Guzman-Guzman v. Casey et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JOSE MAURICIO GUZMAN-
GUZMAN,
Petitioner,
v.
JEREMY CASEY, Facility
Administrator, Imperial Regional
Detention Center; DANIEL A.
BRIGHTMAN, San Diego Field Office
Director, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and Removal Operations
("ICE/ERO"); TODD M. LYONS, Acting
Director of Immigration Customs
Enforcement ("ICE"); U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI
NOEM, Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS"); U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; and
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of
the United States,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-0221-GPC-JLB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
[ECF No. 1]
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Before the Court is Petitioner Jose Mauricio Guzman-Guzman’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. ECF No. 1. For the reasons outlined below, the petition is GRANTED
and Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner from custody IMMEDIATELY.
BACKGROUND
On January 14, 2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. The Court ordered issued a scheduling order requiring
Respondent to respond in opposition to the petition by January 20, 2026. ECF No. 2.
Respondents did not file an opposition by this deadline but filed an untimely response on
January 22, 2026. ECF No. 5.
Petitioner is a forty-two-year-old El Salvadorian citizen currently detained at
Imperial Regional Detention Center in El Centro, California. ECF No. 1, ¶ 1. He has been
in the United States since 2004. Id. His wife, children, and stepchildren are all United States
Citizens. Id.
Petitioner was detained by Respondents upon entering the United States in 2004. Id.
At that time, Petitioner was released on his own recognizance and Respondents initiated
full removal proceedings against Petitioner. Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
Petitioner was again detained by Respondents in April 2018. Id. ¶ 6. However, after
nearly one month in detention, Petitioner was released on $7,500 bond. Id. ¶ 8. In 2020,
Petitioner filed an application for cancellation of his removal proceedings and adjustment
of status. Id. ¶ 10. His application remains pending.
On November 15, 2025, Petitioner was arrested and detained by ICE while on his
way to work. Id. ¶ 39. Petitioner was given no explanation, and there has been no material
change in his individual circumstances or conditions of his bond. Id. ¶¶ 11, 40.
Petitioner now files this writ of habeas corpus alleging that his detention violates the
Administrative Procedure Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. ¶
42-58.
LEGAL STANDARD
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I. Section 2241 Habeas Corpus
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a writ of habeas corpus may be granted to any petitioner
who demonstrates that she is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004).
The writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004).
As explained by the Supreme Court, “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a
person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973); Pinson v. Carvajal, 69 F.4th 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2023) (habeas actions limited to
challenges of the legality or duration of confinement). A petitioner bears the burden of
demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” See Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009).
ANALYSIS
Petitioner argues that his re-detention without cause violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. The Court agrees.
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, no person shall be “deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. Indeed,
“[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause
protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Due process rights apply to
noncitizens, including those whose presence in the United States is unlawful. Id. at 693.
As applied to cases like Petitioner’s: “even when ICE has the initial discretion to
detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released
from custody [he] has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi v.
Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025). See also Doe v. Becerra, No. 2:25-
CV-00647-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 691664, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025); Padilla v. U.S.
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Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023); Ortiz Donis v.
Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-01228-JLT-SAB, 2025 WL 2879514, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9,
2025). In fact, the government’s initial release of an individual from custody “creates an
‘implicit promise’ that the individual’s liberty will be revoked only if they fail to abide by
the conditions of their release.” Calderon v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06695-AMO, 2025 WL
2430609, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2025) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482
(1972)). An initial release from ICE custody further reflects “a determination by the
government that [an individual is] neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.”
Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034; Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC
(EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). Thus, DHS may generally not
re-arrest a previously released noncitizen “absent a change in circumstances.” Salcedo
Aceros 2025 WL 2637503, at *1 (citing Panosyan v. Mayorkas, 854 F. App'x 787, 788 (9th
Cir. 2021); Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2017)).
Here, because Petitioner was detained and then released from DHS custody on bond,
he maintained a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. The Court must next
determine “what process is due.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481.
“The constitution typically ‘requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives
a person or liberty or property.’” G.S. v. Bostock, No. 2:25-CV-01255-JNW-TLF, 2025
WL 3014274 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 8, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub
nom. G.S. v. Bostock, No. 2:25-CV-01255-JNW-TLF, 2025 WL 3014035 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 28, 2025) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990)). To determine what
procedures are required by due process, the Court evaluates the three-part test set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-335 (1976). See Ortiz Donnis, 2025 WL 2879514,
at *12. Under Mathews, a court must consider (1) “the private interest” at stake, (2) “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation” without additional procedures and “the probable value .
. . of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) the “Government’s interest,
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including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens imposed by the
additional procedures.” 424 U.S. at 335.
As to the first Mathews factor, Petitioner has a significant private interest in his
continued liberty. Thus, this factor favors Petitioner. See Salcedo 2025 WL 2637503, *12;
Ortiz Donis, 2025 WL 2879514, at *12; Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034-35.
Turning to the second Mathews factor, “it is clear that there is a significant risk that
the government will erroneously deprive [Petitioner] of that liberty interest if it does not
provide [him] with a pre-detention hearing.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035. Where, as
here, petitioner has not received any bond or custody hearing upon his re-detention, “‘the
risk for erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high’ because neither the government nor
[Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for [his]
detention.” Id. (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00801, 2025 WL 1918679 (E.D.
Cal. July 11, 2025)). Further, courts have noted that “civil immigration detention must be
‘nonpunitive in purpose’ and bear a ‘reasonable relation’ to the authorized statutory
purposes of preventing flight and danger to the community.” G.S. v. Bostock, 2025 WL
3014274, at *8. By releasing Petitioner on bond in 2018, immigration officers determined
that he was neither a flight risk nor a danger to his community. See id.; Ortiz Donis, 2025
WL 2879514, at *1; Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034. Respondents have not alleged that
there has been a change in circumstance since Petitioner’s 2018 release. Indeed, they have
not responded at all. Thus, the risk of erroneous deprivation is particularly high in
Petitioner’s case, as there is no evidence of changed circumstances or that Petitioner is a
danger or flight risk. Accordingly, this factor also favors Petitioner.
Finally, the Government “has failed to show any countervailing interest against
providing a pre-detention hearing.” G.S. v. Bostock, 2025 WL 3014274, at *9; Salcedo
Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *12. Indeed, “in immigration court, custody hearings are
routine and impose a minimal cost.” Singh, 2025 WL 1918679, at *8 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). There is also no concern that a hearing will delay or obstruct
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Respondents efforts to remove Petitioner, as Petitioner has already been placed in full
removal proceedings. See ECF No. 1, ¶ 3, G.S. v. Bostock, 2025 WL 3014274, at *9;
Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *12. In sum, the Government’s interest in detaining
Petitioner without a hearing is low. Singh, 2025 WL 1918679, at *8.
Each of the Mathews factors favors Petitioner. Thus, Petitioner was entitled to a pre-
deprivation bond hearing. The Government detained Petitioner, without explanation and
without notice, despite its own prior determination that Petitioner was not a flight risk and
posed no danger to the community. “Under these circumstances, given the government’s
conduct, the substantial liberty interests held by [Petitioner], and the fact that the
government has no evidence and does not contend that [Petitioner] presents [a] risk or flight
or to public safety, a pre-deprivation bond hearing is warranted.” Salcedo 2025 WL
2637503, *12. At such a hearing, the government must demonstrate to a neutral
decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that re-detention is necessary to prevent
danger to the community or flight. Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1038; see also Ortiz Donis,
2025 WL 2879514, at *15. Put simply: “since it is the government that initiated re-
detention, it follows that the government should be required to bear the burden of providing
a justification for the re-detention.” Ortiz Donis, 2025 WL 2879514, at *15.1
Immediate release is the appropriate remedy in this case. Respondents, in their
untimely response to the petition, acknowledge that Petitioner is detained subject to 8
U.S.C. § 1226 rather than § 1225, and concede that Petitioner is entitled to an order from
this Court requiring a bond hearing. ECF No. 5, at 2. However, for the reasons discussed
above, a bond hearing is insufficient to cure the due process violations faced by Petitioner.
Respondents have failed to address Petitioner’s due process arguments or acknowledge
1 Having reached this conclusion on Petitioner’s first claim for relief, the Court declines to
decide the merits of Petitioner’s APA claims.
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that Petitioner has been re-detained without cause after being released on bond.
Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded by Respondents’ arguments and instead orders
Petitioner’s release.
CONCLUSION
Based on the reasoning above, the Court ORDERS:
1. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED.
2. Because the government has no evidence that Petitioner poses a flight risk or
danger to the community, Petitioner SHALL be released IMMEDIATELY
from DHS custody. DHS SHALL NOT impose any additional restrictions on
him, such as electronic monitoring, unless that is determined to be necessary at a
later custody hearing.
3. Respondents SHALL NOT re-arrest or re-detain Petitioner absent compliance
with constitutional protections, which include, at a minimum, pre-deprivation
notice of at least seven days before a pre-deprivation hearing at which the
government will bear the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing
evidence that Petitioner is likely to flee or pose a danger to the community if not
detained.2
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 22, 2026
2 In his prayer for relief, Petitioner requests an award of costs and reasonable attorney’s
fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. ECF No. 1, at 13. That request is
DENIED without prejudice. Petitioner’s counsel may submit an appropriate EAJA fee
application within 30 days of the issuance of this Order.
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