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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ASHLEY PETERSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and
DOES 1-100,
Defendants.
Case No.: 25-cv-01916-H-SBC
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND
[Doc. No. 6.]
On December 2, 2025, Defendant United States of America (“the United States”)
filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Ashley Peterson, Mark Peterson, II, and C.P.’s
complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction and Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. 	(Doc. No. 6.) 	On
December 29, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to Defendant’s motion to
dismiss. 	(Doc. No. 9.) 	On January 5, 2026, the United States filed its reply. 	(Doc. No.
12.) On January 5, 2026, the Court took the matter under submission. (Doc. No. 11.) For
the reasons below, the Court grants the United States’s motion to dismiss.
/ / /
/ / /
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Background
The following factual background is taken from the allegations in Plaintiffs’
complaint and the United States’s Request for Judicial Notice.
On July 29, 2023, three individuals rented two privately owned, personal watercrafts
for use in Mission Bay in San Diego, California. 	(Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 27-29.) 	At
approximately 1:52 p.m., one of the personal watercrafts struck and killed S.P. (the
“Decedent”), a twelve-year-old child who was on a stand-up paddle board near De Anza
Cove in Mission Bay. 	(Id. ¶¶ 40, 48, 49.) 	The operator of the personal watercraft that
struck S.P. was arrested, charged, and ultimately pled guilty to vehicular manslaughter with
gross negligence. (Doc. No. 5-4, Ex. D; Doc. No. 10 at 6.)
On June 17, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a personal injury and wrongful death suit in
Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, against the City of San Diego, the
County of San Diego, the State of California, various employees of those public entities,
the operators of the personal watercrafts, the owners and lessors of the personal watercrafts,
and the website through which the rental was arranged. (Doc. No. 6 at 11.)
On July 28, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the United States and Does 1-
100. 	(Doc. No. 1, Compl.) 	Plaintiff Ashley Peterson is S.P.’s surviving natural mother
and the appointed administrator of the estate of S.P. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 4.) Plaintiff Mark Peterson,
II is S.P.’s surviving natural father, and Plaintiff C.P. is S.P.’s surviving natural brother.
(Id. ¶¶ 5, 6.) Plaintiffs all reside in the County of San Diego. (Id. ¶¶ 3-6.)
Plaintiffs claim that the United States, through the United States Army Corps of
Engineers and the United States Coast Guard, maintains, operates, controls, monitors,
patrols, oversees, regulates, or administers the waters and marinas of Mission Bay, San
Diego in conjunction with the City of San Diego and the State of California. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 22.)
Plaintiffs also assert that the United States is responsible for placing and maintaining “aids
of navigation” throughout Mission Bay, pursuant to an agreement with the State of
California and the City of San Diego. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 25, 26.)
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Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges claims for: (1) negligence and other wrongful conduct
under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30901 et seq.; (2) negligence and other
wrongful conduct under the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. § 31101 et seq.; and, in the
alternative, (3) negligence and other wrongful conduct under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) et seq. (Id. ¶¶ 58-80.) In particular, Plaintiffs allege the United States
failed to demarcate or separate hazardous areas, adequately regulate or prevent dangerous
and unauthorized personal watercraft rentals, provide appropriate warnings or signage,
patrol or enforce safety hazards in Mission Bay, and issue adequate guidance, training, or
materials for rental activity in Mission Bay. (Id. ¶¶ 44-47.)
By the present motion, the United States moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Suits in
Admiralty claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and
Plaintiffs’ Public Vessel Act and Federal Tort Claims Act claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 6 at 8, 13-24.)
Discussion
I. 	Legal Standards
A. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) Standard for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 	United States v. Mark, 530 F.3d
799, 810 (9th Cir. 2008). “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.
Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Steel Co.
v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). Subject matter jurisdiction
cannot be waived and when a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the action must
be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the
court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action. Assoc. of Am. Med. Colls. v. United
States, 217 F.3d 770, 778–79 (9th Cir. 2000).
A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual. 	White v. Lee, 227
F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). 	In a facial attack, the challenger asserts “that the
allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal
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jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a
factual attack, the challenger “disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves,
would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” 	Id. 	In resolving a factual challenge, the
court 	“may 	review 	evidence 	beyond 	the 	complaint 	without 	converting
the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id.
Where, as here, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is brought alongside a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
it is appropriate for the court to first consider and address the disputed jurisdictional issues
before analyzing the merits of the claims. See Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1068
(9th Cir. 2011) (“The jurisdictional question of standing precedes, and does not require,
analysis of the merits.” (citation omitted)).
B. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Standard for Failure to State a Claim
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of the pleadings and allows a court to dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Conservation Force v. Salazar,
646 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.
2001)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading that states a claim
for relief contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” The function of this pleading requirement is to “‘give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
A complaint will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 	“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” 	Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “While legal conclusions
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can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”
Id. at 679. 	Accordingly, dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper where the claim
“lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”
Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008); see Los
Angeles Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2017).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court must “‘accept the
factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.’” Los Angeles Lakers, 869 F.3d at 800 (quoting AE ex rel. Hernandez v.
Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012)). 	But a court need not accept “legal
conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Further, it is improper for a court to assume
the claimant “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated
the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc.
v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
A court may consider documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and
items that are proper subjects of judicial notice. 	See Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593
F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). 	If the court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a
claim, it must then determine whether to grant leave to amend. See Doe v. United States,
58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995); Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th
Cir. 2010). 	Dismissal without leave to amend is proper if it is clear that the complaint
could not be saved by amendment. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048,
1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
II. 	Analysis
The United States moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Public Vessel Act (“PVA”) and
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of
jurisdiction and Plaintiffs’ Suits in Admiralty (“SAA”) claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 6 at 8, 13-24.) The Court will address each
claim in the order set out by the United States.
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A. 	Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss
The United States’ motion to dismiss makes a facial jurisdictional attack on
Plaintiffs’ PVA and FTCA claims. (Doc. No. 6 at 13-14.) The United States asserts that
neither statute provides an applicable waiver of sovereign immunity to invoke federal
jurisdiction. (Id.)
The concept of sovereign immunity is the idea that the United States cannot be sued
unless it has specifically consented. Daniels v. United States, No.: 3-16-cv-02077-BTM-
DHB, 2017 WL 3478765, *2 (S.D. Cal Aug. 11, 2017) (citing Price v. United States, 174
U.S. 	373, 	375-76 	(1899)). 	The 	presence 	of 	such 	consent 	is 	a 	“prerequisite 	for
jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983); see also United States
v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). For the United States to consent to suit, a waiver
of sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed by Congress and any conditions
Congress attaches to a waiver of sovereign immunity “must be strictly observed, and
exceptions thereto are not to be lightly implied.” 	Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of
Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983).
i. 	Plaintiffs’ Public Vessel Act (“PVA”) Claim
Plaintiffs contend that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the PVA, 46 U.S.C. §
31101 et seq. 	(Doc. No. 1, Compl. 67.) 	Plaintiffs argue that “[t]o the extent the public
vessels of the United States . . . were involved in the creation or exacerbation of the
dangerous condition alleged herein, this cause of action is brought under the Public Vessels
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 31101 et seq.” (Id.)
Under the PVA, the United States’ sovereign immunity is waived in “civil actions
in personam in admiralty against the United States for damages caused by a public vessel
of the United States.” 	46 U.S.C. § 31102(a)(1). 	The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the
phrase “damages caused by a public vessel” broadly “to encompass all tort and contract
claims ‘arising out of the possession or operation of the ship.’” Tobar v. United States,
639 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomason v. United States, 184 F.2d 105,
107 (9th Cir. 1950)).
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Here, the invocation of the PVA as an alleged basis for jurisdiction is inappropriate
under the facts alleged. 	The complaint does not identify any public vessels owned or
operated by the United States that caused damage or created or exacerbated the dangerous
conditions alleged. 	(See generally Doc. No. 1, Compl.) 	Rather, the complaint only
identifies two privately owned vessels, a 2022 Yamaha EX Deluxe WaveRunner and a
Goplus 10 ft white and blue inflatable standup paddle board, as the vessels that caused the
damage at issue. (Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 28, 37.) Further, the complaint does not allege
that any person or persons acting on behalf of or in the name of the United States ever took
possession of the identified vessels. As such, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that any public
vessels of the United States within the meaning of the PVA were involved in the incident
such that a waiver of sovereign immunity would be applicable. Therefore, the PVA does
not provide a proper basis for federal jurisdiction, and the Plaintiffs’ PVA claim must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction with prejudice.
ii. 	Plaintiffs’ Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) Claim
In the alternative, Plaintiffs contend that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the
FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). (Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 74.) Plaintiffs assert that the United
States had a “duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation and oversight of navigable
waterways under its control or shared management,” and the United States “breached these
duties by, among other things, failing to regulate unauthorized and unsafe PWC [personal
watercraft] rental activity . . . .” (Id. ¶¶ 76-77.)
The FTCA waives 	the 	United 	States’ 	sovereign 	immunity 	for 	certain 	torts
committed by federal employees. 28 U.S.C. § 1346. The FTCA does not apply to “[a]ny
claim for which a remedy is provided by chapter 309 or 311 of title 46 relating to claims
or suits in admiralty against the United States.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2680(d); see also Smith v.
United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993). 	As such, jurisdiction under the FTCA and the
admiralty statutes is mutually exclusive. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d).
Here, Plaintiffs allege facts for an incident that unequivocally occurred upon
navigable waters. 	(Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 36-43.) 	A collision between watercrafts on
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navigable waters falls under admiralty jurisdiction. 	Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v.
Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206 (1996). Further, the Complaint does not allege any land-based
misconduct by the United States. 	Because the facts of the present action fall within the
Court's admiralty jurisdiction, the waiver of sovereign immunity must come from the SAA
or the PVA. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d); see also Harrington v. U.S., 748 F.Supp. 919 (D.P.R.
1990).
As neither the PVA nor the FTCA contain a proper waiver of sovereign immunity,
the two causes of action do not supply grounds for this Court to exercise jurisdiction. As
such, the two causes of action brought pursuant to the PVA and FTCA must be dismissed.
B. 	Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
Having dismissed Plaintiffs’ PVA and FTCA claims for lack of jurisdiction, the
Court must now consider whether the Plaintiffs’ SAA claim for negligence should be
dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The United States does not dispute that the
Court has admiralty jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ SAA claim.
i. 	Request for Judicial Notice
As an initial matter, the United States filed a request for judicial notice of certain
documents and facts. (Doc. No. 5.) Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take
judicial notice of a fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally
known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily
determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid.
201(b); Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018). Proper
subjects of judicial notice may include information on government websites, legislative
documents, matters of public record, and publicly accessible websites. See Fed. R. Evid.
201; see also, Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1094 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012); Daniels-Hall
v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is appropriate to take judicial
notice of this information, as it was made publicly available by government entities.”).
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court is generally limited to
the four corners of the complaint. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir.
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2003). However, a court may consider “documents attached to the complaint, documents
incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice.” Id.; see also Lee
v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] court may take judicial
notice of ‘matters of public record.’”). A court may also “take judicial notice of matters of
public 	record 	without 	converting 	a motion to dismiss into 	a 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment,” but it “cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public
records.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018).
The United States requests the Court take judicial notice of seven documents
containing information derived from official government agency websites and matters of
public record. 	(Doc. No. 5.) 	On December 29, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an objection to the
United States’ request as to all exhibits. (Doc. No. 10.) Plaintiffs do not generally oppose
judicial notice of the existence of certain public statutes, municipal codes, and other
government documents. (Doc. No. 10 at 2.) Rather, Plaintiffs object to the extent that the
United States seeks to “improperly rely on noticed materials…to attempt to establish facts
which are disputed and which will be the subject of discovery…” or “establish[] lack of
duty”. (Id. at 2, 6.) On January 5, 2026, the United States filed its reply. (Doc. No. 13.)
The United States’ request for judicial notice is granted as to the following
documents:
(1) In 1945, the Legislature of the State of California granted to the City of San Diego
all right and title to Mission Bay located in San Diego. (Doc. No. 5-1, Ex. A.) The
document is a publicly available legislative document whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.
(2) The City of San Diego Municipal Code, Chapter 6, Article 3, (the “Code”) governs
the recreational use of Mission Bay. 	(Doc. No. 5-2, Ex. B.) 	The Court will take
judicial notice of §§ 63.20, 63.20.1-3, 63.20.6, 63.25.2, and 63.25.4 of the Code.
The document is publicly available and derived from an official government agency
website. Its accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
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(3) The Coast Guard Light List for 2023 includes five aids to navigation for Mission
Bay, none of which are in the interior waters of Mission Bay. (Doc. No. 5-5, Ex. E.)
The document is an official publication of the Coast Guard and is publicly available.
Its accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
The Court notes that Plaintiffs cite to Cal. Const., Art. X; § 3, Cal. Civ. Code § 670; and
In re Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC in their objection to requests (1) and (2). Nevertheless,
neither Cal. Const., Art. X, § 31 nor Cal. Civ. Code § 6702 call the above judicially noticed
facts into question. 	Similarly, In re Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC merely establishes
Mission Bay as meeting the definition of “navigable waters” for purposes of admiralty
jurisdiction. 570 F.3d 1125, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). In re Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC does
not touch upon who owns, controls, governs, or maintains Mission Bay.
The United States requested judicial notice of four other documents. (See generally
Doc. No. 5-3, 4, 6, 7, Ex. C, D, F, G.) Because the Court does not rely on these documents
in reaching its conclusion below, the Court denies as moot these remaining requests.
ii. 	Plaintiffs’ Suits in Admiralty Act (“SAA”) Negligence Claim
The SAA permits actions against the United States in cases “in which, if a vessel
were privately owned or operated . . . or if a private person or property were involved, a
civil action in admiralty could be maintained.” 46 U.S.C. § 30903(a). The SAA “does not
itself provide a cause of action. It merely operates to waive the sovereign immunity of the
United States in admiralty suits.” 	Dearborn v. Mar Ship Operations, Inc., 113 F.3d 995,
1 Cal. Const., Art. X, § 3 states that “[a]ll tidelands within two miles of any incorporated city, city and
county, or town in this State, and fronting on the water of any harbor, estuary, bay, or inlet used for the
purposes of navigation, shall be withheld from grant or sale to private persons, partnerships, or
corporations…” It does not undermine the fact that Mission Bay was granted to the City of San Diego,
which is not a private person, partnership, or corporation, or that the City governs the recreational use of
Mission Bay.
2 Cal. Civ. Code § 670 states that “[t]he State is the owner of all land below tide water, and below
ordinary high-water mark, bordering upon tide water within the State; of all land below the water of a
navigable lake or stream; of all property lawfully appropriated by it to its own use; of all property
dedicated to the State; and of all property of which there is no other owner.” It does not undermine the
fact that Mission Bay was granted to the City of San Diego or that the City governs the recreational use
of Mission Bay.
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996 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997). 	As such, Plaintiffs must establish a cognizable admiralty claim
against the United States.
Negligence 	is 	an 	actionable 	wrong 	under 	general maritime law. 	See
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 1 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 5:4 (6th ed. Nov. 2020); Leathers v.
Blessing, 105 U.S. 626, 629 (1881) (recognizing negligence under general maritime law).
To establish negligence under admiralty law, a plaintiff must prove the same elements as a
common law negligence claim by a preponderance of the evidence. 	Morris v. Princess
Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1070 (9th Cir. 2001). 	The elements include duty, breach,
causation, and damages. Id. 	“In admiralty the duty of care may be derived from three
basic sources: (1) duly enacted laws, regulations, and rules; (2) custom; and (3) the dictates
of reasonableness and prudence.” Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law
§ 5:4 (6th ed. 2023).
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that the United States’ negligent and other wrongful
acts and omissions created, exacerbated, or contributed to the conditions that caused the
fatal incident of Decedent. (Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 64.) In particular, Plaintiffs allege that
the United States is responsible for public safety in Mission Bay and breached its duty of
care to Decedent by failing to adequately regulate, patrol, and enforce personal watercraft
rentals and Mission Bay’s waterways. (Id. ¶¶ 62, 63.) The United States’ motion to dismiss
asserts that Plaintiffs’ negligence claim does not satisfy Rule 12(b)(6) because the United
States does not owe a duty of care to Decedent. (Doc. No. 6 at 15-23.) The Court agrees.
Since 1945, Mission Bay has been under the exclusive management and control of
the City of San Diego. 1945 Cal Stat 627 (Doc. No. 5-1, Ex. A). In its efforts to govern
the recreational use of Mission Bay, the City of San Diego established Municipal Code,
Chapter 6, Article 3. See San Diego, Cal., Municipal Code § 63.20 et seq. (Beach Areas –
Authority and Control) (2025) (Doc. No. 5-2, Ex. B). The Code specifies that San Diego
Harbor Police and certain designated lifeguards are responsible for enforcing ordinances
and regulations pertaining to recreational water activities in Mission Bay. Id. at §§ 63.20.1-
2, 63.20.6. While the United States concedes that it has jurisdiction to enforce federal laws
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in Mission Bay, Plaintiffs provide no factual allegations that suggest that the United States
has a duty under any law, regulation, or rule to regulate the recreational use of Mission Bay
or to enforce San Diego’s Municipal Code pertaining to the recreational use of Mission
Bay. Id.; (Doc. No. 12 at 6.)
Moreover, the United States is not liable for any recreational use hazards that may
or may not exist in Mission Bay due to the United States’ lack of control over Mission Bay.
In its motion to dismiss, the United States points out that under premise liability, neither
the United States nor the Coast Guard has any duty to Decedent because they do not
exercise control over Mission Bay. 	(Id. at 15.) 	Fundamental to premises liability is
occupation, control, and ownership of the premises. See Restatement (Third) of Torts § 49
cmt. b (2012). Here, Mission Bay has been under the exclusive management and control
of the City of San Diego since 1945, meaning the United States does not occupy, control,
or own Mission Bay in any capacity. See 1945 Cal Stat 627 (Doc. No. 5-1, Ex. A). Lacking
control of Mission Bay, the United States cannot be held liable for alleged recreational use
hazards in its premises.
Plaintiffs’ opposition also argues that the “Undertaking Doctrine” applies and
creates a duty on the United States towards the Decedent because the Coast Guard oversees
the aids to navigation near De Anza Cove in Mission Bay. 	(Doc. No. 9 at 18-19.) 	The
Court disagrees. 	Plaintiffs assert that the “Undertaking Doctrine” establishes liability in
cases where “the government undertakes to render services necessary for the protection of
others and performs those services negligently.” (Doc. No. 9 at 18) (citing Indian Towing
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955).) As the United States points out, undertaking
applied in Indian Towing because the Coast Guard operated the lighthouse at issue. 	See
Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 62. 	Here, the United States does not operate any of the
private aids to navigation relevant to the incident or near De Anza Cove. (See Doc. No. 5-
5, Ex. E.) 	As noted in the Coast Guard Light List, the official publication of all federal
aids to navigation placed and maintained by the Coast Guard, the five federal aids to
navigation for Mission Bay are not located in the interior waters of Mission Bay or near
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De Anza Cove. (Id.) As such, none of Plaintiffs referenced private aids to navigation are
operated or maintained by the United States. 	Without more, Plaintiffs fail to allege any
facts that establish that the United States renders services related to the private aids of
navigation for purposes of the Undertaking Doctrine. Thus, the United States has no duty
or liability under this theory.
Based upon the facts alleged in the complaint and the facts contained in the judicially
noticeable documents, Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts or information that allows
this Court to draw the reasonable inference that the United States owes the Decedent a duty
of care. 	Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead sufficient facts to satisfy the
elements for a theory of negligence, and Plaintiffs’ claim must be dismissed.
Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court grants the United States’ motion to dismiss, and the
Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ complaint.3 The Court grants Plaintiffs leave to amend as to
any issue that Plaintiffs contend can be cured by amendment. 	Plaintiffs must file its
amended complaint within thirty (30) days from the date this order is filed if it can do so.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 12, 2026
MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
3 Because the Court grants the United States’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court will not address C.P.’s lack
of standing to bring a wrongful death cause of action for S.P.’s death at length. See Cal. Civ. Proc. §
377.60(c) (2025).
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