Sun v. Noem et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
YONG SUN,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI 	NOEM, 	Secretary 	of 	the 	U.S.
Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security, 	in 	her
official capacity, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-00626-RBM-DDL
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Docs. 1, 3, 6]
Before the Court are Petitioner Yong Sun’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1), Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order (“TRO Motion”) (Doc. 3), and Motion for Immediate Release Pending
Adjudication of Habeas Petition (“Motion for Immediate Release”) (Doc. 6). 	For the
reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED and the TRO Motion and Motion for
Immediate Release are DENIED as moot.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a citizen of China who entered the United States on May 3, 2023. (Doc.
1 ¶ 27.)1 He was apprehended almost immediately by the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”), who issued him a Notice to Appear charging him as inadmissible under
1 The Court cites the paragraph numbers of the Petition and the CM/ECF electronic
pagination for other filings unless otherwise noted.
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section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) as a noncitizen
present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled. (Id.; Doc. 9 at 2.)
At that time, DHS released Petitioner on his own recognizance. (See Doc. 3 at 31; Doc. 1
¶ 28; Doc. 9 at 2.) Petitioner was re-detained by DHS on May 31, 2025, and has been in
the Otay Mesa Detention Center since then. (Doc. 1 ¶ 28.)
On July 7, 2025, Petitioner filed a bond redetermination request. (See Doc. 3 at 31.)
The immigration judge granted Petitioner’s “request for a change in his custody status and
imposed a $1,500 bond with Alternatives to Detention at [DHS’s] discretion.” (Id. at 33.)
DHS appealed the immigration judge’s decision. (Id. at 37.) The Board of Immigration
Appeals sustained the appeal and vacated the immigration judge’s decision, finding that he
lacked jurisdiction pursuant to Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
(Id. at 37–38.)
B. 	Procedural Background
On February 1, 2026, Petitioner filed the Petition. (Doc. 1.) On February 3, 2026,
Petitioner filed the TRO Motion. (Doc. 3.) That same day, the Court ordered Respondents
to show cause why the Petition and TRO Motion should not be granted by filing a written
response. 	(Doc. 2.) 	On February 11, 2026, upon the Parties’ joint motion, the Court
continued the briefing schedule. 	(See Docs. 5, 7.) 	On February 13, 2026, Respondents
filed their Return to Petition (“Response”). 	(Doc. 9.) 	Petitioner was authorized to file a
reply on or before February 18, 2026 (Doc. 7), but did not file one.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
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burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause and the INA. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 30–73.) Specifically, he argues that: (1) if he is detained
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, his detention has become unreasonably prolonged (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 30–
64); and, alternatively, (2) if he is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, he is entitled to a bond
hearing under that statute or under the court’s orders in Bautista v. Santacruz2 (id. ¶¶ 65–
73). 	Respondents argue only that Petitioner is not a member of the class certified in
Bautista because Petitioner was apprehended upon arrival. (Doc. 9 at 2.)3 For the reasons
below, the Court finds that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C § 1226 and is entitled to
immediate release.
A. 	Detention Under § 1225 or § 1226
The Court has previously agreed with Respondents’ position that similarly situated
petitioners are not members of the class certified in Bautista. See Xie v. LaRose, Case No.:
3:25-cv-03649-RBM-MSB, 2026 WL 92066, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2026) (“Unlike the
class members in Bautista who entered the United States without apprehension, Petitioner
was previously detained, identified as inadmissible, placed in removal proceedings, found
to be neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and released on his own
recognizance.”). For the same reasons here, Petitioner is not a Bautista class member.
2 See Bautista v. Santacruz, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25,
2025).
3 Respondents state that “Petitioner has filed a habeas petition solely ‘to seek enforcement
of [his] rights as [a] member[] of the Bond Eligible Class certified in [Bautista]” and that
“the petition contains a single cause of action alleging Petitioner is entitled to an
individualized bond hearing because he is a member of the ‘Bond Eligible Class.’”
(Doc. 9 at 1.) 	The Petition actually brings three causes of action, and Petitioner seeks a
bond hearing not only under Bautista, but under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 30–73,
Prayer for Relief.)
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The Court’s inquiry does not end there, though, as “the fact that [Petitioner] is not a
class member does not mean that he is necessarily subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2).” 	Maldonado v. Scott, Case No. 2:26-cv-00014-TMC, 2026 WL 251819, at
*2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2026). Instead, “the basis for [a petitioner’s] detention requires
analysis of the specific facts surrounding his previous interactions with immigration
officials.” 	Id.; see also Del Valle Castillo v. Wamsley, Case No. 2:25-cv-02054-TMC,
2025 WL 3524932, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 26, 2025) (explaining that petitioners who
were apprehended upon arrival could be subject to detention under § 1226 if the
government treated them as subject to discretionary detention since their arrival).
Here, Petitioner was apprehended upon his arrival in the United States in May 2023
and was soon thereafter released on his own recognizance. 	(Doc. 1 ¶ 28; Doc. 9 at 2.)
Petitioner’s release on his own recognizance shows that he was initially detained under
§ 1226(a). See Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is
apparent that the [Immigration and Naturalization Service] used the phrase ‘release on
recognizance’ as another name for ‘conditional parole’ under § 1226(a).”); Martinez v.
Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 215 (D. Mass. 2025) (“Release on recognizance is . . . a form
of ‘conditional parole’ from detention upon a charge of removability, authorized under
section 1226.”). 	Indeed, the Court “has previously held that where a petitioner is
apprehended at the border, paroled into the country, and had been residing in the country
when he was re-detained, his detention is governed by § 1226.” Ayinder v. LaRose, Case
No.: 26-cv-0566-JES-MSB, 2026 WL 296658, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2026) (citations
omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226.
B. 	Due Process
The Due Process Clause prohibits deprivations of life, liberty, and property without
due process of law. 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all
‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. 	To determine
which procedures are constitutionally sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the
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Court applies the three-part test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Court
must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) the
“risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the
Government’s interest including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335.
The Court has granted several habeas petitions filed by similarly situated petitioners.
For example, in Faizyan v. Casey, the Court applied the Mathews test and found that the
respondents’ summary revocation of the petitioner’s “conditional parole without an
opportunity to be heard deprived [him] of his due process rights.” 	Case No.: 3:25-cv-
02884-BM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); accord C.A.R.V. v.
Wofford, Case No. 1:25-CV-01395, JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov.
3, 2025) (finding due process violation where the petitioner was originally released on an
order of release on own recognizance). Here, like in Faizyan, Petitioner was released on
his own recognizance and lived in the United States for about two years before being re-
detained. (Doc. 1 ¶ 28.) The Court thus adopts its reasoning in Faizyan and applies it here.
For those same reasons, ICE’s revocation of Petitioner’s release on his own recognizance
without a pre-deprivation hearing violates his due process rights and renders his detention
unlawful.
C. 	Previous Bond Hearing
The Court finds that immediate release, rather than requiring another bond hearing,
is the appropriate remedy. 	At the July 7, 2025 hearing, the immigration judge ordered
Petitioner released on a $1,500 bond along with Alternatives to Detention at DHS’s
discretion. (Doc. 3 at 33.) As the Court previously reasoned:
Petitioner has been in immigration custody since [the bond hearing], which
means that circumstances have not changed such that the immigration judge’s
finding should be called into question. 	Particularly given Respondents’
“weighty” interest in the “efficient administration of the immigration laws,”
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982), it does not make sense to require
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Respondents to set a new bond hearing before a potentially new immigration
judge just to duplicate the same efforts taken at the [July 7], 2025 hearing.
Nor would this remedy prejudice Respondents. First, they have not contested
the immigration judge’s findings or argued that Petitioner poses a flight risk
or danger to the community. Second, should Respondents wish to make those
arguments, they may do so by appealing the immigration judge’s decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals. 	See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(f), 1003.38(a);
Bui v. Holder, No. 1:15-cv-0-636-JLT, 2015 WL 3903764, at *3 (E.D. Cal.
June 25, 2015).
Ruiz v. Noem, Case No.: 3:25-cv-03536-RBM-BJW, 2025 WL 3719888, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
Dec. 23, 2025). 	The Court incorporates its reasoning in Ruiz here and reaches the same
conclusion.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly:
1. Respondents are 	ORDERED 	to immediately release Petitioner from custody,
subject to a $1,500 bond and the conditions of release set forth in the immigration
judge’s bond memorandum. (See Doc. 3 at 31–33).
2. The TRO Motion (Doc. 3) and Motion for Immediate Release (Doc. 6) are DENIED
as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: February 20, 2026
____________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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