Tumasov v. Doe 1 et al

1
26cv590-LL-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ROLAND TUMASOV,
Petitioner,
v.
DOE 1; et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26cv590-LL-DEB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND DENYING AS MOOT
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
[ECF Nos. 1, 2]
Before the Court are Petitioner Roland Tumasov’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”)] and Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order [ECF No. 2 (“TRO”)]. Also before the Court are Respondents’ Return
in Opposition to the Petition [ECF No. 5 (“Ret.”)], and Petitioner’s Traverse [ECF No. 6
(“Traverse”)]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, DENIES AS MOOT the Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order, and ORDERS Petitioner be immediately released from custody.
/ / /
/ / /
Case 3:26-cv-00590-LL-DEB Document 7 Filed 02/18/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 7

2
26cv590-LL-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a citizen of Armenia, entered the United States on October 3, 2024 and
was taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody. Pet. ¶¶ 15–16;
ECF No. 5-1, Declaration of Leticia Rodriguez (“Rodriguez Decl.”) ¶ 3. In Armenia,
Petitioner was beaten and threatened with death by his employer and his employer’s
bodyguards. Pet. ¶ 15. On October 24, 2024, Petitioner received a positive finding at his
credible fear interview. Pet. ¶ 17; Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 3. On November 5, 2024, Petitioner
was served with a Notice to Appear, which charged inadmissibility under Immigration and
Nationality Act §§ 212(a)(6)(C)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 4; ECF No.
5-2. On September 26, 2025, an immigration judge issued an order denying Petitioner’s
application 	for 	asylum, 	granting 	withholding 	of 	removal 	to 	Armenia 	pursuant 	to
Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3), and ordering removal. Pet. ¶ 21; Rodriguez
Decl. ¶ 5. Petitioner reserved appeal on the September 26, 2025 decision, and the removal
order became final on October 27, 2025. Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 6.
According to Respondents, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) San
Diego Office is currently working with ERO Removal and International Operations
Headquarters (HQ-RIO) in Washington, D.C., and the Department of State (“DOS”) to
identify a third country that will accept Petitioner. Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 8. On January 30,
2026, ICE ERO followed up with HQ-RIO but provided no update. Id. ¶ 10.
Petitioner has been detained since October 3, 2024. Pet. ¶ 9. Petitioner alleges that
his prolonged detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Pet. ¶¶ 28–37. Petitioner’s Petition and Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order both seek a writ of habeas corpus directing Respondents to,
inter alia, release him from custody or alternatively, a bond hearing. Pet. at 12; TRO at 9.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl.
2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
Case 3:26-cv-00590-LL-DEB Document 7 Filed 02/18/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 7

3
26cv590-LL-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of
habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he is “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally,
“the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive
detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” Hamdi, 542
U.S. at 536 (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)). Accordingly, challenges
to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court’s habeas
jurisdiction. 	Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) (“Section 2441 habeas
proceedings are available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-
removal-period detention.”); see also Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759 (9th Cir.
2020) (“[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas
challenges to immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits of [a]
removal order.”).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner 	alleges 	that 	his 	prolonged 	detention 	violates 	Zadvydas.
Pet. ¶¶ 30–37. Respondents argue that Petitioner’s detention is lawful and that he has not
established that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future. Ret. at 4–8.
A. Zadvydas
“Section 241(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a), authorizes the detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed from
the United States.” Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 575 (2022). Under this
statute, a noncitizen ordered 	removed must 	be detained 	for 90 	days 	pending the
government’s efforts to secure the noncitizen’s removal through negotiations with foreign
governments. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). Section 1231(a)(6) “authorizes further detention
if the Government fails to remove the [noncitizen] during those 90 days.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 682. The statute, however, is limited to “a period reasonably necessary to bring
Case 3:26-cv-00590-LL-DEB Document 7 Filed 02/18/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 7

4
26cv590-LL-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
about [the noncitizen’s] removal from the United States” and “does not permit indefinite
detention.” Id. at 689.
Petitioner contends that his detention is not authorized by statute and due process
because the 90-day removal period has expired and he has sufficiently demonstrated there
is no significant likelihood that he will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Pet. ¶¶ 28–37.
1. Rebuttable Presumption
Respondents 	argue 	that 	“Petitioner’s 	case 	is 	premature 	as 	the 	six-month
presumptively reasonable removal period has not lapsed.” Ret. at 5. Petitioner responds
that he may challenge his continued detention as unconstitutional because the 90-day
statutory removal period has expired and the six-month presumption is not a prohibition
on claims challenging detention less than six months. (Traverse at 2–4.)
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court recognized a six-month presumptively reasonable
period of detention after a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final. 533 U.S. at 701.
“After this 6-month period, once the [noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that there
is 	no 	significant 	likelihood 	of 	removal 	in 	the 	reasonably 	foreseeable 	future, 	the
Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. The
Supreme Court later clarified its holding in Zadvydas and explained that:
Zadvydas did not hold that the statute authorizes detention until
it approaches constitutional limits; it held that, since interpreting
the 	statute 	to 	authorize 	indefinite 	detention 	(one 	plausible
reading) would approach constitutional limits, the statute should
be read (in line with the other plausible reading) to authorize
detention only for 	a period consistent with the purpose of
effectuating removal.... If [it] were, as the Government seems to
believe, free to ‘interpret’ statutes as becoming inoperative when
they ‘approach constitutional limits,’ [the Supreme Court] would
be able to spare [itself] the necessity of ever finding a statute
unconstitutional as applied.
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 384 (2005) (emphasis added).
Case 3:26-cv-00590-LL-DEB Document 7 Filed 02/18/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
4 of 7

5
26cv590-LL-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Multiple district courts have found that the six-month presumption in Zadvydas is
rebuttable. See Trinh v. Homan, 466 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“At no point
did the Zadvydas Court preclude a noncitizen from challenging their detention before the
end of the presumptively reasonable six-month period.”); Hoang Trinh v. Homan, 333 F.
Supp. 3d 984, 994 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (“The Supreme Court in Zadvydas outlined a ‘guide’
for approaching these detention challenges . . . not a prohibition on claims challenging
detention less than six months.”) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700–01); Uzzhina v.
Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01594-DAD-SCR, 2025 WL 3458787, at *3 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2,
2025) (“The fact that a noncitizen has been held in-custody less than six months does not
foreclose a claim that his or her detention is unlawful under Zadvydas.”); Medina v. Noem,
794 F. Supp. 3d 365, 375 (D. Md. 2025) (noting that “what Zadvydas did make clear was
that it was adopting a presumption—not a conclusive bar to adjudication of whether
continued detention is authorized that lifts only after six months have elapsed”); Ali v.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 451 F. Supp. 3d 703, 707 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (“This six-month
presumption is not a bright line, however, and Zadvydas did not automatically authorize
all detention until it reaches constitutional limits.”). In contrast, if we follow Respondents’
proposed interpretation, “the Government would be permitted to detain noncitizens ordered
removed for up to six months even when their removal is impossible.” Zavvar v. Scott, No.
CV 25-2104-TDC, 2025 WL 2592543, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 8, 2025).
The Court agrees with these courts’ reasoning and finds the six-month presumption
in Zadvydas is rebuttable and therefore does not foreclose claims challenging detention less
than six months. See Clark, 543 U.S. at 387 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he 6-month
presumption ... in Zadvydas ..., is just that—a presumption.”). Here, Petitioner’s removal
order became administratively final on October 27, 2025. Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 6. Therefore,
Petitioner’s 90-day post-removal period has passed, and if Petitioner can demonstrate that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, Petitioner
is eligible for release under supervision.
/ / /
Case 3:26-cv-00590-LL-DEB Document 7 Filed 02/18/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
5 of 7

6
26cv590-LL-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2. Significant Likelihood of Removal
Petitioner argues that he has satisfied his burden of showing there is good reason to
believe that removal is not significantly likely, and the Court agrees.
The Supreme Court set the “presumptively reasonable period of detention” under 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) at six months. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. After the six-month period,
a petitioner is entitled to release if he “provides good reason to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future” and the government
is unable to rebut that showing. Id. (emphasis added).
Here, Petitioner cannot be removed to Armenia, which is his country of birth and
citizenship, as well as the country designated during his removal proceedings, because he
was granted withholding of removal to Armenia. Pet. ¶ 21; Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 5; Ret. at 4.
Respondents also agree they do not plan on doing so. Ret. at 3 (“ICE is not attempting to
remove Petitioner to Armenia.”) Thus, as Respondents concede, “there appears to be no
other country that would meet the definitions under subsection (i) through (vi)” of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(2)(E). Ret. at 4; Traverse at 4–5.
The Court is also not persuaded by Respondents’ argument that ICE ERO is
“working diligently” to identify “countries that may be willing to accept Petitioner for
removal.” Ret. at 6. It has been over three months since Petitioner’s removal order became
final, and ICE has not yet identified any country that would accept Petitioner. See
Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding the petitioner
sufficiently 	established 	no 	significant 	likelihood 	of 	his 	removal 	in 	the 	reasonably
foreseeable future based on his grant of asylum and CAT protection because “the
government [was] not entitled to remove him to Sri Lanka, and no other country has been
identified to which he might be removed.”) They have not provided any details as to their
efforts to identify countries that “may be willing” to accept Petitioner, other than that their
last follow-up was on January 30, 2026. Therefore, Respondents failed to rebut Petitioner’s
claim that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
See e.g., Ndandu v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-02939-RBM-MSB, 2026 WL 25848, at *4 (S.D.
Case 3:26-cv-00590-LL-DEB Document 7 Filed 02/18/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
6 of 7

7
26cv590-LL-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Cal. Jan. 5, 2026) (granting habeas to a petitioner who was detained for less than six months
because he could not be moved to his country of origin, removals to third countries are
historically rare, and Mexico, the only country ICE identified, declined to accept him).
Thus, Petitioner’s detention is no longer reasonable or authorized by statute.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS1 Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, DENIES AS MOOT the Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order, and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from
detention, under appropriate conditions of supervised release. As this concludes the
litigation in this case, the Clerk of Court SHALL close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 18, 2026
1 In his prayer for relief, Petitioner requests attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal
Access to Justice Act, which the Court DENIES without prejudice. Pet. at 12.
Case 3:26-cv-00590-LL-DEB Document 7 Filed 02/18/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
7 of 7