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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Liang SUN,
Petitioner,
v.
Christopher LAROSE, Senior Warden,
Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-0193-GPC-JLB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[ECF No. 1]
Petitioner Liang Sun (“Petitioner”) is a Chinese citizen who has experienced
persecution based on his political beliefs. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”) ¶ 7. To escape this
persecution, Petitioner sought asylum in the United States on September 22, 2023. Id. ¶ 8.
He was able to enter the country and was released on a form of conditional parole. Id. ¶ 9.
On November 19, 2025, Petitioner reported to his check-in at Respondents’ San Diego
field office. Id. ¶ 13. As soon as Petitioner arrived, Respondents claimed to revoke his
conditional parole and detained Petitioner. Id.
On January 13, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, naming
the Warden of the Otay Mesa Detention Center, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
and Removal Operations (“ICE”)’s Field Office Director for the San Diego Field Office,
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and several other individual agency officials as respondents (“Respondents”). ECF No. 1.
A response and traverse have been filed. ECF Nos. 4, 5. For the following reasons, the
Court GRANTS the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court VACATES the
hearing set for January 23, 2026.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Petitioner is a citizen of China. Pet. ¶ 7. Because of his political opinions, Petitioner
has suffered persecution in China, including imprisonment and torture. Id. As a result,
Petitioner left his home country to seek asylum in the United States. Id.
On September 22, 2023, Petitioner entered the United States without inspection and
without valid entry documents. Id. ¶ 8. Upon arrival, he approached border officials and
informed them of his fear to return to China. Id. He was detained for approximately a day
before being released on conditional parole. Id. ¶ 9. He was released on conditional parole
after a determination that he was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community under
INA Section 236. Id. That same day, Respondents issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear
(NTA). Id.
Since his release, Petitioner regularly complied “with all conditions of his release on
conditional parole [and] also attended all his court hearings, timely filed his application for
asylum, attended his biometrics appointment, and otherwise obeyed all laws of the United
States.” Id. ¶ 12. Petitioner was also issued a work permit, a Social Security card, and a
California driver’s license. Id.
On November 19, 2025, Petitioner reported to an ICE check-in at the San Diego field
office. Id. ¶ 13. Upon arrival, Respondents claimed to revoke Petitioner’s conditional
parole and immediately detained him. Id. Petitioner was not provided any showing of
changed circumstances and was not given any notice or an opportunity to be heard. Id. At
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the time of his detainment, Petitioner’s immigration court proceedings were and continue
to be pending before the Los Angeles Immigration Court. Id ¶ 15.
Petitioner is currently being detained at Otay Mesa Detention Center. Id. ¶ 19.
B. Procedural Background
On January 13, 2026, Petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus. ECF
No. 1. On January 19, 2026, Respondents filed a return in opposition to the habeas petition.
ECF No. 4 (“Ret.”). Petitioner filed a reply on January 20, 2026. ECF No. 5.
Petitioner presents three claims. First, Petitioner alleges Respondents violated the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause when Respondents detained Petitioner without a
hearing and when there is no indication that Petitioner’s circumstances have changed. Pet.
¶ 100. Second, Petitioner alleges Respondent has violated the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”) by applying 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) arbitrarily, capriciously, and not in
accordance with the law. Id. ¶ 106. Third, Petitioner claims his detention is in violation of
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)-(b) because Respondent lacks statutory authority to detain Petitioner
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Id. ¶ 108.
The Petitioner asks the Court to (1) grant the instant petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, (2) alternatively, conduct an immediate bond hearing, (3) issue an order
prohibiting the Respondents from transferring Petitioner from the district without the
Court’s approval, and (4) award Petitioner attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal
Access to Justice Act and on any other basis justified under law. Id. at 35.
II. 	STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. Standard & Expedited Removal Proceedings
An arriving noncitizen seeking admission into the United States at a U.S. Port of
Entry is “processed either through expedited removal proceedings or through regular
removal proceedings.” 	Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 507 (9th Cir.
2019). The regular removal procedure is also known as “section 240 proceedings.” 240
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proceedings involve an evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge and the ability
for the individual to apply for asylum if he would be persecuted upon return to his home
country. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1), (b)(1); Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Noncitizens seeking asylum are guaranteed due process under the
5 th Amendment throughout this process. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).
The DHS Secretary has discretion to release a noncitizen on parole during this
process. In one procedure, an arriving asylum seeker may be paroled “for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). A separate
procedure puts the immigrant in conditional parole. Id. § 1226(a). In either case, to release
a noncitizen from custody requires a case-by-case determination, where the noncitizen
must “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a
danger to property or persons” and that the noncitizen is “likely to appear for any future
proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8).
The second, more streamlined process is expedited removal, governed by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225. Under these proceedings, noncitizens can be ordered removed by an immigration
officer “without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Because of the
truncated 	procedure, 	expedited 	removal 	is 	limited 	to 	noncitizens 	meeting 	several
requirements. First, a noncitizen is potentially eligible for expedited removal if he (1)
sought to procure immigration status or citizenship via fraud or false representations or
(2) “at the time of application for admission,” failed to satisfy certain documentation
requirements. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C), 1182(a)(7).
Second, expedited removal is further cabined to noncitizens who 1) are categorized as
“arriving in the United States,” or 2) have “not been admitted or paroled into the United
States” and cannot affirmatively show they have been “physically present in the United
States 	continuously 	for 	the 	2-year 	period 	immediately 	prior 	to 	the 	date 	of 	the
determination 	of 	inadmissibility.” 	Id. 	§ 	1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). 	Within 	that 	second
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requirement, the Attorney General can designate the population of noncitizens subject to
expedited removal. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I).
Once detained under expedited removal, if the noncitizen indicates an intention to
apply for asylum and the asylum officer finds the fear to return to be credible, the
applicant’s claim will be fully considered in a standard removal hearing. Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. 103, 110 (2020).
B. 2025 Designation for Expedited Removal
The Attorney General has delegated the office’s expedited removal designation
power to the DHS Secretary. Before January 2025, DHS had only designated noncitizens
as eligible for expedited removal if they were identified as “arriving,” had arrived by sea
within the last two years, or had been apprehended within 14 days of entry and 100 miles
of the border. See Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under Section
235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68924, 68924
(Nov. 13, 2002); Designating Aliens For Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877, 48879
(Aug. 11, 2004). In January 2025, DHS published the 2025 Designation, authorizing
expedited removal to be exercised to the “full scope of its statutory authority.” Designating
Aliens for Expedited Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139, 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025). DHS has stated
that this full scope applies to noncitizens “who are encountered anywhere in the United
States more than 100 air miles from a U.S. international land border, and who have been
continuously present in the United States for at least 14 days but for less than two years.”
Id.
In its implementation of the 2025 Designation, “the Government began targeting
for expedited removal people already in section 240 removal proceedings, many of whom
are pursuing asylum and other collateral relief” and executing “courthouse arrests.” Make
the Rd. New York v. Noem, No. 25-CV-190 (JMC), 2025 WL 2494908, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug.
29, 2025). The DHS’ typical procedure for these courthouse arrests consist of “moving
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orally (without any advance notice) to dismiss the individual's pending section 240
proceedings, then arresting the individual at the courthouse immediately upon the
dismissal of their section 240 proceedings, and then, finally, placing the individual in
expedited removal proceedings through which they can be deported far more quickly, and
with far less process, than they would have been in the section 240 proceedings.” Id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims his detention violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause,
the Administrative Procedure Act, and 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Pet. ¶¶ 100, 106, 108.
Respondents have conceded that “Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is
entitled to an order from this Court directing a bond hearing be held pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a).” Ret. at 2. At the same time, Respondents “reserve the right to supplement this
response in the event of a stay of enforcement of the Bautista final judgment, appellate
relief, or a change in DHS policy.” Id. Beyond the fact that a bond hearing is not at issue
here and Respondents have conceded on that claim, the Court will conduct a full analysis
of the issues given Respondents’ reservation.
A. Fifth Amendment Due Process
i. 	Entitlement to Due Process Rights
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Though
noncitizens do not enjoy constitutional protections outside our borders, once a noncitizen
“enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to
all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
Under this wide umbrella, “[i]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens
to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306
(1993).
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Here, Petitioner has “passed through our gates” and “may be expelled only after
proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process
of law.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). Because
Petitioner has developed an interest in remaining during his time here, “the procedures
used to remove [him] must adequately protect” that interest. Make the Rd. New York v.
Noem, No. 25-CV-190 (JMC), 2025 WL 2494908, at *10 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2025).
This instant case stands in contrast to Thuraissigiam. There, the respondent was a
noncitizen detained close to the border and shortly after unlawful entry, and keeping those
characteristics in mind, the Supreme Court held that those “in respondent's position ha[ve]
only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.” Dep't of
Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (emphasis added). This
holding only reinforced the precedent that noncitizens “on the threshold of initial entry
stand[ ] on a different footing” than those who have “passed through our gates.” Mezei,
345 U.S. 212.
In this case, Petitioner is not an “arriving” noncitizen but one that has present in our
country for over two years. This substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the
Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189
U.S. 86, 87 (1903) (finding a noncitizen was entitled to due process before removal despite
having spent only four days in the US).
ii. 	Government’s Adherence to Due Process
Generally, due process protections depend on the situation and must account for (1)
the private interest at issue, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through
the procedures used, and (3) the Government's interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 334–35 (1976). Here, Petitioner alleges that he was detained while his removal
proceedings were pending without any opportunity to be heard prior to being arrested and
detained. Pet. ¶¶ 14, 15.
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First, Petitioner has a private interest in remaining free, which developed over the
two years he resided in the United States. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482-
483 	(1972); 	Zadvydas 	v. 	Davis, 	533 	U.S. 	678, 	690 	(2001) 	(“Freedom 	from
imprisonment—from 	government 	custody, 	detention, 	or 	other 	forms 	of 	physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”). This
liberty interest applies to Petitioner, even in his parole status. For example, Morrissey—
though analyzing the criminal parole context—found that “the liberty of a parolee,
although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its
termination inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee and often others…[thus it] must be seen
within the protection of the [Fifth] Amendment.” 408 U.S. at 482.
In the deportation context, detention has minimum due process protections.
Generally, detention is seen “as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process,”
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003), and the government holds the discretion to
detain an immigrant pending removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). However, that discretion is not
unbounded. Detention pending 	removal proceedings has “two regulatory goals”—
ensuring future appearances and preventing danger to the community. Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). This logically also extends to the granting of parole and its
revocation. Marczak v. Greene, 971 F.2d 510, 515 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[I]n each case a
district director must determine whether a particular person is likely to flee, and whether
that person’s continued detention would be in the public interest.”); Pinchi v. Noem, 792
F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after
her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither
a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in
remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria.”). These primary goals
provide guidance for the floor of due process afforded to noncitizens for detention and
parole.
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Further, Petitioner has a Fifth Amendment right to due process of law in
deportation proceedings. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Here, Petitioner was
initially provided due process for his removal proceedings following his arrival on
September 22, 2023. Pet. ¶ 9. He was able to enter the country and was given parole after
an interview with a CBP officer who determined he was not a flight risk or a danger to the
community. Id. He has timely applied for asylum and regularly complied with ICE check-
ins. Id. ¶¶ 12, 15. The proceedings have created a protectable expectation of his due
process rights in his removal proceedings and the fair procedures this country guarantees.
Thus, Petitioner was entitled to due process in his parole revocation. Particularly, he was
entitled to both notification of revocation and the reasoning for revocation, if not also an
opportunity to be heard and contest the determination.
Second, the procedures used present a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of
those interests and are not outweighed by the Government’s interest. In Make the Rd. New
York v. Noem, which considers the application of the 2025 Designation and courthouse
arrests, the court determined that “[b]efore removing someone through expedited removal,
the Government must make several threshold determinations: whether the individual has
been continually present in the United States for two years; whether they have previously
been admitted or paroled; whether they are inadmissible on one of the grounds that make
them eligible for expedited removal; whether they have a credible fear of persecution; and
whether they are a citizen, lawful permanent resident, refugee, or asylee.” No. 25-CV-
190-JMC, 	2025 	WL 	2494908, 	at 	*14 	(D.D.C. 	Aug. 	29, 	2025). 	Each 	of 	these
determinations present a substantial risk of error and harm to Petitioner’s interests in
remaining at liberty. This is especially true in regard to the credible fear interview—where
individuals might not be appropriately referred for the interview or not afforded an
effective opportunity to be heard—and the continual presence determination. Id. at *15-
17.
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Respondents have also failed to demonstrate a significant interest in Petitioner’s
detention. 	Respondents did not provide Petitioner individualized notice and reasoning
prior to his arrest and detention on November 19, 2025 and have presented no legitimate
reason for why those decisions were made. Any governmental interest of efficient
administration of immigration laws by using courthouse arrests does not outweigh these
first two factors. See id. at *19. Petitioner does not have a criminal record and has regularly
complied with and appeared for ICE check-ins and court hearings. There is no indication
that he is a flight risk or presents a danger to the community, which strike at the core,
guiding goals for parole, and Respondents have not supplied any additional information
to the contrary. “At its foundation, due process prohibits detaining an individual without
justification.” Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1158 (D. Minn. 2025).
Denying 	Petitioner 	notice 	and 	reasoning 	on 	the 	termination 	of 	his 	240 	removal
proceedings, his placement into expedited removal proceedings, and revocation of his
parole took away a meaningful opportunity to contest and violated due process. See
Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032-35; Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1146-47
(D. Or. 2025) (D. Or. July 9, 2025).
Finally, “[t]he Due Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and
repose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 	U.S. 	244, 	267 	(1994). 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	limited 	retroactivity 	under
the Due Process Clause under its “prohibition against arbitrary and irrational legislation.”
United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30 (1994) (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.
v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984)). Abiding to this principle, “administrative
rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result.” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
The 2025 Designation’s language does not clearly require that it be applied to
individuals who entered the United States prior to its effective date. Therefore, executing
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the Designation over Petitioner who entered the country before the Designation’s effective
date violated the Due Process Clause.
For those reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner’s due process rights have been
violated.
B. Administrative Procedure Act
Under the APA, an agency action may be set aside if it is arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
An action is an abuse of discretion if the agency “entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference
in view or the product of agency expertise.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). For a challenged agency action
to be upheld, the agency “must explain the evidence which is available, and must offer a
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 52 (1983) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
Petitioner argues Respondents violated APA when they revoked Petitioner’s parole
and initiated expedited removal proceedings without lawful authority. Pet. ¶¶ 105, 106.
i. 	Legal Standards under the APA
“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there
is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 704;
Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 61–62 (2004). Reviewable agency
action includes “the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). Agency action is deemed
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final if it (1) “impose[s] an obligation, den[ies] a right or fix[es] some legal relationship as
a consummation of the administrative process,” Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S. S.
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948), and (2) is an action “by which ‘rights or obligations have
been determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will flow,’” Bennett v. Spear, 520
U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
ii. 	Failure to Abide by APA
In general, “[r]elease reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen
is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d
1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137
(9th Cir. 2018). Following this, a noncitizen should not be returned to custody unless the
purposes of the parole have been served. Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1144-
45 (D. Or. 2025). Additionally, under regulation, parole must be terminated upon written
notice after an individualized determination that the purposes no longer apply. 8 C.F.R. §
212.5(e)(2)(i); see, e.g., Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1146-47 (finding parolee must receive
written notice of impending revocation with reasons for revocation); Padilla v. U.S.
Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“The Supreme
Court has consistently held that non-punitive detention violates the Constitution unless it
is strictly limited, and, typically, accompanied by a prompt individualized hearing before
a neutral decisionmaker to ensure that the imprisonment serves the government's
legitimate goals.”); 	Castellon v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-CV-00968 JLT EPG, 2025 WL
2373425, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2025) (finding a case-by-case analysis is needed to
revoke parole); Garcia v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-01006-JLT-SAB, 2025 WL 2420068, at
*12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); but see Doe v. Noem, No. 25-1384, 2025 WL 2630395, at
*9 (1st Cir. Sept. 12, 2025) (finding an individualized termination of parole is not
required). In sum, to meet statutory and regulatory requirements, revocation should only
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occur when the parole’s purpose is served, and the noncitizen is provided written notice.
Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1144-46.
However, neither of the other two conditions were met here. First, Petitioner was
not provided any notice as to the termination of his parole. Second, Respondents must
provide at minimum some reasoning explaining why the Petitioner would now be
considered a flight risk or danger to the community. See Castellon, 2025 WL 2373425, at
*12; Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032-35 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025). Given
Respondents have not attempted to justify the revocation for Petitioner, this Court holds
the Respondent has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the APA.
iii. 	Initiation of Expedited Removal Proceedings
The application of expedited removal is limited to noncitizens who meet several
requirements. One of those requirements cabins initiation of expedited removal to
noncitizens who (1) are categorized as “arriving in the United States,” or (2) have “not
been admitted or paroled into the United States” and cannot affirmatively show they have
been 	“physically present in 	the United States continuously for the 2-year period
immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility.” 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii); see also Coalition for Human Immigrant Rights v. Noem, No. 25
Civ. 872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *30 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025).
Petitioner is no longer an “arriving” noncitizen after having resided here for over
two years. In addition, beyond the fact that he has been present in this country for a 2-year
period, he also has been paroled into the United States. Therefore, the Court finds that
Petitioner could not be subject to § 1225.
Moreover, 	Petitioner 	could 	not 	have 	been 	subjected 	to 	expedited 	removal
proceedings. His original immigration proceedings were still pending when he was
detained. Pet. ¶ 15. Thus, detaining him under § 1225(b) on November 19 had no legal
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basis. See, e.g., Javier Tomas Munoz v. Paul Arteta, et. al., No. 25 CIV. 6137 (ER), 2025
WL 2630826, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025).
In sum, Respondents’ actions are arbitrary, fail to adhere to the law, and therefore,
violate the APA.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the reasoning above, the Court GRANTS the petition for writ of habeas
corpus. The parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report within 72 hours of this
Order’s filing, confirming Petitioner’s release. Further, in aid of the Court’s jurisdiction,
which is hereby retained, the Court ORDERS pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1651, that Respondents shall not cause Petitioner to be re-detained during the pendency of
her removal proceedings without prior leave of this Court. The Clerk of Court SHALL
enter judgment in Petitioner's favor and close this case.1
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 21, 2026
1 In his prayer for relief, Petitioner requests an award of costs and reasonable attorney’s
fees. Pet. at 23. Petitioner’s counsel may submit an appropriate EAJA fee application
within 30 days of the issuance of this Order.
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