Velasquez Chinga v. Noem et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ANGELA THERESA VELASQUEZ
CHINGA,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-00105-RBM-KSC
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Doc. 1]
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	are 	Petitioner 	Angela 	Theresa 	Velasquez-Chinga’s
(“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(Doc. 1) and Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO Motion”) (Doc. 2.). For
the reasons set forth below, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native of Ecuador, entered the United States in 2016 with her month-
old child seeking asylum. (Doc. 1 at 2.) 1 Petitioner presented herself at the border and was
subsequently released on parole. 	(Id.) 	On November 6, 2016, the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued Petitioner a “Notice of Release and Proof of Service”
1 The Court cites the CM/ECF electronic pagination for filings unless otherwise noted.
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on an I-830 Form. 	(Doc. 1-4 at 2–3.) 	The Notice of Release states that Petitioner was
“[r]eleased from ICE custody” on the condition of “parole[ ] pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 121.5”
(Id. at 3.)
Petitioner’s asylum application was later denied. 	(Doc. 1 at 2–3 (citing Doc. 1-2,
First Declaration of Angela Theresa Velaquez-Chinga [“Velazquez-Chinga Decl.”] ¶ 1).)
The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Ninth Circuit denied her appeal in 2020 and in
January 2022, respectively. (Id. at 3.) Petitioner remained on parole for nearly four years
and “always checked in as ordered.” (Id. (citing Velazquez-Chinga Decl. ¶¶ 2–3).)
On November 5, 2025, Petitioner was arrested while attending her regular check-in
with ICE. (Id. (citing Velazquez-Chinga Decl. ¶ 3).) “No one told her why she was being
arrested or gave her any paperwork explaining the revocation.” (Id.) After her arrest, “ICE
immediately took her to the U.S.-Mexico border.” 	(Id. (citing Velazquez-Chinga Decl.
¶ 4).) 	Petitioner was denied entry into Mexico after she informed Mexican officials that
she was not Mexican. (Id. (citing Velazquez-Chinga Decl. ¶ 4).) Petitioner alleges the ICE
officers “were mad at [her]” and “told [her] to say that [she was] Mexican.” 	(Id. (citing
Velazquez-Chinga Decl. ¶ 4).) ICE then transferred her to the Otay Mesa Detention Center
where she remains in detention. 	(Id.) 	Neither ICE nor her deportation officer have met
with Petitioner about her deportation. (Id. (citing Velazquez-Chinga Decl. ¶ 5).)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” 	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl.
2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims she is being detained in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1231, and the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 	(Doc. 1 at 7–13.)
Petitioner also claims ICE may not remove her to a third country without due process. (Id.
at 13–17.)2 Respondents argue the Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner’s regulatory
violation claims because “Congress has explicitly foreclosed district court jurisdiction over
‘the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings and adjudicate
cases.” (Doc. 7 at 6 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)).) Respondents further argue that “[e]ven
if the agency’s compliance with the regulations had fallen short, Petitioner has not
established prejudice nor a constitutional violation.” (Id.)
A. 	Jurisdiction
As 	a 	preliminary 	matter, 	courts 	in 	this 	District 	have 	consistently 	rejected
Respondents’ argument that similarly situated petitioners’ claims are jurisdictionally
barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). See Noori v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2800149, at *7 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 2025); Araujo v. LaRose, No. 25cv2942-BTM-MMP, 2025 WL 3278016, at *1
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) (“There will be jurisdiction if DHS failed to follow the law when
revoking parole.”).
In this case, Petitioner challenges the revocation of her parole as unlawful, not her
removal or the execution of a removal order. 	Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction to
review the lawfulness of Respondents’ discretionary decision to revoke Petitioner’s parole.
See Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *5–8.
B. 	Revocation of Parole
Petitioner claims that Respondents violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
2 Based on Respondents’ contention that Ecuador has accepted Petitioner for removal,
Petitioner “acknowledges that her Zadvydas and third-country removal claims cannot
succeed.” (Doc. 8 at 1–2.) Counts 2 and 3 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
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Clause and the APA by failing to comply with the applicable regulatory and statutory
requirements to revoke her parole. (Doc. 1 at 7–9; Doc. 8 at 2–4.) Respondents contend
that “no notice was required” to detain Petitioner because the purpose for which her parole
was authorized for expired “once [her] removal order became final on March 15, 2022.”
(Doc. 7 at 6 (citing Doc. 7-1, Declaration of Gloria S. Solares [“Solares Decl.”] ¶ 12).)
Petitioner responds that her “parole document has no expiration date” and that the
applicable regulation “talks about the expiration of ‘time,’ not purpose.” 	(Doc. 8 at 4
(citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1)(ii)).) The Court agrees.
According to the Notice of Release, Petitioner was released in November 2016 on
“parole[ ] pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.5.” 	(Doc. 1-4 at 3.) 	Under that regulation, parole
may be granted “on a case-by-case basis for ‘urgent humanitarian reasons’ or ‘significant
public benefit,’ provided the [noncitizens] present neither a security risk nor a risk of
absconding.” § 212.5(b); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). The governing statute allows for the
revocation of parole “when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary
of Homeland Security, have been served.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). The noncitizen must
then “return or be returned to the custody from which [s]he was paroled and thereafter [her]
case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for
admission to the United States.” Id. The Secretary has delegated its authority “to continue
[a noncitizen] in custody or grant parole” to various officials. 8 C.F.R § 212.5(a) (listing
the officials).
The relevant regulations provide for the automatic termination of parole “without
written notice (i) upon the [noncitizen’s] departure from the United States . . . , or, (ii) if
not departed, at the expiration of the time for which parole was authorized . . .”
§ 212.5(e)(1)(i)–(ii). 	Otherwise, parole may be terminated with written notice to the
noncitizen “upon accomplishment of the purpose for which parole was authorized” or when
“neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued presence of the
[noncitizen] in the United States.” § 212.5(e)(2)(i).
Although Respondents argue that Petitioner’s parole “expired” when her removal
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order became final, revocation based on the “accomplishment of the purpose for which
parole was authorized” requires written notice under § 212.5(e)(2)(i). As Petitioner notes
(see Doc. 8 at 4), there is no indication in the record before the Court that Petitioner’s
parole was authorized for any specific amount of time. Nor is there any indication that the
Secretary or a designee determined the purposes of Petitioner’s parole have been served.
Because Petitioner continued to check-in with ICE pursuant to the conditions of her parole
well after her removal order became final, such a determination cannot be inferred.
Accordingly, Petitioner’s parole was not automatically terminated under § 212.5(e)(1) and
termination of her parole required written notice. As discussed infra, Respondents failed
to provide such written notice.
C. 	Due Process and the APA
“[N]umerous courts in the Ninth Circuit have found that when a noncitizen is paroled
under [8 C.F.R § 212.5], [her] ‘liberty interest does not expire along with h[er] parole.’”
D.L.C. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01996-DC-JDP (HC), 2026 WL 145646, at *4 (E.D. Cal.
Jan. 20, 2026) (quoting Omer G.G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-01471-KES-SAB (HC), 2025
WL 3254999, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025)) (citing cases). “That the express terms of
the [§ 1182] parole notice allowed for discretionary termination or expiration does not
somehow obviate the need for the Government to provide [an] individualized hearing prior
to re-detaining the parolee.” 	Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1136
(W.D. Wash. 2025). 	“Due process for parole terminations requires (1) a decision by an
appropriate official on whether the purpose of parole has been served; (2) written notice of
the reasons for the termination; and (3) an opportunity to rebut the reasons given for the
termination.” 	Araujo, 2025 WL 3278016, at *2 (citing Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *11
(analyzing factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976)).
Respondents do not dispute that Petitioner was not provided with an individualized
determination (see supra Sec. III.B) or an opportunity to be heard before her parole was
terminated. Respondents claim that Petitioner was served with an I-200, Warrant for Arrest
of Alien, but do not provide the I-200 itself. 	(Doc. 7 at 3 (citing Solares Decl. ¶ 13).)
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Indeed, Petitioner correctly states that the documents Respondents submitted say nothing
about the revocation of Petitioner’s parole. (See Doc. 8 at 2–3.) “[B]ecause Respondents
detained Petitioner by revoking her parole in violation of the Due Process Clause, her
detention is unlawful.” 	Salazar v. Casey, Case No.: 25-CV-2784 JLS (VET), 2025 WL
3063629, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025); accord Noori v. LaRose, Case No. 25-cv-03006-
BAS-MMP, 2025 WL 3295386, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2025) (granting habeas petition
where summary revocation of parole violated the petitioner’s due process rights). 	“The
revocation of Petitioner’s parole is thus neither consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)
nor the demands of due process.” 	Araujo, 2025 WL 3278016, at *2. 	And “by denying
Petitioner the required procedure before purporting to terminate [her] parole, Respondents
acted arbitrarily and capriciously and violated the APA.” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp.
3d 1123, 1146 (D. Or. 2025). The Court therefore finds that the revocation of Petitioner’s
parole 	and 	her 	subsequent 	detention 	violate 	the 	Due 	Process 	Clause 	of 	the 	Fifth
Amendment and the APA.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART. Accordingly:
1. Count 1 is GRANTED. 	Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release
Petitioner from custody, subject to the conditions of her pre-existing parole.
2. Respondents MAY NOT re-detain Petitioner without compliance with 8 C.F.R.
§ 212.5, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), and the Due Process Clause.
3. Counts 2 and 3 are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
4. The TRO Motion (Doc. 2) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: February 5, 2026
____________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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