acid produced using Aspergillus niger. ECF No.
10-1 at 4.
The Court does not agree. Here, the Complaint specifically alleges that the citric acid
Defendant uses is produced through industrial fermentation using Aspergillus niger and
subsequent chemical processing. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 15. The Complaint further alleges that
traditional extraction from fruit juices is unavailable at the scale of Defendant’s operations
and that approximately 99% of commercial citric acid production is carried out using
Aspergillus niger and synthetic chemicals. Id. at ¶¶ 16–17. The Complaint supports the
latter allegation by citing an article that states that “[a]pproximately 99% of the world
production 	of 	[manufactured 	citric 	acid] 	is 	through 	microbial 	processes 	using
predominantly a mutant strain of the black mold Aspergillus niger.” See ECF Nos. 1 at ¶
17; 1-2 at 2.
Taken together, these allegations are sufficient to permit a reasonable inference, at
the pleading stage, that the citric acid used in the Products is produced through the alleged
industrial fermentation process.. See Ringler v. J.M. Smucker Co., 783 F. Supp. 3d 1229,
1238–39 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (finding allegations of Aspergillus niger fermentation and
chemical 	extraction, 	together 	with 	scientific 	literature 	and 	the 	alleged 	commercial
infeasibility of fruit extraction, sufficient to connect the alleged process to the products);
Carbine v. Target Corp., No. CV 24-03721-MWF (AJRx), 2025 WL 501829, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 13, 2025) (finding allegations that approximately 99% of commercial citric acid
is produced using Aspergillus niger and that the citric acid used in the products was
chemically processed sufficient to link the alleged process to the products); Squeo v.
Campbell Soup Co., No. 24-CV-02235-SVK, 2024 WL 4557680, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22,
2024) (finding allegations concerning the prevalence of manufactured citric acid and the
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commercial infeasibility of fruit extraction sufficient to support a reasonable inference that
the products contained manufactured citric acid); Albrigo, 2025 WL 1930007, at *7
(finding an allegation that the citric acid used in the products at issue was industrially
manufactured sufficient to link the alleged ingredient to the products).
4. 	Misleading to Reasonable Consumer
Defendant next argues that the challenged “All Natural,” “Natural Ingredients” and
“Nothing Artificial” representations would not mislead a reasonable consumer, contending
both that Ninth Circuit precedent precludes Plaintiff’s claim and that judicially noticeable
USDA and FDA materials render Plaintiff’s claims implausible. ECF No. 10-1 at 5–6.
The Court is unpersuaded. Defendant relies on three decisions in arguing that Ninth
Circuit precedent forecloses Plaintiff’s claim: Becerra v. Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc., 945
F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2019); Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2016); and Moore
v. Trader Joe’s Co., 4 F.4th 874 (9th Cir. 2021). Id. at 5. In Becerra, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of claims challenging the use of “diet” in Diet Dr
Pepper, holding that “no reasonable consumer would assume that Diet Dr Pepper’s use of
the term ‘diet’ promises weight loss or management.” 945 F.3d at 1229. Rather, “[i]n
context, the use of ‘diet’ in a soft drink’s brand name is understood as a relative claim about
the calorie content of that soft drink compared to the same brand’s ‘regular’ (full-caloric)
option.” Id.
In Ebner, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims alleging that a lip
product’s labeling was misleading because its dispenser allowed only 75% of the product
to advance past the tube’s opening. 838 F.3d at 961. The label accurately disclosed the
product’s 	total 	weight 	and 	dispenser 	tubes 	using 	that 	screw 	mechanism 	were
commonplace. Id. at 965. The Court of Appeals explained: “[t]he reasonable consumer
understands the general mechanics of these dispenser tubes and further understands that
some product may be left in the tube to anchor the bullet in place.” Id.
Finally, in Moore, the Court of Appeals held that the representation “100% New
Zealand Manuka Honey” in Trader Joe’s honey products was not misleading to a
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reasonable consumer. 4 F.4th at 883–85. The Court of Appeals explained: “given the
foraging nature of bees, a reasonable honey consumer would know that it is impossible to
produce honey that is derived exclusively from a single floral source.” Id. at 883. Two
additional contextual features reinforced the court’s conclusion: the honey’s relatively low
price and its “10+” on a “Unique Manuka Factor” rating scale indicating it fell lower on
the purity scale. Id. at 884–85.
While Defendant cites these cases to argue that reasonable consumers interpret
product labels in context and with common sense, Defendant does not explain how any of
them forecloses Plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 10-1 at 5. Instead, each case turned on
materially 	different 	considerations: 	the 	meaning 	of 	“diet” 	in 	soft-drink 	branding,
consumers’ familiarity with a lip-product dispenser, and the impossibility of obtaining
honey exclusively from a single floral source. See Becerra, 945 F.3d at 1229; Ebner, 838
F.3d at 965; Moore, 4 F.4th at 883–85.
Defendant also relies on various USDA and FDA materials to argue that Plaintiff’s
interpretation of the challenged “All Natural,” “Natural Ingredients” and “Nothing
Artificial” representations is implausible. ECF No. 10-1 at 5–6. Specifically, Defendant
cites a USDA document entitled “Guidance Classification of Materials,” which “describes
the procedures used to classify materials as synthetic or nonsynthetic . . . under the USDA
organic regulations.” USDA, Guidance Classification of Materials (effective Dec. 2,
2016), ECF No. 10-4 at 1. The guidance offers “[c]itric acid” as an example of a product
that is “natural and nonsynthetic” when created by a “naturally occurring biological
process, such as fermentation[.]” Id. at 4. Defendant also cites 7 C.F.R. § 205.605(a) which
lists citric acid “produced by microbial fermentation of carbohydrate substances” as a
nonsynthetic substance. ECF No. 10-1 at 6. Finally, Defendant cites a 2015 FDA notice
requesting comments on the use of the term “natural” in food labeling. ECF Nos. 10-1 at
6; 10-6. In so doing, Defendant notes the FDA has not adopted a formal regulatory
definition of “natural” and that its informal policy concerning that term was “not intended
to address food production methods.” ECF Nos. 10-1 at 6; 10-6 at 2.
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Defendant 	does 	not, 	however, 	meaningfully 	connect 	these 	materials 	to 	how
reasonable consumers would understand the challenged representations. The USDA
materials concern the classification of substances under the organic-labeling framework.
See ECF No. 10-4 at 1, 4. But Plaintiff is not challenging the ingredient’s eligibility for use
in organic-labeled products. Defendant’s reliance on the FDA notice suffers from a similar
gap: the absence of a formal definition and the agency’s informal policy do not establish
how reasonable consumers would understand the challenged “All Natural,” “Natural
Ingredients” and “Nothing Artificial” representations. See Carbine, 2025 WL 501829, at
*4 (rejecting reliance on FDA and USDA characterizations of citric acid to defeat the
plaintiff’s reasonable consumer theory).2
Rather, 	multiple 	courts, 	including 	the 	Ninth 	Circuit, 	have 	recognized 	that
representations similar to the ones alleged here may mislead reasonable consumers into
believing that a product contains only natural ingredients. See Brazil v. Dole Packaged
Foods, LLC, 660 F. App’x 531, 533–34 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that the evidence could
support a finding that “All Natural Fruit” labeling was misleading to a reasonable consumer
because the products contained synthetic citric and ascorbic acids); Williams, 552 F.3d at
939 (“[T]he statement that Fruit Juice Snacks was made with ‘fruit juice and other all
natural ingredients’ could easily be interpreted by consumers as a claim that all the
ingredients in the product were natural, which appears to be false.”); Albrigo, 2025 WL
2 Defendant also cites an excerpt from Bruce Alberts et al., Molecular Biology of the
Cell (4th ed. 2002) to argue that there is no meaningful distinction between fruit-derived
and mold-derived citric acid because both are produced through the same “metabolic
pathway”—the Krebs cycle. ECF Nos. 12 at 2–3; 12-3 at 3. Even were the Court to take
judicial notice of this document and accept this representation, whether reasonable
consumers would regard citric acid produced through the alleged industrial process using
Aspergillus niger as “natural” is a disputed factual question that is not appropriate for
resolution at this stage of the case. See Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 958 (9th
Cir. 2015) (explaining that the reasonable consumer standard “raises questions of fact that
are appropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss only in rare situation[s]”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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1930007, at *7 (“Plaintiff has sufficiently pled that the inclusion of stevia extract, monk
fruit extract, and [manufactured citric acid] in products labeled ‘Only Natural Ingredients’
is likely to deceive a reasonable consumer under the UCL and FAL.”). 3
At a minimum, whether reasonable consumers would regard citric acid produced
through the alleged process as inconsistent with the challenged representations at issue here
presents 	a 	fact 	intensive 	question 	not 	appropriately 	resolved 	at 	this 	stage 	of 	the
proceedings. See Carbine, 2025 WL 501829, at *5 (holding that whether a reasonable
consumer would consider a naturally occurring compound artificial because of its
production method was a “fact-intensive determination” inappropriate for resolution at the
motion to dismiss stage); Squeo, 2024 WL 4557680, at *7 (finding plausible allegation that
reasonable consumer could be misled by chips containing the label “No Artificial Colors,
Flavors or Preservatives” when they contained artificially produced citric acid, reasoning
that “whether a reasonable consumer would be deceived will usually be a question of fact
not appropriate for decision on demurrer”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Fried v.
Snapple Beverage Corp., 753 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1153 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (“[Q]uestions
regarding how consumers interpret terms or phrases on product labels are factual inquiries
best suited for resolution at a later stage of the litigation and not on a motion to dismiss.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
3 Although Defendant contends that “Ninth Circuit” law forecloses Plaintiff’s theory,
Defendant relies centrally on Valencia v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 23-CV-1399 (CS),
2024 WL 1158476 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2024). ECF No. 10-1 at 5. The Court does not find
that decision persuasive on the allegations here. In Valencia, the court emphasized that
while plaintiff had alleged that citric acid was produced through industrial fermentation,
she had not alleged “that the resulting citric acid contains synthetic agents.” 2024 WL
1158476, at *6. Here, by contrast, Plaintiff alleges that manufactured citric acid differs
from naturally produced citric acid because it can contain residues of synthetic chemicals
used in its production and impurities or fragments from Aspergillus niger. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶
21–23; see Carbine., 2025 WL 501829, at *5 (“In contrast to Valencia, Plaintiff here does
contend that the manufactured citric acid contains something synthetic[.]”) (emphasis in
original).
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For these reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL
and CLRA claims on this ground.
5. 	Economic Injury
Defendant appears to next challenge Plaintiff’s price premium allegations. Plaintiff’s
Complaint alleges that Defendant “exploited” consumer desire for “All Natural” beverages
by selling the Products at a premium compared to similar products without the challenged
representations—identifying Canada Dry Ginger Ale as an example. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 32–
33. Defendant responds that Canada Dry Ginger Ale is not a suitable comparator for the
Products, which are “premium ginger beverages.” ECF No. 10-1 at 6–7.
The Court construes Defendant’s argument as a contention Plaintiff has not
sufficiently pleaded a plausible economic injury. “Under California law, the economic
injury of paying a premium for a falsely advertised product is sufficient harm to maintain
a cause of action.” Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2018);
McGee v. S-L Snacks Nat’l, 982 F.3d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[O]verpayment is a viable
theory of economic injury. We have consistently recognized that a plaintiff can satisfy the
injury in fact requirement by showing that she paid more for a product than she otherwise
would have due to a defendant’s false representations about the product.”).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he relied on the “All Natural,” “Natural Ingredients” and
“Nothing Artificial” representations when purchasing the Products and would not have
purchased them, or would have paid less, had he known they contained manufactured citric
acid. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 34, 36.
Multiple courts have found similar allegations sufficient to plead economic injury—
even in the absence of a comparator product. See Chavez v. Blue Sky Nat. Bev. Co., 340 F.
App’x 359, 361 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding injury in fact adequately alleged where the plaintiff
claimed he purchased beverages in reliance on misrepresentations about their geographic
origin and would not have purchased them had he known the truth); Albrigo, 2025 WL
1930007, at *11 (“Plaintiff has alleged an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing
because she asserts that she overpaid for the Products based on her reliance on a false
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representation.”); Grausz v. Hershey Co., 691 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1189 (S.D. Cal. 2023)
(finding reliance and resulting economic injury adequately pleaded where the plaintiff
alleged she would not have purchased the chocolate products had their labeling disclosed
the presence of heavy metals); Brown v. Starbucks Corp., No. 18CV2286 JM (WVG), 2019
WL 4183936, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2019) (finding economic injury adequately pleaded
where plaintiff alleged that the packaging’s omission of an artificial flavor disclosure
induced her to pay a price premium and that she would not have had she known gummies
products contained artificial flavors).4
For these reasons, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument Plaintiff must identify a
more suitable comparator product to adequately plead economic injury at this stage.
6. 	Entitlement to Injunctive Relief
Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s bare assertion that he “wishes to rely” on
the Products’ labels in the future is insufficient to establish standing to seek prospective
injunctive relief. ECF Nos. 1 at ¶ 37; 10-1 at 7.
“A plaintiff must demonstrate constitutional standing separately for each form of
relief requested.” Davidson, 889 F.3d at 967. “For injunctive relief, which is a prospective
remedy, 	the 	threat 	of 	injury 	must 	be 	‘actual 	and 	imminent, 	not 	conjectural 	or
hypothetical.’” Id. (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)).
4 Nor does Defendant’s reliance on Karabas v. TC Heartland LLC, 770 F. Supp. 3d
454 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) establish that a comparator product is required. ECF No. 10-1 at 7. It
is true that in Karabas, the court held that to plead loss under New Jersey’s Consumer
Fraud Act, a plaintiff “must specify the price he paid for the product and the price of
comparable products.” 770 F. Supp. 3d at 469–70. However, Defendant does not explain
why this requirement applies to Plaintiff’s California claims. Indeed, in a separate section
on standing, 	Karabas 	held that “one method of demonstrating actual injury in the
consumable goods context is by showing that the plaintiff paid a ‘price premium’” and that
a plaintiff was not required to identify “the price of competing products to establish the
premium” to demonstrate injury. Id. at 465.
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In fact, Davidson—which Defendant cites—does not actually support Defendant’s
position. ECF No. 10-1 at 7. In Davidson, plaintiff alleged she paid a premium for pre-
moistened wipes that were labeled as “flushable” because she believed these wipes were
better for the environment and more sanitary than non-flushable wipes. 889 F.3d at 961.
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s dismissal for lack of standing to seek
injunctive relief, explaining plaintiff had “properly alleged that she faces a threat of
imminent or actual harm by not being able to rely on [defendant]’s labels in the future, and
that this harm is sufficient to confer standing to seek injunctive relief.” Id. at 967.
Specifically, Davidson held:
[A] previously deceived consumer may have standing to seek an
injunction 	against 	false 	advertising 	or 	labeling, 	even 	though 	the
consumer now knows or suspects that the advertising was false at the
time of the original purchase, because the consumer may suffer an
actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical threat of future
harm. Knowledge that the advertisement or label was false in the past
does not equate to knowledge that it will remain false in the future. In
some cases, the threat of future harm may be the consumer’s plausible
allegations that she will be unable to rely on the product’s advertising
or labeling in the future, and so will not purchase the product although
she would like to.
889 F.3d at 969–70 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he “wishes to rely on Reed’s labeling in the future but
cannot do so unless Defendant stops this deceptive practice” and that he therefore faces an
ongoing risk of harm when he encounters the Products for sale. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 37. Read
together with Plaintiff’s allegations concerning his prior purchases, there is a reasonable
inference that Plaintiff wishes to purchase the Products again but cannot rely on
Defendant’s labeling in deciding whether to do so.
Under Davidson, this is sufficient for Plaintiff to plead standing for injunctive relief.
See 889 F.3d at 969–70; see also Falcone v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 24-7707, 2026 WL
74510, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2026) (district court did not err in finding plaintiff had
standing to pursue injunctive relief where she testified that she “loves Nestlé products and
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that she would like to purchase these products in the future but that she stopped purchasing
them when she learned about child labor and environmental damage.”); Cohen v. E. W. Tea
Co., LLC, No. 17-CV-2339-JLS (BLM), 2018 WL 3656112, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018)
(“Similar to Davidson, Plaintiff adequately alleges she is unable to rely upon Defendant’s
labeling in the future and will not purchase the Product even though she would like to.”).
B. 	Express Warranty (Claim 3)
Defendant separately argues Plaintiff’s express warranty claim fails because the
Complaint does not plausibly allege that the Products fail to conform to the challenged
representations. ECF No. 10-1 at 7.
Under section 2313 of the California Uniform Commercial Code, “[a]ny description
of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that
the goods shall conform to the description.” Cal. Com. Code § 2313(1)(b). “To prevail on
a breach of express warranty claim under California law, a plaintiff must prove that: (1)
the seller’s statements constitute an affirmation of fact or promise or a description of the
goods; (2) the statement was part of the basis of the bargain; and (3) the warranty was
breached.” In re ConAgra Foods, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 919, 984 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, Defendant’s argument rests on the same asserted failure to plead actionable
deception that underlies Defendant’s challenge to Plaintiff’s CLRA and UCL claims. See
ECF No. 10-1 at 7 (“Because the Complaint fails to state a plausible deception theory, it
necessarily fails to allege that the Reed’s products did not conform to the challenged
statements under an objective reasonable-consumer standard.”). Because the Court has
already concluded that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged the challenged representations are
misleading, it declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s express warranty claim for the same reasons.
C. 	Preemption
Defendant argues, in the alternative, that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by “obstacle
preemption.” ECF No. 10-1 at 7–8. According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s claims would
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effectively impose a categorical state law prohibition on labeling products containing
fermentation-derived citric acid as “natural.” Id.
1. 	Preemption—Generally
The Supremacy Clause provides that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the
Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. “Accordingly, [i]f federal law imposes
restrictions or confers rights on private actors and a state law confers rights or imposes
restrictions that conflict with the federal law, the federal law takes precedence and the state
law is preempted.” Conocophillips Alaska, Inc. v. Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation
Comm’n, 177 F.4th 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2026) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Federal preemption can be either express or implied.” Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc.
v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 863 (9th Cir. 2009). Express preemption occurs when the
language of the statute explicitly states that federal law has a preemptive effect. See Aguayo
v. U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Congress may preempt state law by so
stating in express terms.”). “But even if no federal statute expressly preempts state law,
‘obstacle’ preemption means that state law is unenforceable when it ‘stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”
Conocophillips, 177 F.4th at 968–69.
“The Supreme Court has found obstacle preemption in only a small number of cases
of two specific types: those where the federal legislation at issue involved a uniquely
federal area[] of regulation and state law directly interfered with the operation of the federal
program, and those where a federal enactment clearly struck a particular balance of
interests that would be disturbed or impeded by state regulation.” Id. at 972 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “The mere fact that there is tension between federal and state
law is not enough to establish obstacle preemption.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. 	Analysis
Here, Defendant has not demonstrated that Plaintiff’s claims are barred under the
doctrine of obstacle preemption. In seeking dismissal on this ground, Defendant relies on
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the same USDA and FDA materials discussed above with respect to Defendant’s challenge
to Plaintiff’s CLRA and UCL claims. Specifically, Defendant again cites the USDA’s
classification of fermentation-derived citric acid as nonsynthetic for organic-labeling
purposes and the 2015 FDA notice requesting comments on the use of “natural” in food
labeling. ECF No. 10-1 at 5–8
Beyond citing these materials and general obstacle preemption principles, however,
Defendant offers only the conclusory assertion that Plaintiff’s claims would override
“federal choices” and “stand as an obstacle to the federal scheme.” Id. at 8. As noted above,
the USDA materials are directed to the classification of substances as synthetic or
nonsynthetic for purposes of the organic-labeling framework. See ECF No. 10-4 at 1 (“This
guidance describes the procedure used to classify materials as synthetic or nonsynthetic,
and as agricultural or nonagricultural, under the USDA organic regulations.”); 7 C.F.R. §
205.605 (“The following nonagricultural [substances] may be used as ingredients in or on
processed products labeled as ‘organic’ or ‘made with organic (specified ingredients or
food group(s))’”). Defendant does not explain why that framework controls whether the
Products may be represented as “All Natural,” containing “Natural Ingredients,” or
containing “Nothing Artificial.”
Defendant’s reliance on the FDA notice is similarly unpersuasive. Again, Defendant
does not explain why FDA’s statement regarding its informal policy concerning the use of
“natural” in food labeling supports the preemption of Plaintiff’s claims. Indeed, rather than
resolving whether fermentation and other processing methods affect whether a food may
be labeled “natural,” the notice requests comments on those questions. ECF No. 10-6 at 4
(“Should manufacturing processes be considered in determining when a food can bear the
term ‘natural?’ For example, should food manufacturing processes, such as . . . fermenting
. . . 	be a factor in defining ‘‘natural?’ . . . 	Should the term ‘natural’ only apply to
‘unprocessed’ foods? If so, how should ‘unprocessed’ and ‘processed’ be defined for
purposes of bearing the claim?”). The Court is unpersuaded the FDA notice supports
Defendant’s obstacle preemption theory. See Iglesias v. Arizona Beverages USA, LLC, No.
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22-CV-09108-JSW, 2023 WL 4053803, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2023) (“Courts in this
district have long ‘rejected the idea that unfair competition claims based on natural type
labels are expressly preempted by FDA regulations.’”) (quoting Pratt v. Whole Foods Mkt.
California, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-05652-EJD, 2014 WL 1324288, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31,
2014)) (collecting cases); Barnes v. Campbell Soup Co., No. C 12-05185 JSW, 2013 WL
5530017, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2013) (“Until such time when the FDA issues a explicit
position, rule, and requirement regarding the use of the term ‘natural,’ the Court cannot
intrude upon the FDA’s authority and unilaterally preempt Plaintiff’s claims.”); Hitt v.
Arizona Beverage Co., LLC, No. 08 CV 809 WQH (POR), 2009 WL 449190, at *5 (S.D.
Cal. Feb. 4, 2009) (“Plaintiff’s All Natural Claims do not stand as an obstacle to
accomplishing Congress’s objectives of uniformity and consistency in regulating beverage
labeling because there are no federal requirements regarding the term ‘natural’ to be given
preemptive effect.”); see also Holk v. Snapple Bev. Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 342 (3d Cir. 2009)
(“We believe that neither the FDA policy statement regarding the use of the term ‘natural’
nor the FDA’s letter indicating that some forms of [high fructose corn syrup] may be
classified as ‘natural’ have the force of law required to preempt conflicting state law.”).
At this stage of the proceedings, Defendant has not shown that this action falls within
either of the two narrow categories of cases in which the Supreme Court has found obstacle
preemption. The Court therefore declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on this ground.5
5 The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s requests for judicial notice
as follows. ECF Nos. 10-2, 12-2. The Court grants the requests concerning the USDA
guidance document and Agriculture Handbook No. 98 excerpt, the FDA notice, and the
voluntary dismissal with prejudice in Mason v. Reed’s Inc. See United States v. 14.02 Acres
of Land More or Less in Fresno County, 547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2008); Reyn’s Pasta
Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court denies as
unnecessary the requests concerning 7 C.F.R. § 205.605(a), the Complaint, the cited
judicial decisions, and the Molecular Biology of the Cell excerpt. See Lathan v. Ducart,
No. 16-16551, 2017 WL 3976705, at *1 (9th Cir. June 16, 2017); Ecological Rts. Found.
v. PacifiCorp, 738 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1248 (N.D. Cal. 2024). Finally, the Court denies the
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 14, 2026
____________________
Hon. Robert S. Huie
United States District Judge
requests concerning motion papers in Karabas v. TC Heartland LLC (E.D.N.Y.), Valencia
v. Snapple Beverage Corp. (S.D.N.Y.), and Tarzian v. Kraft Heinz Foods Co. (N.D. Ill.).
because Defendant did not provide them.
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