Ward v. Lovell et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WAYNE WARD,
CDCR #BK-3300,
Plaintiff,
vs.
J. LOVELL; E. GUEVARA;
C. MARTINEY; R. ALLEN;
J. MAGNAR,
Defendants.
Case No.: 25-cv-03341-AJB-DDL
ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL
ACTION AS FRIVOLOUS
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1) AND DENYING
LEAVE TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
AS MOOT
[Doc. Nos. 2, 3]
Plaintiff Wayne Ward, currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional
Facility (“RJD”), and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint (“Compl.”)
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).1 (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff has also filed copies of
1 While Plaintiff used the Court’s form Bivens civil rights complaint, all Defendants are alleged to be state
officials employed by RJD, not federal prison officials. (See Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Because a Bivens action
may not be maintained against state officials, and Plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional rights
by state actors, the Court liberally construes his complaint as if it were filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting court’s duty to construe pro se prisoner’s
pleadings liberally when screening complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A) (citation omitted);
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his CDCR Inmate Statement Reports, as well as a prison certificate authorized by a RJD
senior accounting officer, which the Court construes as requests to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. Nos. 2; 3.) Because Plaintiff raised the same claims against the
same Defendants in a prior civil rights action, however, the Court dismisses this case as
frivolous and denies Plaintiff’s requests to proceed IFP as moot.
I. 	Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, obligates the
Court to review complaints filed by anyone “incarcerated or detained in any facility who
is accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the
terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as
soon as practicable after docketing” and regardless of whether the prisoner prepays filing
fees or moves to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). Pursuant to this provision of
the PLRA, the Court is required to review prisoner complaints which “seek[] redress from
a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” and to dismiss
those, or any portion of those, which are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted,” or which “seek monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b)(1)–(2); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446–47
(9th Cir. 2000); Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011). “The purpose
of § 1915A is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the
expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).
Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1) because it is duplicative of another civil action he previously filed and had
dismissed in this Court. See Ward v. Lovell, No. 3:24-CV-1400-RSH-MSB, 2025 WL
2677395, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2025) (“Ward I”). A court “‘may take notice of
Guerrero v. So, No. 3:20-CV-01117-GPC-MSB, 2020 WL 6449194, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2020)
(construing pro se prisoner’s Bivens complaint against state prison officials as a § 1983 suit).
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proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those
proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212,
1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir.
2002)).
In Ward I, Plaintiff named as Defendants the same five RJD prison officials as he
does in this case, claiming that on January 15, 2023, they “use[d] excessive force on [him]”
by poking him in the shoulder, confronting him in the dayroom, and either slapping,
slinging, or throwing him into a stationary bench. See Compl. at 1, 2; cf. Ward I, 2025 WL
2677395, at *1. Plaintiff further claims the same RJD officials refused to provide him
medical care afterward. See Compl. at 3; cf. Ward I, 2025 WL 2677395, at *1. On May 7,
2025, and again on September 8, 2025, Judge Huie screened Plaintiff’s pleadings in Ward
I, 	but 	dismissed 	them 	sua 	sponte 	and 	in 	their 	entirety 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim. See Ward I, 2025 WL
2677395, at *3 (Doc. No. 9); id., Doc. No. 7.
Plaintiff later submitted his Bivens complaint to the Clerk of the Court in this case
on November 21, 2025, again seeking to sue RJD Officers Lovell, Guevarra, Martiney,
Allen, and Magnar, and again claiming they used excessive force against him on January
15, 2023, by “throw[ing] [him] into a stationary bench of the dayroom,” and telling him he
would “receive medical care later,” which “never happened.” See Compl. at 2, 3. Plaintiff’s
complaint was assigned to this Court as Case No. 3:25-cv-3341-AJB-DDL (hereafter
“Ward II”). But except for the fact that he now seeks to proceed under Bivens in Ward II
instead of under § 1983, as pleaded, the Court finds his claims are nevertheless identical to
those previously alleged and dismissed in Ward I. The two cases, both filed in the Southern
District of California, name the same Defendants, allege the same constitutional violations
arising from the same January 15, 2023 incident at RJD, and are filed by the same Plaintiff.
Compare Ward I, Doc. Nos. 1, 8, with Ward II, Doc. No. 1. A prisoner’s complaint is
considered frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) if it “merely repeats pending or
previously litigated claims.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995)
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(construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Because Plaintiff has already brought and had dismissed the same claims presented in the
instant action against the same Defendants in Ward v. Lovell, No. 3:24-CV-1400-RSH-
MSB, 2025 WL 2677395, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2025), dismissal of this duplicative
and subsequently filed civil case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) is warranted. See
Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105 n.2; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446 n.1; see also Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of
Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n assessing whether the second
action is duplicative of the first, we examine whether the causes of action and relief sought,
as well as the parties or privies to the action, are the same.”), overruled on other grounds
by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008).
II. 	Conclusion
Good cause appearing, the Court DISMISSES this civil action as frivolous pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), DENIES Plaintiff’s leave to proceed IFP (Doc. Nos. 2, 3) as
moot, CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter a judgment of dismissal
and to close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 17, 2026
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