Phillips v. Sison et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DEVON ALVIN PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff,
v.
SGT. P. WHITE, BRYAN SISON
(CV1269), CORPORAL N. HICKS, and
CHULA VISTA POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
Case No.: 24-CV-1818 TWR (DDL)
ORDER (1) GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
LODGMENT, AND (2) GRANTING
IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FOURTH
AMENDED COMPLAINT
(ECF Nos. 44, 45)
Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Devon Alvin Phillips’ Motion for Lodgment
(“Pl.’s Mot.,” ECF No. 44) and the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended
Complaint and Claims Therein Under Rule 12(b)(6) (“Defs.’ Mot.,” ECF No. 45) filed by
Defendants Patrick White, Nathan Hicks, Bryan Sison, and Dustin Dubois, as well as
Plaintiff’s Response to (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 47) and Defendants’ Reply in Support of
(“Reply,” ECF No. 48) Defendants’ Motion. 	The Court took Defendants’ Motion under
submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). (See ECF No.
46.) 	Having carefully considered Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC,” ECF
No. 42) and Plaintiff’s Lodgment, the Parties’ arguments, and the relevant law, the Court
/ / /
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GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF No. 44) and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN
PART Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 45), as follows.
BACKGROUND
I. 	Plaintiff’s Allegations1
On September 28, 2023, Plaintiff was standing on the sidewalk near his vehicle at
trailer space #88 at 288 Broadway, Chula Vista, waiting for “police assistance regarding a
fraud suspect (Sepulveda).” 	(FAC at 3, 17.) 	It appears that the trailer in space #88 was
occupied by a man named Sepulveda and his girlfriend, R. Pedraza. (Id. at 17–18.) From
what the Court is able to glean from IMG_0738, one of the videos in Plaintiff’s Lodgment,
Plaintiff and his fiancée (Veronica) suspected that Sepulveda (perhaps in concert with
Pedraza) had been cashing fraudulent checks purportedly signed by Veronica’s father, who
was in the hospital. (See Lodgment IMG_0738.) It appears that Plaintiff and Veronica’s
son, Mercado, had gone to Sepulveda’s trailer to see whether he was home. (See id.) When
Mercado confirmed that Sepulveda was in the trailer, Plaintiff called his family to request
that they send the police to their location. (FAC at 5.)
Plaintiff has provided photos taken outside the trailer and timestamped 1:01 p.m.
(See Lodgment IMG_0007 & IMG_0008; see also FAC at 23 (“Ex. 3”) & 24 (“Ex. 4”).)
While Plaintiff was in the car taking photos, Mercado exited the vehicle to approach the
open gate in front of Sepulveda’s trailer. (See FAC at 25 (“Ex. 5”).) The next timestamp
available is from video IMG_0738, which Veronica recorded at 1:42 p.m.
It is not entirely clear what happened between 1:01 p.m. and 1:42 p.m., when
Plaintiff appears to be handcuffed and under arrest. Pedraza claimed that “she [had been]
walking with Sepulveda when they were approached.” (FAC at 17.) Pedraza told officers
1 	For purposes of the Motion, the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint are
accepted as true. See Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that, in
ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept all material allegations of fact as true”). The Court
is also mindful that “pro se pleadings are liberally construed, particularly where civil rights claims are
involved.” See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).
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that Plaintiff and/or Mercado hit Sepulveda several times with a baseball bat and then threw
it over a fence, (see id. at 5, 10), and that Sepulveda had run away and was then chased by
Mercado. (See id. at 9, 10, 18.) Plaintiff contends that Pedraza was not a witness, (See d.
at 10, 18), and that Sepulveda’s and Pedraza’s comments to the police were not true. (See
id. at 12.) 	He also claims that he would not “have been able to strike anyone with a bat
because he was recovering from a spinal surgery.” (Id. at 5; see also id. at 18.)
When Sergeant White arrived at the scene, he ordered Officer Harper to handcuff
Plaintiff “until we figure out what is going on.” 	(Id. at 3.) 	Although Officer Harper
directed Plaintiff to sit on the ground, Plaintiff explained that he was unable to comply
because he was recovering from spinal surgery. (See id.) Plaintiff was also searched. (See
id. at 7.) Ultimately, Plaintiff was charged with kidnapping in violation of Section 207(a)
of the California Penal Code, assault with a deadly weapon (not firearm) in violation of
Section 245(a)(1) of the California Penal Code, and vandalism ($400 or more) in violation
of Section 594(b)(1) of the California Penal Code. (See FAC at 7, 8, 16.)
Officer Sison took Plaintiff’s car keys and conducted a search of Plaintiff’s vehicle.
(See id.) He removed a small lock box from Plaintiff’s glovebox, which Plaintiff contends
contained money, (see id.), but which the Officer commented to Veronica contained a
firearm. 	(See Lodgment IMG_0868 at 15:25–50 (asking Veronica for a key to the “gun
safe” which felt like he contained a firearm).) 	Ultimately, Plaintiff’s vehicle was towed
and impounded. (See FAC at 12, 43 (“Ex. 23”).)
Officer Dubois prepared the official report, which contained several inconsistent
comments from Sepulveda and Pedraza, (see id. at 5–6, 7–8, 9–11), as well as statements
Officer Dubois attributed to Plaintiff that Plaintiff denies having made. (See id. at 6–7, 10,
13, 15.) For example, Officer Dubois’ report indicated that, “several times while [Officer
Dubois] was in booking with Phillips, [Plaintiff] would make statements about how
[S]epulveda pushed [Plaintiff] first. Phillips said that he was just trying to detain Sepulveda
[and] did not intend to kidnap him.” 	(Id. at 6.) 	Plaintiff claims he never made such a
statement, and that he had invoked his right to remain silent. (See id.) Officer Dubois also
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reported that “Plaintiff was armed with 17-Club, Blackjack, [and] Brass knuckles,”
although those weapons were not found on Plaintiff’s person or in his vehicle. 	(Id. at
15–16.) 	Officer Dubois misrepresented “statements that were being made by family
members by saying ‘so they came for revenge[.]’” (Id. at 19.)
Plaintiff spent four days in jail, (id. at 9; see also id. at 13), before being permitted
to post bail in the amount of $100,000. 	(See id. at 9.) 	The district attorney ultimately
declined to prosecute because of the contradictory versions of events and lack of sufficient
evidence. (See id. at 11.)
II. 	Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint against Sergeant White, Officer Sison, Corporal
Hicks, and the Chula Vista Police Department on October 9, 2024. 	(See ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiff filed a document listing his “cause[s] of action” on December 3, 2024, (see ECF
No. 10), which the Court construed as a clarifying addition to Plaintiff’s initial Complaint.
On December 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint as a matter of
right against the same Defendants, (see ECF No. 11), and sought service through the United
States Marshals Service (“USMS”), (see ECF No. 12), and leave to “submit a thumb drive
with evidence to support” his amended complaint. (See ECF No. 13.) Although the Court
denied Plaintiff’s request for service through the USMS, (see ECF No. 14 at 2), the Court
granted Plaintiff leave to file a thumb drive containing videos and photos in support of his
First Amended Complaint. (See id.) Plaintiff lodged his thumb drive with the Court, (see
ECF No. 15), and filed additional exhibits, (see ECF No. 20), on December 16, 2024.
Following Plaintiff’s service of his First Amended Complaint on Defendants, (see
ECF Nos. 16–19), Defendants moved to dismiss that pleading. 	(See ECF No. 24.) 	On
March 17, 2025, at the request of the Parties, (see ECF No. 31), the Court granted Plaintiff
leave to file a further amended complaint and continued the hearing date and briefing
schedule for Defendants’ anticipated motion to dismiss. (See ECF No. 32.)
On March 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC,” ECF
No. 33), which asserted causes of action for unlawful seizure and imprisonment in violation
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of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against Sergeant White, (see id. at 10–12);
wrongful arrest and improper investigation against Sergeant White, (see id. at 13–15); and
violation of constitutional rights without probable cause in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment against Sergeant White, (see id. at 16–18), Officer Sison, (see id. at 18–21),
and Corporal Hicks, (see id. at 21–24).2 Defendants moved to dismiss on April 14, 2025.
(See generally ECF No. 34.)
The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion on July 25, 2025,
dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s claims under the Fifth Amendment and dismissing
without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (See
generally ECF No. 38 (the “Prior Order”).) 	Specifically, with respect to the claims for
which the Court granted leave to amend, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had failed
sufficiently to plead his Fourth Amendment claims for wrongful detention and arrest of his
person and unlawful search of his vehicle, (see id. at 6–10), and Fourteenth Amendment
claims for malicious prosecution and fabrication of evidence. (See id. at 11–13.) Although
the Court concluded that Plaintiff had adequately alleged a claim for the impoundment of
his vehicle, (see id. at 10–11), the Court was required to dismiss that claim on grounds of
qualified immunity, (see id. at 16–17), but the Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend.
Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint on August 22, 2026, (see generally
ECF No. 39), and, with leave of Defendants and the Court, (see ECF Nos. 40, 41), the
operative Fourth Amended Complaint on September 5, 2026. (See generally ECF No. 42.)
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint adds a fourth Defendant, Officer Dustin Dubois
(erroneously sued as Dustin Dubios), and asserted claims for unlawful search and seizure
in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights against Sergeant White, Officer Sison,
and Corporal Hicks, (see FAC at 12); false arrest/imprisonment in violation of Plaintiff’s
2 	Unlike Plaintiff’s prior complaints, (see generally ECF Nos. 1, 11), Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint did not name the Chula Vista Police Department as a Defendant. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc.
v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (because amended pleading supersedes
original, party named in prior complaint but not named in operative complaint is not proper party).
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Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against Sergeant White, Officer Sison, and
Corporal Hicks, (see id. at 12–13); and fabrication of evidence in violation of Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights against Officer Dubois, (see id. at 13). 	Plaintiff filed his
Motion lodging two thumb drives containing photographic and video evidence with the
Court on September 19, 2025, (see generally ECF No. 44), which the Court treats as
incorporated by reference into Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint.
Defendants’ Motion followed on September 26, 2025. (See generally ECF No. 45.)
LEGAL STANDARD
“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.’”
Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Navarro
v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). 	“A district court’s dismissal for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a ‘lack of
a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal
theory.’” 	Id. at 1242 (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
Cir. 1988)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” 	Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
Id. at 679 (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
“If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be
granted ‘unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the
challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” 	DeSoto v. Yellow Freight
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Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well
Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). 	“A district court does not err in
denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile.” Id. (citing Reddy v. Litton
Indus., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 921 (1991)).
ANALYSIS
Through the instant Motion, Defendants seek dismissal with prejudice, (see ECF No.
45-1 (“Mem.”) at 1, 15–16), of each of Plaintiff’s causes of action in his Fourth Amended
Complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), (see Mem. at 4–10), and on the
grounds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (See id. at 10–15.)
I. 	Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Allegations
A. 	Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” 	See U.S.
Const. amend. IV. Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant White, Officer Sison, and Corporal Hicks
(the 	“Fourth 	Amendment 	Defendants”) 	violated 	his 	Fourth 	Amendment 	rights 	by
unlawfully detaining and arresting him and by unlawfully searching his vehicle. (See FAC
at 12–13.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under any of these Fourth
Amendment theories. (See generally Mem. at 4–8.)
1. 	Unlawful Seizure of Person
Plaintiff alleges that the Fourth Amendment Defendants unlawfully detained and
arrested him when they placed him in handcuffs and searched him without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. 	(See, e.g., FAC at 2–3, 12–13, 14–15.) 	“There are two
categories of police seizures under the Fourth Amendment: Terry stops and full-scale
arrests.” 	Reynaga Hernandez v. Skinner, 969 F.3d 930, 937 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Allen
v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1995)).
“Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), police officers may conduct a brief,
investigative stop of an individual when they have reasonable suspicion that the ‘person
apprehended is committing or has committed a criminal offense.’” Id. (quoting Arizona v.
Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009)). 	The court “examine[s] the ‘totality of the
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circumstances’ to determine whether a detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective
basis’ for suspecting criminal wrongdoing.” Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 273 (2002)). 	“An officer cannot rely only upon generalizations that ‘would cast
suspicion on large segments of the lawabiding population.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2006)). 	“‘Seemingly innocuous behavior,’
unless combined with other circumstances indicating criminality, does not justify a Terry
stop.” 	Id. (quoting Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d at 935). “During a Terry stop motivated by
reasonable suspicion, the officer may ask investigatory questions, but the ‘scope of the
detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.’” 	Id. at 938 (quoting
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).
“The second category of police seizures are arrests.” 	Id. 	“An arrest must be
supported by probable cause to believe that the person being arrested has committed a
crime.” 	Id. (citing Allen, 73 F.3d at 236). 	“Probable cause is more difficult to establish
than reasonable suspicion, and is determined at the time the arrest is made.” 	Id. (citing
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273–74; Allen, 73 F.3d at 236). 	“It must be based on ‘reasonably
trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the accused
had committed or was committing an offense.’” Id. (quoting Allen, 73 F.3d at 237). “Like
reasonable suspicion, it can ‘only exist in relation to criminal conduct.’” Id. (quoting Allen,
73 F.3d at 237).
The first question confronting 	the Court 	is whether the Fourth Amendment
Defendants had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to handcuff Plaintiff upon arriving
at the scene. Although it remains unclear precisely what events precipitated the call(s) to
the Chula Vista Police Department and Plaintiff’s role in those events, construing the facts
most favorably to Plaintiff—as the Court must in ruling on Defendants’ Motion—it appears
that Defendants arrived in response to a call concerning a report that a fraud suspect was
on the premises. (See FAC at 3, 5–6.) Defendants arrived to find Plaintiff standing beside
his parked car at the reported residence. (See id. at 3.) Sergeant White then ordered Officer
Harper to handcuff Plaintiff “until we figure out what is going on.” (See id.)
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Based on the facts alleged by Plaintiff, the Fourth Amendment Defendants had no
reasonable suspicion, much less probable cause, to handcuff Plaintiff when they arrived on
the scene. The Ninth Circuit has
only allowed the use of especially intrusive means of effecting a stop[, such
as the use of handcuffs,] in special circumstances, such as 1) where the suspect
is uncooperative or takes action at the scene that raises a reasonable possibility
of danger or flight; 2) where the police have information that the suspect is
currently armed; 3) where the stop closely follows a violent crime; and
4) where the police have information that a crime that may involve violence
is about to occur.
Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1189 (9th Cir. 1996). “An additional factor courts
consider in analyzing the reasonableness of the use of aggressive investigatory tactics as
part of a Terry stop is the number of police officers present.” 	Id. at 1190. 	Accepting
Plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Fourth
Amendment Defendants were responding to a call concerning the location of a fraud
suspect and arrived to find Plaintiff unarmed and cooperative. Under these circumstances,
Plaintiff 	has 	adequately 	alleged 	that 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	Defendants’ 	initial
handcuffing of him was not justified under the Fourth Amendment.
The calculus changes, however, once Defendants began to question Sepulveda and
Pedraza, who told Defendants that Plaintiff and/or Mercado had struck Sepulveda more
than once with a baseball bat, (see FAC at 5, 10), following which Sepulveda ran away
from Plaintiff, (see id. at 9), and was chased by Mercado. 	(See id. at 18.) 	“[T]hese
statements would be sufficient to persuade ‘a person of reasonable caution to believe that
an offense has been or is being committed.’” 	See Johns v. City of Eugene, 771 F. App’x
739, 740 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir.
2007)) (reversing district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds where “the officers that responded to the incident were told by [the alleged victim]
that [the alleged aggressor and plaintiff] had struck her with a baseball bat and then used
the bat to smash her phone”); see also, e.g., Brainerd v. Cnty. of Lake, 357 F. App’x 88, 90
(9th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
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defendant deputies because they had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff “for threatening
to hit his co-resident . . . in the head with a baseball bat during the course of an argument”).
Plaintiff faults Defendants for not investigating more thoroughly and for arresting
him despite the numerous inconsistencies both between Sepulveda’s and Pedraza’s
statements and with Plaintiff’s account. 	(See FAC at 5–6, 7–8, 9–11.) 	To the extent
“Plaintiff appears to suggest that [Defendants] should have done more . . . [,] clearly
established law requires only a reasonable investigation, not an exhaustive one.” 	Hart v.
Sandoval, No. 1:24-CV-00071-HBK, 2025 WL 2675833, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2025)
(citing Johns, 771 F. App’x at 741). 	As Defendants note, (see Mem. at 6), “[p]robable
cause requires more than bare suspicion but need not be based on evidence sufficient to
support a conviction, nor even a showing that the officer’s belief is more likely true than
false.” United States v. Brobst, 558 F.2d 982, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). “[O]fficers may not solely rely on the claim of a citizen
witness that he was a victim of a crime, but must independently investigate the basis of the
witness’ knowledge or interview other witnesses.” Peng v. Hu, 335 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir.
2003) (quoting Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir.
2001)). 	“A sufficient basis of knowledge is established if the victim provides facts
sufficiently detailed to cause a reasonable person to believe a crime had been committed
and the named suspect was the perpetrator.” 	Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1444 (9th Cir. 1991)).
Here, despite contradictions regarding how many times Sepulveda was hit or who
chased Sepulveda, Sepulveda and Pedraza did corroborate each other in reporting that
Plaintiff had committed an assault by striking Sepulveda with a bat. 	Sepulveda’s and
Pedraza’s reports were further corroborated by the recovery of a baseball bat at the scene.
(See FAC at 7.) In other words, “[t]he officers did not just accept [Sepulveda]’s version of
events at face value and arrest [Plaintiff]. Instead, . . . the officers questioned [Sepulveda,
Pedraza, Plaintiff, and Mercado], and observed some physical evidence that corroborated
[Sepulveda]’s claims before arresting [Plaintiff].” 	See Johns, 771 F. App’x at 741.
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“Because the information that the officers obtained during the course of that investigation
was ‘sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or
is being committed by the person being arrested,’ . . . the officers” had probable cause to
arrest Plaintiff. 	See id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir.
2007)). Although the Court sympathizes with Plaintiff’s frustration at finding himself in a
“he said, she said” situation, “not all wrongs, even when perpetrated by a government actor,
are redressable under § 1983.” See Hennick v. Bowling, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1208 (W.D.
Wash. 2000).
The Court therefore GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ Motion and DISMISSES
Plaintiff’s causes of action against the Fourth Amendment Defendants under the Fourth
Amendment for wrongful arrest of his person. The Court, however, DENIES IN PART
Defendants’ Motion to the extent Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant White and Officer Harper
unlawfully handcuffed him upon their arrival at the scene.
2. 	Unlawful Search and Seizure of Vehicle
Plaintiff also alleges that the Fourth Amendment Defendants illegally searched his
vehicle. (See, e.g., FAC at 3–5, 12.) “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject 	only 	to 	a 	few 	specifically 	established 	and 	well-delineated
exceptions.” 	Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
Here, Defendants contend that they lawfully searched Plaintiff’s vehicle incident to
his arrest. (See Mem. at 7–8.) “The exception derives from interests in officer safety and
evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations.” Gant, 556 U.S. at
338. 	Consequently, “an automobile search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest is
constitutional (1) if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle during the search,
or (2) if the police have reason to believe that the vehicle contains ‘evidence relevant to the
crime of arrest.’” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 234–35 (2011) (quoting Gant, 556
U.S. at 343).
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As the Court previously concluded, (see Prior Order at 9–10), because Plaintiff had
been handcuffed and separated from his vehicle, it appears unlikely that the first of the
Supreme Court’s search justifications under Gant would apply here. 	Under the second
Gant justification, however, the Fourth Amendment Defendants could have believed that
Plaintiff’s vehicle may have contained evidence of the crimes for which he was arrested,
including kidnapping and assault with a deadly weapon (not a firearm). Consequently, for
the same reasons Plaintiff fails to allege an unlawful arrest, see supra Section I.A.1,
Plaintiff fails plausibly to allege that the search of his vehicle conducted incident to that
arrest was unconstitutional. The Court therefore GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ Motion
and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims against the Fourth Amendment
Defendants to the extent they are premised on the unlawful search of his vehicle incident
to his arrest.
B. 	Fourteenth Amendment
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Dubois fabricated evidence in his police report
in violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (See FAC at 13.) As
the Court previously explained, (see Prior Order at 12), in Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d
1070 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit recognized that “there is a clearly
established constitutional due process right not to be subjected to criminal charges on the
basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the government.” 	See id. at
1074–75. “To prevail on a § 1983 claim of deliberate fabrication, a plaintiff must prove
that (1) the defendant official deliberately fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate
fabrication caused the plaintiff’s deprivation of liberty.” Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789,
798 (9th Cir. 2017).
Defendants 	address 	only 	the first 	of these elements, arguing that 	Plaintiff’s
Devereaux claim must be dismissed because the inconsistencies in Officer Dubois’ report
and the alleged insufficiency of his investigation do not give rise to a plausible inference
that Officer Dubois fabricated material evidence. 	(See Mem. at 8–10.) 	Although
Defendants are correct in that regard, they fail to address Plaintiff’s critical allegations that
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Officer Dubois included in his report several statements that Plaintiff never made,
including, “several times while I was in booking with Phillips, he would make statements
about how [S]epulveda pushed him first. 	Phillips said that he was just trying to detain
Sepulveda and did not intend to kidnap him,” (FAC at 6), and “Plaintiff was armed with
17-Club, Blackjack, [and] Brass knuckles.” (Id. at 15–16.) Because Plaintiff alleges that
Officer Dubois included incriminating statements that Plaintiff never made in his police
report, the Court must conclude that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Officer Dubois
engaged in deliberate fabrication of evidence. 	See, e.g., Caldwell v. City & Cnty. of S.F.,
889 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2018) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of sergeant defendant who included in his report that the plaintiff had “made a
‘spontaneous statement’ on the street about being present at the shooting and dealing
drugs” where the plaintiff testified at his deposition that ‘[t]he only thing correct in [the
disputed statement] is my name’”) (alterations in original)); Spencer, 857 F.3d at 798
(reversing district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants
on deliberate fabrication claim where the defendant officer’s “investigative reports
contained scores of quotations attributed to [the accused plaintiff’s children], both of whom
unequivocally testified at trial that they had never made those statements”).
Because Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff’s allegations regarding causation, the
Court declines to do so in the first instance. Accordingly, the Court DENIES IN PART
Defendants’ Motion to the extent Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Devereaux claim
against Officer Dubois.
II. 	Qualified Immunity
Alternatively, Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (See
Mem. at 10–15.) “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold
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public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably.” Id.
“In assessing whether qualified immunity applies, [the Court] consider[s] whether
(1) the plaintiff has plausibly alleged a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) the
constitutional right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged misconduct.”
DeFrancesco v. Robbins, 136 F.4th 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing Ballentine v. Tucker,
28 F.4th 54, 61 (9th Cir. 2022)). 	Where the plaintiff has failed plausibly to allege a
violation of a constitutional right, “then the officer’s conduct was constitutional, and there
can be no violation of § 1983,” and, consequently, “the officer has no need for immunity”
because “he is innocent of the alleged infractions.” See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d
896, 915 (9th Cir. 2012).
Here, the Court has determined that Plaintiff alleges plausible claims for wrongful
detention, see supra pages 8–9, and fabrication of evidence, see supra pages 12–13.
Accordingly, the Court must determine whether those “constitutional right[s] w[ere]
‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged misconduct.” 	See DeFrancesco, 136 F.4th
at 938. “To meet the ‘clearly established’ requirement, the law at the time of the conduct
must have been ‘sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have understood
that what he is doing’ was unlawful.” 	Id. at 939 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 741 (2011)). “In other words, ‘the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that
her conduct was unlawful, . . . judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the
conduct.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Evans v. Skolnik, 997 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th
Cir. 2021)). “A constitutional right may be ‘clearly established by controlling authority or
a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.’” 	Id. (quoting Tuuamalemalo v.
Greene, 946 F.3d 471, 477 (9th Cir. 2019)) (citing Waid v. Cnty. of Lyon, 87 F.4th 383,
388 (9th Cir. 2023); Hopson v. Alexander, 71 F.4th 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2023)). 	“The
plaintiff bears the burden of proof that the right allegedly violated was clearly established
/ / /
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at the time of the alleged misconduct.” Shooter v. Arizona, 4 F.4th 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Romero v. Kitsap Cnty., 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991)).
A. 	Fourth Amendment Claim for Wrongful Detention with Handcuffs
Plaintiff contends that it was clearly established that he could not be detained without
reasonable suspicion, citing to Terry v. Ohio and “Davis v. Mississippi and Hicks v.
Officers.” 	(See Opp’n at 14–15.) 	Defendants counter that “temporary detentions during
the rapidly evolving scene [sic] have been routinely upheld as constitutionally valid.” (See
Mem. at 12 (first citing Saunders v. Knight, No. CV F 04-5924 LJO WMW, 2007 WL
3482047, *16 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2007); then citing Cannon v. City of Petaluma, No. C
11-0651-PJH, 2012 WL 1183732, *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2012); then citing United States v.
Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir. 1982)).)
In reviewing the cases cited by Plaintiff, the Court bears in mind that “[t]he ‘clearly
established’ standard . . . requires that the legal principle clearly prohibit the officer’s
conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” 	Distr. of Columbia v. Wesby, 583
U.S. 48, 63 (2018). 	“The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is ‘clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” 	Id.
(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), abrogated in part on other grounds by
Pearson, 555 U.S. 223). 	“This requires a high ‘degree of specificity.’” 	Id. (quoting
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13 (2015) (per curiam)). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly
stressed that courts must not ‘define clearly established law at a high level of generality,
since doing so avoids the crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.’” Id. at 63–64 (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard,
572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014)). 	“A rule is too general if the unlawfulness of the officer’s
conduct ‘does not follow immediately from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly
established.’” Id. at 64 (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 641 (1987)). 	“In the context of a warrantless [detention], the rule must obviously
resolve whether the circumstances with which [the particular officer] was confronted . . .
/ / /
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constitute[d] [reasonable suspicion].” 	Id. (internal quotation marks omitted and second
through fourth alterations in original) (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 13).
The Supreme Court also has “stressed that the ‘specificity’ of the rule is ‘especially
important in the Fourth Amendment context,’” id. (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12), and
“the need to ‘identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was
held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting White
v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)). 	“While there does not have to be ‘a case directly on
point,’ existing precedent must place the lawfulness of the particular [detention] ‘beyond
debate.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
The Court has carefully reviewed Terry, 392 U.S. 1; Davis, 394 U.S. 721; and
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S., 321 (1987), to determine whether they put Sergeant White and
Officer Harper on notice that their handcuffing of Plaintiff was unlawful based on the facts
provided by Plaintiff, namely, that the Fourth Amendment Defendants were responding to
a call concerning a non-violent and non-emergent crime, had no reason to suspect that
Plaintiff was armed, and found Plaintiff waiting for them calmly. 	Ultimately, the Court
necessarily concludes that Terry, Davis, and Hicks involved factual patterns too distinct
from those at issue here to provide the requisite degree of specificity. 	In Terry, for
example, the Supreme Court affirmed a conviction for carrying a concealed weapon where
the revolver had been discovered during a stop and frisk of a man whom the police officer
had seen “acting in a manner [the officer] [had taken] to be a preface to a ‘stick-up’” and
whom “a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing . . . was armed
and thus presented a threat to the officer’s safety while he was investigating his suspicious
behavior.” 	See 392 U.S. at 28. In Davis, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction based
on fingerprint evidence that had been obtained during a second detention not supported by
probable cause as part of a rape investigation. See 394 U.S. at 728. Finally, in Hicks, the
Supreme Court affirmed the exclusion of evidence found in a search because the defendant
policeman had only reasonable suspicion, and not probable cause, to believe that the stereos
in question had been stolen. 	See 480 U.S. at 326. 	These cases define the law regarding
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warrantless detention at too high a level of generality to provide the Fourth Amendment
Defendants with notice that their handcuffing of Plaintiff upon their arrival at the scene
violated the Fourth Amendment.
Although the law was clearly established at the time based on the Court’s
independent research, see, e.g., Washington, 98 F.3d at 1192 (“The law was also clearly
established that if the Terry-stop suspects are cooperative and the officers do not have
specific information that they are armed or specific information linking them to a recent or
inchoate dangerous crime, the use of such aggressive and highly intrusive tactics is not
warranted, at 	least when, as 	here, there are no 	other extraordinary 	circumstances
involved.”), as the Court previously noted, (see Prior Order at 16–17), “[t]he plaintiff bears
the burden of proof that the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of
the alleged misconduct.” Shooter, 4 F.4th at 961 (quoting Romero, 931 F.2d at 627), and
“Plaintiff is not relieved of this burden because he represents himself.” 	See Williams v.
Alvarez, No. CV-22-00154-PHX-MTL (CDB), 2025 WL 588233, at *4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24,
2025) (collecting cases); see also Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“A district court lacks the power to act as a party’s lawyer, even for pro se litigants.”). As
before, the Court therefore must conclude that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden here
and that the Fourth Amendment Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on
Plaintiff’s surviving Fourth Amendment claim. 	Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN
PART 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	and 	DISMISSES 	Plaintiff’s 	claim 	that 	his 	immediate
detention and handcuffing violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
B. 	Fourteenth Amendment Devereaux Claim
Plaintiff claims that it was clearly established in both Devereaux and Spencer that
“[f]abrication of evidence by law enforcement to initiate or sustain prosecution violates
due process.” 	(See Opp’n at 14.) 	Defendants contend that Devereaux is distinguishable
because that case “involved hours-long, suggestive interviews with young children
regarding extreme claims of sexual abuse,” where this case involves “statements made by
the alleged victim and witness.” (See Mem. at 14.)
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Even assuming that Devereaux did not suffice to put Officer Dubois on notice that
his alleged fabrication of statements in his police report violated Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights, Spencer unquestionably did. 	In Spencer, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its prior
holding in Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2010), that
“an interviewer who deliberately mischaracterizes witness statements in her investigative
report . . . commits a constitutional violation.” 	Spencer, 857 F.3d at 798 (alteration in
original) (quoting Costanich, 627 F.3d at 1111). 	In that case, the defendant detective
attributed several quotations to the plaintiff’s minor children, who later testified that the
quotations had been fabricated. See, e.g., id. at 795–96, 798–99. In reversing the district
court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to the defendants on the fabrication-of-
evidence claim, the Ninth Circuit held that “the Constitution prohibits the deliberate
fabrication of evidence whether or not the officer knows that the person is innocent.” See
id. at 800.
Here, 	as 	in 	Spencer, 	Officer 	Dubois 	allegedly 	included 	statements 	in 	his
investigative report that the witness—here, Plaintiff—denied making. The Court therefore
concludes that Plaintiff has carried his burden of establishing that a reasonable officer
would have understood that falsely attributing a fabricated statement to a witness in an
investigative report was unlawful at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest. 	The Court therefore
DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s
Deveraux claim on the grounds that Officer Dubois is entitled to qualified immunity.
III. 	Leave to Amend
Finally, Defendants request that Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint be dismissed
without leave to amend. (See Mem. at 1, 15; Reply at 7–8.) As Defendants acknowledge,
(see Mem. at 15), where a complaint is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), leave to amend
should be granted unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent
with the challenged pleading could not cure the deficiency. 	See Schreiber Distrib., 806
F.2d at 1401. 	“The ‘rule favoring liberality in amendments to pleadings is particularly
important for the pro se litigant.’” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012)
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(quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000)). “At the same time, futile
amendments should not be permitted.” Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med. Serv.
Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962); Smith v. Commanding Officer, 555 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1977)).
For the reasons discussed above, see supra Section I.A, the Court concludes that
amendment would be futile as to Plaintiff’s claims for unlawful arrest and unlawful search
of his vehicle. The Court therefore DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment claims based on his unlawful arrest and the search of his vehicle. 	Because
Plaintiff could allege that the law concerning his unlawful detention was clearly established
at the time, the Court DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion to the extent it seeks
dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims against the Fourth
Amendment Defendants based on their initial detention and handcuffing of Plaintiff, which
claims the Court therefore DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
Defendants’ 	Motion. 	Specifically, 	the 	Court 	DISMISSES 	WITH 	PREJUDICE
Plaintiff’s claims against the Fourth Amendment Defendants for his unlawful arrest and
the unlawful search of his vehicle under the Fourth Amendment and DISMISSES
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claims against the Fourth Amendment Defendants
for his unlawful initial detention and handcuffing under the Fourth Amendment, for which
the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend. Defendants’ Motion is otherwise DENIED.
Plaintiff MAY FILE an amended complaint on or before March 26, 2026.
As before, (see Prior Order at 19), the Court advises Plaintiff that any amended
complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his prior complaints. 	Any
defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the amended complaint—such as
Plaintiff’s prior claims against the Chula Vista Police Department and concerning the
impoundment of his vehicle—will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal
Roach Studios, 896 F.2d at 1546 (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”);
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Lacey, 693 F.3d at 928 (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not
re-alleged in an amended pleading may be considered waived if not repled). 	Should
Plaintiff elect not to file an amended complaint, this case SHALL PROCEED as to
Plaintiff’s surviving claim against Officer Dubois under Devereaux.
Defendants SHALL RESPOND to Plaintiff’s operative complaint on or before
April 9, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 4, 2026
___________________________
Honorable Todd W. Robinson
United States District Judge
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