Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MOSAZIG MEDHANI,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-0594-CAB-JLB
ORDER DENYING A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Mosazig Medhani (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	[Doc. No. 1 (“Petition”).] 	Petitioner claims that his
detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) since his order of removal
became final on May 23, 2025 violates Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). [Id. at 3,
8–15.] 	He 	seeks 	immediate 	release 	from 	ICE 	detention 	and 	an 	order 	enjoining
Respondents from removing him to any country other than Eritrea without certain
procedures. 	[Id. at 17–18.] 	For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s
request for a writ of habeas corpus.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is an Eritrean national who crossed the United States border in March
2025. 	[Id. at 3.] 	He was apprehended, placed in ICE custody, and served with a Notice
and Order of Expedited Removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). [Doc. No. 3 at 1.] He was
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given a credible fear interview, which he did not pass. [Petition at 3.] Petitioner appealed
the credible fear decision to an immigration judge, who denied his appeal on May 23, 2025.
[Id.; Doc. No. 3 at 2.] Petitioner’s order of removal became final no later than this date.
[Doc. No. 6 at 1; Doc. No. 7 at 2.] Petitioner has since remained in ICE custody.
According to Respondents, “ICE is seeking to expeditiously remove Petitioner to
Eritrea pursuant to the Order of Expedited Removal,” including twice contacting Eritrean
authorities to effect Petitioner’s removal. [Doc. No. 3 at 2.] Respondents claim that during
this process, “Petitioner refused three times to complete or sign the necessary documents
to request a travel document in October 2025 and February 8, 2026.” [Id.] Respondents
say that this refusal “has significantly delayed efforts to remove Petitioner and has extended
his period of removal.” [Doc. No. 11 at 2.]
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus challenges the legality of a petitioner’s custody and seeks
to secure release from that illegal custody. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a district court may
grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” The petitioner bears the burden of
demonstrating that he is in illegal custody. See Martinez v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2740-BJC-
BJW, 2025 WL 3171738, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents 	challenge 	this 	Court’s 	jurisdiction 	based 	on 	8 	U.S.C.
§§ 1252(a)(2)(A), 1252(e), and 1252(g). [Doc. No. 3 at 3.]
1. 	8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)
As the Supreme Court reasoned in Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.,
§ 1252(g) “applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her
‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders.’” 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (emphasis in original); see also Ibarra-Perez v. United
States, 154 F.4th 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2025) (“The Supreme Court has instructed that we
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should read § 1252(g) narrowly.”). Accordingly, § 1252(g) does not bar the “many other
decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation process[,]” including the decision
“to refuse reconsideration” of the “final order that is the product of the adjudication.” Reno,
525 U.S. at 482. 	Moreover, “[i]t is implausible that the mention of three discrete events
along the road to deportation was a shorthand way of referring to all claims arising from
deportation proceedings.” Id.
Here, the Petition does not contest the decision to commence proceedings, the
adjudication of Petitioner’s removal case, or any action to execute a removal order. Rather,
Petitioner seeks review of the legality of his detention, arguing that the length of time he
has been detained is unlawful. Section 1252(g) does not strip this Court of jurisdiction.
2. 	8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(A) and (e)
Sections 1252(a)(2)(A) and (e) apply to the expedited removal process outlined in
8 U.S.C. § 1225. 	Respondents argue that these provisions strip the Court of jurisdiction
because they limit a district court’s jurisdiction to review an expedited removal order.
[Doc. No. 3 at 3–6.] But the Petitioner here does not challenge his credible fear finding,
ensuing expedited removal order, or any of the processes that led to it. Petitioner’s case is
therefore not like cases the Court has dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to an attack on
“the procedure leading to his order of removal [as] defective.” Vitalii v. LaRose, No. 3:25-
cv-3745-CAB-MSB, 2026 WL 61187, *1 (S.D. Cal. January 8, 2026); see also Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 112 (2020) (“[C]ourts may not review ‘the
determination’ that an alien lacks a credible fear of persecution.”). 	Again, Petitioner
challenges his prolonged detention since his May 2025 final order of removal. 	We
therefore hold—like many other courts—that §§ 1252(a)(2)(A) and (e) do not strip this
Court of jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s claim that his continued detention violates
8 U.S.C. § 1231 and Zadvydas. 	E.g., Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1164 (S.D.
Cal. 2025); Cong v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3730-GPC-DEB, 2026 WL 76566, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
Jan. 9, 2026). Further, Petitioner challenges his post-final removal order detention under
§ 1231 and Zadvydas and not his removal order under § 1225(b)(1), which is what
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§ 1252(a)(2)(A) and (e) pertain to. 	Accordingly, the Court is satisfied of its jurisdiction
and proceeds to the merits.
B. 	Merits
Petitioner argues that his prolonged detention following a final order of removal—
to date almost ten months—violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and Zadvydas. 	[Petition at 9.]
Surprisingly, Respondents do not even mention § 1231 or Zadvydas in their response.
Instead, they counter that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), has no rights beyond those afforded by statute, and therefore
cannot state a due process claim with respect to continued detention. [Doc. No. 3 at 8–9.]
Following supplemental briefing, it is clear to the Court that Petitioner has been
subject to a final order of removal for at least 10 months of detention. 	[Doc. Nos. 6, 7.]
What would otherwise be a relatively straightforward Zadvydas case is complicated,
however, by Respondents’ assertion that Petitioner has refused to sign or complete
documents necessary to obtain a travel document, significantly delaying efforts to remove
Petitioner. [Doc. No. 3 (asserting October 2025 and February 8, 2026 refusals); Doc. No.
11.]
Ordinarily, the INS must remove an alien in its custody within ninety days from the
issuance of a final removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)–(B). But § 1231(a)(1)(C)
provides an exception to this rule:
The removal period shall be extended beyond a period of 90 days and the alien
may remain in detention during such extended period if the alien fails or
refuses to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to the alien’s departure or conspires or acts to prevent the alien’s
removal subject to an order of removal.
Lema v. I.N.S., 341 F.3d 853, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2003).
Petitioner argues that an extension of the removal period is unwarranted under
§ 1231(a)(1)(C) because, as the Ninth Circuit explained in Diouf v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d
1222 (9th Cir. 2008), that provision applies only to “intentionally obstructionist, bad faith
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tactics that are designed to frustrate the government’s attempts to effectuate a removal
order[.]” Id. at 1232.
The problem with Diouf is that the “obstructionist” behavior at issue there was
petitioning the courts for relief from removal, which the Ninth Circuit deemed a “good
faith attempt to make use of legally available judicial review and remedies.” Id. See also
Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are highly skeptical
about the government’s suggestion that an alien’s attempt to seek judicial relief from
deportation constitutes ‘conspiring or acting to prevent his removal.’” (original alterations
removed)). 	Here, Petitioner’s refusal to complete or sign documents “are clearly of a
different nature than an alien’s attempt to make use of legally available judicial review and
remedies.” Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1060 (referring also to Lema, 341 F.3d at 856 (alien
refused to “cooperate fully and honestly with officials to secure travel documents”) and
Pelich v. INS, 329 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003) (alien refused to fill out passport
application)). 	Further, Respondents provided dates documenting Petitioner’s refusals.
[Doc. No. 3 (October 2025 and February 8, 2026).] In such cases, “when an alien refuses
to cooperate fully and honestly with officials to secure travel documents from a foreign
government, the alien cannot meet his or her burden [pursuant to Zadvydas] to show there
is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 	Lema, 341
F.3d at 856.
The Court thus finds that Petitioner’s continued detention does not violate 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231 or Zadvydas and so DENIES the request for a writ of habeas corpus.
C. 	Third Country Removal Claim
Petitioner claims that ICE must provide adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard before removing him to a country other than Eritrea (“third country”). [Petition at
13–17.] 	But there is no evidence before the Court that Respondents intend to remove
Petitioner to a third country or that if a third country is identified, Respondents will
contravene Ninth Circuit precedent requiring Petitioner to be notified that he may apply
for appropriate relief, including withholding of removal to that third country. 	See, e.g.,
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Andriasian v. I.N.S., 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Failing to notify individuals
who are subject to deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum in the United
States and for withholding of deportation to the country to which they will be deported
violates both INS regulations and the constitutional right to due process.”). 	It is thus
premature on the current record for this Court to order injunctive relief related to
Petitioner’s potential future removal to an unidentified third country. The Court DENIES
Petitioner’s request for relief on this issue.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the request for a writ of habeas corpus.
The Court also DENIES Petitioner’s request to enjoin Respondents with respect to third
country removal. The Clerk of the Court shall close the case.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 24, 2026
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