Leonard v. County of San Diego

1
25cv0842-BTM (DEB)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JASON THOR LEONARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO and
UNKNOWN DEPUTIES,
Defendant.
Case No.: 25cv0842-BTM (DEB)
ORDER DISMISSING SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT
WITHOUT FURTHER LEAVE TO
AMEND FOR FAILURE TO STATE
A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)
On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff Jason Thor Leonard, a pretrial detainee at the San Diego
Central Jail at the time of the events but released from custody prior to initiating this action,
proceeding pro se, filed a civil complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	(ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiff claimed that the conditions during his four-day confinement at the San Diego
Central Jail in April of 2023 constituted cruel and unusual punishment arising from
deliberate indifference to his health, and that he was retaliated against for complaining.
(See id. at 3-5.) 	On July 24, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and screened his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which requires
sua sponte dismissal of a complaint brought by a person proceeding in forma pauperis
which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who
Case 3:25-cv-00842-BTM-DEB Document 7 Filed 03/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 8

2
25cv0842-BTM (DEB)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
are immune. (ECF No. 3.) The complaint was dismissed with leave to amend for failure
to state a claim after Plaintiff was notified of its pleading deficiencies. (Id. at 3-8.) Plaintiff
thereafter filed a First Amended Complaint which repeated the conditions of confinement
claim but dropped the retaliation claim. (ECF No. 4.)
On November 10, 2025, the Court screened the First Amended Complaint and
dismissed it for failure to state a conditions of confinement claim for the same reasons the
original Complaint failed to state such a claim. (ECF No. 5 at 5-6.) Although it appeared
unlikely Plaintiff would be able to cure the defects of pleading to plausibly state a claim
for relief, he was granted one final opportunity to amend. (Id. at 6.) On January 2, 2026,
Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (ECF No. 6.) The Court finds, for
the following reasons, that the SAC fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
for the same reasons the prior versions of the complaint failed to state a claim, and that it
is now clear Plaintiff is unable to further amend his pleading to plausibly state a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim for relief. Thus, the Court dismisses the SAC without further leave to amend.
I. 	SCREENING P URSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
A. 	Standard of Review
Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, his SAC requires a pre-Answer screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 	The Court must sua sponte dismiss a complaint, or
any portion of it, brought by a person proceeding in forma pauperis which is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. Lopez
v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), citing Barron v. Harrington,
152 F.3d 1193, 1994 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The statutory authority is clear: ‘the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted.’”), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d
1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
Case 3:25-cv-00842-BTM-DEB Document 7 Filed 03/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 8

3
25cv0842-BTM (DEB)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “To
establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law.” 	Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128,
1138 (9th Cir. 2012).
B. 	Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff alleges that from April 8-11, 2023, he was “confined continuously in a
holding tank at the San Diego Central Jail. The holding tank was not designed or intended
for overnight or multi-day housing, but rather for short-term processing, consistent with
widely recognized correctional standards.” (ECF No. 6 at 3.) “Plaintiff was provided no
mattress, no bedding, no blanket, and no insulated sleeping surface. Plaintiff was forced
to sleep either directly on cold concrete flooring or on a hard bench, despite repeatedly
requesting basic bedding.” 	(Id. at 4.) 	He alleges the holding tank was cold and he
experienced prolonged exposure to low temperatures. (Id.) In response to his requests for
bedding or a blanket, “Defendant Deputies mocked Plaintiff and told him to ‘masturbate
to keep warm,’ rather than providing any measure to abate the cold.” (Id.) Plaintiff also
alleges he was “denied access to showers, soap or basic hygiene supplies, including after
using the toilet. This occurred during a period in which Covid-19 remained a known and
ongoing infectious risk in custodial facilities.” (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff alleges in claim one that the individual Defendants, San Diego Sheriff’s
deputies whose names are unknown to him, violated his Fourteenth Amendment due
process right as a pre-trial detainee to be free from punishment by being exposed to “a
substantial risk of harm, including hypothermia, musculoskeletal injury, sleep deprivation,
and infection.” (Id. at 8-9.) He alleges in claim two that Defendant San Diego County is
liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because it
maintained policies, customs or practices which were the moving force behind the
constitutional violation, including a practice of using holding tanks for prolonged detention
Case 3:25-cv-00842-BTM-DEB Document 7 Filed 03/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 8

4
25cv0842-BTM (DEB)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
due to overcrowding, a custom of denying bedding and hygiene items in holding areas for
extended periods, and a failure to train its deputies regarding housing conditions of pretrial
detainees outside regular housing units. (Id. at 10-11.)
C. 	Analysis
“Due process [under the Fourteenth Amendment] requires that a pretrial detainee not
be punished. 	A sentenced inmate, on the other hand, may be punished, although that
punishment may not be “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment.” 	Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen.
Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (holding that “due process rights” of a person who has
not been convicted “are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to
a convicted prisoner.”) 	To state a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement
against an individual defendant under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pre-trial detainee must
plausibly allege: “(i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the
conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at
substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable
available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances
would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved - making the consequences of the
defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused
plaintiff’s injuries.” Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018).
In order to state a claim for municipal liability against the County of San Diego under
Monell, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right, (2) the
County has a policy, custom or practice which amounted to deliberate indifference to that
constitutional right; and (3) the policy, custom or practice was the moving force behind the
constitutional violation. 	Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900-01 (9th Cir.
2011), citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (“We conclude, therefore, that a local government
may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.
Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
Case 3:25-cv-00842-BTM-DEB Document 7 Filed 03/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
4 of 8

5
25cv0842-BTM (DEB)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”) Municipal
liability may be shown when an employee who committed the constitutional violation was
“acting pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy, longstanding practice or custom,
or as a final policymaker.” Thomas v. County of Riverside, 763 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir.
2014), citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
The Court informed Plaintiff in the prior screening orders that he had not identified
a custom, policy or practice by the County of San Diego allegedly adhered to with
deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights, but had merely alleged in a conclusory
manner that the conditions of his confinement during his four days at the jail were the result
of such policies. 	(ECF No. 3 at 4-5; ECF No. 5 at 4-5.) 	He was instructed that such
allegations fail to plausibly allege municipal liability because “proof of a single incident of
unconstitutional activity,” or even a series of “isolated or sporadic incidents” will not give
rise to § 1983 municipal liability, and that liability based on custom, practice or policy
“may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices
of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional
method of carrying out policy.” 	Grant v. County of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 618 (9th
Cir. 2014), Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (for an unwritten policy or custom to form the basis of
a claim, it must be so “persistent and widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent and well
settled” practice) and Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996).) 	Plaintiff was
twice instructed that factual allegations regarding the specific nature of the policy, custom
or practice are required. (ECF No. 3 at 5; ECF No. 5 at 5, both citing Hernandez v. County
of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (a complaint with bare allegations of a
municipal policy fails to state a claim where it does not “put forth additional facts regarding
the specific nature of this alleged policy, custom or practice.”)) 	He was also twice
instructed that his allegation that the conditions of his confinement were caused by a failure
to train jail staff failed to allege the County “was deliberately indifferent to the need to train
subordinates, and the lack of training actually caused the constitutional harm or deprivation
of rights,” and that to do so he must allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations,
Case 3:25-cv-00842-BTM-DEB Document 7 Filed 03/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
5 of 8

6
25cv0842-BTM (DEB)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
because isolated incidents are insufficient to allege that the County was put on “notice that
a course of training is deficient in a particular respect” and that “the absence of such a
course will cause violations of constitutional rights.” (ECF No. 3 at 5-6; ECF No. 5 at 5-
6, both citing Flores v. County of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014),
Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that short
term or temporary deprivations of basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter and sanitation
do not plausibly allege a constitutional violation), Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637 (applying
Iqbal’s pleading standards to Monell claims) and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that a
complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if it does not “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”)
(internal quote marks omitted).)
Plaintiff has once again failed to cure any of those pleading defects with respect to
a claim against the County of San Diego. He has once again failed to set forth factual as
opposed to conclusory allegations identifying a San Diego County custom, policy or
practice, or plausibly allege a “direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and
the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Collins v. County of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115,
123 (1992); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (in order to impose liability on
a local government under § 1983 a plaintiff must plead and prove that an “action pursuant
to official municipal policy” caused their injury). 	Rather, he continues to rely on the
conditions of his confinement for the four-day period he was incarcerated at the jail to
support his conclusion and supposition that they were the result of a custom, policy or
practice of San Diego County regarding the manner in which he was confined.
Even if Plaintiff could satisfy the custom, policy or practice pleading standard as to
a claim against the County, he has also once again failed to set forth factual allegations
identifying a constitutional violation or an injury necessary to state a claim against the
County or the individual Defendants, and it is now clear he is unable to do so. “[E]xtreme
deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim. Because routine
discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
Case 3:25-cv-00842-BTM-DEB Document 7 Filed 03/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
6 of 8

7
25cv0842-BTM (DEB)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities
are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” 	Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (internal quote marks and citation omitted); see also
Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that short
term or temporary deprivations of basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter and sanitation
do not plausibly allege a constitutional violation); Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 (a plaintiff
must plausibly allege he was confined under conditions which put him at a substantial risk
of suffering serious harm, that a defendant did not take reasonable available measures to
abate that risk, and “by not taking such measures, the defendant caused plaintiff’s
injuries.”) 	Plaintiff’s allegations of a four-day uncomfortable stay at the jail without
bedding or showers which exposed him to, but did not result in, injury are not sufficient to
plausibly allege a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9; Anderson, 45
F.3d at 1312-13; Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125; see also e.g. North v. Salazar, No. 25cv1750-
WQH (LR), 2025 WL 3208842, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) (collecting cases and
noting that the Ninth Circuit and district courts have found deprivation of bedding and
showers for four, seven and nine days did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Demery v.
Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that to constitute punishment under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the governmental action must cause harm that “either
significantly exceeded, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.”),
citing 	Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (holding that for a governmental action to constitute
punishment under the Fourteenth Amendment the action must cause the pre-trial detainee
to suffer some harm).
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s SAC fails to state a plausible claim for relief under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Because it is now clear Plaintiff cannot state a claim, the dismissal is without further leave
to amend. 	See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court
should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear
that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’”), quoting Akhtar
Case 3:25-cv-00842-BTM-DEB Document 7 Filed 03/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
7 of 8

8
25cv0842-BTM (DEB)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012); see also United States ex rel. Insoon Lee v.
SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Futility of amendment
can, by itself, justify the denial of . . . leave to amend.”)
II. 	C ONCLUSION AND ORDERS
The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) without
further leave to amend. The Clerk of Court will enter a final judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 2, 2026
___________________________
Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz
United States District Judge
Case 3:25-cv-00842-BTM-DEB Document 7 Filed 03/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
8 of 8