Ahmed v. County of San Diego et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MOHSEN AHMED,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 25cv1920-LL-MMP
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT
[ECF No. 15]
Before the Court is Defendants’1 Motion to Dismiss pro se Plaintiff Mohsen
Ahmed’s (“Plaintiff”) First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 15. This matter is fully
briefed, and the Court deems it suitable for determination on the papers and without oral
argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the FAC is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On July 28, 2025, Plaintiff Mohsen Ahmed, proceeding pro se, sued Defendant
County of San Diego and six County of San Diego officials and employees in their official
1 Defendants include: (1) County of San Diego, a public entity; (2) Ebony Shelton, in her official capacity
as Chief Administrative Officer; (3) Claudia Silva, in her official capacity as County Counsel; (4) Cynthia
Lerma, in her official and individual capacities; (5) Richard McCarvell, in his official and individual
capacities; (6) Ziad Aswad, in his official capacity as Contracting Officer Representative; (7) Terra
Lawson-Remer, in her official and individual capacities as County Supervisor. See FAC.
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(and some in their individual) capacities. ECF No. 1. On August 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed
the operative FAC with a demand for a jury trial, against the same seven Defendants. ECF
No. 10. On August 27, 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss the FAC pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 15. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition
to the Motion [ECF No. 16] and Defendants filed a Reply [ECF No. 18]. The following
allegations are from Plaintiff’s FAC.
Plaintiff 	owns 	a 	general 	construction 	contracting 	company 	called 	Tiger
Construction, LLC (“Tiger Construction”). FAC ¶ 21. Since 2020, Tiger Construction has
participated in multiple public solicitations administered by Defendant County of San
Diego, and alleges that “each time [he] faced disparate treatment not afforded to similarly
situated non-minority contractors.” Id. ¶ 21. Defendant County of San Diego nullified
several of these public solicitations, or “bids,” when Tiger Construction was identified as
the “apparent low bidder.” See id. ¶¶ 36–37, 44–45, 53–56, 72. Defendants stated Tiger
Construction’s bids were “non-responsive” and therefore rendered it ineligible for bidding.
See id. ¶¶ 37–38, 45, 56, 72. Plaintiff regularly contacted Defendants to express concerns
about their decision-making process. Id. ¶¶ 27, 31, 33, 61. Defendants’ communications to
Plaintiff about their actions were either vague and unsupported or went unexplained. Id. ¶¶
25, 52, 65. At the same time, Plaintiff was performing other contracts with the Defendants.
Id. ¶¶ 35, 78. Following a change of staff with the Defendant County of San Diego,
Contracting Office Representative (“COR”), Plaintiff alleges that he was met with
inconsistent contract interpretation and administration that was not applied to other
contractors. Id. ¶¶ 82–85, 90,122.
These alleged events form the basis for Plaintiff’s claims for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
equal protection violations based on Plaintiff’s “race, ethnicity, and status as the owner of
a certified minority-owned business.” Id. ¶ 121. Plaintiff also purports to bring a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for procedural due process violations based on his “constitutionally
protected 	property 	interests 	in 	contract 	awards, 	performance 	opportunities, 	and
participation in public procurements.” Id. ¶ 127. Next, Plaintiff alleges a claim under 42
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U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment violations based on his “engaging in protected
activity” by “reporting suspected discrimination to County officials, contacting elected
members of the Board of Supervisors, filing administrative bid protests, and seeking
redress through available internal and external channels.” Id. ¶ 133. Finally, Plaintiff brings
a Monell claim against the County, alleging his constitutional rights were violated based
on the County’s policies, practices, and customs. Id. ¶ 140.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Parties may move to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191,
1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring Rule 12(b)(6) to “be read in conjunction with Rule
8,” which requires a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief).
To survive this motion, a complaint must have “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although
“allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party,” courts are not required to accept as true “allegations that contradict
matters properly subject to judicial notice” or “allegations that are merely conclusory,
unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State
Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
This standard is ultimately a “liberal” one, especially when the action has been filed
“pro se.” See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976). Still, even under a “liberal
interpretation,” courts “may not supply elements of the claim that were not initially pled.”
See Ivey v. Bd. Of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
III. 	DISCUSSION
a. Standing
The Court will first address standing as it is a threshold matter in this case.
Defendants argue that “Plaintiff lacks standing under the doctrine of prudential standing to
assert the FAC’s claims because they are based on events that implicate only the legal
rights and interests of his company, Tiger, rather than his own personal legal rights and
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interests.” Motion at 15.
The doctrine of prudential standing requires that a plaintiff “generally must assert
his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or
interests of third parties.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see also Ray Charles
Found v. Robinson, 795 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2015). Prudential standing requires
courts to consider “whether the alleged injury is more than a ‘mere generalized grievance,’
whether the plaintiff is asserting her own rights or the rights of third parties, and whether
the claim ‘falls within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the constitutional
guarantee in question.’” Alaska Right to Life Pol. Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840,
840-49 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Stewart, 702 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1983)).
Plaintiff argues that he “asserts his own constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
not derivative corporate claims.” Oppo. at 5. Specifically, Plaintiff argues:
The FAC alleges that Defendants excluded Plaintiff from equal participation
in County contracting, retaliated against him personally for protected speech,
and deprived him of fair notice and due process. These are individual
constitutional harms, including reputational injury, loss of equal opportunity
to compete, and chilling of protected petitioning activity, all of which are
redressable under § 1983.
Compl. ¶ 17. Plaintiff also argues that the “Tiger LA” case is inapposite. Id. ¶ 18 (citing
Tiger Construction LLC v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles, 2023 WL 12007340 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 8, 2023) (hereinafter “Tiger LA”)). In support thereof, Plaintiff argues:
That case involved a single lost bid and alleged harms belonging solely to an
LLC. Here, Plaintiff alleges a five-year pattern of systemic discrimination and
retaliation directed specifically at him as the owner and representative of a
certified minority-owned contractor. (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff
further alleges exclusion even where other contractors, such as C&C Glass
and F&L Gates, were allowed to proceed under more favorable treatment
(internal citation omitted).
Compl. ¶ 18.
Plaintiff’s arguments are unfounded. Although Plaintiff attempts to argue in a
conclusory manner that he asserts his claims “in an individual capacity for violations of his
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personal constitutional rights, the damages [sic] which are distinct from and in addition to
any injury to Tiger Construction, LLC,” it is evident from the allegations in the FAC that
the harm is to Plaintiff’s business. Compl. ¶ 4. For example, Plaintiff states that “Tiger
Construction, LLC” was “the contracting entity in several of the described transactions”
and describes Defendants’ contract-related behavior as causing Plaintiff “significant
economic harm,” disruption to his “business operations,” and irreparable damage to his
“professional reputation.” Id. ¶¶ 2, 4. Plaintiff also asserts that “the County’s actions have
deprived Plaintiff of property interests in the awarded contracts and bidding opportunities
[and] disrupted his business operations.” Id. ¶ 17. On their face, the allegations that form
the basis of Plaintiff’s causes of action concern his business. Plaintiff’s Opposition also
fails to explain why the harm is personal to him. Like his FAC, Plaintiff’s Opposition
asserts bare, conclusive statements that he suffered “reputational injury, loss of equal
opportunity to compete, and chilling of protected petitioning activity.” Oppo at 5.
Further, Plaintiff attempts to distinguish the LA Tiger case and argues that case
concerns only one bid while the facts here allege a five-year pattern of discrimination.
Compl. ¶ 18. However, the allegations that form the basis for the alleged injury here are
still allegations about harms to Tiger Construction—albeit over a longer period. See id. ¶¶
2, 4, 17.
Plaintiff’s reliance on Austin v. Univ. of Oregon, 925 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2019) to
support his standing claim is misplaced. Oppo. at 6. Plaintiff cites to Austin in his
Opposition in support of his argument that “Ninth Circuit precedent confirms that
individuals alleging discriminatory exclusion from government contracting processes may
assert personal constitutional harms.” Id. (citing Austin v. Univ. of Oregon, 925 F.3d at
1138-39). In Austin, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for gender
discrimination under Title IX. Id. The plaintiffs were male students at the University of
Oregon. Id. at 1135. After a female student accused the plaintiffs of “forcing her to engage
in nonconsensual sexual sex,” the University “proceeded with a formal disciplinary
process” against 	the 	plaintiffs 	and 	ultimately 	suspended 	them. Id. at 1135-36. 	The
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plaintiffs brought suit against the University, alleging that it discriminated against them on
the basis of their sex by “disciplin[ing] male students for sexual misconduct but never
female students.” Id. at 1136, 1138. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to adequately
state a claim for discrimination. The court explained that “the complaint does not claim
that any female University students have been accused of comparable misconduct, and thus
fails to allege that similarly situated students—those accused of sexual misconduct—are
disciplined unequally.” Id. at 1138. These facts are not relevant or applicable to the facts
in this case which require the Court to determine whether the FAC’s claims involve events
that implicate only the legal rights and interests of Plaintiff’s company or his own personal
legal rights and interests.
Additionally, courts in the Ninth Circuit have held that “[i]n general, shareholders
lack standing to assert an individual § 1983 claim based on harm to the corporation in
which they own shares.” RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1057 (9th Cir.
2002); see also Erlich v. Glasner, 418 F.2d 226, 228 (9th Cir.1969) (holding a shareholder
of a corporation could not assert a claim on behalf of their business for injuries to the
company). The reasoning of these holdings has also been applied to limited liability
companies. See Elizabeth Retail Props. LLC v. KeyBank Nat. Ass’n, 83 F.Supp.3d 972, 986
(D. Or. 2015) (recognizing the “shareholder standing rule” has been applied to members
of LLCs); see also Woods View II, LLC v. Kitsap Cnty, 484 Fed. Appx. 160, 161 (9th Cir.
2012) (finding the sole member of an LLC lacked standing to bring claims against Kitsap
County because she was “not injured directly and independently of the limited liability
company.”); see also Balboa Cap. Corp. v. Innovix Med. PLLC, No. 8:19-cv-01145-JLS-
DLM, 2020 WL 1969763, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2020) (finding third-party plaintiff’s
allegations that she was personally induced to sign an agreement on behalf of the company
she owned insufficient to establish that the harm she suffered was independent of the harm
suffered by the company).
In sum, at this procedural posture, Plaintiff fails to successfully meet the threshold
for prudential standing because the allegations that form the basis of the operative
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Complaint concern harms to his company, Tiger Construction, and not Plaintiff personally.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with leave to amend.2
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff lacks prudential
standing to bring this action on behalf of Tiger Construction. Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint to
cure the deficiencies in this Order within twenty-one (21) days. Additionally, to the extent
that an amended complaint is filed, Plaintiff must sufficiently serve process on all
Defendants, including any individual-capacity defendants. If Plaintiff fails to file an
amended complaint by the deadline set herein, the Court may enter a final order dismissing
this case. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not
take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the
dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 18, 2026
2 To the extent that Plaintiff chooses to bring an amended complaint on behalf of Tiger Construction,
Plaintiff is reminded that he cannot represent his company pro se. The Civil Local Rules provide that
“[o]nly natural persons representing their individual interests in propria persona may appear in court
without representation by an attorney…. All other parties, including corporations, partnerships, and other
legal entities, may appear in court only through an attorney permitted to practice pursuant to Civil Local
Rule 83.3.”
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