Daniels v. Oceanside Unified School District et al

1
3:25-cv-00601-RBM-KSC
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JAKE DANIELS, a minor, by and through
his guardian ad litem, Jessica Daniels,
Plaintiff,
v.
OCEANSIDE UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT, and DOES l through 25,
inclusive,
Defendants.
Case No.: 3:25-cv-00601-RBM-KSC
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
[Doc. 4]
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	Defendant 	Oceanside 	Unified 	School 	District’s
(“Defendant” or the “District”) Motion to Dismiss (“Motion to Dismiss”). (Doc. 4.) On
April 7, 2025, Plaintiff Jake Daniels (“Plaintiff”), a minor, by and through his guardian ad
litem, Jessica Daniels (“Plaintiff’s mother”), filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss (“Opposition”). (Doc. 5.) Defendant filed a Reply on May 5, 2025. (Doc. 6.)
The Court finds this matter suitable for determination without oral argument
pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). 	For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
//
//
Case 3:25-cv-00601-RBM-GC Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 11

2
3:25-cv-00601-RBM-KSC
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background 1
Plaintiff, a minor student, was born with severe mental disabilities and is nonverbal.
(Doc. 1-2 ¶¶ 3, 16.)2 Plaintiff was a student at North Terrace Elementary School (“North
Terrace”), a school within the District. 	(Id. ¶ 3.) 	Plaintiff has had an Individualized
Education Program (“IEP”) at the District since 2020, as required under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. (“IDEA”). (Id. ¶ 17; see Doc. 5
at 7.) 	His “IEP specifically required the District to always have constant one-to-one
supervision while [he] was at school.” 	(Doc. 1-2 ¶ 23.) 	It “also required his classroom
door to be closed, which was intended to prevent elopement.” (Id.) The IEP reflected his
parents’ and the District’s “concerns with his elopement.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Specifically, the IEP
noted that Plaintiff “would run away spontaneously,” with “no antecedent cause and can
happen at any time,” and that “in the past month his eloping has increased and has been
[an] area of concern.” (Id. ¶ 18.)
Plaintiff “had a lengthy history of eloping from” school campuses within the District.
(Id. ¶ 26.) 	He “once eloped from Libby Elementary School and twice from Laurel
Elementary [which are both] part of the District.” 	(Id. ¶ 27.) 	Plaintiff also eloped from
North Terrace prior to the incident at issue. (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff “had regularly recurring
IEP reviews and evaluations, with the most recent occurring prior to the incident on March
4, 2024.” (Id. ¶ 17) “During the IEP meeting, [Plaintiff’s mother] shared that [Plaintiff]
regularly elopes.” (Id. ¶ 21.) In particular, Plaintiff’s mother stated that Plaintiff elopes at
home, that he “knows how to take the dowel out of the window/door to open them [, and]
1 The factual summary in this section reflects Plaintiff’s allegations, not conclusions of
fact or law by this Court. Well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes
of this Motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
2 The Court cites the paragraph numbers of the Complaint and the CM/ECF electronic
pagination for other citations unless otherwise noted.
Case 3:25-cv-00601-RBM-GC Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 11

3
3:25-cv-00601-RBM-KSC
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
that there are seven locks on the front door at her home and all windows and doors in the
house are locked to keep [Plaintiff] from eloping.” (Id. ¶ 21.) Six District employees were
in attendance at Plaintiff’s IEP meeting including: “Administrator Dieter Swank, General
Education Teacher Charlene Martinez, Education Specialist Michael Brown, Speech-
language 	pathologist 	(SLP) 	Charito 	Shook, 	Occupational 	Therapist 	(OT) 	Kimberly
Jackson, and Home ABA therapist BCBA Emily Wanous.” (Id. ¶ 22.)
On June 13, 2024, Plaintiff enrolled as a student at North Terrace for the 2024
summer school session. 	(Id. ¶ 25.) 	Plaintiff was seven years old at the time. 	(Id. ¶ 24.)
On June 17, 2024, Plaintiff ran away from North Terrace and was lost for over 6 hours.
(Id. ¶¶ 31–32.) “Upon investigation, the school’s gate was not secure and had a hole in it,”
which allowed Plaintiff to escape. (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff’s “classroom door was also not in
a closed position.” (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff had an “AirTag on him, which would locate
him by GPS in the event he was lost.” (Id. ¶ 34.) “However, the Camp Pendleton military
base scrambled the GPS signal [and Plaintiff’s] last GPS ping happened one block from
the school.” 	(Id.) 	As a result of this incident, Plaintiff “suffered physical injuries and
severe dehydration.” (Id. ¶ 35.) “His liver reading levels were high and white blood cells
doubled.” (Id.) “In addition to physical injuries, [Plaintiff] suffered psychological injuries,
which resulted in significant behavioral changes.” (Id.)
B. 	Procedural Background
On December 30, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action in the Superior Court of
California, County of San Diego. (See Doc. 1-2.) On March 13, 2025, Defendant removed
the action to this Court. 	(See Doc. 1.) 	The action was transferred to the undersigned on
March 19, 2025. 	(Doc. 3.) 	Plaintiff brings the following four causes of action: (1)
negligence; (2) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; (3) dangerous condition of
public property; and (4) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Doc.
1-2 ¶¶ 38–86.) 	As relief, Plaintiff seeks general and special damages, attorney’s fees,
interests, and costs. (Id., Prayer for Relief at 14–15.)
Case 3:25-cv-00601-RBM-GC Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 11

4
3:25-cv-00601-RBM-KSC
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6), an action may be dismissed for failure to allege “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). 	“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” 	Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court
“accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 	Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).
However, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nor is the
Court “required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the
Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely
conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Daniels-Hall v.
Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). “In sum, for a complaint to survive
a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from
that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss
v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Meet-and-Confer Requirement
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant failed to satisfy their meet-and-confer obligations
required under this Court’s Civil Chambers Rules because it “never attempted to have a
conference regarding this Motion.” 	(Doc. 5 at 11–12 (emphasis in original).) 	Plaintiff
does not seek dismissal, or any other form of relief, based on Defendant’s failure to comply
with the undersigned’s Civil Chamber Rules. (See id.)
Case 3:25-cv-00601-RBM-GC Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
4 of 11

5
3:25-cv-00601-RBM-KSC
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
The relevant rule provides that parties must meet-and-confer in good faith at least
seven days prior to the filing of a noticed motion “to discuss thoroughly—preferably in
person—the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential resolution.” The Hon.
Ruth Bermudez Montenegro Civ. Chambers R. (“Civil Chambers Rules”) III.A.
In its Reply, Defendant asserts it had “minimal time to review” the Civil Chamber
Rules and was unable to confer with Plaintiff seven days before filing the instant Motion
to Dismiss because this action was transferred to the undersigned on March 19, 2025—
eight days before it filed the Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 6 at 2.) Defendant argues that the
Court should resolve the Motion to Dismiss on its merits because “Plaintiff has not suffered
prejudice as a result of this failure.” (Id.) The Court, in its discretion and in the interests
of justice, considers the Motion to Dismiss on its merits. Counsel are warned to adhere to
this District’s Civil Local Rules, the undersigned’s Civil Chambers Rules, and the federal
rules in the future. Future motions that fail to meet this requirement will be stricken.
B. 	ADA
Plaintiff alleges violations of Title II of the ADA arising from the District’s failure
to provide “reasonable accommodations that he needs in order to enjoy meaningful access
to the benefits of” a public education. 	(Doc. 1-2 ¶¶ 75–76, 79(a).).3 The District argues
that Plaintiff fails to state an ADA claim because Plaintiff does not allege: (1) the District
“excluded Plaintiff from participation or denied benefits to him on the basis of his
disability”; and (2) the District’s “services, programs, or activities are not readily accessible
to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” (Doc. 4-1 at 9.)
3 As pled, Plaintiff alleges disability discrimination based on a failure to accommodate.
As Plaintiff does not allege a systemic failure of any specific policies or procedures, his
claim fails to the extent it is based on a disparate treatment or disparate impact theory. See
Payan v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll Dist., 11 F.4th 729, 738 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[A] reasonable
accommodation claim is focused on an accommodation based on an individualized request
or need, while a reasonable modification in response to a disparate impact finding is
focused on modifying a policy or practice to improve systemic accessibility”).
Case 3:25-cv-00601-RBM-GC Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
5 of 11

6
3:25-cv-00601-RBM-KSC
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “Title II emphasizes ‘program access,’ meaning that a
public entity’s programs and services, viewed in their entirety, must be equally accessible
to disabled persons.” Cohen v. City of Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 694–95 (9th Cir. 2014).
Title II’s implementing regulations describe “public entities’ statutory obligations with
more specificity, but a public entity may violate the ADA even if no regulation expressly
proscribes its particular conduct.” 	Id. at 695. 	As relevant here, the implementing
regulations 	require 	public 	entities 	to 	make 	reasonable 	modifications 	to 	avoid
discrimination against people with disabilities. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). While there
are no ADA regulations specifically concerning the education of children with disabilities,
the ADA has been interpreted co-extensively with the special education requirements
promulgated under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). 	See 28 C.F.R. § 35.103(a);
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631–32 (1998) (construing “the ADA to grant at least as
much protection as provided by regulations implementing the [RA].”) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
12201(a)); see also Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.11 (9th
Cir. 1999) (noting ADA and § 504 claims are routinely considered together because
“[t]here is no significant difference in analysis of the rights and obligations created by” the
statutes). Thus, in the context of educational services, the ADA and the RA both require
public schools to provide reasonable accommodations to students with disabilities to allow
them access to public education. 	A.G. v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 815
F.3d 1195, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2016).
“A plaintiff bringing suit under . . . Title II of the ADA must show: (1) [he] is a
qualified individual with a disability; (2) [he] was denied ‘a reasonable accommodation
that [he] needs in order to enjoy meaningful access to the benefits of public services;’ and
(3) the program providing the benefit receives federal financial assistance.” 	Paradise
Valley, 815 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir.
Case 3:25-cv-00601-RBM-GC Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
6 of 11

7
3:25-cv-00601-RBM-KSC
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2010)). “The reasonable accommodation element can be satisfied by showing the school
wrongly denied an accommodation request or failed to comply with a binding regulation.”
Csutoras v. Paradise High Sch., 12 F.4th 960, 969 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Paradise Valley,
815 F.3d at 1204); see also McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir.
2004) (finding a defendant’s failure to provide reasonable accommodations sufficiently
demonstrates discrimination “‘by reason of’ [ ] disability for the purposes of overcoming a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”).
When a plaintiff seeks monetary damages under Title II of the ADA, as here, he
must also allege the public entity “intentionally or with deliberate indifference fail[ed] to
provide meaningful access or reasonable accommodation to disabled persons.” 	Mark H.
v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 938 (9th Cir. 2008). 	Deliberate indifference requires “both
knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to
act upon that likelihood.” 	Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001)
(citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1988)). “[A] failure to act must be a
result of conduct that is more than negligent, and involves an element of deliberateness.”
Id. “In other words, the ‘deliberate refusal’ to accommodate a plaintiff’s disability-related
needs can violate the ADA.” Mel Marin v. Trs. of the Santa Barbara City Coll. Dist., Case
No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC, 2026 WL 49332, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2026).
Here, the Parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability
and that the District receives federal funding. (Doc. 1-2 ¶¶ 73, 86.) As to the reasonable
accommodation element, Plaintiff does not claim that the District denied any of his
accommodation requests.4 Rather, Plaintiff claims the District “took no action to
accommodate his disability” because it did not provide certain accommodations as outlined
4 Plaintiff does not specify when his elopement issues began, when he eloped from the
other schools, or when the accommodations intended to prevent his elopement were
included in his IEP. (See Doc. 1-2 ¶¶ 18, 21, 26–28, 82.) The Court therefore construes
Plaintiff’s allegations as pertaining only to the incident on June 17, 2024.
Case 3:25-cv-00601-RBM-GC Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
7 of 11

8
3:25-cv-00601-RBM-KSC
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
in his IEP on June 17, 2024. (Doc. 1-2 ¶ 82.) Plaintiff alleges these accommodations—
constant one-on-one supervision and closed classroom doors—were intended to prevent
his elopement from school grounds and therefore necessary for him to enjoy meaningful
access to the benefits of public school. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 75–76.) 5 He further alleges the District’s
failures were “deliberately indifferent and . . . a product of discriminatory animus to [his]
needs because he had eloped off [a District school] at least four (4) times prior to the
incident.” 	(Doc. 1-2 ¶ 82.) 	Plaintiff’s parents also informed District employees that
Plaintiff regularly elopes, that he knows how to take the dowels out of windows and doors
to open them, and that there are seven locks on the front door of his home to prevent him
from eloping. 	(Id. ¶¶ 18, 21.) 	Making all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff,
Plaintiff plausibly alleges that the District was “alerted . . . to his need for accommodation.”
Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139.
Plaintiff’s own allegations, however, indicate that the District did not fail to
accommodate him much less with the required “element of deliberateness.” 	See Duvall,
260 F.3d at 1139. 	In response to such knowledge, the District adopted Plaintiff’s IEP,
noted its concerns about Plaintiff’s elopement issues, assigned a paraeducator to supervise
Plaintiff at North Terrace, and held “regularly recurring IEP reviews and evaluations, with
the most recent occurring prior to the incident on March 4, 2024.” (Id. ¶¶ 17–18, 29, 31.)
As the District correctly notes, “the Complaint alleges Plaintiff had an IEP meeting and six
[District] employees participated.” 	(Doc. 4-1 at 9; see Doc. 1-2 ¶ 23.) 	In addition to
Plaintiff’s 	assigned 	paraeducator, 	Plaintiff 	was 	also 	supervised 	by 	several 	District
employees including his teacher. (Doc. 1-2 ¶¶ 29, 31.) Based on the facts alleged, Plaintiff
fails to raise a plausible inference that the District deliberately failed to act in response to
his need for accommodation. See Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139 (“[B]ureaucratic slippage that
5 Without more, the Court is unable to ascertain whether Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate
claim is also premised on the District’s alleged failure to secure the school’s gate. 	(See
Doc. 1-2 ¶ 33.)
Case 3:25-cv-00601-RBM-GC Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
8 of 11

9
3:25-cv-00601-RBM-KSC
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
constitutes 	negligence 	rather 	than 	deliberate 	action 	or 	inaction” 	is 	not 	sufficient).
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not offered sufficient non-conclusory allegations of intentional
discrimination by the District to support a claim for damages. 	See D.J. v. Walnut Creek
Sch. Dist., Case No. 24-cv-02660-LJC, 2025 WL 1114453, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2025)
(“Knowledge that a student with a disability exhibited behavioral issues does not in itself
support an inference of deliberate indifference, particularly where the reports indicated that
[school] staff responded to each issue.”).
In his Opposition, Plaintiff contends that the District denied him available and
reasonable accommodations because it materially failed to implement his IEP in violation
of the IDEA. (Doc. 5 at 23–24 (citing Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J,
502 F.3d 811, 823 (9th Cir. 2007)).) 	Plaintiff’s contention relies substantially on the
IDEA’s requirement that public schools must provide a free appropriate public education
(“FAPE”) to students with disabilities. (See id.) However, Plaintiff does not bring a claim
under the IDEA. 6 While § 504’s implementing regulations, which the ADA adopts, also
require that public schools “provide a free appropriate public education” to students with
disabilities, the FAPE requirements differ from those under the IDEA. 	See Paradise
Valley, 815 F.3d at 1203; 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a); see also Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580
U.S. 154, 170–71 (2017) (“[T]he IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational
services, 	while 	Title 	II 	and 	§ 	504 	promise 	non-discriminatory 	access 	to 	public
institutions.”). 	As such, “a showing that FAPE was denied under the IDEA does not
necessarily establish” such a denial under § 504 or the ADA. Paradise Valley, 815 F.3d at
1203–04 (citation omitted); Lemahieu, 513 F. 3d at 933 (“Plaintiffs who allege a violation
of the FAPE requirement in . . . § 504’s regulations may not obtain damages simply by
6 Plaintiff seeks only damages under the ADA, not equitable relief which may require
exhaustion under the IDEA. 	See Martinez v. Newsom, 46 F.4th 965, 973 (9th Cir. 2022)
(“A plaintiff seeking relief for the denial of a FAPE ordinarily must exhaust the
administrative process before filing a lawsuit, even if the plaintiff asserts claims arising
under the Constitution or a federal statute other than the IDEA.”).
Case 3:25-cv-00601-RBM-GC Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
9 of 11

10
3:25-cv-00601-RBM-KSC
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
proving that the IDEA . . . requirements were not met.”).7 Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff
claims the services provided by the District did not meet his individual educational needs
“as adequately as the needs” of his non-disabled peers, he fails to plead the required
“comparison between the manner in which the needs of disabled and non-disabled children
are met.” Lemahieu, 513 F. 3d at 933; see 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1). The Court therefore
finds this argument unavailing.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s ADA claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Cook v. N. Cal. Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990)
(“[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading
was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the
allegation of other facts.”).
C. 	Supplemental Jurisdiction
A district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” if it “has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see
Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[I]n the usual case in
which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be
considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims.”) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350
n.7 (1988)). Having dismissed the only federal claim for failure to state a claim, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 	28
U.S.C. § 1367(a). 	Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims are therefore DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE provided Plaintiff can state a cognizable ADA claim.
7 The Court also notes that Plaintiff alleges the District adopted his IEP (see Doc. 1-2 ¶ 17)
which “is sufficient to provide a FAPE under [s]ection 504.” McKnight v. Lyon Cty. Sch.
Dist., 812 Fed. App’x 455, 456 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Lemahieu, 513 F. 3d at 933).
Case 3:25-cv-00601-RBM-GC Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
10 of 11

11
3:25-cv-00601-RBM-KSC
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) is GRANTED
and the Complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 	Plaintiff may file an
amended complaint fixing the identified deficiencies on or before March 2, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: February 2, 2026
____________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 3:25-cv-00601-RBM-GC Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
11 of 11