Kachele, Jr. v. State of California et al

1
25-cv-3458-AGS-MMP
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
William S. KACHELE, Jr.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Jo EL-MAASRI, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 25-cv-3458-AGS-MMP
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION (ECF 9)
Self-represented plaintiff William Kachele, Jr., seeks reconsideration of this Court’s
prior order denying his request for a temporary restraining order. (See ECF 9, 12.) A motion
to reconsider is appropriate only when a court “(1) is presented with newly discovered
evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if
there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist. No. IJ v. ACandS, Inc.,
5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). Kachele offers none of these, so his motion is denied.
In the original order, this Court noted that “[s]ection 1983 requires, among other
things, that any ‘alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.’” (ECF 7,
at 2.) Since Kachele had only pleaded private actions from his landlords, it wasn’t clear
how he would prevail. Thus, the Court determined that his “likelihood of success on the
merits”—a requirement of a temporary restraining order—was low. (See id.) In his
reconsideration motion, he cites several cases for the proposition “that private parties act
under color of state law when they invoke state judicial or enforcement procedures to
deprive property interests.” (See ECF 9, at 5.) But none of those authorities suggest that a
landlord’s threat to sue, without any accompanying state action, meets that standard.
Instead, they require substantially more. For instance, in Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d
380 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit ruled that landlords may act “under color of state
law” when those “landlords, with police aid, used self-help to evict” plaintiffs. Id. at 382
(emphasis added). The Court emphasized that the “color of state law” issue turned on how
“significant” the police involvement was in the action. Id. at 382. The landlords in that case
Case 3:25-cv-03458-AGS-MMP Document 13 Filed 01/22/26 PageID.<pageID>
Page 1 of 3

2
25-cv-3458-AGS-MMP
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
acted under color of state law because they “repeatedly requested aid by the police to effect
the eviction, and the police intervened at every step.” Id. at 385. Similarly, in another case
Kachele relies on—Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982)—“a Clerk of
the state court issued a writ of attachment [for certain property], which was then executed
by the County Sheriff.” Id. at 924. Both cases are far from our facts: The landlords here
allegedly threatened to file an unlawful detainer, but no state actor has done anything yet.
So, these authorities are not a basis for clear error in this Court’s prior ruling.
Similarly, the Court questioned Kachele’s Americans with Disabilities Act causes
of action because “he does not claim to have a disability or otherwise be covered by the
ADA personally, and he cannot sue to protect the rights of others.” (ECF 7, at 2.) Kachele
believes this Court “overlook[ed]” two cases—Langer v. Kiser, 57 F.4th 1085 (9th Cir.
2023), and Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center v. Hospitality Properties Trust
(“CREEC”), 867 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2017)1—which he reads “as Ninth Circuit authority
establishing 	ADA 	standing 	for 	non-disabled 	plaintiffs 	alleging 	discrimination 	by
association or operational harm to public accommodations.” (ECF 9, at 2.) Neither case
stands for that principle. In both cases, the individual plaintiffs had qualifying disabilities.
See Langer, 57 F.4th at 1090 (“Chris Langer is a paraplegic man . . . [who] cannot walk,
so he uses a wheelchair to get around and drives a van that deploys a ramp from the
passenger side.”); CREEC, 867 F.3d at 1097 (“Named Plaintiffs Ann Cupolo-Freeman,
Ruthee Goldkorn, and Julie Reiskin . . . are physically disabled and use wheelchairs for
mobility.”). And the one organizational plaintiff in CREEC was dismissed from the case.
See CREEC, 867 F.3d at 1097 n.2. At any rate, if Kachele is relying on organizational
standing, he has not attempted to meet the many requirements for it. See Food & Drug
1 Kachele cited the non-existent case of “Cupolo-Freeman v. Hospitality Props. Tr.,
881 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2018)” (see ECF 9, at 2), but this Court assumes he meant CREEC.
In CREEC, one plaintiff is “Cupolo-Freeman” (though she is not named first), and the
defendant is “Hospitality Properties Trust.” CREEC, 867 F.3d at 1096–97.
Case 3:25-cv-03458-AGS-MMP Document 13 Filed 01/22/26 PageID.<pageID>
Page 2 of 3

3
25-cv-3458-AGS-MMP
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Admin. 	v. 	Alliance 	for 	Hippocratic 	Med., 	602 	U.S. 	367, 	393 	(2024) 	(discussing
organizational standing).
Finally, he offers purportedly “newly obtained evidence” in the form of two
“Certified Access Specialist (CASp) reports” that he says were “not available with the
original motion.” (ECF 12, at 1–2.) But these reports do not address or alleviate any of the
Court’s concerns. While they provide evidence of alleged violations of the ADA and of
related California regulations, neither report addresses whether Kachele can properly bring
ADA claims nor cures the potential diversity-jurisdiction problems for his state claims.
(See generally ECF 12-1, 12-2.) So, they offer no basis for reconsideration.
The pending reconsideration motion is DENIED.
Dated: January 22, 2026
___________________________
Hon. Andrew G. Schopler
United States District Judge
Case 3:25-cv-03458-AGS-MMP Document 13 Filed 01/22/26 PageID.<pageID>
Page 3 of 3