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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JOSEPH MOORE,
CDCR #BD8941,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JEFF MACOMBER, CDCR, DOES 1–10,
DR. SATO,
Defendants.
Case No.: 25-cv-2980-AJB-BLM
ORDER:
(1) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND
1915A(b); and
(2) DENYING MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER (Doc. No. 8)
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Joseph Moore (“Plaintiff” or “Moore”) is a prisoner proceeding pro se with
a civil rights action. On February 4, 2026, the Court granted Moore’s application to proceed
in forma paupers (“IFP”), dismissed the original complaint without prejudice, and denied
her1 motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (See Doc. No. 6.) The Court also
granted Moore leave to file an amended complaint. (Id.)
1 Because Plaintiff identifies as a transgender woman the Court will refer to Plaintiff with female
pronouns in this Order. See, e.g., Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1192 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000).
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On February 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and
another TRO motion. (See Doc. Nos. 7; 8.) As she did in her original complaint, in her
FAC, Moore alleges violations of her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). (Doc. No. 7 at 8–11.) She also raises Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments claims pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 3–7.) In her TRO
motion, Moore again seeks an injunction preventing Defendants from assigning her a
cellmate and requiring Defendants to permanently classify her for a single cell. (See Doc.
No. 8.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses the FAC without prejudice
for failure to state a claim and denies the TRO without prejudice as moot.
II. 	SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)
A. 	Legal Standard
Because Moore is a prisoner proceeding IFP on a civil rights complaint against
government defendants, the Court must screen the FAC and is required to sua sponte
dismiss the case at any time it concludes the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A; Byrd v. Phoenix Police
Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 641–42 (9th Cir. 2018). “The standard for determining whether
Plaintiff 	has 	failed 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	upon 	which 	relief 	can 	be 	granted 	under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for
failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule
12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). While detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice” to state a claim. Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility
standard. Id.
///
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B. 	Plaintiff’s Allegations
Moore states she is a transgender inmate confined at R.J. Donovan Correctional
Facility (“RJD”). (Doc. No. 7 at 3.) She alleges “Macomber, [the Secretary of the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)], Dr. Sato, and Does
1–10 knew [she] faced substantial risk of psychological and physical harm, and knew the
classification of double-celling under CDCR’s egregious housing policy exacerbated her
‘gender dysphoria.” (Id.) Moore states she informed “each Defendant” that if she was
forced into a double cell she would have to disrobe and use the toilet in front of a cellmate,
which would be “humiliating and psychologically harmful” to her. (Id.)
While Moore states she has been improperly classified for “double cell” housing,
she does not allege she has been assigned a cellmate. Rather, she states Defendants have
attempted to “force [her] into double-cell housing,” but does not elaborate on the specific
circumstances of these attempts, nor does she not state when they occurred.2 (Id.) Moore
alleges, however, that Defendants’ failure to classify her for a single cell causes her
emotional distress and makes her fear for her physical safety. (Id. at 3, 10.)
Moore also states that she told Dr. Sato, a psychologist, that she needed single cell
classification and housing due to her vulnerabilities but “he failed to act to protect her.”
(Id. at 4.) Specifically, Dr. Sato failed to recommend that Moore be classified for single
cell status despite Dr. Sato recommending other inmates with mental health conditions be
classified for a single cell. (Id. at 4, 7.) Moore also sent a letter to Macomber, “requesting
he protect Moore yet [Macomber] refused even though he knew [of] the heightened risks
and Moore’s single cell pleas.” (Id. at 4.)
C. 	Discussion
Moore names as defendants: the CDCR itself and Jeff Macomber (Secretary of the
2 	Moore indicates her rights were violated on October 21, 2025, February 2, 2016 and “2017 –
ongoing,” (see Doc. No. 7 at 1), but does not elaborate on what occurred on these dates in the body of her
FAC.
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CDCR), Sato, and Does 1–10 in their individual and official capacities. (Doc. No. 7 at 2.)
Moore alleges Defendants violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). (Id. at 8–11.) She also alleges violations of
the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at
3–7.) Plaintiff seeks money damages and an injunction preventing Defendants “from
enforcing their egregious housing placement policy” and requiring Defendants grant her
“permanent single cell status.” (Id. at 13.)
1. 	ADA and RA
Plaintiff alleges Defendants3 violated her rights under the ADA and RA. (Doc. No.
7 at 8–11.) As discussed in this Court’s previous order, to state a claim under Title II of the
ADA, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) [s]he is an individual with a disability; (2) [s]he is
otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services,
programs, or activities; (3) [s]he was either excluded from participation in or denied the
benefits 	of 	the 	public 	entity’s 	services, 	programs, 	or 	activities, 	or 	was 	otherwise
discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or
discrimination was by reason of [her] disability.” Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d
1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).
To state a claim under Section 504 of RA, a plaintiff must allege she was: (1) an
individual with a disability; (2) otherwise qualified to receive the benefit; (3) denied the
3 	The proper defendant to a Title II ADA claim is the public entity responsible for the alleged
discrimination. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 153 (2006). As such, the CDCR is a proper
Defendant here. Moreover, a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is also, in effect, a
suit against the government entity. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus,
because Plaintiff sues Macomber, Sato, and Does 1–10 in their official capacities, her ADA and RA claims
against them are not improper; however, they are redundant and as such may be subject to dismissal. See
Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 2008)
(when plaintiff names both an officer in his official capacity and the government entity, “the court may
dismiss the officer as a redundant defendant”); see also Hofschneider v. City of Vancouver, 182 F. Supp.
3d 1145, 1150 (W.D. Wash. 2016) (dismissing ADA and RA claims against individual defendants in their
official capacities as redundant because the ADA and RA claims already were asserted against the City
and School District).
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benefits of the program solely by reason of her disability; and (4) the program receives
federal financial assistance. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002).
Because of the similarities between the laws and remedies available, a complaint that
properly states a claim under Title II of the ADA also states a claim under Section 504 of
the RA. Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999).
In dismissing Plaintiff’s original complaint, the Court assumed gender dysmorphia4
to be a qualifying disability but found Moore failed to state a claim under the ADA or RA
because she failed to allege facts showing Defendants denied her a single cell classification
“by reason of [her]” gender dysmorphia. See Guinn, 502 F.3d at 1060 (emphasis added).
In her FAC, Moore again fails to plausibly allege she has been denied a single cell
classification “by reason of her disability.” Moore states that “CDCR has denied her safe
housing and subjected her to discrimination solely based on her disability.” (Doc. No. 7 at
8.) She also states “Defendants . . . violated the ADA by failing to accommodate [her]
disability of gender dysphoria by appropriately housing her due to serious medical needs
and discriminated against her due to her disability.” (Id.) But Moore provides no specific
facts to support these conclusory statements. Such allegations lacking in factual support
constitute an improper “formulaic recitation” of an essential element required to state a
4 	The statutory definition of disability is “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(A). But, pursuant to § 12211, “the term ‘disability
shall not include . . . transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity
disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders[.]’” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12211(b)(1). While this Court is unaware of any controlling law in the Ninth Circuit on whether gender
dysmorphia is a qualifying disability, other federal courts have presumed so. See, e.g., Williams v. Kincaid,
45 F.4th 759 (4th Cir. 2022) (holding that the plaintiff “has plausibly alleged that gender dysphoria does
not fall within the ADA’s exclusion for ‘gender identity disorders not resulting from physical
impairments.’ ”); see also Doe v. Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 730 F. Supp. 3d 1327, 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2024)
(“The ADA does not exclude gender dysphoria from its protection.”); Doe v. Horne, No. 23-cv-00185-
TUC-JGZ, 2024 WL 3091984, at *4 (D. Ariz. June 21, 2024) (finding that gender dysphoria qualifies as
a disability under the ADA and RA); .
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claim under the ADA and RA. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (2009) (stating “formulaic
recitations” of elements of cause of action are insufficient.); see also Ritter v. Hunt, No.
24-CV-087-H-DLC, 2025 WL 1194016, at *2 (D. Mont. Apr. 24, 2025) (“[Plaintiff] does
not allege any facts that, if true, would establish that any defendant discriminated against
him on the basis of his disability.”); Olson v. Carter, No. 2:21-CV-00929-JAM-CKD-PS,
2021 WL 3115126, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2021) (dismissing ADA and RA claims as
conclusory where “ the complaint does not contain any additional supporting facts” to show
the plaintiff was denied benefits “because of [their] disability”); Turner v. Ralkey, No.
3:20-CV-5472-TL-DWC, 2022 WL 18460747, at *18 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 26, 2022)
(dismissing ADA and RA claims when transgender Plaintiff failed to meet her burden to
establish defendants’ decisions regarding her housing were “by reason of” her gender
dysphoria). Thus, Moore has failed to plausibly allege discrimination “by reason of her
disability.” See Guinn, 502 F.3d at 1060.
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims without
prejudice for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1);
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
2. 	42 U.S.C. § 1983
In her FAC, Moore also brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 7 at
3–7.) Moore alleges Defendants Macomber, Sato and Does 1–10 violated her Eighth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights in their individual capacities. (Id. at 5, 7.)
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “both (1) deprivation
of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert
Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).
a. 	Does 1–10
As an initial matter, the Court finds Moore has failed to state a claim against any
Doe Defendant. As discussed in this Court’s previous order, while the use of fictitiously
named “Doe” defendants is generally not favored, Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642
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(9th Cir. 1980), amendment is allowed to substitute true names for fictitiously named
defendants, Merritt v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1989). Here,
however, Moore has again failed to make any specific allegations against any individually
identified Doe Defendant; instead she references “Does 1–10” only collectively. (See Doc.
No. 7 at 3–6.) If Plaintiff wants to state claims against unknown defendants, she must
identify them individually (i.e. Doe 1, Doe 2, etc.) and specify what each separately
identified unknown individual did. She “must allege sufficient facts to show how each doe
defendant individually violated [her] constitutional rights. If [s]he does so, [s]he may be
given leave to obtain the names of doe defendants during discovery and seek leave to
amend to name those defendants.” Finefeuiaki v. Maui Police Dep’t, No. 18-CV-00325-
JAO-KSC, 2018 WL 4839001, at *3 (D. Haw. Oct. 4, 2018) (citing Wakefield v. Thompson,
177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999)).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against “Does 1–10” are dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim against any individual Doe Defendant. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
b. 	Eighth Amendment
Next, Moore fails to state an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against
Defendants Macomber and Sato. The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison
officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” and protect
them from “violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
832–33 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state a failure-to-protect
claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege (1) she was subjected to conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm to her safety; and (2) defendants were deliberately
indifferent to those risks. Id. at 837.
As to the first component, Moore fails to sufficiently allege her “double cell”
classification amounts to a substantial risk of serious harm to her safety. A “mere suspicion
that an attack will occur” is not enough to support a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim.
Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). And here, while Moore has been
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classified for a “double cell,” and she vaguely states that Defendants “attempted to force
her [to] double-cell,” she has not alleged she was ever given a cellmate. (See Doc. No. 7 at
3.) Nor has she alleged sufficient facts to show the mere possibility she may be assigned
an unspecified cellmate in the future amounts to a threat to her safety. “[S]peculative and
generalized fears of harm at the hands of other prisoners do not rise to a sufficiently
substantial risk of serious harm.” Williams v. Wood, 223 Fed. App’x. 670, 671 (9th Cir.
2007) (concluding the district court properly dismissed failure-to-protect claim because the
plaintiff “did not allege that he has been assaulted or threatened with an assault by other
prisoners . . . and his speculative and generalized fears of harm at the hands of other
prisoners do not rise to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm to his future health”);
see also Torres v. Avalos, No. 22-CV-00053-FWS-AGR, 2024 WL 3008864, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 19, 2024) (“It is not enough that Plaintiff feared assault.”).
Second, Moore has also failed to allege sufficient facts to show Macomber and Sato
acted with “deliberate indifference” to her health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To
show deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the official displayed a
subjective indifference “to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d
1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). “Deliberate indifference” is evidenced only when “the official
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Here, while Moore states she informed Macomber and Sato that she feared for her
safety as a transgender inmate if she were to be given a cellmate, she does not allege
sufficient facts to show Macomber or Sato subjectively “drew th[e] inference” that a
“substantial risk of serious harm” to Moore’s existed. See id. And because Moore does not
allege she has been given a cellmate and states no facts regarding any specific or
particularized threat, she has not plausibly alleged Macomber and Sato were deliberately
indifferent to her safety. See Berg, 794 F.2d at 459 (“The deliberate indifference standard
‘does not require that the guard or official believe to a moral certainty that one inmate
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intends to attack another at a given place at a time certain before that officer is obligated to
take steps to prevent such an assault. But, on the other hand, he must have more than a
mere suspicion that an attack will occur.’”); Elias v. Griffin, No. 2:23-CV-02940-MWF-
JC, 2024 WL 4406823, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2024) (finding transgender Plaintiff who
failed to allege she was ever given a cellmate had not shown any Defendant actually and
proximately caused a deprivation or injury and thus failed to state an Eighth Amendment
claim).
The Court therefore DISMISSES Moore’s Eighth Amendment claims against all
Defendants for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1);
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
c. 	Equal Protection
Finally, Moore alleges Defendants Macomber and Sato violated her Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection by failing to ensure she was classified for a single
cell. (Doc. No. 7 at 6–7.) To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff generally must
“show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against [her]
based upon membership in a protected class.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d
1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (“We have
held that § 1983 claims based on Equal Protection violations must plead intentional
unlawful discrimination or allege facts that are at least susceptible of an inference of
discriminatory intent.”). The Ninth Circuit has held that gender identity is at least a “quasi-
suspect class.” Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 2019). Thus,
discrimination on the basis of transgender status is subject to intermediate scrutiny. See id.
at 1201; see also Harrison v. Kernan, 971 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 2020) (adopting
intermediate scrutiny to gender-based equal protection claims arising in prison).
Here, however, Moore has failed to allege discriminatory intent. First, to the extent
Moore alleges cisgender female inmates with mental health issues are given single cells,
while she has been denied one, this is insufficient show discriminatory intent. That
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cisgender female inmates, incarcerated at other prisons,5 with unspecified mental health
issues, may receive a single cell classification, this generalization is insufficient to show
Moore and such cisgender inmates “similarly situated.”
Moreover, Moore has failed to allege any facts showing Defendants are responsible
for her classification status, much less were motivated by discriminatory intent. Plaintiff
has submitted no evidence demonstrating any discriminatory motive underlying her double
cell classification on the part of Macomber or Sato. She merely states Macomber and Sato
are aware that she is transgender and does not want a cellmate due to her fear, anxiety and
need for privacy. Moore then speculates that the failure to provide her a single cell
classification suggests they are discriminating against her based on her gender identity. But
this is insufficient to show discriminatory motive. See Groux v. California Prison Indus.
Auth., No. 2:23-CV-2831-CSK P, 2025 WL 1248797, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2025)
(“Plaintiff speculates that actions were taken based on plaintiff’s transgender identity, but
plaintiff sets forth no facts evidencing discriminatory intent on the part of a particular
defendant.”); Harris v. Holguin, No. 18-CV-10382-DMG-DFM, 2019 WL 7987683, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2019) (“Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that either defendant was
motivated by her gender or transgender status, or that she was treated differently from other
inmates due to her gender or identity as a transgender woman). Moore’s conclusory
allegations about the Defendants’ motives are insufficient to state a claim. See Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (stating that while “detailed factual
allegations” are not required, stating a claim “requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do”).
Finally, Moore appears to suggest the “fail[ure] to comply with SB 132” shows
discriminatory intent. California Senate Bill 132 was codified in Cal. Penal Code § 2606
and states, in relevant part:
5 	RJD, where Moore is incarcerated, houses transgender inmates but does not house cisgender
female inmates.
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(a) An individual incarcerated by the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation who is transgender, nonbinary, or intersex, regardless of
anatomy, shall:
. . . .
(3) Have their perception of health and safety given
serious consideration in any bed assignment, placement, or
programming decision within the facility in which they are
housed 	pursuant 	to 	paragraph 	(3) 	of 	subdivision 	(a) 	or
subdivision (b), including, but not limited to, granting single-cell
status, housing the individual with another incarcerated person
of their choice, or removing the individual or individuals who
pose a threat from any location where they may have access to
the individual who has expressed a safety concern.
Cal. Penal Code § 2606. This section, however, does not require transgender inmates
receive a single cell classification; rather it directs the CDCR to take an inmate’s gender
identity into “serious consideration” when classifying them. Id. And while one of the
options referenced is a single cell assignment, other options include assigning the inmate a
cellmate of their choice or simply removing any threat to safety posed by specific inmates
who may pose a threat. Thus, it is not clear Defendants failed to comply with California
Penal Code § 26066 and as such it is insufficient to show discriminatory intent.
Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s equal protection claim for failure to
state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
D. 	Leave to Amend
Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants her one final opportunity to amend
her complaint. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district
6 	To the extent that Plaintiff alleges a violation of California Senate Bill 132, the Court notes that a
violation of state law or CDCR rules and policies alone is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under
Section 1983. See Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Section 1983
requires [plaintiff] to demonstrate a violation of federal law, not state law.”); see also Elias v. Griffin,
2024 WL 4406823, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2024) (stating an alleged violation of the “penal code sections
that codified California Senate Bill 132” alone is insufficient to § 1983 claim).
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court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely
clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting
Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)).
IV. 	MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Along with her FAC, Plaintiff filed a second TRO motion in which she seeks an
order directing Defendants to “cease all attempts to double-cell Plaintiff.7 (Doc. No. 8 at
8.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) governs the issuance of a TRO. Such injunctive
relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22
(2008) (citation omitted).
As with Plaintiff’s previous TRO motion, her current Motion for TRO has been
rendered moot because Plaintiff’s FAC has been dismissed for the reasons discussed above.
The Court cannot grant Plaintiff injunctive relief because it has no personal jurisdiction
over any Defendant at this time. 8 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1), (d)(2); Zepeda v. I.N.S., 753
F.2d 719, 727‒28 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Goggin v. Williams, 2025 WL 3034073, at *4
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025) (denying pro se plaintiff’s TRO as moot where his complaint
failed 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	and 	required 	sua 	sponte 	dismissal 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)); Youssef v. Youssef, 2022 WL 5287776, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2022) (“Since
there is no basis for federal jurisdiction, it would be improper to consider the merits of
Plaintiff’s motion for restraining order.”); Olajide v. Brown, 2018 WL 3328227, at *3
7 	The Court again notes that the FAC lacks any specific allegation regarding any attempts by any
Defendant to assign her a cellmate. (See Doc. No. 7.)
8 	In addition, to obtain a TRO or a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff “must establish that [she] is
likely to succeed on the merits, that [he] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in [her] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Herb
Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2013). And here, because
Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state a claim, she has necessarily failed to show a likelihood of success on the
merits of her claims, or even a “serious question” as to her claims, to justify preliminary injunctive relief.
See Pimental v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]t an irreducible minimum the moving
party must demonstrate a fair chance of success on the merits, or questions serious enough to require
litigation.”) (cleaned up).
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(N.D. Cal. July 6, 2018) (dismissing the complaint and denying the TRO motion as moot).
Therefore, the Court DENIES the TRO Motion (Doc. No. 8) without prejudice as moot.
V. 	CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Accordingly, the Court:
1. 	DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint in its entirety without
prejudice for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).
2. 	DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. No. 8)
without prejudice as moot.
3. 	GRANTS Plaintiff sixty (60) days leave from the date of this Order in which
to file a Second Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted in this
Order. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without
reference to her original Complaint. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v.
Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading
supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012)
(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended
pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).
If Plaintiff fails to timely file a Second Amended Complaint, the Court will enter a
final Order dismissing this civil action based both on failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), and
failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v.
Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of
the opportunity to fix her complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the
complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 26, 2026
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