Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MUDEER HUSSAIN,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, in his official
capacity as Senior Warden of Otay Mesa
Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-00194-RBM-MSB
ORDER 	GRANTING 	PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Doc. 1]
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Mudeer Hussain’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and Complaint for Administrative
Procedure Act Relief (“Petition”) challenging the lawfulness of his detention by United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Doc. 1.) For the reasons set forth
below, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Pakistan who entered the United States without
inspection on January 5, 2025. 	(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 14–15.)1 That same day, Petitioner was
1 The Court cites the CM/ECF electronic pagination for filings unless otherwise noted.
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determined to be inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and taken into ICE
custody. 	(Doc. 4 at 2.) 	About three months later, on April 15, 2025, the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear, which initiated removal
proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a against him. 	(Doc. 4-1 at 2–3; Doc. 1 ¶ 18.) 	On
September 17, 2025, the immigration judge denied Petitioner’s applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and
ordered Petitioner removed to Pakistan. 	(See Doc. 4-1 at 6–9.) 	Petitioner appealed the
immigration judge’s order, and that appeal is pending. (Doc. 1 ¶ 19.) Because Petitioner’s
immigration proceedings remain pending, he has not received a final order of removal.
(Id. ¶ 21; Doc. 4 at 2.) Petitioner remains detained in Otay Mesa Detention Center today.
(Doc. 1 ¶ 17.)
B. 	Procedural Background
Petitioner filed his Petition on January 13, 2026. (Doc. 1.) The next day, the Court
set a briefing schedule. (Doc. 2.) Respondents filed a Return to Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (“Response”) (Doc. 4) on January 21, 2026, and Petitioner filed a Reply to
Respondents’ Return to Habeas Petition (“Reply”) (Doc. 5) on January 22, 2026.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The Parties agree that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1225(b). 	(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 17, 37; Doc. 4 at 1.) 	Accordingly, the issue before the Court is
whether, under the circumstances of this case, applying the mandatory detention provisions
of § 1225(b) violate Petitioner’s due process rights.2
Petitioner argues that, even though he is mandatorily detained, his “prolonged
detention . . . has not been justified through any constitutionally sufficient procedure, and
. . . statutory mandatory-detention provisions cannot override due process limitations.”
(Doc. 1 ¶ 49.) 	Respondents argue that “section 1225(b)(2) mandates [Petitioner’s]
detention until the [immigration] proceedings have concluded,” and that “even if the Court
infers a constitutional right against prolonged mandatory detention, Petitioner’s claim still
fails.” (Doc. 4 at 5–10.)
The Court agrees with Petitioner that an unreasonably prolonged detention under
§ 1225(b) without a bond hearing violates due process, and that Petitioner’s detention has
become unreasonably prolonged.
A. 	Due Process
Respondents argue that the Supreme Court “addressed the due process rights of
inadmissible arriving noncitizens seeking initial entry into the United States” and “stated
that such individuals have no due process rights ‘other than those afforded by statute.’”
(Doc. 4 at 7 (quoting Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107 (2020).)
“Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Thuraissigiam, some district courts
have adopted Respondents’ reasoning to dismiss or deny habeas petitions in the context of
2 Respondents also argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Petition under
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). The Court has consistently rejected this argument, see Constantinovici
v. Bondi, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2898985, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025), and does
so again here for the same reasons. 	Petitioner “seeks only to compel the government to
honor the statutory and constitutional limits on detention.” 	(Doc. 5 at 5.) 	He is thus
enforcing 	his 	“constitutional 	rights 	to 	due 	process 	in 	the context 	of 	the 	removal
proceedings—not the legitimacy of the removal proceedings or any removal order.”
Garcia v. Noem, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2549431, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025)
(emphasis in original).
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arriving aliens subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(1).” Gao v. LaRose,
— F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2770633, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025); see Mendoza-
Linares v. Garland, Case No.: 21-cv-1169-BEN (AHG), 2024 WL 3316306, at *2 (S.D.
Cal. June 10, 2024) (“Petitioner has no Fifth Amendment right to a bond hearing pending
his removal proceedings.”); St. Charles v. Barr, 514 F. Supp. 3d 570, 579 (W.D.N.Y. 2021)
(same); Petgrave v. Aleman, 529 F. Supp. 3d 665, 667 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (same).
“Most courts have ruled otherwise.” 	Gao, 2025 WL 2770633, at *3 (collecting
cases); accord Abdul-Samed v. Warden of Golden State Annex Det. Facility, Case No. 1:25-
cv-00098-SAB-HC, 2025 WL 2099343, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2025) (“Although the
Ninth Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process requires a bond hearing for
citizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), . . . essentially all district courts that have
considered 	the 	issue 	agree 	that 	prolonged 	mandatory 	detention 	pending 	removal
proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the right to due
process.”); A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F. Supp. 3d 822, 825 (W.D. Pa. 2025) (“Nowhere in
[Thuraissigiam] did the Supreme Court suggest that arriving aliens being held under
§ 1225(b) may be held indefinitely and unreasonably with no due process implications, nor
that such aliens have no due process rights whatsoever.”). 	The Court thus “joins the
majority of courts across the country in concluding that an unreasonably prolonged
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without an individualized bond hearing violates due
process.” Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 772 (S.D. Cal. 2020).
B. 	Prolonged Detention
Although Respondents disagree that the Court should reach this issue, they agree
with Petitioner that, if the Court reaches it, the three-factor balancing test in Lopez v.
Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022), is the proper framework for analyzing
a due process challenge to prolonged detention. 	(Doc. 4 at 8–10; Doc. 5 at 8–10.) 	The
Court notes, however, that the Lopez court analyzed those factors in the § 1226 context.
See Lopez, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 879 (“To determine whether § 1226(c) detention has become
unreasonable . . . .”). 	Therefore, the Court applies the six-factor balancing test used by
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courts analyzing prolonged detention under § 1225(b). 	See Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp. 3d at
773. These factors share significant overlap with the Lopez factors, and the Parties have
adequately briefed them.
Under this test, the Court considers:
(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future
detention; (3) conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings
caused by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the
government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in
a final order of removal.
Gao, 2025 WL 2770633, at *4.
As to the first factor, which has been described as “the most important,” Banda v.
McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2019), Petitioner has been detained
for nearly 13 months. 	(Doc. 4 at 2.) 	Respondents argue that “the length of Petitioner’s
detention falls comparatively short of the length courts in this district have found to warrant
habeas relief.” (Id. at 9 (collecting cases finding detention unreasonably prolonged after
27 to 42 months).) 	As another court in this District noted, though, “[c]ourts have found
detention over seven months without a bond hearing weighs toward a finding that it is
unreasonable.” Abdul Kadir v. Larose, 2025 WL 2932654, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2025)
(collecting cases and finding that a nearly 13-month detention weighed in favor of the
petitioner). Having reviewed these cases, the Court finds that this factor favors Petitioner.
As to the second factor, Petitioner argues that although his merits hearing is
scheduled for March 3, 2026, “there is no guarantee that Petitioner’s removal or release
will follow promptly,” as the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) “has not even set a
briefing schedule yet, and appeals to the BIA typically take several months to over a year
to resolve.” 	(Doc. 5 at 8–9 (citing Executive Office for Immigration Review statistics
indicating a “substantial backlog of administrative appeals”).) Respondents argue that after
the March 3, 2026 hearing, Petitioner’s “path to release or removal should be clear.”
(Doc. 4 at 9.) 	The Court finds that “the undetermined, but likely significant, period of
mandatory detention through the appeals process” weighs in favor of Petitioner. Gao, 2025
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WL 2770633, at *4; accord Abdul Kadir, 2025 WL 2932654, at *5; Masood v. Barr, Case
No. 19-cv-07623-JD, 2020 WL 96533, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2020) (“The BIA appeal
. . . [is a] perfectly legitimate proceeding[] he is legally entitled to pursue,” and the
respondents “cannot predict with any degree of confidence when the BIA appeal will be
resolved,” which “could lead to further proceedings that might take up many more months,
or even years.”).
As to the third factor, “[t]he more that the conditions under which the [noncitizen]
is being held resemble penal confinement, the stronger his argument that he is entitled to a
bond hearing.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (citation omitted). Petitioner alleges that
conditions at Otay Mesa Detention Center include “lack of adequate medical care,
restricted communication with his family and counsel, and intimidation by certain facility
staff.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 26–29.) As multiple other courts have found, detention at Otay Mesa
Detention Center is “indistinguishable from penal confinement.” 	Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp.
3d at 773 (citation omitted). This factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
As to the fourth and fifth factors, the Court finds that neither Petitioner nor
Respondents caused delays in the removal proceedings. 	Although Petitioner argues that
“DHS itself delayed initiation of removal proceedings for more than three months” after
his initial detention, an immigration judge made a decision regarding several of Petitioner’s
requests for relief on September 17, 2025. 	(See Doc. 4-1 at 6–9); see Gao, 2025 WL
2770633, at *4 (finding no delay caused by the government where the petitioner “received
a merits hearing before an immigration judge less than seven months after his arrest”).
As to the sixth factor, Petitioner’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal,
and CAT relief were all previously denied. (Doc. 4-1 at 6–7.) This makes it more likely
that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal. Cf. Abdul Kadir, 2025
WL 2932654, at *5 (finding that the petitioner’s grant of asylum was a strong indication
that he would not receive a final order of removal). This weighs against Petitioner.
Four of the six factors, including “the most important” one, weigh in Petitioner’s
favor. Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b) has become
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unreasonably prolonged and that due process requires that he be provided with a bond
hearing. 	In light of this finding, the Court declines to reach the remaining grounds for
relief raised in the Petition.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. 	Accordingly, Respondents
are ORDERED to arrange an individualized bond hearing for Petitioner before an
immigration judge within fourteen (14) days of entry of this Order to determine whether
his continued detention is warranted. 	Respondents shall bear the burden of establishing,
by clear and convincing evidence,3 that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a
risk of flight.4 If no hearing occurs within fourteen days of entry of this Order, Petitioner
shall be released from Respondents’ custody.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: January 27, 2026
___________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3 See Sadeqi v. LaRose, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 3154520, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12,
2025) (“Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at which
Respondents must justify her continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing
evidence that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released.”)
(citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds
by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) (explaining that “the substantial liberty
interest at stake” warranted placing the burden on the government to “prove by clear and
convincing evidence that [a noncitizen] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to
justify denial of bond”).
4 This relief has been granted in similar matters. 	See Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d
1083, 1089 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Gao, 2025 WL 2770633, at *5; 	Abdul Kadir, 2025
WL 2932654, at *6.
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