Maceo Aguilera v. The City of Holtville, CA et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
NAYADE MACEO AGUILERA,
Petitioner,
v.
THE CITY OF HOLTVILLE, CA, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26cv532-LL-MSB
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS
[ECF No. 3]
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Nayade Maceo Aguilera’s Amended Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 3 (hereinafter “Pet.”).
Also before the Court is Respondents’ Response to Petition (“Response,” ECF No. 6) and
Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 7). For the reasons set forth below, the Court
GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a citizen of Cuba, was paroled into the United States through the San
Ysidro Port of Entry on December 23, 2024, with her parole continuing through December
21, 2026. Id. ¶¶ 21, 22. Petitioner states that she was arrested on July 29, 2025, during an
apparently routine traffic stop, and taken into immigration custody at the Imperial Regional
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Detention Facility where she has now been held for more than five months. Pet. ¶¶ 23.
Petitioner states that she did not receive any notice of termination of her parole status, nor
was she provided with notice that her parole would be terminated, or the opportunity for a
hearing on whether she is a danger or a flight risk. Id. ¶ 28. Petitioner states that she has
lived in the United States with the expectation that she would not be subject to re-detention
if she did not violate the law. Id. ¶ 25. She is seeking several forms of relief before the
immigration court, including adjustment of status and a pending application for asylum and
for withholding of removal. Id. ¶ 26. Although Petitioner does not have family in the United
States, she has significant ties through close friendships and a long-term relationship with
her boyfriend, who is a lawful permanent resident. Id. ¶ 27. She has also been steadily
employed, having worked for two different cleaning companies while in the U.S. Id. In
sum, she states that she has “demonstrate[ed] her willingness and ability to support herself
lawfully and contribute to her community.” Id. Petitioner argues in the instant Petition that
her detention without notice or an opportunity to be heard violates the Parole Statute at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) and the related parole regulations, and the Due Process Clause. Id.
¶¶ 47-67.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
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138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (citations omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Due Process
Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of her parole without notice or a
hearing violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. ¶¶ 56-67. The Court agrees.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 	Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the
State deprives a person of liberty or property.” 	Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127
(1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose
liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-5632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July
25, 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual
may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to release an
individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely,
that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of
release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). “Thus, even when
ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings,
after that individual is released from custody [he] has a protected liberty interest in
remaining out of custody.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, No.
22-cv-20508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
Respondents in their Response acknowledge that in light of Maldonado Bautista,
Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is entitled to a bond hearing. See
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Response at 2. However, the Court finds that the relief Petitioner is entitled to is not limited
to a bond hearing. Petitioner was paroled into the United States, and at that time was
determined to not be a danger to the community or a flight risk and was released. Pet. ¶
22. Petitioner has complied with all conditions of her release and has been a law-abiding
citizen. Id. ¶ 4. Petitioner has been steadily employed and developed community ties and
is in a relationship with a lawful permanent resident. Id. ¶ 27. Accordingly, Petitioner has
a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. 	See, e.g., Pinchi, 2025 WL
2084921, at *4 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension
reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger
to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she
no longer meets those criteria.”); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 (“Petitioner is not an
‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our country for over a year. This
substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due
process before removal.”); Matute v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-1206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL
2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty interest
in his release).
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before she can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally
sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors.
See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Id.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the government’s
revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be
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heard, denied Petitioner of her due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has
a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to her parole. “Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in remaining with her community, working, getting
the appropriate medical care that she needs for her and continuing the process of seeking
asylum. 	See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of his parole, he
can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other
enduring attachments of normal life.”).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
parole was revoked without providing her a reason for revocation or giving her an
opportunity to be heard. 	Pet. ¶¶ 23, 28. 	Since the initial determination that Petitioner
should be paroled because she posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk,
there is no evidence that these findings have changed. 	See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F.
Supp. 3d 1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the
government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”).
Petitioner has no criminal record, has not been arrested or otherwise in criminal trouble,
has an established community, and is working towards asylum status. Pet. ¶¶ 4, 27. “Once
a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely
because he is subject to removal proceedings.” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1760. “Rather,
the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed circumstances—
namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk. . . .”
Id.
Respondents, failing to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their response,
do not point to any material circumstances that have changed that would warrant
reconsideration of her parole. 	See generally Response. 	“Where, as here, ‘the petitioner
has not received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
liberty is high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to
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determine whether there is any valid basis for [his] detention.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921,
at *5 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1918679, at
*7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025)).
Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Matute, 2025 WL 2817795,
at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the
government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail
to point to any burdens on the government if it were to have provided proper notice,
reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Response
Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking her parole in
violation of the Due Process Clause, her detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v.
Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. at 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025)
(granting a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole
without a pre-deprivation hearing); Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (granting
a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her
preexisting parole on due process grounds).1
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 3), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release
Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of her preexisting parole. 	The Court
ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the
reasons for revocation of her parole and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to
determine whether detention is warranted. 	The government shall bear the burden of
1 The Court need not address Petitioner’s remaining claims because the Petition can be
resolved on due process grounds.
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establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the
community or a risk of flight.2
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 11, 2026
2 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, at *8; Pinchi, 2025
WL 2084921, at *5; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez
v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).
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