Velasquez-Cordova v. Lyons et al

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26-cv-417-JO-DEB
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MARLON JOEL VELASQUEZ-
CORDOVA,
Petitioner,
v.
TODD LYONS, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-417-JO-DEB
ORDER GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS [DKT. 1]
Petitioner Marlon Joel Velasquez-Cordova filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Dkt. 1. The Court held oral argument on February 9, 2026. For the reasons stated on the
record, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s habeas petition [Dkt. 1]. 	Respondents are
ORDERED to release Petitioner by 5 p.m. on February 10, 2025 and file an affidavit
attesting to Petitioner’s release by 5 p.m. on February 11, 2025.
The 	Court 	finds 	that 	it 	has 	jurisdiction 	to 	review 	Petitioner’s 	constitutional
challenges to his detention for the same reasons stated in its prior decision in Pacheco v.
LaRose, No. 3:25-CV-2421-JO-AHG, 2026 WL 242300, *2–*3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2026).
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The Court has also considered whether additional relief, aside from ordering release,
is appropriate in this case. While habeas relief commonly includes reprieve from physical
imprisonment, “release need not be the exclusive remedy.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 779–80 (2008) (“depending on the circumstances, more [relief] may be required”).
Habeas orders also extend to defining the parameters of a petitioner's freedom when needed
to provide complete relief from unlawful detention. 	See Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d
1105, 	1117 	(9th 	Cir. 	2010) 	(holding 	that 	petitioner's 	release—revocable 	at 	the
government's discretion—did not provide complete relief where petitioner sought a legal
ruling that he could only be redetained upon a bond hearing); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S.
371, 376 n.3, 125 S.Ct. 716, 160 L.Ed.2d 734 (2005) (despite release, petitioner's habeas
claim challenging the statutory authority for his detention “continue[d] to present a live
case or controversy” because the court could provide relief to prevent redetention on the
same allegedly unlawful basis). 	As discussed at the hearing, the government granted
Petitioner a protectable liberty interest that persists as long as (1) he complies with his
release conditions and (2) there are no material changes that render him a flight risk or
danger to the community. Despite its previous grant of liberty, the government detained
Petitioner without notice or any consideration of his release status and the liberty interest
that it created. And despite myriad court orders like this one, the government continues to
assert its § 1225 authority to detain countless noncitizens and subject them to the same
wrongful deprivation of their liberty interests.1 Consequently, Petitioner remains exposed
1 	See, e.g., Lopez v. Warden, Otay Mesa Det. Ctr., No. 25-CV-2527-RSH-SBC, 2025 WL
3005346 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); Beltran v. Noem, No. 25CV2650-LL-DEB, 2025 WL 3078837 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 4, 2025); Calel v. LaRose, No. 3:25-CV-02883-GPC-JLB, 2025 WL 3171898 (S.D. Cal. Nov.
13, 2025); Faizyan v. Casey, No. 3:25-CV-02884-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17,
2025); Sanchez v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3068 JLS (MMP), 2025 WL 3214987 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2025);
Ruiz v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-02714-BAS-SBC, 2025 WL 3214975 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2025). The
government has continued this practice even after Bautista v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM,
2025 WL 3678485, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), which declared as unlawful the DHS policy of
classifying noncitizens arrested in the United States as subject to § 1225(b)(2). To this day, the
government continues to mandatorily detain these noncitizens pursuant to its purported § 1225 authority.
See, e.g., Azizi v. LaRose, et al., No. 26-cv-0049-JO-BJW, Dkt. 1 (Habeas Pet.) (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026);
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to immediate redetention and a repetition of the same harm he has just endured, even after
this Court's release order. 	The Court therefore concludes that specific injunctive relief
prohibiting further detention based on this wrongful assertion of statutory authority is
necessary and ORDERS as follows:
1. Respondents are ENJOINED from redetaining Petitioner without a pre-
deprivation hearing before an immigration judge, at which the Government
bears 	the 	burden 	of 	proving 	by 	clear 	and 	convincing 	evidence 	that
circumstances have materially changed, rendering Petitioner a danger to the
community or a flight risk.2 See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1996, 1203 (9th
Cir. 2011). 	The immigration judge must consider Petitioner’s financial
circumstances and alternatives to bond as necessary in setting conditions of
release. See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017).
2. Respondents shall file a declaration attesting to full compliance with these
obligations. 	Respondents are ENJOINED from redetaining Petitioner until
48 hours after filing the declaration.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 9, 2026
Dkt. 5 (Reply to Habeas Pet.) (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2026) (government acknowledging that petitioner was
detained on December 31, 2025—after the Bautista decision—under its § 1225 authority).
2 	While § 1226 allows the government to hold a noncitizen in custody while it decides whether to
initially grant release, a pre-deprivation hearing is the more appropriate remedy for individuals like
Petitioner who already enjoy a liberty interest. In order to prevent an erroneous deprivation of that
existing liberty interest and therefore satisfy due process requirements, this hearing must take place
prior to any detention. Other courts in this circuit have likewise found that enjoining further detention
without first providing a bond hearing is necessary to justify any continued deprivation of a petitioner’s
liberty interest. See, e.g., Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, at *12
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025); Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, 801 F. Supp. 3d 919, 938 (N.D. Cal. 2025); O.G.
v. Albarran, No. 1:26-CV-00010-TLN-DMC, 2026 WL 19105, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2026).
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