Smith v. TransUnion et al

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24-cv-1727-AGS-DTF
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Alvin James SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.
TRANSUNION,
Defendant.
Case No.: 24-cv-1727-AGS-DTF
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTIONS TO SUPPLEMENT
COMPLAINT (ECF 46, ECF 48),
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
SUPPLEMENTAL FILINGS (ECF 45,
ECF 47), AND DENYING AS MOOT
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS (ECF 37)
Plaintiff moves for, among other things, leave to file a supplemental pleading. (See
ECF 46, 48.) That request is granted, which largely moots his other requests.
BACKGROUND
In short, plaintiff’s operative complaint seeks damages for “[i]naccurate credit
reporting” 	related 	to 	two 	“Navy 	Federal 	alleged 	debt 	accounts” 	that 	TransUnion
purportedly “fail[ed] to delete or remove.” (ECF 36, at 2.) One of plaintiff’s remaining
claims is for “negligent and willful violations” of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the
California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act. His other is a California state law
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress for “assassination of his ‘character’”
and “humiliate[ion] and embarrass[ment].” (ECF 36, at 9.) Defendant moved to dismiss.
(ECF 37.) Plaintiff now moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) for leave to
“file a supplemental pleading to include material facts that occurred after the filing” of the
operative complaint. (ECF 46, at 2; ECF 48, at 2.)
DISCUSSION
A. 	Rule 15(d) Motion for Supplemental Pleading
Plaintiff seeks to file a supplemental pleading following the revelation of “two key
subsequent events.” (ECF 48, at 2.) First, plaintiff wishes to add to his complaint “facts
[that] concern [d]efendant TransUnion LLC’s voluntary deletion of two disputed Navy
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Federal Credit Union accounts from Plaintiff’s consumer credit file.” (ECF 46, at 2.)
Notably, plaintiff asserts that this “voluntary deletion” occurred “on or about October 13,
2025” (id.), that is, more than a month after the filing of the third amended complaint here
(see ECF 36). Second, plaintiff alleges that on “November 15, 2025,” “TransUnion
reinserted the very same accounts onto Plaintiff’s credit report under a new debt-buying
furnisher, LVNV FUNDING LLC.” (ECF 48, at 2.) Thus, he claims that he should be
granted leave to file supplemental pleadings as these new “events postdate the filing of the
[operative complaint] and directly relate” to his federal credit reporting claims. (ECF 46,
at 2.)
The Court “may, on just terms” and with “motion and reasonable notice” allow “a
party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that
happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). If the
“newly alleged material unquestionably relates to the matter set forth in the original
complaint, the only inquiry that remains is whether supplementation will promote speedy
disposition of the entire controversy, or whether it will prejudice the responding party.”
Sywula v. Teleport Mobility, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1213 (S.D. Cal. 2023) (quotations
omitted) (citing Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 474–75 (9th Cir. 1988).
1. Relation to the Original Complaint
The first inquiry is whether the supplemental information “unquestionably relates to
the matter set forth in the original complaint.” Sywula, 652 F. Supp. at 1213. Plaintiff’s
supplementary 	information 	relates 	to 	the 	“voluntary 	deletion” 	of 	the 	apparently
problematic accounts that are directly at issue in the operative complaint. (Compare
ECF 36, at 2 (claiming a violation of FCRA for “failing to delete or remove two
(2) inaccurate Navy Federal alleged debt accounts”); with ECF 46, at 4 (alleging that “on
or about October 13, 2025. . . the two disputed Navy Federal Credit Union accounts that
are the subject of this action” were deleted).) According to plaintiff, the “timing and nature
of this deletion” are indicative of TransUnion’s alleged violations. (ECF 46, at 4.) Plaintiff
also claims that “reinsertion” occurred from a “new furnisher, LVNV,” which, in plaintiff’s
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view, also shows “willful violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.” (ECF 48, at 2.)
Particularly since it all deals with the same accounts, plaintiff’s supplemental information
“relates to the matters set forth in the original complaint.” 	See Sywula, 652 F. Supp. at
1213.
2. Prejudice
The Court also must examine any potential “prejudice to” defendant. Sywula, 652 F.
Supp. at 1213. The possibility that defendant “would need to respond to modified []
allegations, and perhaps, litigate” is not sufficient prejudice to defeat plaintiff’s right to
supplement. See id. at 1214 (collecting cases). And, as the Court previously noted, plaintiff
will not be granted another attempt to amend his complaint should the Court grant another
motion to dismiss. (See ECF 35, at 1.) So, disposition on defendant’s motion to dismiss
could result in a final dismissal of plaintiff’s suit with prejudice. Given the court’s
obligation to unrepresented litigants, and the potential result of a final disposition of
plaintiff’s complaint, the equities favor permitting plaintiff to supplement.
Any prior deficiencies in plaintiff’s operative complaint do not alter this result. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) (noting that the “court may permit supplementation even though the
original pleading is defective”).
3. Speedy Disposition
Finally, the Court considers whether allowing plaintiff to supplement will “promote
the speedy disposition of the entire controversy.” 	Sywula, 652 F. Supp. at 1213.
Supplementation generally “promote[s] as complete an adjudication of the dispute between
the parties as possible.” William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668
F.2d 1014, 1057 (9th Cir. 1981). “A supplemental complaint completely supersedes any
earlier complaint, rendering the original complaint non-existent.” Jackson v. Fong, 870
F.3d 928, 934 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). Since it means all the arguments about dismissal
can now be addressed together, the Court concludes that allowing supplementation here
will aid in the speedy disposition of the entire controversy. See Fate Therapeutics, Inc. v.
Shoreline Biosciences, Inc., No. 22-cv-00676-H-MSB, 2023 WL 2456715 at *1 (S.D. Cal.
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Jan. 31, 2023) (collecting cases finding that pending motions to dismiss are “moot in light
of supplemental complaint”).
So, plaintiff’s request for leave to file a supplemental pleading is granted, and
defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied as moot. By March 3, 2026, plaintiff must file a
consolidated complaint because “it would be inefficient to permit a two-part operative
complaint and multiple pending motions to dismiss.” Doe v. Butte Cnty. Prob. Dep’t, No.
20-cv-02248-TLN-DMC, 2022 WL 705616 at *5 (E.D. Cal. March 9, 2022) (finding it
proper for the plaintiff to “file an amended complaint . . . that integrated the operative
Complaint and the proposed supplemental complaint.”). Proceeding in this manner will
allow the court “to award complete relief in one action and avoid waste.” Id. (citing
Planned Parenthood of S. Arizona v. Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that
“permitting the plaintiffs to supplement their complaint . . . [should] serve to promote
judicial efficiency” under Rule 15(d)).
B. 	Plaintiff’s Other Filings
Plaintiff also filed “supplemental” briefs with seemingly preemptive responses to
counterarguments that could be made following defendant’s “voluntary cessation” of the
alleged wrongful conduct. (ECF 45, at 3–4; see also ECF 47 (raising similar arguments).)
But defendant has not yet raised any of these issues, and plaintiff does not seek any other
relief in those filings. So they are denied.
CONCLUSION
Smith’s motions to supplement are GRANTED. Under Local Rule 15.1(a), plaintiff
must file a fourth amended complaint, setting out all relevant facts including those alleged
to have developed after the filing of his third amended complaint, without reference or
reliance on his previous pleadings. Smith must file this new complaint by March 3, 2026.
Once again, “[i]f a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint,
a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire
action.” Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005). Smith’s extraneous briefs
are DENIED. TransUnion’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as moot.
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Dated: February 6, 2026
___________________________
Hon. Andrew G. Schopler
United States District Judge
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