Seyam v. Noem et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MAHMOD SEYAM,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 25cv3850-LL-SBC
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND DENYING AS MOOT
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
(ECF Nos. 1, 2)
Before the Court are Petitioner Mahmod Seyam’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”)] and Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order [ECF No. 2]. Also before the Court are Respondents’ Return in Opposition to the
Habeas Petition [ECF No. 7 (“Ret.”)], and Petitioner’s Traverse [ECF No. 8 (“Traverse”)].
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, DENIES AS MOOT the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, and
ORDERS Petitioner’s immediate release from custody.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a “stateless” individual who was born in Egypt to Palestinian parents.
Pet. at 3. Petitioner entered the United States on October 13, 2023 and was sentenced to
six-month’s imprisonment in Texas for illegal entry. Pet. at 3; Ret. at 1–2. On April 11,
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2024, Petitioner was released from the Bureau of Prisons and taken into United States
Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
custody. Ret. at 2. Petitioner was ordered removed on May 31, 2024. Pet. at 3; ECF No. 1-
2, Declaration of Mahmod Seyam (“Seyam Decl.”) ¶ 3. On June 24, 2024, Enforcement
and 	Removal 	Operations’ (“ERO”) 	Removal 	and 	International 	Operations 	(“RIO”)
confirmed that Petitioner was a citizen of Palestine, not Egypt. Ret. at 2. Petitioner
remained in ICE custody from April 2024 to July 2024, when ICE released him on Order
of Supervision. Pet. at 3; Ret. at 2. Since his release in 2024, Petitioner attended all his ICE
check-ins and sustained no criminal convictions. Pet. at 3; Seyam Decl. at ¶ 2. On October
6, 2025, ICE re-detained Petitioner at his check-in. Pet. at 3. Petitioner alleges that he was
not given any written or oral notice as to why he was being re-detained. Pet. at 3. He further
alleges that he was not given a chance to explain why his release should not be revoked.
Pet. at 3. Respondents do not state that any notice or interview was given at the time of re-
detention. Ret. at 2.
On October 30, 2025, ICE provided Petitioner a Notice of Revocation of Release,
which stated that Petitioner’s release was being revoked “based on a review of your official
[noncitizen] file and a determination that there are changed circumstances in your case.”
Pet. at 3; ECF No. 7-3, Notice of Revocation of Release (“Notice”). The Notice further
stated that “ICE has determined that you can be expeditiously removed from the United
States pursuant to the outstanding order of removal against you. On May 31, 2024, you
were ordered removed to Egypt by an authorized U.S. DHS/DOJ official.” Notice.
Respondents state that an informal interview was also given on October 30, 2025.
Ret. at 2. During the interview, Petitioner “confirmed that he is not an Egyptian citizen,
showed the officer a copy of a Palestine Citizenship Certificate, stated that he fears removal
to Palestine, and expressed a desire to be removed to Dubai.” Ret. at 2. Respondents claim
that Petitioner was referred to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
for a credible fear interview concerning his fear of return to Palestine and Israel. Ret. at 3.
On 	December 	9, 	2025, 	an 	Immigration 	Judge 	reviewed 	and 	affirmed 	USCIS’s
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determination on November 24, 2025 that Petitioner did not have a credible fear. Ret. at 3.
In turn, Petitioner claims that he never received a chance to contest his re-detention. Pet. at
3. Respondents state that EROC has submitted a request to the Consul General of Israel for
an authorization to return Petitioner to the Palestinian Territories on December 19, 2025
and a request to RIO for a current travel document for Petitioner to be removed to Palestine.
Ret. at 3; ECF No. 7-8, Declaration of Jason Cole (“Cole Decl.”) ¶¶ 13–14.
Petitioner now argues that ICE did not comply with applicable regulations when it
re-detained him in October 2025, and thus his detention is unlawful.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl.
2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
that custody, and [] the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of
habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he is “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally,
“the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive
detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” Hamdi, 542
U.S. at 536 (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)). Accordingly, challenges
to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court’s habeas
jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001) (“[Section] 2441 habeas
proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-
removal-period detention.”); see also Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759 (9th Cir.
2020) (“[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas
challenges to immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits of [a]
removal order.”).
/ / /
/ / /
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III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner brings two claims to argue that he should be released from detention: (1)
ICE failed to comply with its own procedures to re-detain him, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment 	Due 	Process 	Clause 	of 	the 	U.S. 	Constitution 	and 	the 	Administrative
Procedures Act; and (2) Respondents are detaining him without a significant likelihood of
removing him, in violation of Zadvydas. Pet. at 7–14. Petitioner also argues that ICE may
not remove him to a third country without providing him with adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Id. at 15–18. The Court finds that Petitioner’s first claim is
meritorious and justifies Petitioner’s release; therefore, the Court will only address this
claim in this Order.
Petitioner challenges his detention as unlawful because ICE failed to provide the
required notice and opportunity to be heard before re-detaining him. The Court agrees.
“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from
depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Due Process Clause
applies to all persons within the United States, including [noncitizens], whether their
presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. A
person at risk of suffering a serious loss being given notice and an opportunity to be heard,
in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time, is the essence of procedural due process.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976).
The detention and release of noncitizens that are subject to a final order of removal
are governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. This statute provides that “when [a noncitizen]is ordered
removed, the Attorney General shall remove the [noncitizen] from the United States within
a period of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). It also authorizes the detention of
noncitizens during this removal period. Id. § 1231(a)(2). However, once that time passes
and “removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer
authorized by statute,” and the noncitizen must be released on supervised release.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–700; see 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (“If the [noncitizen] does not
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leave or is not removed within the 90-day removal period, the [noncitizen], pending
removal, shall be subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney
General.”).
Once ICE releases a noncitizen on supervised release, “ICE’s ability to re-detain that
noncitizen is constrained by its own regulations.” Nouri v. Herrera, SA CV 25-1905-
JFW(DBT), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171809, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025) (citation
omitted). Supervised release and any revocation of such release thereafter is governed by
either 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 or 8 C.F.R. § 241.13.1 Diaz v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01079 JLT
EPG, 2025 WL 2581575, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025). If ICE chooses to re-detain, the
noncitizen must “be notified of the reasons for revocation” and be afforded “an initial
informal interview promptly after his or her return to [ICE] custody to afford the
[noncitizen] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the
notification.”2 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). Thereafter, the noncitizen may “submit any
evidence or information that [he] believes shows there is no significant likelihood [he may]
be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that [he] has not violated the order of
supervision.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).
Here, Petitioner was in ICE custody from April 2024 to July 2024, when ICE
released him on Order of Supervision. Pet. at 3; Ret. at 2. On October 6, 2025, ICE re-
1 Respondents do not appear to suggest that Petitioner violated the terms of his supervised
release (see generally Ret.), ruling out § 241.4(l)(1) or § 241.13(i)(1) as the source of his
revocation. Rather they appear to rely on either § 241.4(l)(2) or § 241.13(i)(2).
2 These requirements for notice and an initial informal interview are not explicitly required
in § 241.4(l)(2), but courts have held that the same requirements constrain revocation of
release under this provision as well. See Diaz, 2025 WL 2581575, at *5 (citing various
district court cases that have rejected the government’s arguments that these provisions do
not apply to § 241.4(l)(2)); Constantinovici v. Bondi, No. 3:25-CV-02405-RBM-AHG,
2025 	WL 	2898985, 	at 	*4 	(S.D. 	Cal. 	Oct. 	10, 	2025) 	(“District 	courts 	have
consistently…held that § 241.4(l)(1)’s procedural requirements apply equally to revocation
of a noncitizen’s release pursuant to § 241.4(l)(2).”).
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detained Petitioner. Pet. at 3; Ret. at 2. Respondents do not dispute Petitioner’s claim that
ICE did not serve Petitioner any written or oral notice of revocation of release when ICE
re-detained Petitioner. Pet. at 3; Ret. at 2. Instead, Respondents claim they served Petitioner
a Notice of Revocation of Release on October 30, 2025. Ret. at 3. The Notice states that
Petitioner’s “order of supervision has been revoked . . . based on a review of [Petitioner’s]
official [noncitizen] file and a determination that there are changed circumstances in
[Petitioner’s] case.” ECF No. 7-3. The Notice however does not state what those changed
circumstances were.
Courts have found similar form revocation notices to be insufficient to provide
notice under the statute. See Xayakesone v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2995-JES-BJW, 2025 WL
3229102, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2025) (finding notice insufficient when it stated that
the “decision has been made based on a review of your official [noncitizen] file and a
determination that there are changed circumstances in your case”); see also Sargsyan v.
Noem, No. 25-CV-3857 JLS (JLB), 2026 WL 92044, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2026)
(finding a generic form revocation letter insufficient to provide notice); Tran v. Noem, No.
25-cv-2391 BTM (BLM), 2025 WL 3005347, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (holding that
this “notice must be in writing and contain all the reasons for the revocation of the
[noncitizen’s] release”); Nouri, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171809 at *14 (“Petitioner cannot
be expected to ‘respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification’ when the
[n]otice does not actually state any reasons for revocation” (citation omitted)). Therefore,
the Court finds that the Notice’s bare-bones explanation is insufficient to provide Petitioner
with adequate reasons for the revocation of his release.
Further, after re-detaining a noncitizen who is out on supervision, ICE must
“promptly” 	conduct 	“an 	initial 	informal 	interview” 	to 	“afford 	the 	[noncitizen] 	an
opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. §
241.13(i)(3). Here, Respondents do not dispute Petitioner’s claim that ICE did not conduct
an initial informal interview at the time of re-detention on October 6, 2025. Ret. at 3, ECF
No. 7-3. Instead, Respondents allege that ICE conducted an interview on October 30, 2025,
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twenty-four days after Petitioner’s re-detention [Ret. at 2] while Petitioner claims that
Petitioner never got “a chance to contest his re-detention” [Pet. at 3]. However, courts have
found ICE’s failure to provide an informal interview immediately after the revocation of
release constitutes a due process violation. See e.g., M.S.L. v. Bostock, No. 6:25-CV-01204-
AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *11 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025) (holding that informal interview
was not sufficiently “prompt” where it took place twenty-seven days after revocation and
collecting cases); Yang v. Kaiser, No. 2:25-CV-02205-DAD-AC (HC), 2025 WL 2791778,
at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025) (a two-month delay in providing an informal interview
“renders petitioner’s re-detention unlawful”); Order Granting Habeas Corpus Petition,
Sayvongsa v. Noem, No.: 3:25-cv-02867-AGS-DEB (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2025), ECF No. 10
(granting petition where petitioner did not receive informal interview for twenty-one days
after being re-detained).
Even if the interview had been conducted promptly, as the regulation requires,
Petitioner would not have been able to respond meaningfully to the reasons for the
revocation of his release because ICE did not provide sufficient notice explaining the
reasons for the revocation. “Petitioner must be told what circumstances had changed or
why there was now a significant likelihood of removal in order to meaningfully respond to
the reasons and submit evidence in opposition.” Adam v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3854 JLS
(BJW), 2026 WL 92067, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2026) (quoting Sarail A. v. Bondi, ---- F.
Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2533673, at *10 (D. Minn. 2025) (finding that even when ICE
agents conducted an interview immediately after detaining Petitioner, “this interview could
not have provided Petitioner with ‘an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation
stated in the notification’ [] because there was no notification.”); Rasakhamdee v. Noem,
No. 25-cv-2816-RBM-DEB, 2025 WL 3102037, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025) (finding
an identically worded written notification insufficient as “ICE’s conclusory explanations
for revoking [p]etitioner’s release did not offer him adequate notice of the basis for the
revocation decision such that he could meaningfully respond at the post-detention informal
interview” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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“Government agencies are required to follow their own regulations.” Hoac v.
Becerra, No. 25-cv-1740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025)
(citing United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 US. 260, 268 (1954)). “[W]hen
ICE fails to follow its own regulations in revoking release, the detention is unlawful, and
the petitioner’s release must be ordered.” Truong v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2597-JES-MMP,
2025 WL 2988357, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025) (collecting cases).
In sum, the Court finds that because ICE did not follow its own regulations in
deciding to re-detain Petitioner, these failures constitute a violation of Petitioner’s due
process rights and justifies his release from unlawful detention. See, e.g., Tran, 2025 WL
3005347, at *3–4 (granting a habeas petition where ICE failed to follow § 241.13(i)(3)
procedures); Xayakesone, 2025 WL 3229102, at *3–5 (same); Truong, 2025 WL 2988357,
at *5–6 (same).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus [ECF No. 1], DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order [ECF No. 2] and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from
custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting Order of Supervision. The Court
ORDERS that Respondents cannot re-detain Petitioner without following the procedures
set out in 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, and other implementing regulations. As this
concludes the litigation in this case, the Clerk of Court SHALL close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 22, 2026
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