Markov v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
VLADIMIR MARKOV,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, OTAY MESA DETENTION
CENTER,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:25-cv-3705-CAB-AHG
ORDER DISMISSING HABEAS
PETITION
[Doc. No. 1]
Before the Court is Petitioner Vladimir Markov’s Petition for writ of habeas corpus
28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Doc. No. 1 (“Petition”).] Petitioner argues that he is being detained by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) without a bond hearing in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. [Id. at 6, 11–12.] 	Respondents filed a response to the Petition. [Doc.
No. 4.] The Court finds this matter appropriate for determination on the papers. See S.D.
Cal. CivLR 7.1.(d)(1). For the following reasons, the Court DISMISSES the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On June 1, 2025, Petitioner, a Russian citizen, applied for admission to the United
States at a port of entry. [Id. at 2.] He did not possess valid documentation allowing him
to legally enter and was thus taken immediately into immigration custody and placed in
expedited removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). 	[Id.] 	Petitioner then
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expressed a fear of returning to Russia, was interviewed, and received a positive credible
fear determination. [Id. at 5; Petition at 9.] Petitioner has remained in ICE custody since.
He is currently detained at Otay Mesa Detention Center (“OMDC”). Petitioner challenges
that his detention without a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. [Petition at 11–12.] Petitioner also alleges that he has not received sufficient
medical care for his condition of pulmonary sarcoidosis. [Id. at 9, 12.]
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus challenges the legality of a petitioner’s custody and seeks
to secure release from that illegal custody. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a district court may
grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” The petitioner bears the burden of
demonstrating that he is in illegal custody. 	See Martinez v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2740-
BJCBJW, 2025 WL 3171738, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that his prolonged detention—to date more than seven months—
violates his Fifth Amendment right to due process. [Petition at 11.] Respondents counter
that the relevant statutory language of § 1225(b)(1) and Supreme Court precedent require
Petitioner’s detention until his removal proceedings are resolved, including his claim for
asylum, and that Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing. [Doc. No. 4 at 4–5.]
Starting first with the statutory language, there can be no dispute that the plain
language of § 1225(b) mandates detention. The Supreme Court has said as much, first in
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 298 (2018) and then in Thuraissigiam. In Jennings,
the Supreme Court reasoned:
Read most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) thus mandate detention of
applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded. 	Section
1225(b)(1) aliens are detained for “further consideration of the application for
asylum,” . . . . Once those proceedings end, detention under § 1225(b) must
end as well. Until that point, however, nothing in the statutory text imposes
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any limit on the length of detention. And neither § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2)
says anything whatsoever about bond hearings.
Id. at 297. 	The Supreme Court affirmed this conclusion in Thuraissigiam, stating that
“[w]hether an applicant who raises an asylum claim receives full or only expedited review,
the applicant is not entitled to immediate release. . . . Applicants who are found to have a
credible fear may 	also 	be detained 	pending 	further consideration 	of their asylum
applications.” 591 U.S. at 111.
Nonetheless, given that Jennings and Thuraissigiam decided only the statutory
question and not the constitutional question, this Court recently held in a similar case “that
§ 1225(b)(1) simply cannot justify practically indefinite civil detention.” L.R.G. v. LaRose,
3:25-CV-3490-CAB-MSB, Doc. No. 13 at 6 (citing Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256
(9th Cir. 2018)). 	The Court adopted the Banda test which considers the following six
factors to determine when detention under § 1225(b)(1) violates due process: (1) the total
length of detention to date, which is the most important factor; (2) the likely duration of
future detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in removal proceedings caused
by the detainee; (5) delays in removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the
likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal. 	Banda v.
McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2019).
The first factor weighs against Petitioner given that he has only been detained for
seven months. See Sibomana v. LaRose, No. 22-CV-933-LL-NLS, 2023 WL 3028093, at
*4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2023) (finding that courts are typically wary of continued custody
without a bond hearing when detention extends beyond one year). As to the second factor,
although Petitioner has an individual merits hearing scheduled for February 2, 2026, it is
currently unclear how long detention could continue; thus, this factor is neutral. The third
factor weighs for Petitioner as he is detained at a secure facility with his movement
restricted and he alleges that the facility is overcrowded and does not provide enough
food—a claim echoed by many other petitioners held at OMDC. [Petition at 9.] The fourth
and fifth factors are neutral as neither side demonstrates any delays. As to the final factor,
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Petitioner was found to have a credible fear of persecution and has submitted an asylum
application, but it has yet to be adjudicated. [Doc. No. 4 at 4–5.] As such, this factor is
neutral. See Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120 (finding sixth factor neutral where petitioner’s
asylum application was on appeal and court had no information to determine whether
petitioner may be removed); cf. LRG, 3:25-CV-3490-CAB-MSB, Doc. No. 13 at 8 (noting
petitioner’s argument that her unique factual scenario meant she would not ultimately be
removed and no opposing argument from the government).
In sum, factors two, four, five, and six are neutral, factor three weighs for Petitioner,
and factor one—the most important—weighs against him. The Court thus concludes that
Petitioner’s continued mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) is not unreasonable such
that due process requires he be given a bond hearing.
Finally, regarding Petitioner’s complaint about medical care, the Supreme Court has
stated that “requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented
in a § 1983 action” rather than a habeas petition which is meant for “[c]hallenges to the
validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration[.]” Muhammad v. Close,
540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004). 	The Court thus finds Petitioner’s argument that he should be
released for alleged insufficient medical care unavailing.1
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court DENIES the Petition for writ of habeas corpus.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 22, 2026
1 Petitioner cites one case in support: Ahn v. INS, 1. F. Supp. 2d 1139 (N.D. Cal. 1998). It appears,
however, that this case does not exist.
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