(HC) A. v. Noem, et al

3:26-cv-00397Casd10 de fev. de 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
A.A.,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-00397-RBM-AHG
ORDER:
(1) GRANTING AMENDED
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS [Doc. 17]; AND
(2) DENYING MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AS MOOT [Docs. 2, 18]
Pending before the Court are Petitioner A.A.’s (“Petitioner”) Amended Verified
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Amended Petition”) pursuant to § 2241 (Doc. 17) and
Amended Ex Parte Emergency Application For Temporary Restraining Order and Order
to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction(“Amended TRO Motion”) (Doc. 18).
For the reasons set forth below, the Amended Petition (Doc. 17) is GRANTED, and
the Amended TRO Motion (Doc. 18) is DENIED AS MOOT.
//
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I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, entered the United States without inspection
on August 2, 2024. (Doc. 17 ¶ 19.)1 Shortly thereafter, Petitioner was detained by United
States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) and released on his own recognizance. (Id.)
Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear charging him as a noncitizen present in the United
States without admission or parole. (Id. (citing Doc. 17-1 at 2).) Petitioner subsequently
filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal, which remains pending. (Id.
¶ 20.) Petitioner was also granted an Employment Authorization Document (“EAD”) that
was valid for five years. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 20, 45; see Doc. 17-2 at 2.)
On December 23, 2025, Petitioner was arrested and re-detained at a scheduled
check-in appointment at the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s
(“ICE”) office. (Id. ¶ 23.) “Petitioner was provided no notice or opportunity to be heard
regarding his re-detention.” 	(Id. ¶¶ 24, 45.) 	Petitioner has no criminal record and has
“complied with ICE check in requirements.” (Id. ¶¶ 22, 45.)
B. 	Procedural Background
Petitioner initially commenced this action in the United States District Court, Eastern
District of California by filing a Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”)
pursuant to § 2241 (Doc. 1), an Ex Parte Emergency Application For Temporary
Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction (“TRO Motion”)
(Doc. 2), and a Motion to Proceed with Pseudonym (“Pseudonym Motion”) (Doc. 3). That
same day, the Honorable Judge Dale A. Drozd of the Eastern District of California ordered
Respondents to file a written opposition to the TRO Motion and Pseudonym Motion. (Doc.
4.) 	On January 19, 2026, Judge Drozd: (1) granted the Pseudonym Motion in part; (2)
converted the TRO Motion into a motion for preliminary injunction based on Respondents’
1 The Court cites the paragraph numbers of the Amended Petition and the CM/ECF
electronic pagination for other citations unless otherwise noted.
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non-opposition; and (3) granted the preliminary injunction in part. (Doc. 11.) Judge Drozd
then ordered Respondents “to immediately release [P]etitioner from [R]espondents’
custody on the same conditions he was subject to immediately prior to his December 23,
2025, re-detention,” and “ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED [Respondents] from re-
detaining [P]etitioner for any purpose, absent exigent circumstances, without providing
[P]etitioner notice and a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge where
[R]espondents will have the burden to demonstrate a change in circumstances justifying
[P]etitioner’s re-detention.” (Id.)
On January 19, 2026, Respondents requested the Petition be dismissed or transferred
because “it was discovered that” Petitioner had been detained at the Otay Mesa Detention
Center since his initial detention on December 24, 2025 and “was never within the physical
jurisdiction of the Eastern District of California.” (Doc. 12 at 1.) Petitioner filed a Motion
to Transfer shortly thereafter. 	(Doc. 13.) 	On January 21, 2026, Judge Drozd granted
Petitioner’s Motion to Transfer and vacated his prior order issued on January 19, 2026.
(Doc. 14.) The action was transferred to this District that same day. (Doc. 15.)
On January 23, 2026, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition (Doc. 17), an Amended
TRO Motion (Doc. 18), and an Amended Pseudonym Motion (Doc. 19). Petitioner asserts
that the only amendments made were to correct the caption (see Doc. 18 at 1 n.1) and to
“reflect the correct detention facility/warden and venue” in the Petition (Doc. 17 ¶ 1.) On
February 5, 2026, this Court granted in part and denied in part the Amended Pseudonym
Motion. (Doc. 22.) The Court also ordered the Parties to file “any supplemental briefing
necessary to this Court’s determination of the issues raised in the Petition” or “a statement
indicating that they wish to submit the Petition on their currently-filed briefs.” (Id. at 2.)
The Parties subsequently filed a Joint Statement informing the Court that “they have agreed
to rest on the previously filed submissions in this matter.” 	(Doc. 23 at 1.) 	Accordingly,
the Court considers the Parties’ arguments and evidence on record in resolving the instant
Amended Petition.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that his ongoing detention violates the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”). 	(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 48–67; Doc. 17 ¶¶ 48–67.) 	Respondents recognize
that “courts nationwide have rejected the Department of Homeland Security’s (‘DHS’) July
2025 Policy (‘July Policy’)” but nonetheless maintain that the July Policy is correct and
lawful. (Doc. 8 at 2 (citing Doc. 4 at 3–4).) However, Respondents did not further explain
the basis for its position that Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or
address Petitioner’s due process claim. (See id.)
This Court has granted several habeas petitions filed by similarly situated petitioners
who were re-detained several years after having been released pursuant to an Order of
Release on Own Recognizance. 	In Faizyan v. Casey, the Court held a similarly situated
petitioner was detained pursuant to Respondents’ discretionary authority under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226 because his Order of Release on Recognizance was issued pursuant to § 1226 and
he was not “seeking admission” at the time of his re-detention. Case No.: 3:25-cv-02884-
RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, at *5–6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); see Ortega-Cervantes
v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is apparent that the INS used the
phrase ‘release on recognizance’ as another name for ‘conditional parole’ under §
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1226(a).”); J.S.H.M v. Wofford, Case No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2938808,
at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025) (recognizing that the term “released on their own
recognizance” typically refers to conditional parole). 	The Court then applied the due
process inquiry in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) and found that Respondents’
summary revocation of the petitioner’s “conditional parole without an opportunity to be
heard deprived [him] of his due process rights.” Faizyan, 2025 WL 3208844, at *6–7; see
Xie v. LaRose, Case No.: 3:25-cv-03649-RBM-MSB, 2026 WL 92066, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
Jan. 13, 2026).
In this case, Petitioner was released on his own recognizance and lived in the United
States for about a year and a half before he was re-detained while attending a required ICE
check-in. 	(See Doc. 17 ¶¶ 23, 45.) 	Petitioner also alleges that he was re-detained
“[w]ithout any notice or process or any change in facts of circumstances.” (Id. ¶ 45.) The
Court therefore adopts its reasoning in Faizyan and applies it here.
For those same reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) and is therefore also a member of the Bond Eligible Class certified in Bautista
v. Santacruz, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025).
Moreover, like in Faizyan, Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner’s release without
an opportunity to be heard deprived Petitioner of his due process rights. “As ICE was not
authorized to release [Petitioner] if [he] was a danger to the community or a flight risk, the
Court must infer from [the] release that ICE determined [he] was neither.” Pinchi, 792 F.
Supp. 3d at 1034. 	Petitioner also alleges that he complied with his ICE check-in
requirements, and was in fact arrested while appearing for such a check-in, and that he was
not provided notice or an opportunity to be heard as to the reasons for the revocation of his
release. (See Doc. 17 ¶ 45.) Respondents provide no evidence that Petitioner was afforded
any notice or opportunity to be heard regarding the reasons for the revocation of his release.
(See generally 	Doc. 8.) 	Accordingly, ICE’s revocation of Petitioner’s release on
recognizance without a pre-deprivation or bond hearing violated his due process rights and
rendered his detention unlawful. 	See Faizyan, 2025 WL 3208844, at *6–7; C.A.R.V. v.
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Wofford, Case No. 1:25-CV-01395 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3,
2025) (finding due process violation where the petitioner was originally released on an
order of release on recognizance); Leiva Flores v. Albarran, Case No. 25- cv-09302-AMO,
2025 WL 3228306, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2025) (finding the same and requiring a
hearing before detention). The Amended Petition is therefore GRANTED. 2
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Amended Petition (Doc. 17) is GRANTED.
Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to
the same conditions he was subject to immediately prior to his detention on December 23,
2025.
1. The Court ORDERS that, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, Petitioner shall
receive notice and a hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) to determine whether detention is warranted. Respondents shall bear the
burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a
danger to the community or a risk of flight. 3
2. The Petition (Doc. 1), the TRO Motion (Doc. 2), and the Amended TRO Motion
(Doc. 18) are DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: February 10, 2026
____________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 In light of the disposition herein, the Court declines to address the Petition’s remaining
grounds for relief.
3 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See E.A. T.-B v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp.
3d 1316,1324 (W.D. Wash. 2025); Duong v. Kaiser, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2689266,
at *7–10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2025); Lepe v. Andrews, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL
2716910, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025).
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